JUDGMENT 1. - The prayer in this petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Criminal Procedure Code ) is for quashing criminal proceedings in criminal case No. 179/86 pending in the Court of Special Magistrate (Economic Offences) Jaipur for the offence punishable under Section 9(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) on the ground of delay in the trial. The charge against the petitioners is that they evaded payment of excise duty in the tune of Rs. 2,66,795/-. 2. The facts giving rise to the criminal proceedings may be stated here in a nut-shell in order to appreciate the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Accused petitioners came to be prosecuted as a result of a raid at their factory by the officials of the Central Excise and Custom Department on September 25, 1972 on the basis of a secret information. The investigation resulted into detection of evasion of central excise duty amounting to Rs. 2,66,795/- during the period October, 1967 to 1972. Before launching criminal prosecution, adjudication proceedings were initiated against the petitioners and the Adjudicating Authority ordered the unit to deposit central excise duty and penalty of Rs. 1,000/-. The unit, namely, Ms Baiton Cables filed an appeal against the order of adjudication dated, July 29, 1982. Thereafter the present criminal case was initiated against the petitioners and one Vinod Kumar Gupta by filing a complaint on March 1, 1985 in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences) Rajasthan, Jaipur Under section 9 of the Act read with Rules 9A, 52A, 53 and 226 of Central Excise Rules, 1944. The learned Magistrate took cognizance on the aforesaid complaint on the same day and issued process against the accused to procure their attendance. On April 20, 1985 all the accused appeared. After furnishing a copy of the complaint, the case was posted on July 22, 1985 to record pre-charge prosecution evidence. On 6.9.85, three applications were filed on behalf of the accused. One prosecution witness P.K. Mehra was present, but his evidence could not be recorded on account of the applications filed by the accused and as such he was discharged by the Court. On 6.9.85, three applications were filed on behalf of the accused. One prosecution witness P.K. Mehra was present, but his evidence could not be recorded on account of the applications filed by the accused and as such he was discharged by the Court. From 6.9.85 to 17.2.86, the prosecutor sought time to file reply to the applications and on February 17, 1986, the trial Magistrate directed the complainant to produce the documents which were seized by it. On May 27, 1986, future personal attendance of the accused petitioners was exempted and the case was fixed for production of documents as the learned Magistrate was of the view that in absence of documents evidence cannot be recorded. Time was sought by the prosecution again and again for production of documents on the ground that the documents were sent to the appellate authority as an appeal was pending before it against adjudication order. On July 24, 1987, the Court directed the prosecution to file authenticated copies of the documents and October 16,1989 was fixed for production of the documents. Then, from 16.10.89 till January 12, 1990, three adjournments were taken by the prosecution to file authenticated copies of the documents. On January 12, 1990, counsel for the complainant stated before the trial Magistrate that he had received copies of the documents and the witnesses be summoned for recording pre-charge evidence. Hence, March 7, 1990 was fixed for recording prosecution evidence. Time was again sought by the Prosecutor to produce documents and on January 29, 1991, counsel for the complainant stated before the trial Magistrate that the record shall be produced by him at the time of recording evidence as the record was voluminous. The next date was fixed as 13.3.91. On this date, the statement of P.W.1 Prem Kumar Mehra was recorded and April 25, 1991 was fixed for recording the remaining prosecution evidence. The Custom Inspector Shri Jhabar Mal was also directed to produce original documents on that day. On April 25, 1991, it appears that summons to the witnesses were issued and next date was fixed as June 21, 1991. On this date, one H. Luthra was present but his evidence could not be recorded as the Prosecutor did not think it necessary to get his statement recorded at pre-charge stage. Next date for recording prosecution evidence was fixed as August 8, 1991. On this date, one H. Luthra was present but his evidence could not be recorded as the Prosecutor did not think it necessary to get his statement recorded at pre-charge stage. Next date for recording prosecution evidence was fixed as August 8, 1991. From August 8, 1991 several dates were fixed, but no further progress in trial could be made for one reason or the other till case file was summoned by this court. 3. In the back ground of the aforesaid factual aspect, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently contended that fundamental right of the accused for speedy trial has been infringed in the case, as such, their criminal prosecution should be quashed by this court in exercise of inherent powers Under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code. Learned Counsel contended that evasion of excise duty related to the period 1967 to 1972 and criminal prosecution has been launched against the petitioner in the year 1985. It was also contended that the Prosecuting Agency had never been serious either in producing relevant documents or in getting the prosecution evidence recorded expeditiously and the delayed trial would cause prejudice to the accused in their defence and in the present situation it can be said that the accused have been denied adequate opportunity to defend themselves or that the trial is not fair and reasonable. Learned counsel therefore, strenuously contended for quashing criminal proceedings pending against the petitioners. 4. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor strongly contended that the petitioners are facing serious and grave charges relating to economic offences which have serious adverse impact on the entire economy of the country and as such, it is not in public interest to quash the proceedings. It was also contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that the accused are also equally responsible for the delay and the concerned Court also did not take effective steps to secure attendance of the prosecution witnesses and that all documents are now available with the Court, as such, instead of quashing the proceedings, any other appropriate direction be given by this Court. 5. A short question which falls for consideration, therefore is : as to whether the pending criminal proceedings before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences) against the petitioners be quashed on the ground of delay or not? 6. 5. A short question which falls for consideration, therefore is : as to whether the pending criminal proceedings before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences) against the petitioners be quashed on the ground of delay or not? 6. After giving my careful and deep consideration to the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the confirmed view that in the facts and circumstances of the case, including nature of the offence, quashing of charges may not be in the interest of justice. The petitioners are facing criminal trial for evasion of excise duty in the tune of Rs. 2,66,795/- which is an economic offence having serious impact on the economy of the country and it would be in the public interest that instead of quashing proceedings such appropriate orders be passed which may facilitate expeditious trial of the case. 7. In Chhote Lal Jain V. State of Rajasthan, 1991 (1) R.L.R. 98 I had an occasion to consider the question of quashing criminal proceedings on the ground of delay in trial. In para-12 of the judgment, after considering various judicial pronouncements of the High Courts including that of the Apex Court of the country, the proposition of law in this connection was laid down as under : (i) A speedy trial is fundamental right of the accused within the ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution of India is no more in dispute. But, the question whether this fundamental right has been violated or is likely to be violated on account of the delay in the trial will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no outer limit can be fixed in a general way for all the cases; (ii) While considering the length of delay, the Court will take into account the period consumed in the investigation of the case and the delay caused in actual proceedings in Court after filing of the charge-sheet. A speed investigation and a trial are equally mandated both by the letter and spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (iii) While deciding such question, the Court shall take into account the working of the judicial system in India and the lack of satisfactory working conditions in judicial courts, including large pendency and institution of the cases, inadequacy of judge strength and under staffing etc; (iv) In a pending case to decide the question whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed or any other appropriate direction be given to the trial court to secure the ends of justice will depend on several factors to be taken into consideration, such as, the gravity and seriousness of the offence, whether the delay was occasioned by the tactic or conduct of the accused himself, whether the accused objected at any stage when such delay occasioned and whether the accused is, prejudiced in his defence on account of the delay ? (v) If the delay has caused prejudice to the accused in the conduct of his defence, the pending criminal proceedings should be normally quashed as in that situation it could be said that the accused has been denied an adequate opportunity to defend himself and the trial is not fair and reasonable; (vi) In grave and serious offences against the society or in relation to Nation's economy, defence or security, the criminal proceedings should not be normally quashed on the ground of delay simplicitor without anything further. (vii) In trivial offences having no or very little impact on the society, quashing of criminal proceedings on the ground of delay simplicitor shall be in the interest of justice as it will provide a room for serious and grave offences and will lessen the burden of the Court with heavy workload. 8. In Abdul Rehman Antule V. R.S. Nayak and another, AIR 1992 Supreme Court 1701, the Apex Court of the country had an occasion to consider the question relating to infringement of right of speedy trial and quashing of charges levelled against the accused on this ground. In para-54 of the judgment, the Apex Court laid down the guidelines in this connection as under : "54. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions, emerge to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. In para-54 of the judgment, the Apex Court laid down the guidelines in this connection as under : "54. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions, emerge to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are : 1. Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the societal interest also does not make it any-the-less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances. 2. Right to Speedy Trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial. That is how this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view. 3. The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are : (a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction; (b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and (c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise. 4. At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. As is often pointed out, "delay is a known defence tactic". Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of Course, there may be cases where the prosecution for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of Course, there may be cases where the prosecution for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the right of speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is-who is responsible for the delay ? Proceedings taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay. It goes without saying that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the day or reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good faith. The mere fact that an application/petition is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior court is by itself no proof that the proceedings is not a frivolous. Very often these stays are obtained on ex parte representation. 5. While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of Right of Speedy Trial) one must have regard, to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on-what is called, the systematic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one. 6. Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has been observed by Powell, J. in Barker "it cannot be said how long a delay is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate". 6. Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has been observed by Powell, J. in Barker "it cannot be said how long a delay is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate". The same ideal has been stated by White, J. in U.S. V. Ewell, (1966) 15 Law ED 2d 627 , in the following words : "the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather than mere speed, as its essential ingredients; and whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances." However, inordinarily long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case. 7. We cannot recognise or give effect to, what is called the 'demand' rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the Court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused's plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such a demand and yet he was not tried speedily, it would be plus point in his favour, but the mere non-asking for a speedy trial cannot be put against the accused. Even in U.S.A., the relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered down in Barker and other succeeding cases. 8. Ultimately, the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors-'balancing test' or 'balancing process' and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. 9. Ordinarily speaking, whether the Court comes to the conclusion that Right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other, circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other, circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order-including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded-as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case. 10. It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay.At the same time, it is the duty of the Court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of U.S.A. too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time limit inspite of the sixth Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such outer limit ineffectuates the guarantee of right to speedy trial. 11. An objection based on denial of Right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis." 9. It would also be relevant to refer to paragraph-53 of the above judgment which runs as under : "Another question seriously canvassed before us related to the consequence following from an infringement of right to speedy trial. Counsel for accused argued on the basis of the observations in Sheela Barsa ( AIR 1986 Supreme Court 1773) and Strunk (1973 (37) Law ED 2d (56), that the only consequence is quashing of charges and/or conviction, as the case may be. Normally, it may be so. But we do not think that that is the only order open to court. Normally, it may be so. But we do not think that that is the only order open to court. In a given case, the facts-including the nature of offence-may be such that quashing of charges may not be in the interest of justice. After all, every offence-more so economic offences, those relating to public official and food adulterations-is an offence against society. It is really the society-the State-that prosecutes the offender. We may in this connection recall the observations of this Court in Champalal Punjaji Shah ( AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1675). In case, where quashing of charges/convictions may not be in the interest of justice, it shall be open to the Court to pass such appropriate orders as may be deemed just in the circumstances of the case. Such orders, may, for example, take the shape of order for expedition of trial and its conclusion within a particular prescribed period, reduction of sentence where the matter comes up after conclusion of trial and conviction, and so on." 10. In the background of the aforesaid guidelines and the proposition of law laid down by this Court and the Apex Court of the country, it can be safely held that the present case is not of that nature where charges should be quashed on the ground of some delay in trial. 11. It is no doubt true that the prosecuting agency was not so much vigilant as is expected of it to be in a case like the present one which relates to serious economic charges, in taking proper steps for filing original or authenticated copies of the documents before the trial Magistrate. The learned counsel for the complainant took the matter in a most casual and leisurely manner in seeking adjournment, after adjournment and the Court also had been too liberal, though wholly unjustified in adjourning the matter on mere asking by the counsel for the complainant. It is also true that the Court did not take positive and firm steps in securing attendance of prosecution witnesses and even after production of the documents, no progress in trial could be made for the last more than three years. This is really shocking and I have no reservation in expressing my displeasure to the manner in which the concerned Magistrate proceeded with trial of the case. This is really shocking and I have no reservation in expressing my displeasure to the manner in which the concerned Magistrate proceeded with trial of the case. In spite of the fact that the prosecution was responsible for some delay, but on this count alone, I am not inclined to quash the proceedings, and think it just and proper to give following directions so that the trial is concluded expeditiously. (i) The trial Magistrate shall take up the trial of the present case on priority basis and adjournments shall not be granted on mere asking either by the learned counsel for the complainant or the accused. Efforts should be made that effective hearing takes place on the dates the case is posted. (ii) The Court shall also take positive and firm steps to secure attendance of the witnesses. If necessary, coercive steps be taken to procure their attendance if witnesses do not turn up in spite of their service. The concerned Superintendent of Police may be asked to take personal interest in effecting service on the witnesses in order to avoid further delay. (iii) If witnesses turn up, their evidence shall be recorded day today till all the witnesses present in Court are examined. (iv) Long adjournments in the case shall not be granted and efforts shall be made that the trial is concluded within two years from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. (v) The trial Magistrate shall intimate to this court about progress of the trial in the case after every three months. 12. Before concluding I would like to express my serious concern to the manner in which criminal trials are taken in subordinate courts even in case of serious and grave charges. It is also often seen that the Prosecuting Agency is not serious for expeditious trial and proper efforts are not made by it to produce and examine the prosecution witnesses and a greater part of delay is caused by it. If the Prosecuting Agency keeps vigil and examines prosecution witnesses without delay or unnecessary adjournments are not sought there can hardly be any ground for any delay in the trial. It is also noticed that trial courts are too liberal in granting adjournments on mere asking and firm and positive steps are not taken by it in procuring attendance of the witnesses. It is also noticed that trial courts are too liberal in granting adjournments on mere asking and firm and positive steps are not taken by it in procuring attendance of the witnesses. The cases are adjourned in a routine manner being unmindful of serious and grave charges. If we really want to do justice to the society such practice should be stopped earlier the better. I trust and hope that the concerned Magistrate will comply with the directions given in the case with seriousness.The petition is disposed of as indicated above.Petition disposed of. *******