K. SHIVASHANKAR BHAT, J. ( 1 ) THE first petitioner is the company, of which the second petitioner is a shareholder and director. The petitioners challenge the assessment order marked Annexure-C which is made on the bill of entry for home consumption under the Provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 ('the act' for short ). ( 2 ) THE first relief sought is for a direction to respondents 5 and 6 to disclose the date on which the official gazette dated 15-12-1990, containing notification nos. 285 and 286 of 1990 was put on sale to the public. There is also a prayer to declare Section 15 of the Act, insofar as it permits the levy and collection of import duty based on the rate of duty prevailing at the time of filing of the bill of entry, as ultra vires the Provisions of entry 83 of list i to the seventh schedule to the Constitution of india. Another relief sought is for a direction to allow the refund application of the first petitioner. ( 3 ) THE relevant facts are that the first petitioner is a manufacturer of all kinds of processed goods and for this purpose it has set up a factory near Bangalore. The first petitioner-company imported the processing machinery required for the said factory from japan. The goods were imported through the vessel ocean referred in the writ petition and the vessel entered Indian territorial waters on or about 12-12-1990 and arrived at Madras port on 13-12-1990. The import manifest had been filed even prior to the said date before the Madras customs authority and thereafter entry inwards was granted by the customs authority on 10-12-1990. The goods were unloaded from the vessel on 14-12-1990 at Madras; however, the goods were consigned to the first petitioner at Bangalore and therefore the goods were transhipped to the inland container depot at Bangalore for unloading and clearance at Bangalore. It is stated by the petitioner that the goods were transhipped to Bangalore by rail on or about 17-12-1990 and according to the petitioners the concerned rail receipts and customs sub-manifests, etc. , Were forwarded by the customs authorities to the second respondent who received the same on or about 20-12-1990. On 20-12-1990 the petitioner presented the bill of entry at Bangalore in respect of the goods. There is no doubt that the goods were covered by sub-heading 8476. , Were forwarded by the customs authorities to the second respondent who received the same on or about 20-12-1990. On 20-12-1990 the petitioner presented the bill of entry at Bangalore in respect of the goods. There is no doubt that the goods were covered by sub-heading 8476. 19 of the customs tariff under which the import duty was at the rate of 70%. There is also no dispute that this duty was reduced to 35% by a notification No. 125/86-cus. , Dated 17-2-1986 as amended by notification No. 225/86-cus. , Dated 27-3-1986 as well as notification nos. 95 of 1987, dated 1-3-1987, 49 of 1988, dated 1-3-1988, 304 of 1988, dated 11-11-1988 and 65 of 1989, dated 1-3-1989. These notifications were issued under Section 25 of the act. Under the Finance Act, 1990, an auxiliary duty of customs at the rate of 50% was levied. This was reduced to 5% under notification No. 142 of 1990, dated 20-3-1990 and 182 of 1990, dated 31-5-1990. On the basis of these notifications bill of entry was presented by the petitioner showing the customs duty as 35% and auxiliary duty as 5%. This was not accepted by the first respondent and the petitioners had to file a bill of entry with customs duty at 35% and auxiliary duty at 25%. It is unnecessary to refer to the mode of payment made to the japan supplier alleged in the writ petition as we are not concerned with the said aspect of the case. An order of assessment was made ultimately altering the relevant entries regarding the value of the imported machinery and auxiliary duty was levied at 25%. The petitioner had to pay the same and get the goods released. Subsequently the first petitioner filed an application seeking refund of the duty paid in excess of the lawful duty payable under Section 27 of the act. The second respondent issued a show-cause notice proposing to reject the application for the reasons stated in the said show-cause notice dated 17-12-1991. ( 4 ) IN the writ petition it is asserted that the auxiliary duty was only 5% and the notification issued under Section 25 enhancing the duty by reducing the concession was actually not operative on 15-12-1990, the date on which the said notification is purported to have been printed in the gazette. ( 4 ) IN the writ petition it is asserted that the auxiliary duty was only 5% and the notification issued under Section 25 enhancing the duty by reducing the concession was actually not operative on 15-12-1990, the date on which the said notification is purported to have been printed in the gazette. In other words, the contention of the petitioners is that, even though the gazette bears the date 15-12-1990 there was no due publication of the gazette and in the eye of law there was no notification as on the said date and the said notification was available to the public only after 14-1-1991 (this later date was not available to the petitioner and it has been disclosed in the statement of objections filed by the respondents to i. a. i. filed by the petitioner ). If the notification issued under Section 25 of the Act, altering earlier notification, was not in force on 20-12-1990 there can be no doubt, according to the petitioner, that the auxiliary duty could be only 5%. In addition to this the petitioner challenged the validity of Section 15 of the act. It was also contended that Section 15 is inapplicable to the levy of auxiliary duty levied under Finance Act, 1990, having regard to the language of Section 64 of the Finance Act, 1990. ( 5 ) THREE questions arise for our consideration in the writ petition. They are: (1) what was the rate of auxiliary duty when the bill of entry was presented by the petitioners at Bangalore? (2) whether Section 15 of the Customs Act is attracted at all for the levy and computation of auxiliary duty levied under the Finance Act, 1990? And (3) whether Section 15 of the Customs Act is constitutionally valid to the extent it is challenged by the petitioners? ( 6 ) RE: question No. 1: in para 5 of the writ petition the petitioners asserted that the notifications enhancing the auxiliary duty were not published in the official gazette and made available to the public till after the import and even the filing of the bill of entry. The petitioners also pointed out that they had sought the relevant information from the authorities as to when the notifications, bearing the date 15-12-1990, was made available to the public. But the information was not furnished. The petitioners also pointed out that they had sought the relevant information from the authorities as to when the notifications, bearing the date 15-12-1990, was made available to the public. But the information was not furnished. Para 6 of the writ petition asserts that the said notification was put on sale long after the purported dated of 15-12-1990 and also after the filing of the bill of entry by the first petitioner. Ground-h in the writ petition also refers to this contention. It was represented therein that the notifications, although purported to be dated 15-12-1990, were in fact only given for publication in the gazette of that date and actual publication and putting of gazette on sale to the public was long after the said date which was, after 20-12-1990 when the bill of entry was filed by the first petitioner. In the writ petition, i. a. i, was filed for a direction to the respondents 5 and 6 to furnish to the petitioners the information as to when the said notifications dated 15-12-1990 were published and put on sale to the public. In the statement of objections filed to this i. a. i, it is stated thus:". . . . It is further submitted that the notification nos. 285 and 286 of 1990-cus. Was published in the gazette of india, extraordinary, part ii, Section 3, sub-section (1), dated 15-12-1990 at gsr No. 958-e and the gazette was placed on sale on 14-1-1991". in the statement of objections filed to the main writ petition on 8-4-1993 there is no reference to this contention raised by the petitioner and the respondents have not traversed the relevant basic facts pleaded in the writ petition. ( 7 ) SRI shylendra kumar, appearing for the central government, stated before us that the writ petition was mainly concerned with validity of Section 15 of the act and therefore it was felt unnecessary to traverse the plea regarding the notifications referred above. ( 8 ) IT is not possible to accept this submission of the learned counsel because one of the main contention raised in the writ petition pertains to the effect of the publication of the notifications dated 15-12-1990. The question raised by the petitioner goes to the root of the matter. It is impossible for any one to miss this plea raised in the writ petition. The question raised by the petitioner goes to the root of the matter. It is impossible for any one to miss this plea raised in the writ petition. The petitioners have repeatedly urged this point and stated the relevant facts. In fact even in the application filed under Section 27, seeking refund of the duty, the first petitioner has raised this plea, as could be seen from para 3 of the grounds of claim read with para 6 thereof. In the show-cause notice issued by the second respondent on 17-12-1991 there is a reference to this plea raised by the first petitioner. But the show-cause notice does not traverse this plea. ( 9 ) THE specific case of the petitioners is that the notifications in question dated 15-12-1990 were not notified at all on the said date and were published subsequent to the date of the clearance of goods by the petitioners by presenting the bill of entry and making the payment of duty. Having regard to the respective pleadings there can be no other finding except to uphold this assertion made by the petitioners and consequently we hold that the basic fact is that the notifications dated 15-12-1990 were made available to the public only after the goods in question were released by payment of duty on presentation of bill of entry on 20-12-1990. The question is, whether on this fact, the revenue is justified in levying the auxiliary duty on the basis of the notifications dated 15-12-1990 only because the gazette bears the date 15-12-1990 purporting to contain the notifications in question. ( 10 ) SRI joseph vellapally, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, relied on the language of Section 25 of the act to point out that the exemption under Section 25 is to be 'by notification in the official gazette'. The learned counsel urged that the term 'notification' itself conveys that it should be accessible to the public so that the content of the notification would be known to the public. A printed matter purporting to have been printed in the official gazette which has not gone out of the press or displayed properly for due notification to the public cannot be termed as notification at all. A printed matter purporting to have been printed in the official gazette which has not gone out of the press or displayed properly for due notification to the public cannot be termed as notification at all. The learned counsel pointed out that there is a distinction between the act of the legislature in enacting a legislation which would be known to the public in the very process of enacting it, unlike a notification issued by the delegated authority like the government of india. In Harla v State of Rajasthan , the principle was stated by the Supreme Court reads thus:". . . . In the absence of any special law or custom, we are of opinion that it would be against the principles of natural Justice to permit the subjects of a state to be punished or penalised by laws of which they had no knowledge and of which they could not even with the exercise of reasonable diligence have acquired any knowledge. Natural Justice requires that before a law can become operative it must be promulgated or published. It must be broadcast in some recognisable way so that all men may know what it is; or, at the very least, there must be some special Rule or regulation or customary channel by or through which such knowledge can be acquired with the exercise of due and reasonable diligence. The thought that a decision reached in the secret recesses of a chamber to which the public have no access and to which even their accredited representatives have no access and of which they can normally know nothing, can nevertheless affect their lives, liberty and property by the mere passing of a resolution without anything more is abhorrent to civilised man. It shocks his conscience. In the absence therefore of any law, Rule, regulation or custom, we hold that a law cannot come into being in this way. Promulgation or publication of some reasonable sort is essential". thereafter the Supreme Court also referred to a similar principle prevalent in england and thereafter noted the difference between the law enacted by the legislature and the notification issued under a delegated authority thus:". . . . The difference is obvious. Acts of the british parliament are publicly enacted. Promulgation or publication of some reasonable sort is essential". thereafter the Supreme Court also referred to a similar principle prevalent in england and thereafter noted the difference between the law enacted by the legislature and the notification issued under a delegated authority thus:". . . . The difference is obvious. Acts of the british parliament are publicly enacted. The debates are open to the public and the acts are passed by the accredited representatives of the people who in theory can be trusted to see that their constituents know what has been done. They also receive wide publicity in papers and, now, over the wireless. Not so royal proclamations and orders of a food controller and so forth. There must therefore be promulgation and publication in their cases. The mode of publication can vary; what is good method in one country may not necessarily be the best in another. But reasonable publication of some sort there must be". the same principle was reiterated again by the Supreme Court in B. K. Srinivasan and another v State of Karnataka and others. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the intimation to the public through official gazette that the outline development plan was available for inspection at the office of the planning authority is a sufficient compliance with the requirement of the statute in question. In this connection the principle was repeated thus:"there can be no doubt about the proposition that where a law, whether parliamentary or subordinate, demands compliance, those that are governed must be notified directly and reliably of the law and all changes and additions made to it by various processes. Whether law is viewed from the standpoint of the 'conscientious good man' seeking to abide by the law or from the standpoint of Justice holme's 'unconscientious bad man' seeking to avoid the law, law must be known, that is to say, it must be so made that it can be known. We know that delegated or subordinate legislation is all pervasive and that there is hardly any field of activity where governance by delegated or subordinate legislative powers is not as important if not more important, than governance by parliamentary legislation. But unlike parliamentary legislation which is publicly made, delegated or subordinate legislation is often made unobtrusively in the chambers of a minister, a secretary to the government or other official dignitary. But unlike parliamentary legislation which is publicly made, delegated or subordinate legislation is often made unobtrusively in the chambers of a minister, a secretary to the government or other official dignitary. It is, therefore, necessary that subordinate legislation, in order to take effect, must be published or promulgated in some suitable manner, whether such publication or promulgation is prescribed by the parent statute or not. It will then take effect from the date of such publication or promulgation. Where the parent statute prescribes the mode of publication or promulgation that mode must be followed. Where the parent statute is silent, but the subordinate legislation itself prescribes the manner of publication, such a mode of publication may be sufficient, if reasonable. If the subordinate legislation does not prescribe the mode of publication or if the subordinate legislation prescribes a plainly unreasonable mode of publication, it will take effect only when it is published through the customarily recognised official channel, namely, the official gazette or some other reasonable mode of publication. There may be subordinate legislation which is concerned with a few individuals or is confined to small local areas. In such cases publication or promulgation by other means may be sufficient. See R. Narayana Reddy v State of Andhra Pradesh by the secretary (home) transport department, hyderabad and others". ultimately it was held that the statutory requirement of publi cation was complied with in the said case because the mode of publication was statutorily prescribed and it was done according to law. ( 11 ) SRI shylendra kumar sought to distinguish this decisionon the ground that no where the Supreme Court observed that the notification should have been made available to the public and secondly the notification therein was issued under a power given under a Rule or under a subordinate legislation. It is true, the Supreme Court has not stated that the notification should have been made available to the public but the Supreme Court pointed out that the requirement of the publication prescribed under the act shall have to be complied with and that would constitute a due publication to the public. The concept of publication as statutorily evolved for the purpose of the enactment before the Supreme Court had been complied with by the authority concerned and consequently the notification was held as operative. The concept of publication as statutorily evolved for the purpose of the enactment before the Supreme Court had been complied with by the authority concerned and consequently the notification was held as operative. As to the second distinction made by the learned counsel for the central government, it is necessary to note that the notification under Section 25 also is issued by the delegated authority. The question is whether the notification is issued as prescribed by Section 25 and whether the nun-availability of the printed matter to the public would make the said printed matter a notification at all as contemplated by Section 25. In r. k. v. motors and timbers (P) Ltd. And others v Regional Transport officer and another , a full bench of the Kerala high court had an occasion to consider a similar question. The Kerala high court followed the decision of Andhra Pradesh high court in r. Narayana reddy's case, supra (also referred by the Supreme Court in b. k. srinivasan's case, supra, quoted by us ). The full bench of the Kerala high court did not accept a proposition which is similar to the one now stated by Sri shylendra kumar; the court observed at page 171 thus:"it is doubtful whether the proposition that a subordinate legislation by a delegated authority would be binding on, and can affect the rights of a citizen, even without there being any reasonable means for the citizens to know about its issue or existence (let alone the contents), would pass muster when tested on the principles of reasonableness and absence or arbitrariness encapsulated in articles 14 and 19 of the constitution. We need not, however, proceed to make a pronouncement on this aspect, as, in our view, the decisions of the Supreme Court fully support the views of one of us (poti, j.) And chinnappa reddy, j. , In the decisions referred to above". the same view had been expressed earlier in another decision which is quoted in the decision of full bench at page 168. The relevant observations quoted at page 168, read as follows:"statutes passed by the legislature and law made by authorities to whom power of legislation is delegated by statutes call for compliance by those to whom they are directed and therefore it is necessary that there should be publicity in regard to such laws so as to bind those whom they govern. Legislations by way of statutes are 'often accompanied by a fanfare of publicity'. During the process of its motion through the legislative anvil there is publicity for the measure. The matter is debated in the legislature and discussed in the press and sometimes in the platforms. But this is not the case with subordinate legislation which often issue from the secretariat of the government or other offices. The citizen to whom it is directed is not expected to have notice of it automatically so as to call for his obedience to it unless it is accompanied by such publicity as would normally bring it to his notice. It is open to the statute under which such subordinate legislation is made to prescribe the mode in which publication is to be made. In the absence of any such direction in the parent statute such subordinate legislation would become operative only on publication in one or other modes which is being normally resorted to. The publication in the gazette is the usual mode in which such legislation is notified to the public and under ordinary circumstances that should be taken to be the proper or the normal course". in commissioner of Income-Tax v S. Ratnam Pillai, the same principle was applied by another bench of the Kerala high court. The notification was dated 29-3-1979 but it was published on 3-4-1979. In this context the bench observed at page 502, thus:"in the light of the above authorities on the subject, we have no hesitation to hold that the subordinate legislation in this case the notification dated March 29, 1979 was published and made available to the public only on April 3, 1979, and can be effective only from that date onwards. . . ". the bench has taken care to point out that the notification in question was made available to the public also on 3-4-1979 and therefore it was effective from the said date. In Asia Tobacco Company Limited, v Union of India and others, the learned judge of the Madras High Court dealt with the same question arising in respect of a notification issued under Rule 8 of the Central Excise Act. In Asia Tobacco Company Limited, v Union of India and others, the learned judge of the Madras High Court dealt with the same question arising in respect of a notification issued under Rule 8 of the Central Excise Act. There is a detailed discussion of the question and the learned judge concluded at page 169, thus:"the mere printing of the official gazette containing the relevant notification and without making the same available for circulation and putting it on sale to the public will not amount to the 'notification' within the meaning of Rule 8 (1) of the rules. The intendment of the notification in the official gazette is that in the case of either grant or withdrawal of exemption the public must come to know of the same. 'notify' even according to ordinary dictionary meaning would be to take note of, observe; to make known, publish, proclaim; to announce; to give notice to; to inform'. It would be a mockery of the Rule to state that it would suffice the purpose of the notification if the notification is merely printed in the official gazette, without making the same available for circulation to the public or putting it on sale to the public. The communication from the department of publication, government of india, dated 23-4-1983, as per extract made above, leaves no room for doubt that the official gazette containing the withdrawal notification was placed on sale for public only on 8-12-1982. Without a proper notification in the sense, without putting the public or notice of the same, it is not possible to enforce the withdrawal of the exemption earlier accorded. It is not a case of printing, (may be anterior to the publishing) and releasing to the public, the notification, on the same date which the official gazette bears. Neither the date of the notification nor the date of printing nor the date of the gazette counts for 'notification' within the meaning of the Rule, but only the date when the public gets notified in the sense, the concerned gazette is made available to the public. The date of release of the publication is the decisive date to make the notification effective. Printing the official gazette and stacking them without releasing to the public would not amount to notification at all". The date of release of the publication is the decisive date to make the notification effective. Printing the official gazette and stacking them without releasing to the public would not amount to notification at all". in State of Madhya Pradesh and another v Ram Ragubir Prasad Agarwal and others, the Supreme Court was concerned with the term 'publication'. It was held that, 'publication' means more than mere communication to concerned officials or departments. It means, offering to public notice or rendering it accessible to public scrutiny. The decision of the learned single judge in asia tobacco company limited's case, supra, was upheld by the division bench in Union of India and others v Asia Tobacco Company Limited. The withdrawal notification was made available to the public by sale only on 8-12-1982 in the said case and therefore the bench held that the withdrawal notification became effective only from that date viz,, 8-12-1982. A few more decisions cited before us by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the standing counsel for the respondents are: (1) Jindal Strips Limited v Collector of Customs ; (2) GTC Industries Limited, Bombay and another v Union of India and another ; (3) Swati Chemicals v Collector of customs ; (4) G. Narayana Reddy and others v State of Andhra Pradesh and others ; (5) universal cans and containers limited v union of India ; (6) yemmiganur spinning mills limited and another v State of Andhra Pradesh and others; (7) u. s. awasthi and another v inspecting assistant commissioner of income-tax (acquisition range), lucknow and another; (8) kishan lal v inspecting assistant commissioner of income-tax (acquisition range), lucknow and others ; (9) commissioner of income-tax, gujarat-iii v shilaben kanchanlal rana; (10) general fibre dealers limited and another v union of India and others. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh high court in g. Narayana reddy's case, supra, is one of the earlier rulings, referred frequently; the Supreme Court has also referred to it in b. k. srinivasan's case, supra, obviously with approval. The decision of the gujarat high court in shilaben kanchanlal rana's case, supra and of the Calcutta high court in general fibre dealers limited's case, supra, supports the contention urged on behalf of the respondents; we respectfully disagree with the view expressed in these decisions. However, we don't consider it necessary to repeat the reasonings found in these and other decisions. However, we don't consider it necessary to repeat the reasonings found in these and other decisions. ( 12 ) ACCORDING to the learned counsel for the revenue, notification issued under Section 25 is a notification providing for exemption from the levy, either wholly or partly, and the tax-payer has no right to expect such a concession and therefore, grant of exemption need not be notified. This argument has to be stated, only to be rejected, because, when the rate of duty is reduced under one notification, enhancing the rate by a subsequent notification affects the rate of tax; the notification issued under Section 25 cannot be ignored while levying the tax; it has as much force, as the charging provision, though the notification cannot enhance the rate from the one imposed by the parliament under the act or the connected enactments. If an enforceable rate of duty is the one notified under Section 25, the assessing authority has no competence to collect tax at a higher rate, ignoring the notification issued under Section 25. Any assessment of tax, ignoring the notification issued under Section 25 would be an illegal collection, rendering the assessment violative of article 265 of the constitution. Levy and collection could be only as prescribed by law and the term law comprises a valid statutory notification. The manner of issuing the notification has to be in the mode prescribed; (as in the case of b. k. srinivasan's case, supra ). If the manner and mode of making a notification are not prescribed, then the question arises, as to when the said 'notification' becomes an effective notification. In the case of a Central Act, its coming into operation is governed by Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. There is no similar provision governing the 'coming into operation' of a notification. ( 13 ) THE very concept of a 'notification' involves the requirement of conveying its existence to others. The term 'notification' means ' (i) the act or an instance of notifying; (ii) a written or printed matter that gives notice' (vide: webster's new collegiate dictionary ). There is no similar provision governing the 'coming into operation' of a notification. ( 13 ) THE very concept of a 'notification' involves the requirement of conveying its existence to others. The term 'notification' means ' (i) the act or an instance of notifying; (ii) a written or printed matter that gives notice' (vide: webster's new collegiate dictionary ). ( 14 ) WHEN Section 25 states that the central government 'by notification in the official gazette' grant exemption, it means that the process of or the manner of notifying the exemption is through the official gazette; if so, the process and the manner of notifying will not be complete unless the gazette is made available to the public to read it. A purported notification, merely printed in the gazette and kept within the four walls of the government press would not be available for the public to read it; it cannot result in notifying the contents to the public. ( 15 ) IT was argued that even if the gazette is made available at Delhi, residents of remote parts of India would not know the contents of the notification and if the petitioners' argument is accepted, the notification issued at Delhi will become operative on different dates at different places, depending upon its availability in the locality concerned; this would lead to an absurd result. ( 16 ) NO argument should be stretched to its extreme logical end. The purpose of the notification could be held as achieved, when it is made available to the public, at a place, where normally such a notification is made available; it is the accessibility to the gazette that makes its contents an effective notification. The fortuitous circumstance of people residing in different parts of the country is wholly irrelevant; the contents of the gazette could be said to have been notified when it is issued and made available to the public. ( 17 ) IF the purported notification is printed on a particular day in the gazette, antedating the date of gazette, can it be said that the notification became effective on the date printed on the gazette as the date of its publication? This would, certainly render the notification retrospective, without an express intention to make it retrospective. ( 17 ) IF the purported notification is printed on a particular day in the gazette, antedating the date of gazette, can it be said that the notification became effective on the date printed on the gazette as the date of its publication? This would, certainly render the notification retrospective, without an express intention to make it retrospective. ( 18 ) A distinction was sought to be made between a notification issued by virtue of a power given by a subordinate legislation, (like Rule 8 of central excise rules) and a notification issued under a power granted directly by the parliament. It was contended that probably in the former case, due publication of the gazette may be necessary, unlike the notification issued under the power directly vested by the parliament. We do not find any qualitative distinction between these two kinds of notifications: both notifications are in the nature of delegated legislation or subordinate legislation. The real test is whether the parliament prescribed a particular mode for the publication, so as to make the notification effective; if the prescribed procedure is followed, subject to other considerations as to reasonableness, validity, etc. , The notification would become effective and operative; if no procedure is prescribed. Court has to consider whether the purported notification or any other subordinate legislation was issued in a manner, from which, its due publication to the public could be inferred. ( 19 ) IN the exercise of a power to make a subordinate legislation, principles of natural Justice has no role to play. Here we are not concerned with the principles of natural justice, at all; we are concerned with the content of the term 'notifications' and when a printed matter could be called a 'notification'. ( 20 ) THE decision of the Supreme Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Limited and others v Union of India and others, has no application to the question before us. ( 21 ) IN view of the above we have no hesitation in rejecting the contention of the learned counsel for the revenue. The notification dated 15-12-1990 cannot be relied upon to the detriment of the interest of the petitioners having regard to the admitted facts before us. ( 21 ) IN view of the above we have no hesitation in rejecting the contention of the learned counsel for the revenue. The notification dated 15-12-1990 cannot be relied upon to the detriment of the interest of the petitioners having regard to the admitted facts before us. ( 22 ) SRI shylendra kumar, then contended that the revenue is entitled to invoke Section 27-b of the act while considering the refund, and in case the refund would result in the unjust enrichment of the petitioners the refund cannot be ordered. The learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out that the goods imported were machineries used in the factory and they are capital goods, which are not sold by the petitioners and therefore there is no occasion to apply the principle of unjust enrichment. However, we agree with the learned counsel that this is a matter for the statutory authority to consider while disposing the application filed under Section 27, bearing in mind the observations we have made regarding the effectiveness of the notifications dated 15-12-1990. ( 23 ) SRI shylendra kumar also contended that, since the first petitioner has already invoked the alternative remedy under Section 27, this court should not interfere in this writ petition. There is no doubt that existence of an effective alternative remedy would normally persuade this court not to exercise its writ jurisdiction; but, here is a case where the question raised by the petitioner involves a question of considerable importance. The decisions of different high courts are not uniform. The revenue has taken a particular stand which would defeat the petitioners claim. In view of the specific contention of the respondents there is no scope at all for the authority to apply his own discretion in deciding the question raised by the petitioners. In the circumstances, we have thought it equitable and just that the question raised should be decided by us especially in the background that there is no authoritative pronouncement of this court on this aspect of the case. ( 24 ) IN view of our decision on the first question we think it unnecessary to consider the other two questions raised by the petitioners. Those questions are left open. The petitioners may raise the same in case an occasion arises for the same in future. ( 24 ) IN view of our decision on the first question we think it unnecessary to consider the other two questions raised by the petitioners. Those questions are left open. The petitioners may raise the same in case an occasion arises for the same in future. In the result, we allow this writ petition with a direction to the second respondent to dispose of the application filed by the petitioner under Section 27 of the Act, in the light of the observations made herein. The second respondent shall dispose of the same within three months from today. There shall be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .