All the above Civil Rules involve common questions of law and similar facts and, therefore, I propose to dispose of all the Civil Rules by this common judgment. 2. All the petitioners except the petitioner in Civil Rule No. 1845 of 1996 are engaged in the business of coal. In course of their, business they purchase coal from respondent-North Eastern Coal Fields owned by Coal India Limited. Respondent-North Eastern Coal Fields is a mining licensee engaged in extraction of coal in various parts of Upper Assam, namely, Ledo, Margherita, etc. This respondent sells and supplies coal to various consumers, price of which is fixed by the Central Government in exercise of the power under a Control Order known as the Colliery Control Order, 1945 and respondent-North Eastern Coal Fields cannot alter or vary the price fixed by the Central Government. As a licensee, respondent-North Eastern Coal Fields pays land revenue and other taxes as imposed by the State Government. Initially in die year 1989 an Ordinance known as "The Taxation (On Specified Lands) Ordinance of 1989" was passed imposing tax of Rs. 100/- per Metric ton of coal on the basis of annual productivity of coal mine, this Ordinance was later made an Act knwoh as Assam Taxation (On Specified Lands) Act, 1990. Though coal price was fixed by the Central Government under the Colliery Control Order, 1945, fixing one price of the coal at the relevant time, Coal India demanded tax imposed on it by the State Government as per the said Act from the consumers and the consumers, namely, the petitioners paid the said tax during the period from 1st January, 1990 till the interim order was passed by this Court in all the petitions. The petitioners have challenged the vires of the Act on the ground that the State Government had no legislative competence for imposing tax. Besides, the petitioners have challenged the authority and jurisdiction of the respondent-North Eastern Coal Fields to pass on the burden of tax to the consumers. Hence the present petitions. 3. I have heard Mr. PC Deka, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. U. Baruah, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in Civil Rule Nos.2701 of 1992, 2702 of 1992, 2793 of 1992,2794 of 1992, 2659 of 1992, 2793 of 1992,2792 of 1992,2661 of 1992 and 1096 of 1993 and Mr. Hence the present petitions. 3. I have heard Mr. PC Deka, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. U. Baruah, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in Civil Rule Nos.2701 of 1992, 2702 of 1992, 2793 of 1992,2794 of 1992, 2659 of 1992, 2793 of 1992,2792 of 1992,2661 of 1992 and 1096 of 1993 and Mr. R. Gogoi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in Civil Rule Nos.4037 of 1991 and 5777 of 1996 and in Civil Rule No.5777 of 1996 assisted by Dr. AK Saraf, learned counsel and Ms. B. Sarma Goyel, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in other Civil Rules. I have also heard Mr. GN Sahewalla, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent-Coal India, Ms. M. Hazarika, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent-North Eastern Coal Fields and Mr. PG Baruah, learned Advocate General, Assam assisted by Mr. A Sarma, learned Government Advocate, Assam. 4. The contention of Mr. Deka as well as Mr. Gogoi is that the Coal India had no jurisdiction or authority to pass on the burden on the consumers because the Assam Tax (On Specified Land) Act, 1990 (for short 'the Act), does not envisage so. Referring to section 6 of the Act, the learned counsel submit that the liability to pay tax under the said Act was on the licensee, viz North Eastern Coal Fileds as well as the Coal India Limited. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Act itself on the basis of which tax was realised by the State Government and ultimate burden was shifted to the petitioners, was ultra vires inasmuch as imposition of tax on the specified land was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. The subject of this Act does not come either in List II or List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Ms. Goyel adopts the arguments made by Mr. Deka and Mr. Gogoi. 5. Mr. GN Sahewalla and Ms. The subject of this Act does not come either in List II or List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Ms. Goyel adopts the arguments made by Mr. Deka and Mr. Gogoi. 5. Mr. GN Sahewalla and Ms. M. Hazarika, on the other hand, submit mat Coal India Limited and North Eastern Coal Fields are, no doubt, to sell coal at price fixed by the Central Government in exercise of the power under the Colliery Control Order, 1945 (for short the Control Order), but the notification issued by the Central Government allowed the Coal India Limited and North Eastern Coal Field to add local and other tax and this tax comes within the ambit of other tax. According to them, tax when passed on the consumers, becomes cost and the -Central Government took into consideration this aspect of the matter and allowed to add local and other tax. Therefore, the respondent North Eastern Coal Field had the full authority and jurisdiction to pass on the burden because it would amount to costs. So far the legislative competence of the State Legislature is concerned, Mr. Sahewalla and Ms. Hazarika submit that me Legislature had full competence to make the law imposing tax. Mr. PG Baruah, learned Advocate General, Assam strenously argues in support of the legislation. According to Mr. Baruah, State Legislature had the right to make taw imposing tax on land. 6. On hearing me learned counsel for the parties it is now to be said (1) whether, the Coal India (North Eastern Coal Field) had any jurisdiction to add tax on specified land with the price and (2) whether the Act itself is ultra vires or not. 7. Point No.1 : Clause 4 of the Control Order empowers the Central Government to fix me sale price at which, or the maximum or the minimum sale price, or both, subject to which coal may be sold by colliery owners. I quote the said clause: "4. 7. Point No.1 : Clause 4 of the Control Order empowers the Central Government to fix me sale price at which, or the maximum or the minimum sale price, or both, subject to which coal may be sold by colliery owners. I quote the said clause: "4. The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix the sale price at which, or the maximum or the minimum sale price, or both, subject to which coal may be sold by colliery owners; and any such notification may fix different prices: (i) for difTerent classes, grades and sizes of coal; and (ii) for different collieries." In exercise of the said power the Central Government issued a notification dated 30th December, 1988 which came into effect from 1st of January, 1989 and this notification is relevant in the present case. The relevant portion of the said notification is quoted below : "11. The pit head prices fixed in Table II, III and IV are exclusive of royalty, cesses, taxes and levy, if any, levied by Government, local authorities or other bodies; duties of excise and sales tax. For removal of dcwibts it is hereby declared that colliery owners shall be entitled to add an amount equal to such royalty, cess, duties of excise, sales tax and other taxes, if any, to the pit-head prices fixed in the said Table. In the case of washery middlings, the amount to be added shall be amount payable on raw coal of the same useful heat value range." By the said clause the Central Government fixed the price as per the tables shown. This price, however, did not include the royalty, cesses, taxes and levy, if any, by the authorities or other bodies; duties of excise and sales tax. From clause 11 quoted above, it is very clear that the Central Government fixed the price as shown in the tables and along with that the Central Government also by the said notification allowed the licensee of the coal mines, namely, North Eastern Coal Field to add those taxes. As per Control Order, price can be fixed by the Central Government, It is to be seen whether the Central Government had the jurisdiction to allow the licensee to add those taxes. If is well settled that the tax, if passed on to the consumers, it becomes costs of the goods supplied. As per Control Order, price can be fixed by the Central Government, It is to be seen whether the Central Government had the jurisdiction to allow the licensee to add those taxes. If is well settled that the tax, if passed on to the consumers, it becomes costs of the goods supplied. In this connection reference can be made to a decision of the Apex Court in M/s Central Wines, Hyderabad vs. Special Commercial Tax Officer, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 371 . In paragraph 7 of the said decision, the Apex Court observed thus : "... So far as the statute is concerned it does hot cast any obligation on the purchaser of the goods to pay any tax and therefore what is collected by the vendor from the vendee by way of consideration for passing the property in the goods to the vendee is the price charged by him and not tax collected by him from the purchaser. The amount of money which goes from the pocket of the vendee to the pocket of me vender as a condition or consideration for passing of the property in the goods is thus the sale price and not the tax..." In that view of the matter it can very well be said that the respondent North Eastern Coal Field realised the price of the goods by way of land tax. In the aforesaid case it was held that as the statute did not cast any obligation on the purchaser of the goods to pay any tax, what was collected by the vendor from the vendee by way of consideration for passing of the property to the vendee was the price charged by him and not tax collected by him from the purchaser. Taking the ratio of the above decision, I am of the opinion that the North Eastern Coal Field had the jurisdiction to pass on the burden of tax to the consumers as it was authorised by the Central Government as per'ttte slid notification. The North Eastern Coal Fields did not challenged the vires. In fact, Mr. Sahewalla and Ms, Hszarika support mis piece of legislation. Tie petitioners to whom the burden has been shifted have Challenged the vires of the Act and hence they have locus standi to challenge the vires. 8. The North Eastern Coal Fields did not challenged the vires. In fact, Mr. Sahewalla and Ms, Hszarika support mis piece of legislation. Tie petitioners to whom the burden has been shifted have Challenged the vires of the Act and hence they have locus standi to challenge the vires. 8. Point No.2: Preamble to the Assam Taxation (On Specified Lands) Act, 1990 shows that this tax was imposed on certain categories of land and to provide for matters connected therewith to make addition to the revenue of Assam. Mr. PG Baruah, learned Advocate General, Assam, Mr. GN Sahewalla and Ms. M. Hazarika support this piece of legislation. In support of his argument Mr. Baruah relies on a decision in Goodricke Group Ltd & others vs. State of WB & others, reported in 1995 Suppl (1) SCC 707. However, on query he finds it difficult to show in what Entry of List II or III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution this piece of legislation was made. In support of their contention Mr. Deka as well as Mr. Gogoi draws my attention to the following decisions of the Supreme Court: (i) The India Cement Ltd etc vs. State of Tamil Nadu etc reported in AIR 1990 SC 85 ; (ii) M/s Orissa Cement Ltd vs. State of Orissa & others reported in AIR 1991 SC 1676 . 9. In the case of the The India Cement Ltd (supra), the Apex Court had the occasion to deal with Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act (35 of 1958). In that case the Apex Court after considering all the aspects observed that royalty on mineral rights was a tax and, as such, a cess on royalty being a tax on royalty, was beyond the competence of the State Legislature because section 9 of the Central Act covered the field and the State Legislature was denuded on its competence under Entry 23 of List II of Schedule 7 of the Constitution. Cess on royalty could not be sustained under Entry 49 of List II as being a tax on land. Royalty on mineral rights was not a tax on land but a payment for the user of land. Cess on royalty could not be sustained under Entry 49 of List II as being a tax on land. Royalty on mineral rights was not a tax on land but a payment for the user of land. However, the levy of said cess was declared to be ultra vires power of State Legislature only prospectively keeping in view the fact that the amounts were collected by the State on the basis that the Supreme Court decision in AIR 1965 SC 117 was the correct position. In The India Cement Ltd (supra) the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1965 SC 117 was overruled. 10. In M/s Orissa Cement Ltd (supra) also the Supreme Court took the similar view. In a recent case in P. Kannadasan & others vs. State of TN & others reported in (1995) 5 SCC 670 validation Act was challenged before the Supreme Court. In the said decision also the Supreme Court observed thus : "...We are, therefore, of the clear opinion that once the levy is created or validated, as the case may be, no distinction can be drawn between the person who had paid and the person who has not paid. We are also unable to find any words in section 2 or anywhere else in the impugned enactment limiting the levy only to the extent of the taxes/cesses already collected on or before the 4th day of April, 1991. Nor are we satisfied that absence of a clause or words corresponding to clause (c) in section 3 (1) of the Sugarcane Cess (Validation) Act makes any difference. The said clause merely sets out the consequence following from the validation contained in the main limb of section 3 (1), by way of abundant caution. It cannot be treated as a substantive provision. Shri K, Parasaran thai submitted that the words 'imposition and collections' in the Preamble do evidence the intention to confine the imposition to amounts already collected. It is not possible to agree. By reading them conjunctively, their meaning cannot be cut down. On the contrary, the said words indicated the intention to validate the imposition as well as collection. 'Collection' does not mean what is already collected alone. It means future collection as well. Neither the Preamble nor section say that what is already collected alone is validated. This contention too accordingly fails." 11. In the present case there was no validation. On the contrary, the said words indicated the intention to validate the imposition as well as collection. 'Collection' does not mean what is already collected alone. It means future collection as well. Neither the Preamble nor section say that what is already collected alone is validated. This contention too accordingly fails." 11. In the present case there was no validation. Therefore, following the decision of the Apex Court I have no hesitation to hold that the Act so far as it relates to taxation on coal mines is ultra vires because the State Legislature had no competence to make law in this regard. It has been informed by the learned counsel for the parties that the State Legislature has since repealed the provisions of the Act relating to taxation on coal and coal mines. At the relevant time the tax was realised on the strength of the said law. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously urge that as tax was realised on an invalid Act the petitioners are entitled to refund of the said amount. It is true that if the tax is realised by the Government, may be through the North Eastern Coal Fields without any valid law the tax payers are entitled to get back the same otherwise it will amount to unjust enrichment at the hands of the authority who realised the tax. In the present case it is informed that the North Eastern Coal Fields had realised the tax and paid it to the State Government. This factual position has not been disputed by the learned Advocate General. Petitioners except in Civil Rule No. 5 777 of 1996 have not stated that the tax burden was not shifted to the consumers. Only in the said Civil Rule die petitioners have stated mat the burden of tax has not been shifted to the consumers. It is very difficult at this stage more so in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to come to a definite finding as to whether the burden was passed on or not. If the burden was passed on, the petitioners are not entitled to get if not, they are entitled. As held in Orissa Cement Ltd (supra), a finding regarding the invalidity of a levy need not automatically result hi a direction for a refund of all collections thereof made earlier. If the burden was passed on, the petitioners are not entitled to get if not, they are entitled. As held in Orissa Cement Ltd (supra), a finding regarding the invalidity of a levy need not automatically result hi a direction for a refund of all collections thereof made earlier. The declaratioa regarding the invalidity of a provision and the determination of the relief that should be granted in consequence thereof are two different things and, in the latter sphere, the Court has, and must be held to have a certain amount of discretion. It is a well settled proposition that it is open to the Court to gratit, mould or restrict the relief in a manner most appropriate to the situation before it in such a way as to advance the interest of justice. It is not always possible in all situations to give a logical and complete effect to a finding. It is also not always possible to determine this aspect of the matter in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. Where a person affected by an illegal exaction files an application for refund under the provisions of the relevant statute or files a suit to recover the taxes as paid under a mistake of law the Court can grant relief only to the extent permissible under the relevant rules. Even if he files an application for refund or a suit for recovery of the taxes paid for several years, the relief will be limited ' only to the period in regard to which the application or suit is not barred by limitation. However, what amount is barred by limitation is a question of fact. This has to be decided in the light of decision of the Apex Court in Salonab Tea Company Ltd etc. vs. The Superintendent of Taxes, Nowgong, AIR 1990 SC 772 . 13. In the present petitions it is difficult for this Court to give direction to refund the amount. However, the petitioners may approach the Department and ask for refund showing that me amount was not passed on the consumers and the authority snail examine "the same and (lecide. If the petitioners are still aggrieved, they shall be at liberty to seek legal remedy in appropriate forum.