J. ESWARA PRASAD, J. ( 1 ) THE plaintiff in original suit No. 162 of 1986 in the court of the munsiff, india, is the appellant. The suit is filed by him for declaration of his title to the suit properties and for permanent injunction against the respondent. The respondent filed original suit No. 92 of 1986 for the same reliefs basing his title through neelavva. Both the suits were tried together and were disposed by a common judgment. Original suit No. 162 of 1989 was dismissed and original suit No. 92 of 1986 was decreed by rejecting the claim of the appellant and holding that the respondent is the absolute owner of the suit properties. The appellant preferred appeals regular appeal nos. 26 and 27 of 1994 against the judgment and decrees of the trial court. The learned judge dismissed the appeals, agreeing with the findings of the trial court. Regular second appeal No. 963 of 1995 is filed against regular appeal No. 26 of 1994 and regular second appeal No. 964 of 1995 is filed against regular appeal No. 24 of 1994. ( 2 ) THE subject-matter of both the suits is survey No. 49/2 bmeasuring 4 acres 21 guntas and a house property bearing si. No. 211 (property No. 119) measuring 25 x 13 situated within the town limits of chadachan. It is not in dispute that the appellant had gone in adoption to the family of kallayya. It was also admitted that irayya was adopted son of kallayya. The contention of the respondent was that the appellant lost his rights in the family in which he was born. The appellant claimed that nilawwa has relinquished her right, title and interest over the suit property in his favour. In support of his claim he relied on documents in exhibits d-l to d-23. It is not in dispute that nilawwa was the absolute owner of the suit property. Both the appellants and the respondent claimed possession of the suit property. The trial court held that the appellant failed to prove that he is the owner of the suit property as he did not produce his title deed. The appellate court agreed with the finding of the trial court as no relinquishment deed was produced. Both the appellants and the respondent claimed possession of the suit property. The trial court held that the appellant failed to prove that he is the owner of the suit property as he did not produce his title deed. The appellate court agreed with the finding of the trial court as no relinquishment deed was produced. ( 3 ) AS contended by Sri albal, entries in revenue record srequire no registration as laid down by the Supreme Court in Digambar Adhar Patil v Devram Girdhar Patil (Dead) by L. rs. And another. These entries in revenue records in exhibit d-7 to d-9 are only evidence of possession, but they do not confer any title on the appellant, for which, he has to fall back on the family settlement, as contended by Sri albal. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant Sri albal strenuously contended that the appellant became the owner of the suit property by virtue of a family settlement and that there was no need to adduce the terms of family settlement into writing and that there was no need to register any such property. In support of his contention, he relies on Maturi Pullaiah and another v Maturi Narasimham and others. ( 5 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that there can be no family settlement between the appellant and nilawwa, as they do not belong to the same family is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Charan Das v Girja Nandini Devi and others, in which it was held as follows:"10. The view that the transaction is a family arrangement is borne out by the decision of the privy council in Ramgowda Annagowda Patil and others v Bhausaheb and others. The facts of the case which have been correctly summarised in the head note are briefly these: "a hindu died in 1846, leaving a widow who survived until 1912, and a daughter. On the death of the widow a was heir to the estate. In 1868 the widow had alienated nearly the whole property by three deeds executed and registered on the same day. By the first deed she gave a property to her brother, by the second she sold half of another property to a, and by the third she sold the other half of that property to her son-in-law. In 1868 the widow had alienated nearly the whole property by three deeds executed and registered on the same day. By the first deed she gave a property to her brother, by the second she sold half of another property to a, and by the third she sold the other half of that property to her son-in-law. The signature of each of the deeds was attested by the two other alienees. A who survived the widow for six years, did not seek to set aside any of the alienations. After his death his son and grandsons brought a suit to recover the whole property". Upon these facts the privy council held as follows: "their lordships consider that the decision of this case depends upon how far the three documents can be taken as separate and independent, or so connected as to form one transaction. The long lapse of time between the execution of the deeds and the institution of the suit has rendered it impossible to prove what actually occurred between the parties on that occasion. There is not sufficiently definite evidence to come to a conclusion as to how far any of those properties were validly encumbered, or what was done with the purchase money alleged to have passed on the two deeds of sale. But the parties to the documents included, or after so great a lapse of time may be presumed in a very real sense to have included, all persons who had any actual or possible interest in the properties namely, the widow herself, her brother, who was a natural object of her affection and bounty, her son-in-law, who was the natural protector of the interests of her daughter and grandson, and the nearest kinsman on the husband's side and the only person from whom any opposition might be apprehended with regard to dealings by the widow concerning her husband's estate. Their lordships conclude that all the circumstances strongly point to the three transaction by which a disposition was made of akkagouda's estate, such as was likely to prevent disputes in the future and therefore in the best interests of all the parties. Their lordships conclude that all the circumstances strongly point to the three transaction by which a disposition was made of akkagouda's estate, such as was likely to prevent disputes in the future and therefore in the best interests of all the parties. The three deeds appear thus inseparably connected together and in that view annagouda not only consented to the sale to shivgouda and the gift to basappa but these dispositions formed parts of the same transaction by which he himself acquired a part of the estate". In our case, however, there is fortunately only one transaction and we have definite evidence to show that there were disputes amongst the members of the family and it was avowedly for settling them that the transaction was entered into. Further we have material to show that all the persons who can be said to be interested in the property were joined as parties to the transaction. In that sense this case is stronger than the one which the privy council had to consider. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that the plaintiff who has taken benefit under the transaction is not now entitled to turn round and say that transaction was of a kind which kadma juar could not enter into and was therefore invalid. Moreover acting on the terms of that document gopinath paid monies to the court of wards for obtaining release from its management of the properties which were allotted to him. The Rule of estoppel embodied in Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 would, therefore, shut out such pleas of the plaintiff. Courts give effect to a family settlement upon the broad and general ground that its object is to settle existing or future disputes regarding property amongst members of a family. The word 'family' in the context is not to be understood in a narrow sense of being a group of persons who are recognised in law as having a right of succession or having a claim to a share in the property in dispute. In ramgowda annagowda patil's case, supra, of the three parties to the settlement of a dispute concerning the property of a deceased person one was his widow, other her brother and the third her son-in-law. The two latter could not, under the hindu law, be regarded as the heirs of deceased. In ramgowda annagowda patil's case, supra, of the three parties to the settlement of a dispute concerning the property of a deceased person one was his widow, other her brother and the third her son-in-law. The two latter could not, under the hindu law, be regarded as the heirs of deceased. Yet, bearing in mind their near relationship to the widow the settlement of the dispute was very properly regarded as a settlement of a family dispute. The consideration for such a settlement, if one may put it that way, is the expectation that such a settlement will result in establishing or ensuring amity and goodwill amongst persons bearing relationship with one another. That consideration having passed by each of the disputants the settlement consisting of recognition of the right asserted by each other cannot be permitted to be impeached thereafter". the Supreme Court expanded the scope and ambit of 'family' while dealing with family settlement. ( 6 ) IN maturi pullaiah's case, supra, the Supreme Court quoted with approval in halsbury's laws of england, 3rd edn. Vol. 17 at pp. 215 and 216, that a family arrangement is an agreement between the members of the same family, intended to be generally and reasonably for the benefit of the family either by compromising doubtful or disputed rights or by preserving the family property or the peace and security of the family by avoiding litigation or by saving its honour. It was further noted that the agreement may be implied from a long course of dealing, but it is more usual to embody or to effectuate the agreement in a deed to which the term 'family arrangement' is applied. The learned judges observed as follows:"briefly stated, though conflict of legal claims in praesenti or in future is generally a condition for the validity of a family arrangement it is not necessarily so. Even bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims will suffice. Members of a joint hindu family may, to maintain peace or to bring about harmony in the family, enter into such a family arrangement. If such an arrangement is entered into bona fide and the terms thereof are fair in the circumstances of a particular case, courts will more readily give assent to such an arrangement than to avoid it". Members of a joint hindu family may, to maintain peace or to bring about harmony in the family, enter into such a family arrangement. If such an arrangement is entered into bona fide and the terms thereof are fair in the circumstances of a particular case, courts will more readily give assent to such an arrangement than to avoid it". basing on these observations the learned counsel contends that the family arrangement need not be in writing and that it can be implied from a long course of dealing and therefore the non-consideration of the document in that behalf cannot negative the claim of the appellant. He further contends that the settlement between neelawwa and the appellant who are the members of a family, which need not necessarily he between persons claiming to have interest in a joint family. The court should only see vhether there are bona fide disputes present or possible and whether members of the family have entered into such a family arrangement to maintain peace or to bring about harmony in the family and if it is found that it is a bona fide settlement, the court will more readily give assend to such an arrangement than to avoid it. ( 7 ) ON the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant did not set up a plea that there was a family settlement and that he obtained the suit property from neelawwa under such a settlement. The revenue records cannot confer title and that the appellant cannot base his claim on the revenue records in the absence of a plea of family settlement. ( 8 ) A perusal of the complaint of the appellant and his writtens tatement in original suit No. 92 of 1986 would show that he took the plea that there was a relinquishment in his favour. He did not plead that there was any family settlement. In his evidence, the appellant has stated that he has a relinquishment deed in his possession which is executed by neelawwa in his favour but he did not choose to produce the same. He did not even plead that there were disputes between him and neelawwa and that in order to save the family honour, a family settlement was arrived at. There was neither a plea nor any evidence adduced in that behalf. He did not even plead that there were disputes between him and neelawwa and that in order to save the family honour, a family settlement was arrived at. There was neither a plea nor any evidence adduced in that behalf. In the State of the pleadings and the evidence on record, it is not possible to apply the ratio of the decisions cited by the learned counsel. ( 9 ) BOTH the courts below have concurrently held that the appellant did not acquire title to the suit properties and that he is not in possession of the same. These findings are based on appreciation of evidence on record which c. annot be interfered with in second appeal. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed. --- *** --- .