JUDGMENT 1. The petitioners have prayed for issue of an appropriate writ or direction to quash Exts. P-3 and P-4 communications sent by the respondent Bank, which is a subsidiary of State Bank of India. By the said communications, their appointment to the posts of peon was cancelled. 2. The petitioners were offered appointments in the subordinate cadre of employment under the respondent, after holding an interview. Exts. P-1 and P-2 are the appointment letters. When the petitioners were asked to produce their certificates regarding academic qualifications, it was found that both of 'them have passed S.S.L.C. Examination. A pass in the S.S.L.C. Examination is a disqualification for appointment to the post of peon according to the rules framed by the respondent in that behalf. Since they were found to be disqualified for appointment as peons, their appointments were cancelled. It is contended by them that by Exts. P-1 and P-2 appointment letters, they have derived a right and the same cannot be taken away arbitrarily. Exts. P-3 and P-4 are violative of the principles of natural justice. Their appointments were cancelled without giving them an opportunity of being heard. 3. The respondent in the counter affidavit has stated that in 1986 the Bank prepared a District wise panel of candidates from among those who were sponsored by the respective Employment Exchanges after conducting an interview with a view to fill up the future vacancies which might arise in the Bank during the one year period from the date of approval of the panel. The petitioners' names were included in that panel and accordingly they were offered appointments in the service of the respondent Bank. One of the conditions for appointments as Peons is that the candidates should be non matriculates or should not have passed the S.S.L.C. Examination but should have the minimum qualification of a pass in VIII standard. The policy behind this is stated as follows: Apart from other requirements and conditions of eligibility for appointment as peon, the essential condition in respect of educational qualification has been prescribed to ensure that candidates with lower qualifications are given opportunity to seek employment in the lowest category of jobs in the respondent Bank. The policy behind this is stated as follows: Apart from other requirements and conditions of eligibility for appointment as peon, the essential condition in respect of educational qualification has been prescribed to ensure that candidates with lower qualifications are given opportunity to seek employment in the lowest category of jobs in the respondent Bank. If any deviation or relaxation is made in the matter of educational qualification fixed for the post of peons, candidates with higher qualification would easily secure the lowest jobs in the Banks to the detriment and disadvantage of the candidates with lower qualification which alone is required to carry out the duties and functions of such jobs. In view of the above, the respondent Bank had to stipulate the condition to exclude or disqualify candidates who have matriculated or who have passed S.S.L.C. Examination from being appointed to the post of peons. Without the stipulation and strict enforcement of such a condition, it would be impossible to ensure that the lowest jobs in the respondent Bank are available to persons who are non matriculars or who have not passed S.S.L.C. Examination. Such a provision is only proper, reasonable, and highly necessary in public interest. It is also necessary in order to ensure a fair and equitable distribution for different categories of jobs. Any departure or relaxation in the said condition would render the aforementioned object ineffective. 4. The offer of appointment was given to both the petitioners on the basis of the information made available to the Bank. When the petitioners did not satisfy the eligibility criteria stipulated as to educational qualification, the petitioners were not allowed to join in the service of the respondent Bank, by cancelling the offer of appointment. The offer of appointment is subject to production of documents in proof of what they stated and claimed to be eligible for the post for which the offer was given. The petitioners failed to show that they fulfilled the eligibility criteria with regard to educational qualification. They did not derive any right by Exts. P1 and P-2 and as such the cancellation of their appointment is neither illegal nor arbitrary. Since the petitioners were found ineligible for appointment according to rules, there was no necessity for giving them any opportunity of being heard before issue of Exts. P-3 and P-4. 5. They did not derive any right by Exts. P1 and P-2 and as such the cancellation of their appointment is neither illegal nor arbitrary. Since the petitioners were found ineligible for appointment according to rules, there was no necessity for giving them any opportunity of being heard before issue of Exts. P-3 and P-4. 5. When this matter came up before a learned Single Judge, the learned Judge doubted the correctness of the proposition laid down in K. Vimaldnandan and another v. The State Bank of Travancore and others OP. No. 4935/86 (decided on 14th August 1989) and as held in various decisions of this court that qualifications have to be considered not on the date of actual appointment but on the date of application or occurrence of vacancies. It was observed by him that this Court in James Thomas v. Chief Justice 1977 KLT 622 (F.B.); Varghese v. State 1981 KLT 458 (F.B.) and K. Vimalanandan v. State Bank of Travancore OP. No. 4935/86 has held that eligibility with regard to qualification for appointment to any post whether on promotion or otherwise should be adjudged on the date of application for the post or the date of occurrence of the vacancy. The learned Judge further held that when pursuit of areas of excellence is a constitutional perception, it is difficult to assent to the view, that the acquisition of subsequent qualification should operate as a disqualification. He therefore referred the matter for decision by a Division Bench. Accordingly, we heard the matter in detail. 6. The main question that arises for consideration is as to which is the relevant date for adjudging the eligibility qualifications of a candidate for appointment to a post. 7. The aforesaid two Full Bench decisions lay down that a person who is eligible for promotion should possess the requisite qualifications on the date when the vacancy arises in that post and not when the actual promotion is given. These two decisions do not deal with matters relating to first or initial appointment. 8. In Dr. M. V. Nair v. Union of India 1993 (2) SCC 429 , it has been laid down by the Supreme Count that suitability and eligibility have to be considered with reference to the last date for receiving the applications unless of course, the notification calling for applications itself specifies such a date. 8. In Dr. M. V. Nair v. Union of India 1993 (2) SCC 429 , it has been laid down by the Supreme Count that suitability and eligibility have to be considered with reference to the last date for receiving the applications unless of course, the notification calling for applications itself specifies such a date. In Rekhu Chaturvedi v. University of Rajasthan 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 168 the Supreme Court affirmed the principle and laid down as follows: "The contention that the required qualifications of the candidates should be examined with reference! to the date of selection and not with reference to the last date for making applications has only to be stated to be rejected. The date of selection is invariably uncertain. In the absence of knowledge of such date the candidates who apply for the posts would be unable to state whether they are qualified for the posts in question or not, if they are yet to acquire the qualifications. Unless the advertisement mentions a fixed date; with reference to which the qualifications are to be judged, whether the said date is of selection or otherwise, it would not be possible for the candidates who do not possess the requisites qualifications in presenti even to make applications for the posts. The uncertainty of the date may also lead to a contrary consequence, viz., even those candidates who do not have the qualifications in presenti and are likely to acquire them at an uncertain future date, may apply for the posts thus swelling the, number of applications. But a still worse consequence may follow, in that it may leave open a scope for malpractices. The date of selection may be so fixed or manipulated as to entertain some applicants and reject others, arbitrarily. Hence, in the absence of a fixed date indicated in the advertisement/notification inviting applications with reference to which the requisite qualifications should be judged, this only certain date for the scrutiny of the qualifications will be the last date for making the applications." While making the above observation, the Supreme Court laid down the following guide lines for future selection process: "A. The qualifications advertised by the University for the posts should not be at variance with those prescribed by its Ordinance/ Statutes. B. The candidates selected must be qualified as on the last date for making applications or on a date specified in the advertisement/ notification for the purpose and not on any subsequent date. C. Unless the advertisement/notification specifically states that the qualifications would be relaxed and also the conditions on which they would be relaxed, any relaxation of the minimum required qualifications would be illegal. D. The proceedings of selection must contain the reasons for making relaxations, if any, in respect of each of the candidates in whose favour relaxation was made. E. The minutes of the meetings of the Selection Committee should be preserved for a sufficiently long time, and if the selection process is challenged until the challenge is finally disposed of." Though the aforesaid guidelines are meant for the University, yet in our opinion, the State and all local or other authorities as envisaged in Art.12 of the Constitution of India should also follow the same while making initial recruitment by selection of candidates for appointment to services and posts in connection with their affairs. This Court followed the aforesaid dictum of the Supreme Court in Mehaboob Razool v. Public Service Commission 1995 (2) KLT 718 . 9. In the instant case, the petitioners were sponsored by the Employment Exchange on the requisition made by the respondent Bank. Neither party has produced the letter which was sent by the Bank to the Employment Exchange requesting them to sponsor the candidates for the said post. There is nothing on record to show the relevant date with reference to which the eligibility is to be ascertained. But it is evident from the general guidelines prescribed by the respondent Bank in the matter of selection to the post of peons that the relevant date is the date when, the candidates becomes eligible for inclusion in the panel of names, who are likely to be appointed. The general guidelines read as follows; "1. The candidates should be given a cycling test to ascertain whether they know cycling. The candidates who know cycling should alone be selected. 2. The candidates will be eligible for inclusion in the panel only if they have passed 8th Standard. They should not have, however passed S.S.L.C. Examination, should be non matriculate but should have passed VIII Standard. The candidates should be given a cycling test to ascertain whether they know cycling. The candidates who know cycling should alone be selected. 2. The candidates will be eligible for inclusion in the panel only if they have passed 8th Standard. They should not have, however passed S.S.L.C. Examination, should be non matriculate but should have passed VIII Standard. (Those who have appeared S.S.L.C. Examination as private overaged candidate and subsequently failed in the examination will not be eligible unless they have passed Standard VIII). 3. The candidates should be between 18 and 24 years of age as in the case of S.C./S.T. candidates, the maximum age limit is 29 years (i.e.) they should be between 18 and 29 years of age as on. In the case of Ex-servicemen, if their active military service is deducted from their actual age, the resultant age should be between 18 and 27 years as on. Their actual age should not, however, be over 45 years. 4. The original certificates evidencing age, educational qualifications should be carefully verified to ascertain the correctness of the information already furnished. 5. In the case of candidates belonging to SC/ST, caste certificate should be verified. 6. In the case of Ex-servicemen, their military discharge certificate should be verified. 7. In the case of physically handicapped candidates, the maximum age limit is 34 years (i.e.) they should be between 18 and 34 years of age as on and should ensure that their handicap should not prevent them from performing the duties of subordinate staff." If a candidate has passed matriculation or S.S.L.C. examination, at the time of preparation of the panel, he becomes disqualified for appointment to the post of a peon. In this case, there is no dispute that the panel was prepared in April, 1986. But, the petitioners had passed the S.S.L.C. Examination in March, 1986. Thus by April, 1986 they were ineligible for appointment as per the aforesaid guide lines prescribed by the respondent Bank. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that it would appear from Ext. P-7 dated 2nd January 1985 that the petitioners were interviewed for the post on 22nd January 1985. By then, they had the requisite qualification to hold the post and were not disqualified for removal from the panel. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that it would appear from Ext. P-7 dated 2nd January 1985 that the petitioners were interviewed for the post on 22nd January 1985. By then, they had the requisite qualification to hold the post and were not disqualified for removal from the panel. If the date of interview is taken to be the relevant date, it is contended that cancellation of their appointment is illegal. We are not inclined to accept this contention. There is nothing in the aforesaid guide lines to show that the date of interview is the relevant date On the other hand, it is legitimate to infer that the date of empanelment is the relevant date. Moreover, neither of these petitioners were empanelled in the panel prepared for appointment in the years 1983 and 1985. Since they were empanelled in April, 1986, the relevant date should be taken to be that occurring in April, 1986. In this view of the matter, we find that the petitioners were found to be disqualified for appointment as peons in the establishment of the respondent Bank on the relevant date and as such the cancellation of their appointment as per Exts. P-3 and P-4 as valid. 11. The policy adopted by the respondent Bank cannot be held to be arbitrary because there is justification in saying that an overqualified candidate is neither desirable nor required for the post We agree with the observation made to the same effect by the learned Single Judge in O. P. No. 4935 of 1986-K. 12. It was not incumbent on the part of the respondent to give an opportunity to the petitioners of being heard before their appointments were cancelled inasmuch as by their own conduct they made themselves disqualified for appointment to the post which was proved by the certificates produced by them No vested right was acquired before they joined in the post In this case, the offer of appointment was cancelled prior to their joining in the post, on valid grounds. 13. For the reasons stated above, we find that there is no merit in this writ petition. We, therefore, dismiss it. Parties to bear their respective costs.