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1996 DIGILAW 261 (PAT)

Raghunath Pathak v. Kamal Prasad Naik

1996-04-12

R.K.DEB

body1996
Judgment P. K. Deb, J. 1. This civil revision application has been preferred by the above-named defendants No.2 and 3 of title Suit No.7 of 1994 regarding part of the order dated 7.3.1994 passed by the munsif at Seraiketla and then confirmed by the 4th Additional District Judge, chaibasa, in Miscellaneous Appeal no 3 of 1994 by which temporary injunction granted in favour of the original plaintiff-respondent has been maintained. The other part of the order regarding amalgamation of the above mentioned suit with Title suit No.32 of 1992 has not been challenged. 2. The original plaintiff Smt. Jamuna Naik alias Bodo Devi @ Savitri devi filed Title Suit No.7 of 1994 before the Court of Munsif at Seraikella for a relief of declaration that the sale deed dated 4.4.1975 executed by her brother defendant No.1 in favour of defendants no.2 and 3 in respect of the suit lands as described in the Schedule of the plaint was illegal, void and inoperative and without consideration and was not binding upon the original plaintiff. There was further prayer for a decree for confirmation of possession having legitimate half share in the suit property and alternatively for recovery of possession and for a decree for permanent injunction restraining defendants No.2 and 3 from interfering/disturbing the plaintiffs possession and with her legitimate right of enjoyment of the suit land. 3. It was the case of the plaintiff savitri Devi that she and her brother defendant No.1 inherited the suit property from their predecessor and although she resides elsewhere with her husband but she occasionally comes to her fathers place and lives in the same house with her brother defendant No.1 sibu Naik, but defendant no.1 defrauded her, sold away the entire property to defendants Nos.2 and 3 in the year 1975 and when she came to know of it that the defendants were trying to divide the suit plot into sub-plots for their possession, then she filed the suit. It may be mentioned here that defendants No.2 and 3 had filed Title suit No.32 of 1992 for declaration of their right, title and interest over the suit land against the defendant No.1 sibu Naik. It may be mentioned here that defendants No.2 and 3 had filed Title suit No.32 of 1992 for declaration of their right, title and interest over the suit land against the defendant No.1 sibu Naik. In that suit, Sibu Naik took the plea that the suit land was inherited not by himself alone but also by her sister Smt. Jamuna Naik alias Savitri devi and he prayed for injunction against the plaintiff of the suit for not interfering with the possession of the defendant Sibu Naik and her sister Smt jamuna Naik, but his prayer of such injunction was dismissed. It must also be mentioned here that the plaintiff Smt jamuna Naik made a petition under section 144 of the Code of Criminal procedure (for short the Code) before the sub-Divisional Magistrate and it was found that the plaintiff Jamuna Naik and a Jhopri over the suit land and, such possession was found in favour of the plaintiff and restraint order was passed against the defendants No.2 and 3. 4. On a prayer being made under order Rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for and on behalf of the plaintiff, the learned Munsif, after hearing objection and on perusal of reply to the show cause granted temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff holding that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land and defendants No.2 and 3 could not get possession by purchase from a co-sharer unless there is partition in the suit property. It must be mentioned here that defendants No.2 and 3 had challenged about the inheritance of the plaintiff Jamuna Devi over the suit property as being sister of defendant no.1 Sibu Naik, but on an admission allegedly being made by the defendants no.2 and 3 in reply to the show cause before the Sub Divisional Magistrate in a proceeding under section 144 of the code, it was held by both the courts below that the defendant had admitted that Jamuna Devi was also a co-sharer in the suit property. Granting of injunction by the plaintiff was challenged in that appeal, as mentioned above, but the appellate court also after hearing both the parties maintained the same and hence this revision-petition. 5. Granting of injunction by the plaintiff was challenged in that appeal, as mentioned above, but the appellate court also after hearing both the parties maintained the same and hence this revision-petition. 5. Mr N. K. Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for and on behalf of the defendants No.2 and 3 petitioners, has submitted that the orders of both the courts below are illegal and even without jurisdiction when both the courts have approached the matter in a wrong angle and relied on obsolete document for the purpose of granting injunction. His submission is that the suit property even if admittedly taken to be owned by the plaintiff Smt. Jamuna devi and her brother Sibu Naik, defendant No.1 and even if the whole of the property has been wrongly sold by Sibu naik to defendants No.2 and 3, then at least title to half of the suit property must have been transferred in favour of the defendants-petitioners and they have got right to possess the same as the sale was made long back in the year 1975. On her admission, Smt. Jamuna devi used to reside elsewhere with her husband and she occasionally visited her fathers house and reside with her brother in the same house. In that case, her continuous exercise of possession over the suit property cannot be inferred. When one of the co-sharers can possess the property on behalf of the other co-sharer then Sibu Naik can be inferred to have possess the land for himself and on behalf of the sister and then sold the suit land as a whole to defendants No.2 and 3 in the year 1975 and definitely the defendants No.2 and 3 must not have sit tight rather came to possess the suit property. When there was interference of possession by Sibu naik, they filed suit for declaration of title and for confirmation of possession and then in that suit Sibu Naik took the plea that the suit property was also jointly held by his sister Smt. Jamuna devi. When attempted on the part of the defendant Sibu Naik for getting injunction against the plaintiff of Title suit No.32 of 1992 failed then it can be very well be inferred that this Jamuna devi was set up by her brother Sibu naik to file for this suit. When attempted on the part of the defendant Sibu Naik for getting injunction against the plaintiff of Title suit No.32 of 1992 failed then it can be very well be inferred that this Jamuna devi was set up by her brother Sibu naik to file for this suit. No where there is any averments from any corner that there was ever any partition of the suit property between the brother and sister. Only there is plea of possession of joint holder that too a lady having her place of abode else where then there cannot be any inference that she was possessing the whole of the land for and on behalf of the co-sharers. 6. Mr. N. K. Prasad has further sub-mitted that none of the two courts had ever discussed the ingredients of temporary injunction while granting the same, such as, prima-facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. In that view of the matter, his submission is that this court should interfere with such an order even if there are concurrent findings of both the courts when there is material irregularity in passing the order impugned. 7. Mr. M. Y. Eqbal, learned Counsel appearing for and on behalf of the opposite parties-plaintiffs submitted that there is no scope of interference under section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure when both the fact-finding courts have passed the injunction order after going through the materials on record and that the learned Munsif had the jurisdiction to pass the order and the Appellate Court has also the same jurisdiction and as such when there is no jurisdictional error there is no scope to interfere with the order of injunction passed by the Munsif and affirmed by the Appellate Court. In support of his contention, Mr Eqbal has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case Hindustan Aeronautics V/s. Ajit prasad (AIR 1973 Supreme Court 76)wherein their Lordships had held that: "in injunction matter, the High Court should not interfere even if the order is right or wrong or in accordance with law or not when both the lower courts had passed the same order unless it has been exercised its jurisdictional illegally or with material irregularity. " 8. In that case, an employee was served with suspension order and a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him. " 8. In that case, an employee was served with suspension order and a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him. He came up before court challenging the validity of the proceeding against him and also the suspension order. His contention was that the proceeding was initiated on malicious grounds, In that suit he applied for an interim order staying the operation of his suspension as well as the proceedings. First of all, the original court issued interim ex-parte order but later on it was revoked after hearing the employer. In the appeal, the order of the trial court was maintained. But in the revision before High Court, the order was modified to the extent of stay of the disciplinary proceedings till the disposal of the suit. Thus injunction was refused by both the courts below and when came up before the Supreme court by the employer, it was held that there is no scope for interference under section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure by the High Court. 9. Mr. Eqbal further in support of his contention has referred to another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi V/s. Suresh Chandra Jaipuria and another (AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2621 ). There also, both the court below had turned down the prayer of temporary injunction of the plaintiff against the defendant-Municipal Corporation, Delhi, regarding assessment of tax but when revision was filed before the High Court of Delhi, relief of injunction was granted. The Apex Court held on further revision being filed by the municipal Corporation, Delhi, that interference by the High Court with concurrent finding was unjustified as the high Court overlooked the principles governing interference under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the facts it was found that the plaintiff. i. e. the assessee had alternative relief available under the Municipal Act itself. Thus, as mentioned above, facts in both the courts are not applicable in the present case except to the extent that both the courts had concurrent findings regarding injunction against the defendant-petitioners but as is held by the apex Court, if such concurrent finding was vitiated by illegal exercise of jurisdiction or with material irregularity then definitely the High Court can interfere even under section 115 of the code of Civil Procedure as specific proviso mentioned under section 115 (1) (c. ). In the present case, both the courts had overlooked the legal position while granting injunction in favour of the plaintiff. Even on the admitted case of the plaintiff, the defendant has also acquired half of the proprietary right of the suit land on purchase from the brother of the plaintiff and the defendants-petitioners also stand on the same footing as that of the plaintiff regarding co-sharer. 10. It is true that there cannot be any specific possession of the co-sharer on purchase from another co-sharer unless the suit property is partitioned.-On this analogy alone, the injunction has been granted but the same analogy is applicable to the plaintiff herself. No where it has been stated that she is in specific possession over the suit property as a whole to the ouster of her brother. She also cannot get specific possession unless the suit property is partitioned. So both the parties remained on the same footing as being co-sharers. So by analogy of law, the defendant alone cannot be debarred by way of injunction. Moreover, for the whole of the suit property, the plaintiff has no claim. There is no prayer for partition in the present suit. Again the learned courts below had relied on an order being passed by the sub-Divisional Magistrate in a proceeding under section 144 of the Code. The question of determination of possession is not there under section 144 of the code. Moreover lifetime of proceeding under section 144 of the Code is only for two months and after the same it becomes obsolete. Thus determination of possession in favour of the plaintiff over the whole of the suit property wherein in a part of it, it is said in the order of a proceeding under section 144 of the code that there was Jhopri belonging to the plaintiff. Moreover the defendants-petitioners are not the recent purchasers. They had purchased long back in the year 1975 and the suit was filed in the year 1994 challenging the sale deed executed long back. Thus I find that the finding of the courts below were vitiated by material irregularity if not illegality. Moreover the defendants-petitioners are not the recent purchasers. They had purchased long back in the year 1975 and the suit was filed in the year 1994 challenging the sale deed executed long back. Thus I find that the finding of the courts below were vitiated by material irregularity if not illegality. The provisions of temporary injunction as contemplated under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure cast duty upon the courts to consider the three ingredients for the purpose of grant or reject of the same but unfortunately, none of the courts below had dealt with ingredients. 11. In the present case, even if there is a prima-facie case of the plaintiff Smt Jamuna Devi then her case is restricted to half of the suit property. The whole of the suit property cannot be brought is within the purview of injunction for her prima facie case. Balance of convenience cannot be in favour of the plaintiff nor in favour of the defendants as both stand on the same footing as that of the co-sharers and unless there is a partition between the co-sharers there cannot be specific possession of either of the parties. 12. Question of irreparable loss cannot even arise in the present case. The plaintiff cannot claim irreparable loss in respect of half of the suit property which admittedly did not belong to her and it is also not known where her share will be specified on partition even if her case is taken to be true on its face value. 13. In view of the above discussions I hold that when there is material irregularity and illegal approach by both the courts below, then the High Court should interfere under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to protect the abuse of the process of law. 14. In the result, this civil revision application is allowed and the impugned orders regarding temporary injunction passed by both the lower courts are hereby set aside. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I shall make no order as to cost.