S. K. TIWARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition under section 482 Cr. P. C. has been filed for quashing the proceeding of Sessions Case No. 9 (3) of 1996 pending in the Court of 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Alipore. ( 2 ) THE Ballygunge Police filed a charge-sheet in P. S. Case No. 136 dated 28th July, 1995 under sections 120b. 304, 326, 420 and 427 I. P. C. in connection with notorious Shibalik Building. ( 3 ) THE learned S. D. J. M. vide order dated 151h November, 1995, directed the issuance of process against accused No. 6 Anil Kumar Dutta. The learned Magistrate has also noted that cognizance had been taken by him. The investigating officer was permitted to keep the case diary with him for the lime being in order to gel the copies prepared for supplying them to the accused persons. ( 4 ) THE petitioner prays for quashing of the prosecution on the ground that the learned Magistrate look cognizance of the offence without looking into the papers and documents required to be filed under section 173 (5) Cr. P. C. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following cases: (i) Satyaranjan Pal v. State of W. B. (96 Calcutta Weekly Notes, 606 ). This was the case where the police report did not contain any allegations of criminal conspiracy and no specific allegation about the entrustment of box containing stolen stamps was made. This Court therefore quashed the prosecution because the cognizance had been taken without any material on record. (ii) Paritosh Kumar Dubey v. SAIL [1995 (1) Calcutta High Court Notes (Cal) 264]. This was a case which was exclusively triable by a Special Judge in view of section 4 of West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act. 1949. The charge-sheet had been wrongly filed in the court of Magistrate. No sanction under section 197 Cr. P. C. had been obtained. Hence this Court held that taking cognizance of the offence by the learned Magistrate was without jurisdiction and the prosecution was liable to be quashed. It was however made clear that the order would not preclude the complainant from taking appropriate action before any other appropriate Court according to law. These two cases are thus distinguishable. Hence this Court held that taking cognizance of the offence by the learned Magistrate was without jurisdiction and the prosecution was liable to be quashed. It was however made clear that the order would not preclude the complainant from taking appropriate action before any other appropriate Court according to law. These two cases are thus distinguishable. (iii) The learned counsel for the prosecution lastly placed reliance on the case of Raghubir Saran Jain v. State [1995 (2) Calcutta Law Times Page 445]. This was a case instituted upon a police report under sections 420. 468 and 471 I. P. C. The prosecution failed to annex documents on which it wanted to rely along with the statements recorded under section 161 Cr. P. C. in this case too the statements recorded under section 161 Cr. P. C. were not annexed with the charge-sheet because they were retained by prosecution for preparation of copies. It was held that the Magistrate was not justified in taking cognizance of the alleged offence on the basis of such incomplete report. ( 6 ) SECTION 190 (1) (b) Cr. P. C. empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of offence upon police report. The essential requirements of police report are enumerated in section 173 (2) Cr. P. C. which runs as under:-" (I) As soon as it is completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government, stating - (a) the names of the parties; (b) the nature of the information: (c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom: (e) whether the accused has been arrested: (f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so whether with or without sureties: (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under section 170. (ii) The officer shall also communicate, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the action taken by him to the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given. (ii) The officer shall also communicate, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the action taken by him to the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given. " ( 7 ) THE Supreme Court in case of Ajit Kumar Palit v. State of W. B. ( AIR 1963 SC 765 ) has laid down that the term 'cognizance' has not been defined by the code. It has no mystic or esoteric significance in criminal law. It only means become aware of and when used with reference to a Court of Judge, to take notice of judicially. Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action: or indeed action of any kind, but occurs as soon as a Magistrate as such applies his mind to suspected commission of an offence. Where the statute prescribes the material on which alone the judicial mind shall operate before any step is taken obviously the statutory requirement must be fulfilled. But statutory provisions apart, there is no set material which must exist before judicial mind can operate. ( 8 ) THE apex court also laid down in case of Darsan Singh v. State of Maharastra (AIR 1971 SC 2373) that cognizance takes place at a point when a Magistrate first takes judicial notice of an offence. This is the position whether the Magistrate lakes cognizance of an offence on a complaint, or on a police report, or upon information of a person other than a police officer. When a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon the police report, prima facie he does so of the offence or offences disclosed in such report. ( 9 ) IT appears that the learned Judge who decided Raghubir Sharan's case (supra) was led away by the observations of the apex court made in paragraph 10 of the judgment in Satya Narayan Musaddi's case (1980) 3 SCC 152 . The apex court while discussing the provision of section 173 Cr. P. C. made the following observations:"the report as envisaged by section 173 (2) has to be accompanied as required by sub-section (5) by the documents and statements of the witnesses therein mentioned. One cannot divorce the details which the report must contain as required by sub-section (5) or its accompaniments which are required to be submitted under section (5 ). P. C. made the following observations:"the report as envisaged by section 173 (2) has to be accompanied as required by sub-section (5) by the documents and statements of the witnesses therein mentioned. One cannot divorce the details which the report must contain as required by sub-section (5) or its accompaniments which are required to be submitted under section (5 ). The whole of it is submitted as a report to the court. "but the Hon'ble Judges hastened to add: "but even if a narrow construction is adopted that the police report can only be what is prescribed in section 173 (2) there would be sufficient complain if what is required to be mentioned by statute has been set out in the report. . . . . if the report with sufficient particularity and clarity specifies a contravention of the law which is the alleged offence, it would be sufficient compliance?" ( 10 ) IT had been argued in Musaddi's case (supra) that failure to mention facts constituting the contravention of rules means that absence in the report of the very first of numerous steps in the course of the trial of something which is vital and goes to the very root of the case. The court observed "this very narrow view of the matter does not commend us". It was further observed that "the court can look at the report in prescribed form along with it's accompaniments for taking cognizance of the offence". From this observation it does not follow that looking into documents filed under section 173 (5) Cr. P. C. is a sine qua non for taking cognizance, even if the challan filed by the police contains full facts. 'can look into' does not mean 'shall look into'. It is only enabling and not mandatory. I, therefore, find that the law propounded in Raghubir Sharon Jain case (supra) is not based on proper appreciation of law propounded in Musaddi's case (supra) and was decided per in curium. ( 11 ) IT would also the pertinent to note that it has been laid down in case of H. N. Rashbud v. State of Delhi (1955 SC 196) that a defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report which results from an investigation is provided in section 190, Cr. No doubt a police report which results from an investigation is provided in section 190, Cr. P. C. as the material on which cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a valid and legal police report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance. Section 190 Cr. P. C. is one out of a group of sections under the heading "conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings'. The language of this section is in marked contrast with that of the other sections of the group under the same heading i. e. , sections 193 and 195 to 199. These latter sections regulate the competence of the court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in compliance therewith. But section 190 does not. While no doubt, it one sense, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 190 (1) are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance. It is not possible to say that cognizance on an invalid police report is prohibited and is therefore a nullity. Such an invalid report may still fall either under clause (a) or (b) of section 190 (1) and in any case cognizance so taken is only in the nature of error in a proceeding antecedent to the trial. To such a situation section 537 Cr. P. C. is attracted. " Hence even if the cognizance was taken on the basis of in complete charge-sheet it was only a curable irregularity (see section 460 (e) Cr. P. C. ). ( 12 ) SECTION 193 Cr. P. C. provides that a court of session shall not take cognizance of an offence as a court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under the code. Hence cognizance of an offence in a commitment proceeding is only with a view to ascertain whether the offence alleged in the charge-sheet is triable by the court of session. If the charge-sheet discloses and offence triable by the court of session, taking cognizance of the offence by Magistrate would be purely of a tentative nature. After the case is committed, the court of session shall have to take cognizance of the offence afresh. If the charge-sheet discloses and offence triable by the court of session, taking cognizance of the offence by Magistrate would be purely of a tentative nature. After the case is committed, the court of session shall have to take cognizance of the offence afresh. After having taken cognizance, the court of session shall decide whether the accused can be charged for an offence triable by the said court or it has to be sent back to Chief Judicial Magistrate under section 228 (1) (a) Cr. P. C. for trial. In Sanjay Gandhi's case ( AIR 1978 SC 514 ) it has been laid down that a Magistrate while acting under section 209 Cr. P. C. , is merely to ascertain whether the case was disclosed appears to be triable by session court. It is not open to him to satisfy whether a prima facie case is made out or not. ( 13 ) A copy of the charge-sheet filed by the police has been annexed with the petition. It is a lengthy documents running into 18 pages. It contains not only full particulars as required under section 173 (2) Cr. P. C. but also narrates the prosecution case in detail. Hence the learned Magistrate committed no error in taking cognizance of the offence solely on the strength of the allegations made in the charge-sheet. ( 14 ) SINCE the learned Magistrate has already committed the case to court of session and the court of session is yet to hear arguments regarding framing of charged, no prejudice has been caused to the accused and irregularity, if there was any, was certainly curable as stated above. ( 15 ) BEFORE parting with this case, I cannot resist the temptation of citing the observations of his Lordship Vivian Bose, J. in case of Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal ( AIR 1955 SC 425 ). "a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties: not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. Our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle. " ( 16 ) HENCE this petition which has been filed with the sole object of delaying trial of a sensational case deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. The interim order of stay hereby stands vacated. The record of the Trial Court be sent back through special messenger at the State expense within 2 days from date and compliance be reported within 3 days. The session court is directed to dispose of the case expeditiously. Petition dismissed