D. K. SETH, J. The question of recognising the Committee of Manage ment of Jagdamba Shiksha Samiti, Malsil Gulzargaaj, District, Jaunpur was granted by the Vice-Chancellor, pursuant to a direction by this Court on 22-1-1995 passed in writ petition No. 4743 of 1995 whereby the Vice-Chancellor was directed to consider the representation in accordance with law. On 15-8-1988 election had taken place and thereafter next election took place on 15-8-1991. The Committee of Management so elected in the said election was recognised by the Vice-Chancellor in favour of respondent No. 3. Thereafter the election had taken place on 14-8-1994 as claimed by the respondent No. 3. The petitioners now claimed to have held election on 17-9-1994. By the impugned order dated 17-1-1996 being Annexure-18 to the writ petition, the Vice-Chancellor had come to a finding that there is no dispute on the ground that the petitioner No. 2 is not a member of the general body and, therefore, he had granted recognition to the Committee of Management elected at the behest of respondent No. 3. It is this order which has been challenged by means of this writ petition. 2. Shri Anil Tewari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 and P. N. Tripathi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3 raised preliminary objection that in view of Section 68 of the State Universities Act, the present writ petition is not maintainable on the ground of existence of adequate alternative remedy as provided in the said section. The next contention that was raised by the learned counsel for the respondents are that in view of Statute 12-07 of the University, it. is the Vice-Chancellor, who can decide the dispute with regard to election of office bearers and while deciding so if the Vice-Chancellor finds that there is no dispute in that event the provision contained in the Statute 12. 28 is not attracted and, therefore, the same cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. As such the same comes within the ambit of Section 68 of the State Universities Act. 3. Sri D. S. M. Tripathi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, on the other hand, contends that the provision of Section 68 of the Act cannot operate as the total bar, particularly, when the order appears to be wholly without jurisdiction. As such the same comes within the ambit of Section 68 of the State Universities Act. 3. Sri D. S. M. Tripathi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, on the other hand, contends that the provision of Section 68 of the Act cannot operate as the total bar, particularly, when the order appears to be wholly without jurisdiction. According to him as soon there is a dispute the matter is covered under Statute 12. 28. According to him Statute 12-07 is subject to Statute 12. 28 of the University. Even in the garb of deciding as to whether there is any dispute or not, the Vice-Chancellor is not empowered to decide the same inasmuch as according to him, Statute 12. 28 does not empower the Vice-Chancellor even to decide to that extent. Therefore, according to him the order being wholly without jurisdiction the same can be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 4. Both the learned counsel for the parties have relied upon several decisions in support of their respective contentions, which I shall be dealing shortly hereinafter. 5. As contended by Sri Anil Tiwari learned counsel for the University that such recognition is granted by reason of the definition of management as contained in Section 2 (13) of the State Universities Act which defines management in relation to an affiliated or associated college means "the managing committee or other body charged with managing the affairs of that college and recognised as such by the University. "the Vice-Chancellor of the University by reason of the said definition recognises the committee of management, as provided in the Statutes. 6. It appears that provision for granting recognition is governed by the Statutes. Statute 12. 07 makes a provision that the constitution of the management of every college in order to obtain affiliation should provide for certain conditions, as enumerated in Statute 12. 0/. Clause (f) contained therein provides that, "if any question arises whether any person has bee n duly chosen as, or is entitled to be a member or office bearer of the management or whether the management is legally consti tuted, the decision of the Vice-Chancellor shall be final. " 7. Therefore, it appears that clause (f) of Statute 12. 07 is a condition which should be present in the constitution of the college. " 7. Therefore, it appears that clause (f) of Statute 12. 07 is a condition which should be present in the constitution of the college. This has provided a remedy for deciding the question as enumerated in clause (f) of Statute 12. 07 by the Vice-Chancellor. This bounds the college by the decision of the Vice Chancellor. Now how the Vice-Chancellor would act when a question is referred to him in view of clause (f) of Statute 12. 07 is provided in Statute 12. 28, which deals with Part-IV of the Statute relating to "continuance of affiliation. " Clause 12. 28 was substituted by U. P. Notification No. 53853/xv-10-85- 13 (5)82, dated October 31, 1985. Originally prior to the said notification in Statute 12. 28 it was provided that "vice-Chancellor" was the authority to find out as to who was the person in actual possession and control of the college pro perties. By reason of the said notification the word vice-Chancellor was substituted by the word regional Deputy Director of Education. This very amendment and substitution clearly indicates that in case of a dispute it is she Regional Deputy Director of Education, who is to decide the same and the Vice-Chancellor has to recognise the management found to be in control by the Regional Deputy Director of Education. Thus recognition is granted by the Vice-Chancellor in view of Section 2 (13) read with Statute 12. 07 and 12-28 but in case of a dispute the Vice-Chancellor has to grant recognition to the management, as is found to be in effective control by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, as provided in Statute 12. 28. 8. A reading of the Scheme of the Statute indicates that clause (f) of the Statute 12. 07 is subject to the Statute 12. 28. There is no denial that the amendment was brought into only to relieve the Vice- Chancellor from being engaged in unnecessary dispute and, therefore, the said power was given to the Regional Deputy Director of Education. But at the same time the Statute has not provided as to how reference to the Deputy Director of Education is to be made. There is no denial that the amendment was brought into only to relieve the Vice- Chancellor from being engaged in unnecessary dispute and, therefore, the said power was given to the Regional Deputy Director of Education. But at the same time the Statute has not provided as to how reference to the Deputy Director of Education is to be made. A plain reading of the said statute reveals that in such a parties may approach the Regional Director of Education or if such question is sent to the Vice-Chancellor, in that event instead of deciding as to whether there is a dispute or not, the Vice- Chancellor should direct the parties to approach the Regional Deputy Director of Education or he may make a reference to the Regional Deputy Director of Education. In the garb of deciding the question as to whether there is any dispute he cannot enter into the dispute itself. The intention of the Legislature in amending the original Statute 12. 28 is to relieve him from engaging himself in resolving such dispute. Statute 12. 28 also makes it clear that such decisions are also subject to the decision of the court of competent jurisdiction. Even if the decision is given by the Regional Deputy Director of Education the same is open to challenge by either of the parties, aggrieved by the said order before the competent court of jurisdiction by means of civil litigation. 9. Sri Tewari learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents has relied on the decision in the case of Lakshmi Kant Mani Tripathi v. Vice-chancellor, Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur, 1984 UPLBEC 330, in support of his contention that in view of Section 68 of the State Universities Act, the said order cannot be interferred with by means of writ petition. But in the said case it was not found as to whether provision to Section 68 would still be attracted for claiming an absolute bar in exercise of writ juris diction. Therefore, the said decision is not attracted, in the facts and circumstances of the case, provided if the said order impugned in the present writ petition, passed by the Vice-Chancellor, appears to be without jurisdiction. He has also relied on the case of Dr. Data Ram Sharma v. The Vice-Chancellor Meerut University, 1982 UPLBEC 144. Therefore, the said decision is not attracted, in the facts and circumstances of the case, provided if the said order impugned in the present writ petition, passed by the Vice-Chancellor, appears to be without jurisdiction. He has also relied on the case of Dr. Data Ram Sharma v. The Vice-Chancellor Meerut University, 1982 UPLBEC 144. The same has also not dealt the question as to what will happen, if the order is wholly without jurisdiction. Therefore, the ratio decidendi therein can also not be attracted in the present case. The decision in the case of Committee of Management R. P. Degree Kamalganj, Farrukhabad v. The Vice-chancellor, Kanpur University Kalyanpur, Kanpw, 1983 UPLBEC 270, is also not attracted because of the same reason, as indicated above. 10. On the other hand it appears that from the decision in the case of Dr. (Smt.) Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitaram (U. P.), 1987 UPLBEC 734, cited by Sri Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioners that where the order is without jurisdiction there existence of alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar. The writ court can interfere in cases where the order is without jurisdiction. While dealing with the said question of interpretation of Section 68 in para 12 of the said judgment the Apex Court has held : 12. The next question that falls for our consideration is whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition of the applicant on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy. It is true that there was an alternative remedy of challenging the impugned order by referring the question to the Chancellor under Section 68 of the U. P. State Universities Act. It is well established that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition. When an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction the High Court should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. In the instant case, the Vice-Chancellor had no power of review and the exercise of such power by her was absolutely without jurisdiction. When an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction the High Court should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. In the instant case, the Vice-Chancellor had no power of review and the exercise of such power by her was absolutely without jurisdiction. Indeed, the order passed by the Vice-Chancellor on review was a nullity such an order could surely be challenged before the High Court by a petition under Article 226 of Constitution and in our opinion, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground that an alternative remedy was available to the appellant under Section 68 of the U. P. State Universities Act. 11. In the present case as I have observed above, that as soon there is a dispute regarding management of affiliated college the same is taken away from the jurisdiction of the Vice-Chancellor so long the dispute subsists and until decision is given either by the Regional Deputy Director of Education or by a competent court of civil jurisdiction, to grant recognition and decide as to whether there is really any dispute existed. He may exercise power conferred under Section 2 (13) read with Statute 12. 07 only when decision of the Regional Deputy Director of Education is available in case where there is a dispute. 12. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case whether the Vice-Chancellor has decided the question as to whether the petitioner is a member or not, is in effect a decision within the meaning of dispute^ to be decided by the Regional Deputy Director of Education. Therefore, the same cannot be said to be within jurisdiction of the Vice-Chancellor. Since the order is without jurisdiction, therefore, the principle laid down in the case of Dr. (Smt) Kuntesh Gupta (supra), is attracted with full force. 13. The above view which I have taken in order to observe that the decision in the present case is without jurisdiction is supported by a decision in the case of Brahm Deo Tripalhi v. Vice-Chancellor, Sampuranand Sanskrit Vi. ihwa Vidyalaya Varanani, 1988 UPLBEC 104, in which the same question was considered. The view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court has been laid down in para 7 of the said judgment which runs as under : "7. ihwa Vidyalaya Varanani, 1988 UPLBEC 104, in which the same question was considered. The view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court has been laid down in para 7 of the said judgment which runs as under : "7. In our opinion, therefore, the proper remedy available to the petitioner is to approach the Deputy Director of Education concerned and in case the petitioner raises a dispute before the Deputy Director of Education concerned, Deputy Director of Education, shall decide the aforesaid dispute after affording an opportunity to the parties in accordance with the provisions of Statute 12. 28 applicable to the Vishwa Vidyalaya. The petitioner has raised an apprehension that the dispute will remain pending and will not be decided at an early date. In case such a dispute is raised, the Deputy Director of Educa tion will decide the same within a period of two months from the date of the referring of the dispute to him. " 14. In that view of the matter I am unable to agree with both the contentions of Sri Tewari and Sri P. N. Tripathi, though, however 1 record my appreciation, in the manner, they have argued their case. The order dated 17-1-1996, being Annexure 18 to the writ petition, is hereby quashed. The parties are directed to approach the Regional Deputy Director of Education, concerned to resolve the dispute within a period of three weeks from date and if such a representation is made to the respon dent No. 5 within the aforesaid period, he shall decide the same in accordance within law after affording reasonable opportunity to both the parties within a period of two months from the date such a representa tion is filed. The Vice-Chancellor shall then exercise his power as contemplated in Section 2 (13) read with Statute 12. 07 and 12. 28 of the Statute within a period of four weeks from the date the decision of res pondent No. 5 is made available to him. 15. With the above observations the writ petition is disposed of. There will be, however, no order as to costs. 16. Let a copy of this order be given to the learned counsel for the petitioner on payment of usual charges within a week. W. P. disposed of. .