JUDGMENT L. MANOHARAN, J. :-The appellant who was accused in Sessions Case No. 685 of 1992 before the 9th Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur, was convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to undergone imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 200/-, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of two months. The appellant challenges the said conviction and sentence, 2. At about 9.00 p.m. on 12-4-1991, father of P.W. 1 Murlidhar was attacked in front of a water tap by the accused with the Article 'A', spear blade. P.W. 1 Murlidhar who witnessed the occurrence unsuccessfully intervened to save his father, and he also sustained incised injury on his buttock. Though the injured was removed to a bullock cart with the object of taking him to the hospital, it was revealed that he was no more and, therefore, P.W. 1 Murlidhar proceeded to the Police Station, Kuhi and tendered oral statement at about 11.30 p.m. before P.W. 7 who registered Crime No. 57/91, Exh. 28, P.W. 7 proceeded to the scene of occurrence and prepared spot panchanama. He made arrangement to send the dead body for post-mortem. Doctor conducted post-mortem and issued exhibit 15, post-mortem examination report. After questioning the witnesses and completing the necessary formalities, P.W. 7 laid charge report before the learned Magistrate who committed the case before the 9th Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur. 3. The prosecution mainly relies on the evidence of occurrence witnesses P.Ws. 1, 4, 5 and 6 along with the material documents. The learned counsel for appellant Mr. Patwardhan contended that the evidence of these witnesses is unworthy of acceptance. The learned counsel pointed out that even as per the evidence of these witnesses, there was darkness and there is nothing in evidence to show that there was light so that these witnesses could see the occurrence. The learned counsel pointed out that the defence has examined D.W. 1 to show that on that night, there was no light at the place of occurrence. It was also argued by the learned counsel that P.Ws. 5 and 6 are only chance and got-up witnesses and their evidence cannot be accepted on the ground that admittedly they were questioned only after five days of the occurrence. It was also argued by the learned counsel that P.Ws. 5 and 6 are only chance and got-up witnesses and their evidence cannot be accepted on the ground that admittedly they were questioned only after five days of the occurrence. It is also contended by the learned counsel that the evidence of these witnesses becomes suspicious, because Exhibit 15 post-mortem examination report shows that the injuries found on the dead body could have been sustained six hours before the post-mortem, which was at 10.30 a.m. on 13-4-1991. It is maintained by Mr. Patwardhan that no reliance whatever can be placed on exhibits 14 and 24 which, according to the prosecution, are respectively their requisition to the doctor to examine the accused and wound certificate issued by him for examining the accused. The learned counsel maintained that inasmuch as no question was put to the accused with reference to the same when he was examined under Section 313, Cr.P.C., the whole trial is vitiated and the accused is prejudiced on that account and at any rate, according to the learned counsel, the said incriminating circumstance appearing from the said evidence cannot be made the basis of conviction of the accused. 4. Before going to the said points, it has to be noted that with due regard to exhibit 15, there can be no doubt that Kisan met homicidal death. There were ten injuries on the dead body of which injury Nos. 1, 5 and 8, according to the doctor, are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Except injury Nos. 2, 9 and 10, all others are incised injuries. Exhibit 15 states that Kisan died due to shock due to injury to lung and heart. 5. Now, the main question for consideration is, whether the evidence of the occurrence witnesses is capable of bringing home the guilt of the accused. The evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 4 are attacked on the ground that they are interested witnesses; P.W. 1 is the son of deceased Kisan and P.W. 4 is his nephew. It is settled position that interestedness by itself is no ground to discard the evidence of a witness. All that is required is that the evidence of such witness has to be subjected. to strict scrutiny and the said scrutiny must be with due regard to the circumstances brought out in the evidence. It is settled position that interestedness by itself is no ground to discard the evidence of a witness. All that is required is that the evidence of such witness has to be subjected. to strict scrutiny and the said scrutiny must be with due regard to the circumstances brought out in the evidence. P.W. 1 Muridhar said that there occurred quarrel between P.W. 4 Someshwar and the accused; his father interfered in the quarrel and he scolded the accused and the accused asking him as to what was his intention, caught hold of the neck of his father, whipped out Article 1 from his waist and started inflicting blows on the deceased with the said weapon. He states that he inflicted injuries on the left and right side of chest and stomach. He proceeds to swear that when he interfered to save his father, the accused inflicts blow of spear blade on his buttock. He narrated that his father died on the spot and he lodged report (Exhibit 27) before the Police Station on the basis of which Exhibit 28, First Information Report was registered. P.W. 4 Someshwar substantially supports the evidence of P.W. 1 Murlidhar. It may be noted that the house of P.W. 4 is opposite the house of accused. These houses are situated on either side of the road and in front of the house of accused, there is a water tap. P.W. 4 stated that at the time of occurrence, daughter of accused was playing around the water tap. His evidence throws light as to how occurrence started. He would swear that he asked daughter of accused to go away, but she complained to her mother and her mother abused him. At that time, accused came there and enquired with his wife as to what had happened, and started abusing him. It was at that time that late Kisan, his paternal uncle came to the scene from the side of temple who asked him as to why he was quarrelling and asked him to go home. Then the accused asked Kisan as to what was his intention and caught hold of his neck, whipped out weapon and started assaulting. He also swears as to the accused inflicting injury on the buttock of P. W. 1 when he tried to interfere. Then the accused asked Kisan as to what was his intention and caught hold of his neck, whipped out weapon and started assaulting. He also swears as to the accused inflicting injury on the buttock of P. W. 1 when he tried to interfere. He identifies the weapon which, according to the prosecution, was in the hand of the accused at the relevant time. P.W. 5 Gangadhar claims that deceased met him near the temple along with one Nago Sapate. He said that he enquired about Vijay, son of deceased, for Vijay was driver on his lorry. Later, when he was at a distance of 10 feet from the scene of occurrence, he heard, which attracted his attention and he proceeded to the scene when he saw knife in the hand of accused Sukhdeo who was inflicting blows on Kisan. He also corroborates the evidence of P.W. 1 Murlidhar as to the sequence of events. P.W. 6 Ramkrushna is another occurrence witness who said that he is residing 3 Kms. away from the scene of occurrence and when he was on his way to start motor pump, he chanced to see the occurrence. He also narrated the transaction. 6. As noticed, the main thrust of attack against the acceptability of this evidence is that these witnesses are interested witnesses as P.W. 1 is son of deceased, P.W. 4 is his nephew and P.W. 6 is their relative. P.W. 6 Ramkrushna said in the cross-examination that he is relative of deceased Kisan. As we have already observed, interestedness by itself is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of a witness. All that is necessary is to see whether their claim that they were present at the occurrence, is probable. P.Ws. 1 and 4 are, admittedly, neighbourers and the evidence of P.W. 1 gets enough corroboration from Exhibit 27, First Information Report; that was lodged within few hours of occurrence and Police Station was 3 Kms. away from the scene of occurrence. The First Information Report can corroborate the informant; with due regard to the proximity of the residences of P.Ws. 1 and 4 and the time of occurrence, their presence becomes highly probable. P.W. 5 has given the reason for his presence at that time though he is residing 3 Kms. away from the scene of occurrence. The First Information Report can corroborate the informant; with due regard to the proximity of the residences of P.Ws. 1 and 4 and the time of occurrence, their presence becomes highly probable. P.W. 5 has given the reason for his presence at that time though he is residing 3 Kms. away from the scene of occurrence. Likewise, P.W. 6 has also sworn to the occasion for his presence he said he was on his way to start the water pump. P.W. 5 is an independent witness. No hostility is brought out in the evidence of either P.W. 5 or P. W. 6. The specific attack against the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 6 is that their statements under Section 161, Cr.P.C. were recorded only after five days of the occurrence. The learned counsel Mr. Patwardhan submitted that so long as the prosecution has no acceptable explanation for that delay, the evidence of these witnesses becomes suspicious. But it is significant in this connection to note that no suggestion even was made to P.W. 7, Investigating Officer in this aspect. The contention that none from the neighbourhood is examined, has to be appreciated in the background of the fact that the prosecution is not obliged to examine all the occurrence witnesses. Further, the Investigating Officer was not asked as to whether he questioned any in the neighbourhood and recorded their statements. In the said situation, it will not be possible to discard the evidence of P. Ws. 5 and 6 on the mere ground that they were questioned only after five days of the occurrence. 7. Yet another contention taken up by the learned counsel against the version given by these witnesses is that the medical evidence is wholly inconsistent with the version given by these witnesses. Mr. Patwardhan made specific reference to the statement in Exhibit 15, Column 17, wherein the doctor says that the injuries were fresh i.e. within six hours and were ante-mortem. The postmortem commenced from 10.40 a.m. on 13-4-1991. It is pointed out by Mr. Patwardhan that as per the aforesaid statement the injuries were only six hours old the occurrence could have been at about 5.00 a.m. on 13-4-1991 whereas according to the occurrence witnesses, the occurrence took place at about 9.00 p.m. on 12-4-1991. The postmortem commenced from 10.40 a.m. on 13-4-1991. It is pointed out by Mr. Patwardhan that as per the aforesaid statement the injuries were only six hours old the occurrence could have been at about 5.00 a.m. on 13-4-1991 whereas according to the occurrence witnesses, the occurrence took place at about 9.00 p.m. on 12-4-1991. This is a total contradiction which should, according to the learned counsel out-weigh the ocular evidence of these witnesses and hence, whole case of the prosecution is in doubt and that benefit must go to the accused. In support of the said submission, the learned counsel referred us to the decision in Bellavaram Pedda Narsi Reddy v. State of A.P., 1991 Cri LJ 1833 : ( AIR 1991 SC 1468 ). This was a case where the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the accused which was reversed by the High Court and convicted the accused persons. In para 5 of the decision, it is observed that the learned Sessions Judge, on consideration of the medical evidence was also of the view that the occurrence could have happened at the time mentioned by the witnesses. Mr. Patwardhan relied on this decision in support of his argument that the medical opinion has got relevancy in considering the probability of the occurrence. It must be noted that it was not the only ground on which the Supreme Court disbelieved the prosecution case. In that case identification parade was not found to have been properly conducted and the identity and involvement of accused was not established beyond reasonable doubt. However, the said decision itself would show that there was a variety of reasons against the conviction by the High Court. Therefore, the statement in para 5 cannot be said to be the ratio particularly when the decision itself makes it clear that the Supreme Court was only adverting to the grounds upon which the learned Sessions Judge had acquitted the accused. In State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal, AIR 1988 SC 2154 : (1989 Cri LJ 288), the Supreme Court has laid down as to the effect of medical evidence in the context of the ocular evidence. In the said decision it is held that where the eye-witnesses' account is found credible and trustworthy medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities cannot be accepted as conclusive. In the said decision it is held that where the eye-witnesses' account is found credible and trustworthy medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities cannot be accepted as conclusive. The Supreme Court proceeded to caution that the ocular evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story. In this case, there is also yet another important circumstance which, we consider, is a complete answer to the aforesaid argument of the learned counsel. Exibit 27 was tendered before P.W. 7 at 11.30 p.m. on 12-4-1991. There is no challenge as to the date and time of tendering Exhibit 27. First Information Report (Exh. 28) was registered on the basis of Exhibit 27. If as a matter of fact, Kisan died only at 5.00 a.m. of 13-4-1991, there could not have been First Information Report at 11.30 p.m. on 12-4-1991 with respect to the occurrence that took place at 9.00 p.m. It must be noted that the offence was registered under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Since there is no challenge as to the time and the date of reporting of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, the same is a complete answer to the argument advanced that the occurrence could have been only at about 5.00 a.m. on 13-4-1991. One cannot exalt the aforesaid statement of the doctor as substantive evidence when one is aware that the same is only opinion evidence admissible under Section 45 of the Evidence Act. Looking at the aforesaid circumstance, it is not possible to agree with the learned counsel that the prosecution case is not acceptable in view of the aforesaid statement in the post-mortem report. Yet another aspect to be noted in this connection is, P.W. 1 had received injury in the same transaction. Reference to his sustaining the injury is made in Exhibit 27 itself. P.W. 5 also swears to his having seen the accused inflicting injury on P.W. 1 also. This also functions as assurance to the veracity of the evidence of the said witnesses. 8. In this connection, one other argument of the learned counsel for appellant has to be noticed. Reference to his sustaining the injury is made in Exhibit 27 itself. P.W. 5 also swears to his having seen the accused inflicting injury on P.W. 1 also. This also functions as assurance to the veracity of the evidence of the said witnesses. 8. In this connection, one other argument of the learned counsel for appellant has to be noticed. The learned counsel pointed out that enough weight was not given to the evidence of D.W. 1 Govindram and if the evidence of D.W. 1 is given the importance which it deserves, it could be seen that there was no light at that time, consequently, the claim of these witnesses that they witnessed the occurrence would become unworthy of acceptance. It is true that the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 4 and 6 does not show whether there was or there was no light at the relevant time. D. W. 1 Govindram said that on seeing the public rushing to the scene of occurrence, he proceeded to the scene and noticed 5/50 persons collected there and there was darkness and therefore, he could not see as to who were standing there. He proceeded to swear that there was no load shedding in their village and the tube light near the tap was out of order for 2-3 days before the occurrence. The learned counsel submits that the prosecution evidence is inconsistent with the original Marathi version of D.W. 1 and as per the Marathi version, the tube light was out of order for the last 2-3 days before the date of incident. Though Exhibit 32, spot panchanama mentions electric pole at a distance of 15 feet from the spot of occurrence, Mr. Patwardhan points out that the spot panchanama does not show that the said electric pole has a tube light. But D.W. 1 himself admits that the said electric pole has a tube light; the only statement of D.W. 1 was that the said tube light was out of order for the last 2-3 days before the occurrence. Therefore, the fact remains that there is electric pole near the spot of occurrence which has tube light. Of course, D.W. 1 said that the tube light was out of order for the last 2-3 days. But P.W. 4 states in his cross-examination that there was street light. Therefore, the fact remains that there is electric pole near the spot of occurrence which has tube light. Of course, D.W. 1 said that the tube light was out of order for the last 2-3 days. But P.W. 4 states in his cross-examination that there was street light. The said statement in the cross-examination of P.W. 4, has got relevance in appreciating the evidence of D.W. 1, particularly in the context of spot panchanama which mentions electric pole near the spot of occurrence and the admitted case that there is a tube light attached to the said electricity pole. In the context of the said piece of evidence, when D.W. 1 himself states that there was no load shedding in their village what is sworn to by P.W. 4, in the circumstances, becomes acceptable. It has to be noted that, the accused as well as the victim are closely known to each other as they are neighbourers. The whole evidence on the question of identification has to be appreciated in the context of the said factor that the accused and these witnesses are closely known to each other and P.W. 1 himself has sustained an injury in the very same transaction. That excludes the possibility of mistaken identification. 9. Mr. Patwardhan criticised the prosecution case, because though Article 'A' is claimed to have been seized from the scene of occurrence and though according to the prosecution, the clothes of the accused were seized and were sent for chemical analysis, no chemical analysis certificate was produced. This, according to the learned counsel, must evoke an adverse inference against the prosecution case. Assuming that adverse inference is possible, the said inference can go only to the extent of holding that the prosecution is not successful in showing that the weapon as well as the clothes had human blood stain. It cannot affect the prosecution case as a whole, if there is reliable evidence of occurrence witnesses. It is then pointed out by the learned counsel that prejudice was caused to the accused on account of failure of the learned Sessions Judge to ask him with reference to the circumstance arising from Exhibits 14 and 24. Exhibit 14 is the requisition for examining the accused and Exhibit 24 is the wound certificate. It is then pointed out by the learned counsel that prejudice was caused to the accused on account of failure of the learned Sessions Judge to ask him with reference to the circumstance arising from Exhibits 14 and 24. Exhibit 14 is the requisition for examining the accused and Exhibit 24 is the wound certificate. Non-compliance of the requirement under Section 313, Cr.P.C. could, under law, be only an irregularity being so, the same cannot vitiate the whole trial or the finding by the trial Court. In the decision, Rama Shankar Singh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1239 : (1962 (2) Cri LJ 296), the Supreme Court held that there may be error or omission in complying with Section 342, (corresponding to new Section 313) correct but that not vitiate the trial. It is further held that (does) unless injustice is shown to have resulted therefrom, a mere irregularity by itself is not sufficient to justify an order of re-trial. Undoubtedly it is the duty of the Court to examine the accused and seek his explanation on the incriminating material appearing in evidence, no matter how weak or scanty the prosecution evidence is. (See State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700 ) : (1992 Cri LJ 3454). But the effect of failure to comply with Section 313, Cr.P.C. is the question that arises for consideration in this case, the trial Court did not question the accused with reference to Exhibits 14 and 24. As noticed, if at all, the same is only an irregularity and the said irregularity will be of relevance only if prejudice thereby is shown. In this context, it has to be noted that the trial Court has questioned the accused on all relevant incriminating circumstances except perhaps with reference to Exhibits 14 and 24. The lower Court also asked the accused whether he has anything to say with regard to the occurrence. In this context, it has to be noted that the trial Court has questioned the accused on all relevant incriminating circumstances except perhaps with reference to Exhibits 14 and 24. The lower Court also asked the accused whether he has anything to say with regard to the occurrence. It is necessary now to advert to the observation of the Supreme Court in paragraph 8 of its decision in Bejoy Chand Patra v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1952 SC 105 : (1952 Cri LJ 644), as under (Para 8) :- "....To sustain such an argument as had been put forward, it is not sufficient for the accused merely to show that he has not been fully examined as required by Section 342, Criminal P.C., but he must also show that such examination has materially prejudiced him. In the present case, it appears that the point urged here was not raised in the grounds of appeal to the High Court nor does it find a place in the grounds of appeal or in the statements of case filed in this Court. It has nowhere been stated that the accused was in any way prejudiced." In this case also there is no statement that failure to ask question under Section 313, Cr.P.C. on the basis of Exhibits 14 and 24, has caused prejudice to the accused. Even assuming that prejudice .was caused on failure to put question with reference to the aforesaid Exhibits 14 and 24, that cannot vitiate the trial the only effect is that particular circumstance arising from the said evidence cannot be relied on to convict the accused. It goes without saying then that if there are other evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt, the said irregularity cannot affect the finding that the accused is guilty. 10. Mr. Patwardhan then contended that the prosecution case is not acceptable, because the prosecution failed to explain the injuries sustained by the accused. Exhibit 24 is the wound certificate of the accused. Five injuries are noted. Injury Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 are mere abrasions and injury No. 4 is contusion on 9th and 11th intercostal space, 2" x 3". The question for consideration in this context is, whether the prosecution invariably is duty-bound to explain the injury on the person of the accused. Five injuries are noted. Injury Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 are mere abrasions and injury No. 4 is contusion on 9th and 11th intercostal space, 2" x 3". The question for consideration in this context is, whether the prosecution invariably is duty-bound to explain the injury on the person of the accused. In the decision of the Supreme Court in Hare Krishna Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1988 SC 863 : (1988 Cri LJ 925), the Supreme Court held that the obligation of the prosecution to explain the injuries sustained by the accused in the same occurrence may not arise in each and every case and that obligation to explain injuries sustained by the accused is not an invariable rule. If the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution are believed by the Court in proof of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the question of the obligation of the prosecution to explain the injuries sustained by the accused will not arise. In considering the duty of the prosecution to explain the injuries sustained by the accused, the nature of the injuries sustained by the accused will have relevance. If the injuries sustained by the accused in the same transaction are only minor, the prosecution is not bound to explain the injuries particularly when there is convincing evidence to support the prosecution case. With due regard to the nature of injuries sustained by the accused and also in the context of the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 4, 5 and 6 we do not consider that prosecution was obliged to explain the injuries on the accused. 11. An alternate argument was advanced by the learned counsel Mr. Patwardhan that at any rate the offence disclosed is not the one punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and if at all, the offence is punishable only under Section 304, Part-II of the Penal Code. According to the learned counsel, the material on record would show that the accused was the victim of sudden and grave provocation. The claim, thus, is that the accused is entitled to the benefit under Exception-I of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. What is submitted by the learned counsel is that the very prosecution case would show that there was a quarrel which preceded the occurrence and the said quarrel deprived the accused of self-control and the quarrel was sudden. The claim, thus, is that the accused is entitled to the benefit under Exception-I of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. What is submitted by the learned counsel is that the very prosecution case would show that there was a quarrel which preceded the occurrence and the said quarrel deprived the accused of self-control and the quarrel was sudden. When the accused claims benefit of the Exception, the burden of proof is on him to establish it. In view of Section 105 of the Evidence Act, though the burden of proof is on the accused the same is not as heavy as that of the prosecution which has to prove the case beyond shadow of reasonable doubt where as the accused need discharge his burden by pre-ponderence of probability. For discharging the said burden, the accused can rely on the very material appearing on the evidence tendered by the prosecution. But the question here is, whether the said material is such that it would lead to a conclusion that the accused was the victim of sudden and grave provocation by which he lost his self-control. A close scrutiny of sequence of events as disclosed from the evidence will be necessary. The evidence of P.W. 4 shows that he asked the daughter of accused, who was playing around the water tap, to go away whereupon wife of accused came to the scene and there ensued quarrel between P.W. 4 and the accused. When the deceased intervened to defuse the tension that was being built up, the accused turned to deceased and asked him, as to what was his intention and the confrontation took place. The very Exception-I is subject to the proviso mentioned therein and the first proviso is to the effect that the provocation was not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person. With due regard to he sequence of events, it has to be noted that it was the accused who provoked the situation which ultimately resulted in the death of Kisan. In the light of the material on record, it is impossible to agree with the learned counsel for appellant/ accused that the accused is entitled for benefit of Exception-I of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. 12. In the light of the material on record, it is impossible to agree with the learned counsel for appellant/ accused that the accused is entitled for benefit of Exception-I of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. 12. Then it was contended that inasmuch as the accused has also sustained the injuries, it can only be a case of private defence. The learned counsel submits that the appellant/accused is entitled to protection of private defence and if at all, it is a case of exceeding the right of private defence, which could attract only Exception-II of Section 300. Of course, it is not necessary that invariably the accused must plea benefit of private defence in his statement under Section 313, Cr.P.C., but as noticed, the material on record must relevant that he is entitled to private defence. The nature of injuries sustained by him in that context is of importance. He had only abrasions and a contusion whereas he caused as many as 10 injuries with a dangerous weapon on the deceased and in that transaction itself, he caused injury to P.W. 1 also. We need not go into sequence of events again. The origin of the occurrence, progress and its culmination do not support the plea of private defence. The evidence of prosecution witnesses reveals that at the occurrence accused was armed with a dangerous weapon and he used it against two persons one of whom died. His injuries are relatively of minor nature and, therefore, accused cannot claim private defence; from that it follows that the accused cannot get the benefit of Exception II of Section 300, I.P.C. also. The said argument, thus, is also not acceptable. The conviction and sentence awarded by the learned Sessions Judge does not call for any interference. The appeal is without merit and it is liable to be dismissed. 13. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.