JUDGMENT Sinha, J. : This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 13.7.88 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, whereby and whereunder the said learned Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants questioning an order of requisition in respect of plot Nos. 1787 and 1788 in Mouza Monoharpur, in terms of a notice dated 9.5.84. 2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. 3. The aforementioned plots were purchased by the writ petitioners in terms of a registered deed of conveyance dated 7th July, 1981 from Sri Haradhan Ballav and Others and their names were mutated and recorded in the relevant records. According to the appellants, they purchased the said plots for the purpose of erecting and/or constructing a factory. By reason of an order dated 21.12.81, the Collector, Hooghly, in purported exercise of his jurisdiction under Section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) requisitioned the said property allegedly for implementation of a housing project at Monoharpur by the West Bengal Housing Board. No order was served upon the appellants although the delivery of possession thereof was served upon the appellants although the delivery of possession thereof was sought to be taken on 7th January, 1982. A representation was made by the appellants on 3.2.82. However, as no relief was granted to them, they moved a writ application before this Court which was marked as C. R. No. 5572 (W) of 1982 on or about 26th April, 1982. In the said proceedings, affidavits-in-opposition were filed by the concerned respondents stating that the lands were requisitioned for the purpose of Dankuni Housing Project. By reason of an order dated 30.1.84, a learned Single Judge of this Court disposed of the writ petition directing that the impugned notices were not to be given effect to, but the respondent No. 5 and the State respondent would be at liberty to proceed in the matter afresh upon serving fresh notice on the proper persons. The appellants have contended that although they had been in actual physical possession of the land in question, delivery of possession of the said plots was taken by the respondents on or about 14.5.84. The appellants have contended that although they had been in actual physical possession of the land in question, delivery of possession of the said plots was taken by the respondents on or about 14.5.84. A purported notice dated 9.5.84 bearing memo No. 1 95 (3) L. A. issued by the Additional District Magistrate, Hooghly, was served for the first time upon the writ petitioner No. 2, who is said to be the registered owner of a portion of the plot of land on 27.5.84, but copies of the said notice had not been served on the appellant Nos, 1, 3 and 4. The instant writ petition was, therefore, filed on 4th June, 1984. In the said proceedings also, affidavits-in-opposition were filed. 4. The learned trial Judge in his impugned judgment noticed that during the pendency of the writ application, an application was filed by the appellants stating that the project of the Housing Board for which the requisition was made had been completed and the appellants lands are surplus land and, therefore, order should be passed derequisitioning the same. However, the said allegation was denied. According to the respondents, the purpose for which the requisition was made was to make available to the economically back ward sections of the community to provide accommodation, which purpose is covered under the said Act. The learned trial Judge having held that the service of notice was effected by affixing a copy thereof in some conspicuous part of the land as also by sending the same under certificate of posting. The learned trial Judge further held that as the order of requisition was made for the purpose of construction of residential houses for the weaker section of the community the same would amount to a public purpose, namely, supplies and services essential to the life of the community. According to the learned trial Judge a housing project meant for the persons belonging to the weaker section of the community is a service essential to the community. 5. Mr. Mitra appearing on behalf of the appellants has raised a number of contentions in support of this appeal. Learned Counsel submits that on the face of the finding of the learned trial Judge. 5. Mr. Mitra appearing on behalf of the appellants has raised a number of contentions in support of this appeal. Learned Counsel submits that on the face of the finding of the learned trial Judge. notice under Sections 3 of the said Act and Rule 3 of the Rules cannot be said to have been complied with, inasmuch as, it is not the finding of the learned trial Judge that the requirement of Rule 3(d) had been complied with in toto whereas in terms of the said rule, service under certificate of posting is not a mode of service. Our attention was further drawn to the purported requisition dated 9.5.84 and it has been contended that supplies of service essential to the life community and implementation of housing project cannot go together. Learned Counsel contends that it is for the first time in the affidavit-in-opposition a contention was raised that the said housing project was for the weaker section of the society although no material in support thereof was placed before the learned trial Judge, nor the same appears in the notice of requisition itself. It has been further submitted that the learned trial Judge was also not correct in holding that the purpose for such acquisition had not been completed. Our attention has been drawn to the fact that before this Court further documents had been produced by the housing Board and upon perusal of the Information Guide of the West Bengal Housing Board’ as contained in Annexure ‘D’ to the affidavit-in-opposition, it would appear that the said housing project also includes within its fold H.I.G. 1 Scheme, which is applicable in respect of persons who come within the purview of income group, namely, Rs. 2,501/- and above, that is, without specifying the higher limits thereof. Mr. Mitra has further placed before us another ‘Information Guide’. from a perusal whereof it would appear that there were five types of housing projects including for upper Higher Income Group houses. It has been contended that the said scheme was formulated for be first time in the year 1990 and would be evident from the fact that last date of sale of such forms was 16.4.90 as would appear form the ‘Information Guide’ as contained in Annexure ‘D’ to the affidavit-in-opposition. It has been contended that the said scheme was formulated for be first time in the year 1990 and would be evident from the fact that last date of sale of such forms was 16.4.90 as would appear form the ‘Information Guide’ as contained in Annexure ‘D’ to the affidavit-in-opposition. It was, therefore, submitted that first requisition having been made in the year 1992 and the public purposes which were mentioned in the year 1982 having been restated in the requisition order dated 9.5.84, admittedly, a shifting stand has been taken now by the Housing Board inasmuch as it has been stated that third phase of housing project was stated in the year 1990 that means after a lapse of eight years and thus the learned Counsel contend that there could not have been any urgency. Our attention was further drawn to the fact that in the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by the responded No. 4, it would appear that the following statements have been made:- “It is stated that the said 2 plots of land in question that is to say, plot Nos. 1787 and 1788 as mentioned hereinbefore, are my much required by the West Bengal Housing Board since the West Bengal Housing Board prepared a scheme to construct 96 flats on parcel of land including these plots. Brocures were sold on the basis of the said scheme. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Be it mentioned here that 2 plots in question are required for construction of further 96 numbers flats and also for constructing market, post office, bank, milk booth and garbage-vat. Brocures were sold on the basis of the said scheme. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Be it mentioned here that 2 plots in question are required for construction of further 96 numbers flats and also for constructing market, post office, bank, milk booth and garbage-vat. It was the scheme of the said Board to construct the entire housing complex with all formalities and for the said purpose they have already constructed 1200 flats but they are not in a position to competed the said project in view of the order of this Hon’ble Court since they cannot make any further construction over the said two plots in question which are the subject matter of dispute in the instant appeal.” * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * As it was already stated earlier that the Dankuni Housing Project is a Housing and Urban Development Corporation, a financial scheme and for the said project the West Bengal Housing Board has borrowed money from the said Corporation and they are also paying interest at a high rate to the said Corporation since the Board could not finish the project within the stipulated period of time.” However, from the ‘Information Guide’ which is contained in Annexure ‘D’ to the affidavit-in-opposition, it would appear that the same is contrary to and inconsistent with the said statement. The learned Counsel, therefore, submits that the Housing Board must be held to have been taking a shifting stand and there had been no urgency for such requisition. In support of his aforementioned contention, reliance has been placed on (1) Jiwani Kumar Paraki v. Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta & Ors. reported in AIR 1984 SC 1707 ; (2) H. D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in AIR 1984 SC 866 ; (3) Indian Metals & Ferro Alloys Limited & Anr. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. reported in 98 CWN 1090 and (4) Sm. Sushila Debi & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in 1989(2) CHN 232 . 6. Mr. Bihani, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the West Bengal Housing Board, on the other hand, submits that in the instant case service of notice is admitted in the writ application itself. reported in 98 CWN 1090 and (4) Sm. Sushila Debi & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in 1989(2) CHN 232 . 6. Mr. Bihani, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the West Bengal Housing Board, on the other hand, submits that in the instant case service of notice is admitted in the writ application itself. The learned Counsel contends that keeping in view the fact that the appellants had categorically stated that they were in possession of the land in question at the relevant time and at least the petitioner No. 2 had received the said notice, such admission should be taken as a whole, and thus it is not required for this Court to go into the question of service of notice. Reliance in this connection, has been placed on (5) Governing Body of Dayanand Anglo Vedic College v. Padmanabha Padhy and Others reported in AIR 1988 SC 612 and (6) Sandeep Kumar Bhakat & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in 1992(2) CLJ 267 . It was further submitted that the opinion of the statutory authority as regards the existence of a public purpose cannot be questioned by the writ petitioners nor this Court can act as an appellate authority. According to the learned Counsel, formation of such opinion is beyond the power of judicial review of this Court. Reliance in this connection, has been placed on The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States of America by Thomas M. Cooley at page 68 and (7) Rajasthan Housing Board and Ors. Shri Krishan and Others reported in 1993(2) SCC 84 and (8) Jai Narain and Others v. Union of India and Ors reported in 199 (1) SCC 9. Mr. Bihani had also relied upon a passage from Administrative Law of H. W. R. Wade and C. F. Forsyth (Seventh Edition) at pages 204 and 207. It was further submitted that non striking out of any part of the notice does no vitiated the requisitioning order. Our attention was further drawn to the statements made in affidavit-in-opposition to the stay application which have been quoted hereinbefore for the purpose of showing that the Housing Board has incurred a huge expenditure. The learned Counsel contends that before a requisition is made, no opportunity of hearing is required to be given. Our attention was further drawn to the statements made in affidavit-in-opposition to the stay application which have been quoted hereinbefore for the purpose of showing that the Housing Board has incurred a huge expenditure. The learned Counsel contends that before a requisition is made, no opportunity of hearing is required to be given. In support of his aforementioned contention, reliance has been placed on (9) Basumati Bag v. Collector, Howrah and Ors. reported in 78 CWN 29. 7. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State had merely supported the submission of Mr. Bihani. 8. In view of the aforementioned rival contentions, three questions arise for consideration in this appeal, namely (1) Whether the entire requisition proceeding is vitiated in law owing to non-service of notice upon the petitioners; (2) Whether the purported order dated 9.5.84 is valid in law and (3) Whether the judgment of the learned Trial Judge can be upheld by reason of the subsequent events as stated by the respondent. Housing Board in its affidavit-in-opposition to the stay application. 9. The said Act was enacted to provided for the requisition and speedy acquisition of the land for certain purposes. It is not in dispute that the writ petitioners are the joint owners of the lands in question. It is also not in dispute that in terms of the provisions of Section 3(2) of the said Act, the writ petitioners were entitled to a notice of requisition, Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act, provides that an order under sub-section (1) of the said Act shall be served in the prescribed manner on the owner of the land and where the order relates to land in occupation of an occupier, not being the owner of the land, also on such occupier. It has not been disputed before us that sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act is mandatory in nature inasmuch as if the owner or occupier of such land as the case may be, fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (1), the same shall be executed by the Collector in such manner as he may consider expedient and for that purpose may take recourse to one or other modes of execution as specified in sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the said Act. It is, therefore, clear that on the respondents’ own showing the principles of natural Justice are not required to be complied with. In a recent decision in (10) Bengal Peerless Housing Development Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. Bijendra Prasad Gupta and Ors., C. O. No. 11910 (W) of 1995 C. O. No. 16429 (W) of 1995 with Appeal form Original Order Tender No. 2894 of 1995 and Appeal from Original Order Tender No. 3379 of 1995 disposed of on 29th March, 1996, this Court, inter alia, has held that keeping in view the fact that the principles of natural Justice are not required to be complied with, the requisitioning authority must strictly comply with mandatory requirements of the provisions of the said Act. Sub-section 2(c) of Section 3 provides that an order shall be served in the prescribed manner. The word, ‘prescribed’ has been defined in Section 2(c) to mean ‘prescribed’ by Rules made under the said Act. The State Government in exercise of its power conferred by Section 13 of the said Act made Rules under the said Act, known as West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Rules, 1948. Rule 3 thereof provides for the manner of service which reads thus:- “3. The State Government in exercise of its power conferred by Section 13 of the said Act made Rules under the said Act, known as West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Rules, 1948. Rule 3 thereof provides for the manner of service which reads thus:- “3. Manner of service of order.-An order under sub-section (1) of Section 3 shall be served on the owner of the land and where the order relates to land in occupation of an occupier of an occupier not being the owner of the land, also on such occupier- (a) by delivering or tendering a copy thereof, endorsed either by the person authorised by the Act to make the order or by the Collector, to the person on whom the order is to be served or his agent, or (b) by fixing a copy thereof on the outer door of some conspicuous part of the house in which the person on whom the order is to be served ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, or (c) by sending the same to the person on whom the order is to be served by registered post with acknowledgment due, or (d) by fixing a copy thereof in some conspicuous part of the land to which the order relates and also in some conspicuous place of the office of the Collector.” It is, therefore, evident that in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act, notices are required to be served in terms of the provisions of Rules 3 aforementioned. In terms of the aforementioned provisions, a notice is required to be sent by registered post with acknowledgment due. There is thus no provision of sending a copy of the order under certificate of posting. Sub-rule (d) of Rule 3 of the said Rules, provides that an order may be served by fixing a copy thereof in some conspicuous part of the land to which the order relates as also in a conspicuous place of the office of the Collector. Admittedly, no notice was affixed in some conspicuous place of the Office of the Collector. The word, ‘and’ used in sub-rule (d) of Rule 3 must be held to be conjunctive and not disjunctive. In a recent decision in (11) West Bengal Housing Board v. Bhanwarlal Mundhra and Ors. Admittedly, no notice was affixed in some conspicuous place of the Office of the Collector. The word, ‘and’ used in sub-rule (d) of Rule 3 must be held to be conjunctive and not disjunctive. In a recent decision in (11) West Bengal Housing Board v. Bhanwarlal Mundhra and Ors. F. M. A. T. No. 1507 of 1994 disposed of on 7.6.96, this Bench held “It is not in dispute that the notice upon the owner or the occupier is mandatorily required to be served before the possession of the land in question is taken. Reference in this connection may be made to the cases reported in (12) 1993 (1) CLJ 371 ; (13) 1992 (1) CLJ 222 and 1992 (2) CLJ 267 as well as the recent Division Bench decision in F. M. A. T. No. 2894 of 1995 with F. M. A. T. No. 3379 of 1995, Bengal Peerless Housing Board v. State of West Bengal. It is admitted that whereas the possession of the land in question was taken over on 7..82 the copy of the notice was served upon the petitioner only on 24..83 in that view of the matter there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the entire proceeding was vitiated in law.” 10. Apart form the fact that Rule 3 has not been cdomplied with strictly, the very fact that possession of the land had been taken on 14th May, 1984 and a copy of the notice was served upon writ petitioner No. 2 on 27th May, 1981, in our opinion, would amount to non-compliance of the mandatory provision of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act. Mr. Bihani himself as indicated hereinbefore had relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court decision in Governing Body of Dayanand Anglo Vedic College v. Padmanabha Padhy and Ors. reported in AIR 1988 SC 612 , wherein the Apex Court relied upon a decision of the Privy Council in (14) M. M. Essabhoy v. M. Haridas reported in AIR 1915 PC 2 and held that although it is permissible for a tribunal to accept part and reject the rest of any witnesses testimony, so far as admission in pleading is concerned, it cannot be so dissected. It may be accepted as a whole or not at all. The said decision, therefore, instead of helping the contention of Mr. Bihani, supports the contentions of the writ petitioners. It may be accepted as a whole or not at all. The said decision, therefore, instead of helping the contention of Mr. Bihani, supports the contentions of the writ petitioners. In (15) Tarak Nath Sen’s case reported in 1983(1) CLJ 371 Sabyasachi Mukherji, J. (as the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India then was) it was categorically held that Section 3(2) makes it manifest that the order of requisition must be served upon the owner in any event and in addition it requires that the order should also be served upon the occupier. Reliance placed by Mr. Bihani upon. The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States of America by Thomas M. Cooley is misplaced. At page 68 the learned Author was considering a case where public purpose was declared by the legislature. In the instant case, it has been done by an administrative order. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that undertaking a Housing Project has a great impact on the people in general, as has been stated in Administrative Law by H. W. R. Wade and C. F. Forsyth at pages 204 and 207, but it would be noticed thereform that discussions were being made therein keeping in view the various acts like Labouring Classes’ Lodging Houses Act, 1851 or the Housing Act, 1969. We are concerned with the validity and legality of requisitioning of the land in terms of the provisions of the said Act. 11. From the records it appears that two orders had been issued by the Collector. It appears from page 26 of the Volume I of the Paper Book, which, inter alia, contains the writ application that the writ petitioner No. 2 received an order as regards the only plot in question namely plot No. 1788 measuring. 18 decimals. However, from the order dated 9.5.84 as contained in Annexure ‘E’ to the affidavit-in-opposition, it appears that another order was passed by the Collector which contains the details of twenty plots although the number of both the case being Requisition Case No. 1-7/81-82 is the same. It has not been explained before us as to how and under what circumstances two different orders were passed on the same day in a same proceeding. It has not been explained before us as to how and under what circumstances two different orders were passed on the same day in a same proceeding. Furthermore, from the said order it appears that according to the opinion of the Collector, the order of requisition was required to be made as “it is necessary for the purpose of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community namely for implementation of Housing Project at Monoharpur”. In our considered opinion, the finding of the learned Trial Judge cannot be sustained for more than one reasons. In terms of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the said Act which confers power to requisition upon the State Government, apart from maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, another purpose namely for creation of better living conditions in rural and urban areas has been mentioned. A Housing Project is undertaken for the creation of better living condition in rural or urban areas. Monoharpur is a rural area and thus a housing project in a rural area could have been undertaken only for creation of better living condition of the people and such housing project in our opinion, would not come within the purview of a public purpose, namely service essential to the life of the community. The words, “service essential to the life of the community” have to be read along with the words, “for maintaining supplies” i. e. public purpose would be maintaining both supplies and services which are essential to the life of the community. In our opinion, the learned Trial Judge has not taken into consideration this aspect of the matter. Such terminologies are found in statutes like Essential Commodities Act and similar other statutes. It is now well known that a statute should be read as a whole. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the said Act specifies various public purposes. There cannot be any doubt that creation of better living condition would be a public purpose, but the same would not sub-serve maintaining of supplies and services essential to the life of the community. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the said Act specifies various public purposes. There cannot be any doubt that creation of better living condition would be a public purpose, but the same would not sub-serve maintaining of supplies and services essential to the life of the community. If a housing project could come within the purview of “service essential to the life of the community”, there was absolutely no reason to specifically mention “for creation of better living condition in rural or urban areas not being an industrial and other area excluded by the State Government by a notification in this behalf by the construction or reconstruction of dwelling house in such areas or for purposes connected therewith or incidental thereto”. In Bengal Peerless Housing Development Company Limited & Anr. v. Bijendra Prasad Gupta and Ors., this Court noticed; “S. A. De Smith in Constitutional and Administrative Law at page 566 (2nd Edn.) has stated that while judicial review is related to the requisition of property, an ostensibly small deviation from the statutory requirements may be held to render the act invalid. For example, no disposal of the matter by the Minister within prescribed period so that the owner of the property cannot prefer an appeal within the time and/or failure to mention in the notice that he is entitled to file representation would vitiate the proceedings. Reference in this connection may be to the case of (16) Lee v. Department of Education and Science reported in (1967) 66 LGR 211 (failure to afford adequated time for persons aggrieved by proposed administrative order to make representation); (17) Agricultural Etc. Training Board v. Kent, (1970) 2 Q. 3. 18 (failure to notify address for lodging appeal). Reference in this connection may be to the case of (16) Lee v. Department of Education and Science reported in (1967) 66 LGR 211 (failure to afford adequated time for persons aggrieved by proposed administrative order to make representation); (17) Agricultural Etc. Training Board v. Kent, (1970) 2 Q. 3. 18 (failure to notify address for lodging appeal). The said view has been referred to in the said treatise (New Edition) at pages 551 in the following terms:- “Examples of procedural requirements which have been held to be mandatory include failure to give notice of a right to appeal within a specified period, failure to give the address to which an appeal must be lodged, failure to notify persons affected by a proposed administrative order in due time.” In Tarak Nath Sen & Ors.’s case (supra) it was held as follows:- “Now in the impugned order all what was stated was that in the opinion of the requisitioning authority it was thought necessary for the purpose of “creating better living condition in the area” to requisition the premises in question. It does not stipulate that it was for the people residing in such area nor does it stipulate that it was for construction or reconstruction of dwelling places. In the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondent authorities it has also not been stated as to whether the premises in question was requisitioned either for the purpose of construction or reconstruction of dwelling places either for the people residing in such area or for any other area at all. Therefore, both form the impugned order and from the answer shown to the Rule Nisit it is apparent that the order was not for the purpose contemplated by the section.” It is true that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not sit in appeal over the opinion of the Collector but there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that as in terms of the provisions of the said Act, as a special power has been conferred upon the Collector, this Court in a suitable case would be entitled to consider as to whether an order under Section 3(1) of the said Act has been made by the Collector upon proper application of mind and whether while passing such order the requirement of law have been competent with or not. In Rajasthan Housing Board & Ors.’s case reported in 1993 (2) SCC 84 the apex Court was considering the provisions of Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act. It is now well known that a decision passed on the provisions of one statute cannot be relied upon for the purpose on the provisions of one statute cannot be relied upon for the purposes of construction of another statute which are not in pari materia with each other. In that case, the apex Court was considering the question as to whether an acquisition of land by invoking the provision of Section 17(4) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act was valid. The apex Court noticed that the Housing Board had obtained loan from HUDCO in a time bound program of construction and appointment of large number of engineers and staff already made by the Board for the work had been made and in those circumstances, satisfaction of the Government that unless possession taken immediately and the Board is permitted to proceed with the construction, it would not be able to adhere to the time bound programme, was upheld. The learned Judges held that they were satisfied that there was materials before the Government in that case upon which it could have formed its opinion. No such materials have been placed before us. In 1996 (1) SCC 9 , the Supreme Court was concerned with a similar question under the land Acquisition Act holding that the land was being acquired under the direction of the Supreme Court and it was of utmost importance and urgency to complete the construction of S. P. T.’s in the city of Delhi as the project was of great public importance. The Court also took judicial notice of the fact that there was utmost urgency and as such, emergency provision of the Act was rightly invoked. However, the case at hand, raises absolutely a different question namely as to whether there had been proper application of mind on the part of the Collector or not. As noticed hereinbefore, the said Act applies where requisition and speedy acquisition of land for certain purposes is necessary. However, the case at hand, raises absolutely a different question namely as to whether there had been proper application of mind on the part of the Collector or not. As noticed hereinbefore, the said Act applies where requisition and speedy acquisition of land for certain purposes is necessary. The Supreme Court of India in H. D. Vora’s case reported in AIR 1984 SC 866 , has clearly pointed out the distinction between two concepts of acquisition and requisition stating, “Acquisition means the acquiring of the entire title of the expropriated owner whatever the nature and extent of that title may be. The entire bundle of rights which was vested in the original holder passes on acquisition to the acquirer leaving nothing to the former. The concept of acquisitions has an air of permanence and finality in that there is transference of the title of the original holder to the acquiring authority. But the concept of requisition involves merely taking of ‘domain or control over property without acquiring rights of ownership’ and must by its very nature be of temporary duration. It was held that the Government under guise of requisition cannot continue for an indefinite period of time which would in substance acquire the property and thus a fraud on the power of the Government. If the Government wasnts to take over the property for an indefinite period of time, the Government must acquire the property but it cannot use the power of requisition for achieving that object. The power of requisition is exercisable by the Government only for a public purpose which is of a transitory character. If the public purpose for which the premises are required is of a perennial or permanent character from the very inception, no order can be passed requisitioning the premises and if passed, would be a fraud upon the statute, for the Government would be requisitioning the premises when really speaking they want the premises for acquisition, the object of taking the premises being not transitory but permanent in character. A housing project evidently is a purpose which is permanent in character. Furthermore, the Collector while exercising his statutory power/jurisdiction under Section 3 of the said Act and when the statutory authorities exercise a statutory powers, such an order can be upheld on the basis of the materials which were on record at the relevant time. A housing project evidently is a purpose which is permanent in character. Furthermore, the Collector while exercising his statutory power/jurisdiction under Section 3 of the said Act and when the statutory authorities exercise a statutory powers, such an order can be upheld on the basis of the materials which were on record at the relevant time. If such an order cannot be upheld on the basis of the materials which were available before the Collector, the same cannot be sustained by bringing on records any subsequent materials or by way of affidavits. Reference in this connection may be made to (18) Mahendra Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner reported in AIR 1978 SC 851 . As indicated hereinbefore, before the learned Trial Judge it was stated that such housing project is necessary for the weaker section of society. During the pendency of the writ application on 19th November, 1987, the appellants filed an application stating that no reason exists for continuing the requisition of the land as the housing project is complete and the West Bengal Housing Board has started selling flats to various people. It was further stated that a substantial area of land became surplus and the respondent No. 4 also made advertisement in the news papers for selling the surplus land, However, in the affidavit-in-opposition to the stay application affirmed by Sri Tapan Kumar Gangopadhyay. Deputy Director (E.W.) West Bengal, filed on 29th January, 1988, it was stated that the Housing Project was not yet complete. However, from the statements made in the affidavit-in-opposition to the stay application, it is now evident that the aforementioned housing project not only comprises of the construction of the building for the weaker section of the society, but for all sections including high income group and middle income group people as would be evident from the following as contained in the Information Guide to ownership houses for sale at Dankuni:- “General Information : For HIG Unit- (i) All houses will be single-storeyed with foundation for double storey. (ii) There will be provision for internal electrification to the house and allottees will have to arrange connection from West Bengal State Electricity Board. (iii) As regards water supply, there will be provision for over head tanks for constant supply’s of water. (iv) For upper HIG Houses, the toilet will be mosaic finished. (v) There will the septic tank to individual houses. (iii) As regards water supply, there will be provision for over head tanks for constant supply’s of water. (iv) For upper HIG Houses, the toilet will be mosaic finished. (v) There will the septic tank to individual houses. For MIG Houses : (i) The houses will be single-storeyed with provision for double storey. (ii) There will be provision for internal electrification for which the allottees will have to arrange connections from West Bengal State Electricity Board. (iii) As regards water supply, there will be one supply point within plot near the buildings. The allottees will have to make further arrangement of their own for further extension. (iv) The outside of the house will be rule-pointing. (v) The sewerage will be treated through leech tanks. For LIG Houses : (i) There will be spot tubewell on community basis. (ii) There will be street light on the road but no internal electrification will be provided. However, the allottees can arrangement for electricity afterwards, if they so desire. Besides those provisions, there shall be following common facilities to all houses. Provision for internal roads, drainage, sewerage disposal street lighting etc. in the project area along with a Central pump-house for supply of water in the project area.” Furthermore, in the ‘Information Guide of Ownership Flats for sale at Dankuni, Phase III’ upon which strong reliance has been placed by the Housing Board as regards HIG (1) flats, it is stated that plinth area would be 57.0 square metre and 96 flats would be constructed, average price whereof would be Rs. 1,80,000/- and the persons entitled to file application therefore may be in the income group of Rs. 2,501/- and above per month i. e. no higher limit at all had been fixed. The lands in question admittedly are required to be uses for Phase III of the housing project which came into being in the year 1990 i. e. after a period of eight years from the date of requisition. In this situation, we have not other option but to hold that there was absolutely no emergency. This Bench in Bengal Peerless’s case (supra) arrived at a similar finding. In this situation, we have not other option but to hold that there was absolutely no emergency. This Bench in Bengal Peerless’s case (supra) arrived at a similar finding. In Indian Metals & Ferror Alloys Ltd. & Anr.’s case (supra) a Division Bench of this Court has clearly held that whether on the face of the records two different stands as to the purpose of requisition is taken, there cannot be any formation of opinion as to the purpose for which it was sought to be requisitioned. In Smt. Sushila Debi & Ors.’s case (supra), a learned Single Judge relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Jiwani Kumar Paraki’s case (supra) held as follows:- “Undoubtedly, if power can be exercised in extremely urgent cases, the use of such power in non-urgent cases like the present one is undoubtedly an abuse of power and this Court is entitled to interfere with such exercise of power in view of the decision in the case of Jiwani Kumar Paraki (supra).” Furthermore is noticed hereinbefore, in the affidavit-in-opposition itself the respondents have stated that the lands are required for construction of 96 number of flats and also for constructing market, post office, bark, milk booth, and garbage vat. Evidently therefore, it is not a case where a housing project was undertaken for the welfare of the weaker section of the society. Reference in this connection may be made to (19) Sayet Fateha Ali Mira v. Union of India reported in 93 CWN 992. In Bengal Peerless Housing Development Company Limited’s case (supra) also this Court held that such a shifting stand cannot be upheld stating that such a housing complex which should serve the purpose of rich men would not require invocation of the provision of the said land by-passing the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and it was further observed that evidently even there was no emergency as is evidenced from sequence of events. 12. It may be true as has been submitted by Mr. Bihani that the order of requisition may not disclose public purpose but when such a public purpose had been stated, the same would subject to the judicial scrutiny. 12. It may be true as has been submitted by Mr. Bihani that the order of requisition may not disclose public purpose but when such a public purpose had been stated, the same would subject to the judicial scrutiny. In any event, as and when such subjective satisfaction on the part of the concerned authority is questioned, it is obligatory on the part of the said authority to produce all materials before the Court to satisfy it that there existed materials for formation of such opinion. This aspect of the matter has been considered by us in West Bengal Housing Board v. Bhanwarlal Mundhra and Ors., F. M. A. T. No. 1507 of 1994 disposed of on 7.6.96 in the following terms:- “In the case of H. D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1984 SC 866 the Apex Court clearly held that it is not necessary that the order of requisition must explicitly set out the public purpose for which it is made but it categorically held that the only requirement of the law is that the requisitioning must be made for a public purpose and so long as there is a public purpose for which an order of requisition is made, it would be valid irrespective of whether such public purpose is recited in the order of requisition or not. The Apex Court further observed that the State Government would have to show that the order of requisition was made for a public purpose and the necessary facts showing the public purpose for which the order of requisition was made would have to be established by the State Government to the satisfaction of the Court. The aforementioned decision of the Apex Court, therefore, instead of assisting the appellant militate against its contention. The aforementioned decision of the Apex Court, therefore, instead of assisting the appellant militate against its contention. We may, however, note that Supreme Court in the case of (20) Union of India v. Rai Singh Dev Singh reported in AIR 1974 SC 478 while considering a notice issued for reopening of assessment in terms of Section 34 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 held that when the Income Tax Officer was called upon by the assessee to produce the report made by him to the Central Board of Revenue thereon but despite the same, neither the Union of India not the Income Tax Officer cared to produce the report made by the Income Tax Officer to the Central Board of Revenue; the Apex Court despite a plea that the records were not traceable drew an adverse inference against the department.” In (21) Amiya Kumar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal and Ors. reported in 70 CWN 499, D. Basu, J. merely stated that specific public purpose may not be stated in the notification at all and that it may be established by hearing evidence aliunde. In the instant case, as noticed hereinbefore, the same has not been done. 13. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Judge cannot be sustained. This appeal is, therefore, allowed and the writ application of the writ petitioners is allowed. Let the possession of the properties in question be restored to the writ petitioners-appellants. The order of requisition is quashed. 14. However, before parting with this case, we may observer that this judgment shall not stand in the way of the Housing Board to purchase the land in question from the appellants by way of negotiations nor this order shall debar the State and/or the competent authority to initiate any other acquisition proceeding in accordance with law. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. Chakraborty, J. ; I agree.