PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, 'the Code') presents some unusual features. A Court of Law is not to be utilised as an instrument of harassment to any person. Court has to deal with iron hands those abuse process of law. It would be a travesty to permit a party to 'persecute' instead of 'prosecuting'. ( 2 ) THE opposite parties (also described as 'complainants') filed ICC No. 179 of 1993 in the Court of Learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bhubaneswar (in short, 'the Magistrate') alleging that the petitioners have committed an offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, 'ipc' ). On perusal of the complaint petition, the initial statement of the complainant and the statement of witness Rabindra Kumar Jena, recorded under Section 202 of the Code, learned Magistrate was satisfied that a prima facie case under Section 500, IPC against the accused-petitioners was made out. Accordingly cognizance of the offence was taken. Against such order of learned Magistrate, Criminal Revision No. 2 of 1994 was filed in the Court of Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar. On 23-4-1994, opposite parties in the revision application (the present opposite parties who were complainants)) filed an application in the said Court in the aforesaid Criminal Revision to send back the lower Court records in ICC No. 179 of 1993 to the learned Magistrate and/or set aside the order of cognizance dated 3-12-1993 passed by the Learned Magistrate. On that day, another application was filed before the learned Magistrate in the concerned complaint case stating that the complainants may be permitted to withdraw the complaint case. On 23-4-1994, the complainants filed an application for advancing the date and to take up the case records for final order. The prayer was got accepted by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge on the ground that the matter shall be taken up on 25-4-1994. On 25-4-1994, prayer was made by the learned counsel for petitioners to give him two days' time to get ready for hearing of the revision application. The prayer was not accepted. Oral prayer made for adjournment was rejected, and the matter was directed to be placed on 5-5-1994 for judgment. On 25-4-1994, prayer was made by the learned counsel for petitioners to give him two days' time to get ready for hearing of the revision application. The prayer was not accepted. Oral prayer made for adjournment was rejected, and the matter was directed to be placed on 5-5-1994 for judgment. ( 3 ) THE judgment dated 5-5-1994 was passed holding that there was no scope to interfere with the order taking cognizance and to set aside such order by exercising the revisional jurisdiction. On 7-5-1994 the learned counsel for complainant filed an application not to press the petition dated 23-4-1994 which contained the prayer not to press the complaint. That was not the date to which the matter was posted. Learned Magistrate accepted the prayer made by the opposite parties not to press the petition dated 23-4-1994, and treated the same as not pressed. The matter was directed to be put up on the date fixed for appearance of the accused. It is to be noted that another petition was filed on 3-4-1995 with prayer to withdraw the complaint. That was rejected on the ground that this Court's order of stay was operative. ( 4 ) ACCORDING to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, the course adopted by the learned Magistrate is not sanctioned in law. The petition for not pressing the withdrawal petition was taken up on a date to which the matter was not posted. Even the petitioners were not granted the opportunity to have their say in the matter. ( 5 ) NONE appears for the opposite parties when the matter is called. ( 6 ) THE scenario as presented by the present petitioners reveals that the opposite parties played hide and seek with the Court of Justice. They were insistent for withdrawal of the complaint. Two applications were filed for that purpose, one before the learned Magistrate, and the other before the revisional Court. The prayer on 23-4-1994 before the revisional Court was to take up the matter that day so that the records can be sent back to the learned Magistrate for passing orders on the prayer for not pressing the complaint. On 23-4-1994 the learned Magistrate passed the following order :"the record is put up today on the strength of an advance petition filed by the complainant's advocate. The complainant files fresh vakalatnama in favour of advocate Shri P. K. Mohanty and others. On 23-4-1994 the learned Magistrate passed the following order :"the record is put up today on the strength of an advance petition filed by the complainant's advocate. The complainant files fresh vakalatnama in favour of advocate Shri P. K. Mohanty and others. A petition praying to withdraw the case is filed by the complainant's advocate. Heard. The original record has already been submitted to the Hon'ble Addl. Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar for reference in C. R. No. 2 of 1994 which was not yet been received. Put up this petition for consideration after receipt of the record from the Court of Hon'ble Addl. Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar. " ( 7 ) THERE is substance in the plea of learned counsel for petitioners that after the revisional Court upheld the order taking cognizance, the complainants changed their mind and the considerations which weighed with them to seek withdrawal of the complaint got obliterated with the oblique motives, and resulted in making prayer before the learned Magistrate not to press the petition dated 23-4-1994. The petitioners had no chance to have their say before the learned Magistrate. There has been clear violation of principles of natural justice. The matter was not posted to 7-5-1994, and therefore, it could not have been taken on that date, that too without sufficient and adequate notice to the present petitioners. ( 8 ) NATURAL justice has been variously defined by different Judges. A few instances will suffice. In Drew v. Drew and Laburn, (1855) 2 Maco 1, 8, Lord Granworth defined it as 'universal justice'. In James Dumbar Smith v. Her Majesty The Queen, (1877-78) 3 App Cas 614, 623 J. C. Sir Robert P. Collier, speaking for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, used the phrase 'the requirements of substantial justice', while in Arthur John Spockman v. The Plunstood District Board of Works, (1884-85) 10 App Cas 229, 240. Kerl of Selborne, L. C. preferred the phrase 'the substantial requirements of justice'. In Voinet v. Barret, (1885) 55 LJPD 39, 41 Lord Eshar, M. R. defined natural justice as 'the natural sense of what is right and wrong'. While, however, deciding Hopkins v. Smithwick Local Board of Health, (1890) 24 QBD 712, 716. Lord Esher, M. R. instead of using the definition given earlier by him in Voinet v. Barret chose to define natural justice as 'fundamental justice'. While, however, deciding Hopkins v. Smithwick Local Board of Health, (1890) 24 QBD 712, 716. Lord Esher, M. R. instead of using the definition given earlier by him in Voinet v. Barret chose to define natural justice as 'fundamental justice'. In Sidge v. Baldwin, (1968) 1 QB 539, 578 Herman, J. in the Court of Appeal equated natural justice with 'fair play in action', a phrase favoured by Bhagwati, J. ,in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCR 621 , 676 : AIR 1978 SC 597 at p. 625-26. In re M. N. (An Infact) (1967) 2 SR 617, 630 Lord Parkar, C. J. , preferred to describe natural justice as 'a duty to act fairly'. In Fairmount Investments Ltd. v. Secretary to State for the Environment, (1976)) 1 WLR 1255, 1265-66 Lord Russell of Killowan somewhat picturesquely described natural justice as 'a fair crack of the whip', while Geoffrey Lane, L. J. in Regina v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs Ex parte Hosanball, (1977) 1 KLR 766, 784 preferred the homely phrase 'common fairness'. ( 9 ) HOW then have the principles of natural justice been interpreted in the Courts and within what limits are they to be confined ? Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation two rules have been evolved as representing the principles of natural justice in judicial process, including therein quasi-judicial and administrative processes. They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair-play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men. The first rule is 'nemo judex in causa sun' or 'nemo debet case judex in propria causas' as stated in (1605) 12 Co. Rep. 114 that is, 'no man shall be judge in his own cause'. Coke used the form 'aliquis non debet esse judex in prepria causa quia non potest esse judex at pars' (Co. Litt. 1414), that is, no man ought to be a judge in his own cause, because he cannot act as judge and at the same time be a party'. We form 'nemo potest esse simul actor et judex', that is, 'no one can be at once suitor and judge' is also at times used. Litt. 1414), that is, no man ought to be a judge in his own cause, because he cannot act as judge and at the same time be a party'. We form 'nemo potest esse simul actor et judex', that is, 'no one can be at once suitor and judge' is also at times used. The second rule and that is the rule with which we are concerned in this writ petition is 'audi alteram partem', that is, 'hear the other side'. At times and particularly in continental countries the form 'audietur et altera pars' is used, meaning very much the same thing. A corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and particular the audi alteram partem rule, namely, 'qui aliquid statuerit parto inaudite altera asquum licet dexerit, haud aequum facerit', that is, 'he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right, will not have done what is right' (See Doswell's case (1605) 6 Co Rep 48b, 52a), or in the words, as it is now expressed, 'justice should not only be done but should manifestlybe seen to be done'. ( 10 ) THE stand of the petitioners is that they were confident that the opposite parties would not pursue the matter cannot be said to be without substance. If the complaint would not have been pressed, certainly the present petitioners would have been free from the litigation. It cannot be said that they had no interest in the matter, and they brought to the notice of the learned Magistrate that the prayer made by the opposite parties not to press their earlier application was intended to cause harassment. Since there has been breach of natural justice, on that question alone the order dated 7-5-1994 is vulnerable. The question, however, has become academic in view of the petition dated 3-4-1995 filed before the learned Magistrate to withdraw the complaint. An important maxim 'boni judicis est lites dirimere, ne lis ex lite oritur, et interest reipublicae ut sint fines litium' (It is the duty of a good judge to put an end to litigation, that suit may not grow out of suit and it concerns the welfare of the State that an end be put to litigation) has to be kept in mind by the Presiding Officer of every Court. ( 11 ) THE proceedings in ICC No. 179 of 1993 in the Court of learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bhubaneswar are quashed and this petition is allowed. Petition allowed.