S. R. MEHROTRA v. STATE OF H. P. — 1996 DIGILAW 265 (HP)

JUDGEMENT M. Srinivasan, C.J. :-I. PREFACE : This petition wass filed by a Professor or H.P University who was in service, at the time when it was filed, in Himachal Pradesh University, Shimla. The prayer in the petition is to declare the amendments made by the Himachal Pradesh University (Amendment) Act, 1983 to Himachal Pradesh University Act, 1970 as illegal, ultra vires, prompted by wrong information, based on erroneous presumptions, a fraud on the Legislature, inconsistent with and repugnant to the objects of the principal Act, violative of the basic structure and essential features of the constitution of the University, a source of confusion and contradictions, tending to convert an autonomous institution into an agency or instrumentality of the State, harmful to the public interest, and quash the same. There is also another prayer to declare illegal and ultra vires the amendments in Ss. 8 and 12 of the First Statutes of the University brought in by a notification No. 3-1/76-HPU(Genl)Vol. II, dated 21st November, 1985, being violative of the proviso to S. 39(2) of the principal Act. 2. Before referring to the averments contained in this writ petition it is necessary to make mention of two earlier writ petitions filed by the petitioner herein, one of them along with another person. The petitioner tiled CWP No. 851/85 in which he prayed for issue of writ directing the proper and full constitution of the Executive Council of Himachal Pradesh University and restraining the then Executive Council, which according to him was illegally constituted, from acting in violation of the Act, Statutes etc. It is not necessary to refer to the other directions in that writ petition. It is not necessary to refer to the other directions in that writ petition. By judgment dated November 20, 1985 a Division Bench of this Court passed an order directing the Court, the Executive Council and the Academic Council to be constituted in accordance with law on the respective dates on which they were to be constituted according to the assurance held out to the Court on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 therein, namely, the University and Vice Chancellor as recorded therein and directing all acts performed and decisions taken by the interim Executive Council/Executive Council in the intervening period, which did not legitimately fall within the scope of its authority, to be placed for ratification before the respective authorities/ bodies to be duly constituted in accordance with law within a period of two months from the date of the regular constitution of said bodies and directing that till the Court, the Executive Council and the Academic Council were duly constituted in accordance with law, no policy or long-term decisions shall be taken by the Executive Council, the interim Court and the interim Academic Council and that they would be entitled to take appropriate decisions in accordance with law only for the purpose of carrying out day-to-day management and administration of the University. The Bench had recorded in that judgment that the amendments to the relevant Statutes with reference to constitution of the Court and Academic Council would be notified on the next date i.e. November 21, 1985. 3. As per the statement made before the Division Bench in that case, the Executive Council did issue a notification on 21-11-1985 notifying the amendment to the First Statute to the University relating to the constitution of the Court and the Academic Council. In fact, the petitioner is challenging the validity of the said notification in this writ petition in addition to his challenging the Amendment Act itself. 4. The petitioner filed another CWP No. 573/86 along with one Dr. K. P. Pandey. Director, Correspondence Courses-cum-Professor of Education in the University for Issue of a writ to quash the amendments to Statutes 13(1) and 3 (1), and Ordinance 1.1 as wrong, harmful to the public interest. deliberately vague discriminatory, ultra vires, illegal and also for some consequential reliefs. That writ petition was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court on 27-6-1996. Director, Correspondence Courses-cum-Professor of Education in the University for Issue of a writ to quash the amendments to Statutes 13(1) and 3 (1), and Ordinance 1.1 as wrong, harmful to the public interest. deliberately vague discriminatory, ultra vires, illegal and also for some consequential reliefs. That writ petition was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court on 27-6-1996. The Division Bench allowed the writ petition and held that the amendments challenged in that petition were not in consonance with the prescribed procedure. Therefore, they were quashed. The Bench, however, observed that the or order will not prohibit the respondents therein to make suitable amendments as were necessitated by the situation but the same should be carried out in the light of the well settled rules contained in the Statues. Hand Books and Ordinance and that the concerned authorities shall ensure that proper procedure was followed. The reasoning of the Bench was that under S. 39(2) (of the Act, the Executive Council was bound to give an opportunity to the concerned faculties and the Academic Council before carrying out the amendments and in that case the said procedure was not followed. The question raised by the petitioner in the present case with reference to the validity of the notification Issued by the Executive Council on 21-11-1985 did not arise before that Bench in the said case. No doubt the petitioner wanted to make use of the observations made by the Division Bench in the present case but in our opinion they will have no applicability in this case. We will refer to the same in detail when we consider later in this judgment the question of validity of the notification dated 2111-1985 issued by the Executive Council. Il. PROVISIONS OF HIMACHAL PRADESH UNIVERSITY ACT. 1970 (ACT 17 OF 1970) : 5. The Himachal Pradesh University Act. 1970 was passed to establish and incorporate a University in Himachal Pradesh. Section 2 contains definition of the expressions used in the Act. Sub-section (13) defines State Government as the Lieutenant Governor of Himachal Pradesh. Sub-section (16) defines University as Himachal Pradesh University constituted under sub-sec. (1) of S.3, Section 3(1) provides that there shall be constituted in the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh a University by the name of Himachal Pradesh University. Sub-section (13) defines State Government as the Lieutenant Governor of Himachal Pradesh. Sub-section (16) defines University as Himachal Pradesh University constituted under sub-sec. (1) of S.3, Section 3(1) provides that there shall be constituted in the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh a University by the name of Himachal Pradesh University. Sub-section (2) is to the effect that the first Chancellor, the first Vice-Chancellor of the university and the first Members of the Court, the Executive Council, the Academic Council and the Board of Management, and all persons who may hereafter become such Officers or Members so long as they continue to hold such office or membership are hereby constituted a body corporate by the name of "Himachal Pradesh University", with headquarters at Simla. According to sub-sec. (3) the University shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and shall sue or be sued by the said name. Section 5 sets out the objects of the University. Mainly it is to disseminate and advance knowledge, wisdom and understanding by teaching and research and by the example and influence of its corporate life and towards that end the university shall perform the functions mentioned in the section. Section 6 sets out the powers of the University and S.7 the jurisdiction thereof. According to S.10. the Chancellor, Vice Chancellor, the Dean of Faculties, the Registrar, the Finance Officer and such other persons in the service of the University as may be declared by the Statutes to be the Officers of the University, Under S.11, the Lieutenant Governor of Himachal Pradesh shall be the Chancellor of the University and he shall have such powers as may be conferred on him by or under the Act. Section 12 provides that there shall be a Vice-Chancellor appointed in the manner prescribed by the Statutes who shall be the principal executive and academic officer of the University and shall be ex-officio Chairman of the Executive Council, the Academic Council, the Finance Committee and the Board of Management. Under S.18 of the Court, the Executive council, the Academic Council, the Faculties, the Finance Committees as may be declared by the Statutes to be the authorities of the University, Section 19 provides that there shall be a Court and its constitution and the term of office of its members shall be, as prescribed by the Statutes. Under S.18 of the Court, the Executive council, the Academic Council, the Faculties, the Finance Committees as may be declared by the Statutes to be the authorities of the University, Section 19 provides that there shall be a Court and its constitution and the term of office of its members shall be, as prescribed by the Statutes. Section 20 sets out the powers and functions of the Court, Section 21 says that the Executive Council shall be the executive body of the University and its constitution and the term of office of its members other than ex-officio members shall be prescribed by the Statutes and that it shall be prescribed by the Statutes and that it shall be in charge of the general management and administration (including the revenue and property) of the University, Section 22 refers to the Academic Council and prescribes that the constitution and the term of its members shall be as laid down in Statutes. Sub-section (4) of S.22 provides that the Academic Council shall have the right to advise the Executive Council on all academic matters. Section 23 provides for constitution of Faculties. 6. Section 38 provides that subject to the provisions of the Act, the Statutes may provide for any of the matters set out in that section. Under clause (a) the constitution, powers and duties of the Court, the Executive Council, the Academic Council, the Board of Management and other authorities of the University and such other bodies as may be deemed necessary to constitute from time to time are the matters for which the statutes may provide. Section 39 prescribes the methods for making the statutes. The section reads as follows : "39, Statutes how to be made: (1) The First Statutes shall be made by the Government and a copy thereof shall be laid before the Himachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly. Section 39 prescribes the methods for making the statutes. The section reads as follows : "39, Statutes how to be made: (1) The First Statutes shall be made by the Government and a copy thereof shall be laid before the Himachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly. (2) The executive Council may, from time to time, make new or additional statutes or may amend or repeal the Statutes in the manner hereinafter provided in this section : Provided that the Executive Council shall not make any Statute or any amendment of a Statute affecting the Statute or any amendment of a Statute affecting the Status, powers or constitution of any existing authority of the University, Until such authority has been given an opportunity of expressing an opinion on the proposal, and any opinion so expressed shall be in writing and shall be considered by the Executive Council. (3) Every Statute or addition to the Statute or any amendment or repeal of the Statutes shall require the approval of the Chancellor, who may assent thereto or withhold assent or remit to the Executive Council for re-consideration. (4) A new Statute or a Statute amending or repealing an existing Statutes shall have no validity unless it has been assented to by the Chancellor." 7. Section 40 provides for Ordinances to be made subject to the provisions of the Act and the Statutes. Section 41 enables an authority of the University to make Regulations consistent with the Act, Statutes and the Ordinances for certain purposes. 8. The First Statutes of the University prescribed in Statute No. 1 originally that the Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor from a panel of not less than three persons recommended by a Committee as constituted under sub-clause (2) therein. The same was amended in 1977 and notified, where after the provision was that the Vice Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor in consultation with the H.P. Government. Statute No. 8 proscribed the constitution of the Court. Statute No. 10 proscribed the constitution of the Executive Council and the powers of the Executive Council were set out in Statute No. 11. The constitution of the Academic Council is provided in Statute No. 12. The same statute provides also the power; of the Academic Council. It is not necessary to refer to the other statutes in this case. III. AMENDMENTS INTRODUCED BY ACT NO. 2 OF 1984: 9. The constitution of the Academic Council is provided in Statute No. 12. The same statute provides also the power; of the Academic Council. It is not necessary to refer to the other statutes in this case. III. AMENDMENTS INTRODUCED BY ACT NO. 2 OF 1984: 9. The Governor of Himachal Pradesh promulgated an Ordinance on 28th of October, 1983, amending the provisions of the Act as at that time the Assembly was not in session. Later a Bill was introduced and passed in the Assembly which resulted in Himachal Pradesh University (Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act No. 20 of 1984). Sub-section (2) of S. 1 of the said Act declares that it shall be deemed to have come into force on the 28th day of October, 1983 i.e. the date on which the Ordinance was passed by the Governor. In the statement of objects and reasons it is stated as follows: "The working of the Himachal Pradesh University revealed (through various reports, sources, commissions and agitations from time to time) very disquieting features and unhealthy influence which had been undermining the discipline and academic atmosphere in the University. The personnel of the Executive Council itself has been responsible to large extents for the prevailing state of affairs in the University." 10. A new section was introduced as S. 9-A after S. 9 by which the Chancellor is empowered to annul the proceedings of the University or of its any authority or the decisions of any officer of the University which is not in conformity with the Act or the Statutes or the Ordinances made thereunder by an order in writing. The proviso to the section reads that before making such order, the Chancellor shall call upon the University, or the concerned authority or the officer to show cause why such an order should not be made and it any cause is shown within the period specified by him in that behalf shall consider the some. 11. Section 12 is substituted by a new Section and Sections 12-A to 12-C have been introduced. Under the new Section 12, the Vice Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor in consultation with the State Government. The term of office of the Vice-Chancellor is prescribed therein and is declared to be a whole time salaried officer of the University. 11. Section 12 is substituted by a new Section and Sections 12-A to 12-C have been introduced. Under the new Section 12, the Vice Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor in consultation with the State Government. The term of office of the Vice-Chancellor is prescribed therein and is declared to be a whole time salaried officer of the University. Subsection (6) of Section 12 provides that the Chancellor shall have power to suspend the Vice Chancellor, during the pendency or in contemplation if any enquiry referred to in subsection (5) whereunder it in the opinion of the Chancellor. The Vice-Chancellor wilfully omits or refuses to carry out the provisions of the Act or abuses the powers vested in him or if it appears to the Chancellor that the continuance of the Vice-Chancellor in office is detrimental to the interests of the University, the Chancellor may, after making such enquiry as he deems proper and in consultation with the State Government, by order, remove the Vice Chancellor. Section 12-A provides for emoluments and other terms and conditions of service of the Vice-Chancellor. Section 12-B relates to arrangement of work during vacancy in the office of the Vice-Chancellor. Section 12C sets out the powers and duties of the Vice- Chancellor. Section 19 is amended by prescribing the maximum number of the members of the Court as 65. Section 21 is substituted and sets out the composition of the Executive council including ex-officio members thereof S. 22 is amended by introducing a proviso to the effect that the total membership of the Academic Council shall in no case exceed sixty five. S. 39 is amended by introducing sub-sec. (3) to the effect that every statute or addition to the Statutes or any amendment or repeal of the Statutes, shall require the approval of the Chancellor. Section 40 is amended by introduction of sub-section (3) to the effect that the amendment or the repeal of the Ordinances under sub-section (2) shall have no validity unless it has been assented to by the Chancellor in consultation with the State Government. Section 41 is substituted by a new Section providing for the making of Regulations by the Executive Council with the sanction of the Chancellor. Section 41 is substituted by a new Section providing for the making of Regulations by the Executive Council with the sanction of the Chancellor. A new Section 49 is introduced that if any elected or nominated member of the Court, Executive council and the Academic Council or any Body or Committee of the University ceases for any reason to be a student, teacher or an employee in which capacity he was elected / nominated he shall cease to be a member and his office shall become vacant. 12. Section 11 contains Transitory Provisions which reads as under :" 11.( 1 ) Notwithstanding anything contained in the principal Act, as amended by this Act, the Court, the Executive Council and the Academic Council of the University shall, as soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, be reconstituted in accordance with the provisions contained in sections 19, 21 and 22 of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, and every person holding office as a member of such authority immediately before the commencement of this Act shall, on the date of such commencement, cease to be member and the said authorities shall stand dissolved. (2) As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, the State Government shall constitute interim Court, Executive Council and Academic Council of the University in such manner as it thinks fit and the members of the said authorities constituted under this sub-section shal1 hold office for a period of six months or until the constitution of the authorities in accordance with provisions of Sections 19, 21 and 22 of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, whichever is earlier." Section 12 enables the State Government to remove difficulties, if any, by appropriate orders published in the Official Gazette. Section 13 repeals the H. P. University (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 and contains a saving clause in sub-section (2). IV CONTENTIONS : 13. Section 13 repeals the H. P. University (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 and contains a saving clause in sub-section (2). IV CONTENTIONS : 13. The following were the main grounds of attack raised by the petitioner : a) The amendment is inconsistent with and repugnant to the objects of the principal Act: b) The amendment aims at converting an autonomous institution into a Department of the State: c) It destroys the basic structure and essential features of the constitution of the University: d) The amendment was prompted by wrong information and is based upon erroneous presumptions; e) The amendment has created confusion and contradictions; f) It is ultra vires the Constitution; and g) It is a colourable piece of legislation. While elaborating the above contentions, the petitioner has submitted that the principal Act made the University entirely autonomous and not dependant upon any Government authority. According to the petitioner the amendment has now made the University a subordinate to the Government and virtually dependent upon the frowns and smiles of the officials of the State and the politicians. Reference is made in the petition and also in the course of oral arguments to a statement made by the Chief Minister while addressing the Convocation of the University on 20-12-1983 that the ensuing legislation would not curtail or tamper with the independent functioning of the University. According to the petitioner, the statement of the Chief Minister was belied by the provisions of the Amendment Act. It is argued that the provisions in Section 12 that the Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor in consultation with the State Government would virtually mean that the Chancellor need not consult anybody at all as Section 2(13) of the Act defines State Government as the Governor of Himachal Pradesh and under section 11 the Governor shall be the Chancellor of the University. It is further argued that there is no logic or rhyme or reason for fixing the maximum number of members for the Court at 65 and the legislature had no authority to play with the constitution of the Court by introducing such a provision. It is also contended that the same number is fixed for the maximum membership of the Academic Council under Section 22. According to the petitioner, there is no reason for such a provision at all and, therefore, the same is unreasonable. It is also contended that the same number is fixed for the maximum membership of the Academic Council under Section 22. According to the petitioner, there is no reason for such a provision at all and, therefore, the same is unreasonable. It is also argued by the petitioner that the statement of objects and reasons for the amendment Act is based upon the wrong information supplied to the Legislature and it was a case of unwarranted presumptions on the basis of which the amendment was introduced. According to the petitioner, the amendment was motivated by certain interested persons and the amendment was vitiated by mala fides. He has gone to the extent describing it as a fraud on the Legislature. 14. Per contra, the learned Advocate General argued that the amendment is well within the competence of the Legislature falling within the scope of entry No. 25 in the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. According to him, once the competence of the Legislature is found and none of the provisions of the amendment is shown to be contrary or violative of any provisions of the Constitution of India the Court cannot invalidate the legislation on any other ground. According to the Advocate General, nothing has been placed before the Court by the petitioner to show how the provisions of the Amendment Act violate any of the provisions of the Constitution of India. It is contended by him that factually the reasons given in the statement of objects and reasons for the amendment were based upon the true information furnished to the Legislature. 15. The learned Advocate General has drawn our attention to the following passages in the reply filed by the State in this writ petition : " 2. ................ The State of affairs prevailing in the University emanated from the enquiry reports of the following Inquiry Officers who were ordered by the Chancellor to inquire into the state of affairs of H.P. University :- 1. Sh. Hem Chand, Retd. Distt. and Sessions Judge, Mandi. 2. Sh. H. D. Kainthla, the then Distt. and Sessions Judge, Solan. 3. Shri A. S. Bajwa, the then Registrar, H. P. Krishi Vishv Vidyalaya, Palampur. 4. Mr. Justice Chet Ram Thakur, Retd. Judge of the Honble H. P. High Court. Sh. Hem Chand, Retd. Distt. and Sessions Judge, Mandi. 2. Sh. H. D. Kainthla, the then Distt. and Sessions Judge, Solan. 3. Shri A. S. Bajwa, the then Registrar, H. P. Krishi Vishv Vidyalaya, Palampur. 4. Mr. Justice Chet Ram Thakur, Retd. Judge of the Honble H. P. High Court. All the above Inquiry Officers have produced voluminous reports to show gross indiscipline, insubordination, financial irregularities, favouritism, misuse of authority and undesirable extraneous influences prevailing in the H. P.University. Mr. Justice Chet Ram Thakur in his report has observed as follows : “It is also observed that the Ordinances have been changed as and when it suits the convenience of the authorities. They have been enacted in a arbitrary fashion. In every meeting it is seen that one or the other Ordinances is amended to fit in a particular candidate or to suit his qualifications. This is really very unhealthy practice followed and it should be discarded in the larger interest of the University. Healthy conventions should be developed." 22. In reply to para 22 of the petition it is submitted that from the perusal of various reports, sources, commissions and agitations, the objects for which the University has been established were disquieting and unhealthy and were responsible for undermining the discipline and academic atmosphere in the University. In order to fulfil the objects for which the University has been established and to maintain the healthy traditions of the highest temple of Education, the Government of Himachal Pradesh came to the conclusion that it is necessary to make immediate changes in the H. P. University Act and take steps to reconstitute the Executive Council, the Court, the Academic Council and the appointing procedure of the Vice-Chancellor of the University so as to put an end to the existing malpractices and weaknesses / shortcomings in the existing provisions of the principal Act. In the principal Act the composition of the Executive Council and Academic Council left much to be desired. A perusal of the Act, Statutes and Ordinances reveals that Executive Council of the University is the Principal Executive Authority of the University and is responsible for policy making, important decisions and smooth functioning of the University in general. In the principal Act the composition of the Executive Council and Academic Council left much to be desired. A perusal of the Act, Statutes and Ordinances reveals that Executive Council of the University is the Principal Executive Authority of the University and is responsible for policy making, important decisions and smooth functioning of the University in general. The composition of the Executive Council in the principal Act would reveal that this body had in its majority of the persons drawn from the University and the result was that the persons at the giving hand are those who are at the receiving end too. Thereby the rules were more honoured in breach than in observance, and thus there was complete lack of checks and balances. ............... ................ 25. ......... The information provided to the State Government regarding the alleged behaviour of the Executive Council emanated mainly from the Inquiry report of Late Mr. Justice Chet Ram Thakur, Retired High Court Judge who has highlighted the misuse and arbitrary exercise of powers by the Executive Council in a number of cases. Some of the glaring example highlighted by the Inquiry Officer, Late Mr. Justice Chet Ram Thakur are reproduced as under :- 1. The long and the short of the findings recorded above are that there have been violations of the provisions of the Act, Statutes and Ordinances. The appointments of several teachers have been made by contravening the mandatory provisions of the Statutes and Ordinances in order to select persons by changing the qualifications from time to time as laid down in Ordinance 35.54. 2. But despite his being disinterested and the consequent withdrawal of his candidature, it is not understood how Dr. Mehrotra could be considered for the post of Professor of History in absentia. 3. The power is vested only in the ViceChancellor under Ordinance 35. 11 (d ) and not in any other person, but the Statutory provision has been more honoured in breach than in observance. In other cases also there has been a breach of this mandatory provisions by the ViceChancellor either in ignorance of law or wilfully, but the fact remains that the breach is there. 4. 11 (d ) and not in any other person, but the Statutory provision has been more honoured in breach than in observance. In other cases also there has been a breach of this mandatory provisions by the ViceChancellor either in ignorance of law or wilfully, but the fact remains that the breach is there. 4. There have also been cause of flagrant violation of the provisions of Statute 13( 1 )(V)(v ) inasmuch as Dean of particular Faculty were appointed such persons who did not belong to that faculty although the aforementioned Statute says that "each department shall have a Head who may be a Professor or if there is no Professor, a Reader... The inquiry report of Mr. Justice Chet Ram Thakur will be shown to the Honble Court if desired." 16. It is submitted by him that it is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to go into the correctness of the information obtained by the legislature or the intention or motive of the Legislature in introducing the amendment. It is also argued that there is no inconsistency or confusion or contradiction and the object of the main Act is in no way disturbed by the amendment. V. RELEVANT PRINCIPLES OF LAW : 17. Before considering the respective contentions, it is necessary to bear in mind the following well settled principles which a Court should take into consideration whenever the validity of a legislation is challenged : A) Legislation in a modern State is actuated with some policy to curb public evil or to effectuate some public benefit. The legislation is primarily directed to the problems before the Legislature based on information derived from past and present experience. It may also be designed by use of general words to cover similar problems arising in future. The courts strongly lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim : ut res magis valeat quam pereat. B) The Legislatures have plenary powers. but they are controlled by the basic concepts of the written Constitution itself and can be exercised within the legislative fields allotted to their jurisdiction by the three Lists under the Seventh Schedule; but beyond the Lists. the legislature cannot travel. B) The Legislatures have plenary powers. but they are controlled by the basic concepts of the written Constitution itself and can be exercised within the legislative fields allotted to their jurisdiction by the three Lists under the Seventh Schedule; but beyond the Lists. the legislature cannot travel. [vide in re: Under Article 143, of the Constitution of India : AIR 1965 SC 745 ] C) Whenever a Court is called upon to decide the validity of a legislation it should advert to three matters : a) The competence of the Legislature to legislate on the subject: b) Whether the legislation curtails the fundamental rights granted in Part-III of the Constitution of India; and c) Whether any other provisions of the Constitution is violated? It is only the express provision of the Constitution which has to be taken into consideration and not any notion as to the spirit of the Constitution. ( Vide A. K. Gopdilan v. State of Madras. AIR 1950 SC 27.1 D) If the provisions of the Law can be construed in one way which would make them consistent with the Constitution, and another interpretation would render them unconstitutional. the Court would lean in favour of the former construction. (Vide Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955). E) The intention and motive of the Legislature for bringing about the legislation are wholly irrelevant and the Court cannot go into the same if the competency of the Legislature is found to exist (Vide A. Gowrishankar v. Sales Tax Officer, AIR 1958 SC 883); Deep Chand v. State of U.P. AIR 1959 SC 648; Sardarsarup Singh v. State of Punjab. AlR 1959 SC 86(and K. Nagaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1985 SC 551). In the last of the cases, referred to above, the Supreme Court has held that the legislature, as a body, cannot be accused of having passed the law for an extraneous purpose and even assuming that the Executive, in a given case, has an ulterior motive in moving a legislation, that motive cannot render the passing of the law mala fide and that the said kind of "transferred malice" is unknown in the field of legislation. VI. Discussion and Findings : 18. Bearing the above principles in mind, we will now consider the contention of the petitioner seriatim. (a) Amendment is inconsistent with the object of the principal Act. 19. VI. Discussion and Findings : 18. Bearing the above principles in mind, we will now consider the contention of the petitioner seriatim. (a) Amendment is inconsistent with the object of the principal Act. 19. We are at a loss to understand how the amendment is inconsistent with or repugnant to the principal Act. We have already referred to the fact that the Act was to establish and incorporate a University in Himachal Pradesh. The objects of the University are found in S. 5 of the Act. No part of it has been amended. The petitioner has not pointed out any inconsistency or repugnancy between the principal Act and the amendment. According to the petitioner. S. 9-A treats the Chancellor as not being part of the University and gives him powers of judicial review of executive action; of the University. There is no substance in this contention. Just because the Chancellor is enabled to scrutinise the proceedings of the University and annual it by an order in writing if he finds it to be not in conformity with the Act, Statutes and Ordinances, he does not cease to be part of the University as stated in S.3(2) of the Act; nor is there any inconsistency between S.3(2) and S.9-A of the Act. Nor is there any merit in the contention that S.9-A is inconsistent with S.12-C(4). The Chancellor is entitled to see whether the action of the Vice-Chancellor is in conformity with the Act. Statutes and Ordinances. 20. The contention that Ss.12 12-A, 12-B and 12-C are inconsistent with and repugnant the object of the principal Act is wholly untenable. The petitioner has deliberately made a misleading statement that the amendment has done away with the provision for appointment of a Vice-Chancellor in the manner prescribed by the Statutes. It is admitted by the petitioner himself that even in 1977 the first Statute was amended so as to enable the Chancellor to appoint a Vice-Chancellor in consultation with the Government of Himachal Pradesh. What was in the Statute of the University is now incorporated in the main Act itself by the amendment. It is not known how it would bring about a repugnancy or inconsistency. There is also no substance in saying that the vice Chancellor is made a political appointee. 21. What was in the Statute of the University is now incorporated in the main Act itself by the amendment. It is not known how it would bring about a repugnancy or inconsistency. There is also no substance in saying that the vice Chancellor is made a political appointee. 21. Incidentally the petitioner contends that in view of the definition is S.2(13) of "State Government" as the Governor of Himachal Pradesh, he need not consult anybody else, There is no merit in this contention. Section 2 begins with the words "in this Act, unless the context requires otherwise." In the context, the expression "State Government" means the Government of Himachal Pradesh and not the Governor 22. The petitioner has also brought to our notice that the Act contained only the expression Lt. Governor in S.2(13) and S.11 even in 1986 and the Legislature did not amend it in spite of some enactments amending other provisions in the Act. There is no substance in this contention as obviously the petitioner is not aware of the real position with regard to the legislation. The State of Himachal Pradesh was established on 25.1.1971 under S.3 of the State of Himachal Pradesh Act, 1970(Act No.53 of 1970) and thereafter it is only the Governor in whom the executive power of the State vested under the Constitution of India and ex-officio he is the Chancellor of the University. Section 49 of the said Act provided for the passing of adaptations of the laws and orders by the State Government with such modifications as may be necessary Accordingly, the Governor of the State passed an order, by name, the Himachal Pradesh Adaptation of Laws (State and concurrent Subjects) Order, 1973 on 18-1-1973. It shall be deemed to have come into force on 25-1-1971 When this State was established as a full-fledged State. Paragraph 3 of the Order provides that from the said appointed day, namely, 25-11971 the existing laws and the central Acts mentioned in the Schedule to the Order, shall, until altered, repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority, have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications, directed by the Schedule at, if it is so directed, shall stand repealed. 22-A. The Schedule Part-II refers to the Himachal Pradesh Acts, As regards Himachal Pradesh University Act, 1970 (17 of 1970) the following modifications and adaptations are set out in the Schedule. 22-A. The Schedule Part-II refers to the Himachal Pradesh Acts, As regards Himachal Pradesh University Act, 1970 (17 of 1970) the following modifications and adaptations are set out in the Schedule. Clause 13 of S. 2 is omitted. In sub-sec. (1) of S. 3, the words Union Territory are substituted by the word State. In. S. 11 (1) the word Lieutenant is omitted. Thus, after the said Adaptation of Laws and Orders, S. 11 refers only to the Governor of Himachal Pradesh who shall be the chancellor of the University. Section 2(13) has been omitted, Hence, the contention of the petitioner is wholly unsustainable and is rejected. 23. It is next argued that the fixation of maximum number of members of The court in S.19 alters the constitution and thereby the legislature has done something indirectly what could not be done directly. There is no meaning in this contention. The Legislature has thought fit as a matter of legislative policy to fix the maximum number of members for the court in S. 19 and for the Academic Council in S. 22. To that extent the power conferred on the Government under.S. 39(1) and the Executive council under S.39(2) are curtailed. The Legislature has the jurisdiction and power to do so and nothing has been done indirectly as alleged by the petitioner. 24. The petitioner made a comment that the same number 65 should not have been fixed for the Court and the Academic Council and that there is no reason for fixing the number 65. Neither argument has any substance. No exception can be taken to the number 65 and nothing has been shown to us as, to how it is not acceptable. There is a Nyaya in Sanskrit known as (Asokavanithanyaya). That is the maxim of grove of Asoka trees. Nobody can say why a grove of Asoka trees was chosen by Ravana to keep Seetha. He could have chosen any other place. The maxim only means that it there are several ways of doing a thing any one way is as good as the other and no reason need he given or found for the choice of the same. Here any number would have been good enough but the Legislature in its wisdom thought fit to fix the maximum at 65, That cannot be questioned by the petitioner. Here any number would have been good enough but the Legislature in its wisdom thought fit to fix the maximum at 65, That cannot be questioned by the petitioner. (b) Converting an autonomous institution into a department of the State and (c) Destroys the basic structure and essential features of the University . 25. We are at a loss to appreciate how the University is converted into a Department of the State by the provisions of the amendment Act. What all has been done by the amendment is only to incorporate certain provisions, which were already in the Statutes framed by the Executive Council of the University in the main Act itself and to prescribe certain limitations with regard to the total membership of the Court, and the Academic Council, 26. The petitioner has (frown our attention to the portion of the speech rendered by the Chief Minister in the Convocation of the University before the Ordinance was passed. According to the petitioner, the Ordinance as well as the Act were diametrically opposite to what the Chief Minister said at the Convocation. There is no merit in this contention. It is well Settled that the Speeches by the Ministers or Members of the Assembly are inadmissible in a Court of Law, when the provisions of an enactment are being considered. 27. In Assam Railways and Trading Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 1935 ) AC. 445, Lord Wright speaking on behalf of the House of Lords said : "It is clear that the language of a Minister of the Crown in proposing in Parliament a measure. such eventually becomes law is inadmissible and the Report of Commissioners is even more removed from value as evidence of intention, because it does not follow that their recommendations were accepted." 28. In State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241, the Supreme Court observer that the Statement of object and Reasons accompanying a Bill, when introduced in Parliament, cannot be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive meaning of the Statute and they cannot be used except for the limited purpose of understanding the background and the antecedent state of affairs leading up to the legislation. The Court proceeded to state that a Statute, as passed by Parliament, is the expression of the collective intention of the Legislature as a whole and any statement made by an individual, albeit a Minister, of the intention and objects of the Act cannot be used to cut down the generality of the words used in the Statute. 29. There is no substance in the contention that the basic structure and the essential features of the University are destroyed. We have already pointed out that the amendment Act does not in any way alter the basic features of the University. The theory of basic structure can be applied in the case of the amendment of the Constitution of India as elucidated in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461. The Court pointed out in that case that the basic structure of the Constitution consisted of the following features : 1. Supremacy of the Constitution: 2. Republican and Democratic form of Government; 3. Secular character of the Constitution; 4. Separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary; 5. Federal character of the Constitution.That doctrine cannot apply in the case of a legislation passed by the Parliament or the State Legislature. It must be remembered that the Constitution is not a law passed or enacted by the Parliament, but it is a law given to the people of India by themselves through the constituent Assembly. It is too well known that any law passed by the Parliament or by the State Legislature can be not only amended or altered, but also be repealed. The question whether it should be amended or repealed is a matter to be decided entirely by the Legislature. Hence, the petitioner cannot invoke the doctrine of basic structure in this case, and the contention is rejected. (d) Prompted by wrong information and based on erroneous resumption. 30. This is a misconception on the part of the petitioner in raising this contention. It is quite obvious that the petitioner was not in possession of the relevant facts regarding this aspect of the matter. We have already extracted the relevant passages from the reply filed by the State Government. They establish beyond doubt that the Legislature had the necessary information and there was no question of any erroneous presumption on the part of the Legislature. We have already extracted the relevant passages from the reply filed by the State Government. They establish beyond doubt that the Legislature had the necessary information and there was no question of any erroneous presumption on the part of the Legislature. It is not within the province of this Court to consider whether the information relied upon by the Legislature was true or not. The Legislature has got its own machinery to decide upon the veracity of such information and the necessity for removing the mischief and passing an appropriate Legislation therefor. This contention is also rejected. (e) Created confusion and contradictions. 31. The confusion if at all is only in the mind of the petitioner. There is no difficulty whatever in reading the Act as amended and understanding the provisions thereof. There is no contradiction or confusion in such provisions. Even so, it is only a matter of interpretation of the Statute and that has no hearing on the validity of the enactment. We have already made a reference to the provisions of S. 50 of the State of Himachal Pradesh Act: It is needless to point out that the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1968 as amended by the Himachal Pradesh Act No. 18 of 1971 would also enable any Court to interpret the provisions of the amended Act in the proper perspective. Hence, the contention is rejected. (f) Ultra vires the Constitution and (g) Piece of colourable Legislation. 32. Though the petitioner has placed,his contention under two different heads as above, strictly speaking both pertain to the competency of the Legislature. We have already pointed out that no Legislature is entitled to pass an enactment, provisions of which violate the provisions of the Constitution of India and if it dies, so, such a legislation is not valid. We also referred to the fact that the State legislature has power to pass the impugned Resolution under Item No. 25 of List III in Seventh Schedule if the Constitution. The only limitation under that entry is that such Legislation shall be subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I. It is not the case of the petitioner that the main Act is repugnant to or contrary to any of the Parliamentary enactment under Entries Nos. The only limitation under that entry is that such Legislation shall be subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I. It is not the case of the petitioner that the main Act is repugnant to or contrary to any of the Parliamentary enactment under Entries Nos. 63 to 66 of List I. Hence, there can he no doubt whatever that the Legislature was competent to pass the impugned Act. 33. Whenever a legislation is alleged to be a colourable legislation, the test is to form whether the legislature has the competency to enact on the subject and in the absence of such competency whether the Legislature has enacted the impugned legislation in such away so as to make it appear that it falls within particular Entry in the relevant List. It is only in such cases, the question of colourable legislation will arise. In this case, we have pointed out that the subject matter of the enactment falls well within the scope of Entry No. 25 of List III and, therefore the Legislature was competent to pass the impugned Act. The question of colourable legislation will not arise in this case. 34. It is necessary in this connection to refer to the following judgments of the Supreme Court in order to appreciate what is colourble legislation. 35. In The State of Bihar v. Sir Kameshwar Singh. AIR 1952 SC 252, Justice Mahajan had observed that legislation ostensibly under one or other of the powers conferred by the Constitution but in truth and filet not jailing within the content of that power is merely colourable constitution but it is real not so. 36. Justice Mukherjee had observed that when a Legislature has limited or qualified power and has got to act within a sphere circumscribed by legislative entries. the question, whether in purporting to act under these entries, it has, in substance, gone beyond them and has done certain things which cannot be accomplished within the scope of these entries, I, really a question affecting the competency of the Legislature, and in such case, although the legislation purports to have been enacted under a particular entry, if it is really outside it, it would be void. 37. Justice Das said that there the noncompliance with the constitutional condition for the exercise of legislative power is covert, it is a fraud on the Constitution. 38. 37. Justice Das said that there the noncompliance with the constitutional condition for the exercise of legislative power is covert, it is a fraud on the Constitution. 38. In K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa. AIR 1953 SC 375, the Court has examined the scope and meaning of the doctrine of colourable Legislation and observed (at p. 379 of AIR) : "It may be made clear at the outset that the doctrine of colourable legislation does not involve any question of bona fides or mala fides on the part of the legislature. The whole doctrine resolves itself into the question of competency of a particular Legislature to enact a particular law. If the Legislature is competent to pass a particular law, the motive; which impelled it to act are really irrelevant. On the other hand, if the Legislature lacks competency the question of motive does not arise at all. Whether a statute is constitutional or not is thus always a question of power vide Cooleys Constitutional Limitations. Vol, I. p. 379. A distinction, however, exists between a Legislature which is legally omnipotent like the British Parliament and the law promulgated by which could not be challenged on the ground of incompetency, and is Legislature which enjoys only a limited or a qualified jurisdiction. If the Constitution of a State distribute, the legislature powers amongst different bodies, which have to act within their respective, spheres marked out by specific legislative entries, of if there are limitations on the legislative authority in the shape of fundamental rights, questions do arise as to whether the Legislature in a particular case has or has not, in repeat to the ,subject matter of the statute or in the method of enacting it, transgressed the limits of it, constitutional powers. Such transgression may be patent manifest or direct, but it may also be disguised, covert and indirect and it is to this latter class of cases that the expression colourable legislation has been applied in certain judicial pronouncements. The idea conveyed by the expression is that although apparently a Legislature in passing a statute purported to act within the limits of its powers, yet in substance and in reality it transgressed these powers the transgression being veiled by what appears, on proper examination, to be a mere pretence or disguise. As was said by Duff. The idea conveyed by the expression is that although apparently a Legislature in passing a statute purported to act within the limits of its powers, yet in substance and in reality it transgressed these powers the transgression being veiled by what appears, on proper examination, to be a mere pretence or disguise. As was said by Duff. J. in Attorney General for Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers. 1924 AC 328 at p. 337(B) : Where the law making authority is of a limited or qualified character it may be necessary to examine with some strictness the substance of the legislation for the purpose of determining what is what the legislature is really doing." 39. In B. R. Shankaranarayana v. The State of Mysore, AIR 1966 SC 1571, the Court referred to the decision in K. C. Gajapathi Narayan Deos case (AIR 1953 SC 375). and reiterated the proposition. The Court added that (at p. 1575 of AIR) : ". . . . . . . . . If the Legislature is competent to pass the particular law, the motives which impel it to pass the law are really irrelevant. It is open to the Court to scrutinize the law to ascertain whether the Legislature by device, purports to make a law which, though in form appears to be within its sphere, in effect and substance, reaches beyond it." 40. It follows ,therefore, the contention of the petitioner in this regard is also unsustainable. Hence, it is rejected.(h) Validity of the Notification issued by the Executive Council under No. 3-1/76-HPU (General) Vol. II. dated 21st November, 1985. 41. The contention of the petitioner is that the Executive Council had no power to issue the notification amending Ss. 8 and 12 of the First Statutes of the University without adopting the procedure prescribed in S. 39(2 ) of the Act and giving an opportunity to the concerned authorities, namely. the Court and the Academic Council to express their opinions. In this connection, reliance is placed upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in C.W.P. No. S573 of 1986, to which we have already made a reference. As pointed out earlier, the question. which has now arisen before us did not arise in that case. Perhaps when the notification impugned in that case was issued, the Academic Council and the concerned authorities were in existence. As pointed out earlier, the question. which has now arisen before us did not arise in that case. Perhaps when the notification impugned in that case was issued, the Academic Council and the concerned authorities were in existence. In so far as the present impugned notification is concerned, at the time when it was issued, neither the Court nor the Academic Council was in existence. Section 11 of the amendment Act contains the transitory provisions. The section has already been extracted. 42. There is no doubt whatever that at the time when the notification was issued by the Executive Council. the Court and the Academic Council constituted earlier were not in existence. The interim Court and the interim Academic Council constituted by the State Government under sub-sec. (2) of S. 11 could have been in existence only for a period of six months or until the constitution of the authorities in accordance with the provisions of Ss. 19, 21 and 22 of the principal Act. as amended by the Act. In the reply filed by the University. it is specifically stated in paragraph 37 that the old body has ceased to exist in view of the coming into force of the amended Act. Even apart from S. 11 of the Amendment Act, it is quite evident from the provisions of the said Act that the constitution of the Court and the constitution of the Academic Council were changed by the statutory provisions and the First Statutes of the University which constituted those authorities earlier could no longer be effective and perforce the said authorities had to be constituted afresh by the Executive Council in accordance with the provisions of the amended Act. In such circumstances there is no merit in contending that the Executive Council should follow the procedure prescribed in S. 39(2) of the Act. It should be noted that the provisions of S. 11 of the amendment Act were not brought to the notice of the Division Bench, which decided C.W.P. No. 573 of 1986. In any event, the reasoning of the Division Bench in that case will not apply in the present case. Hence, the petitioners challenge to the validity of the notification issued by the Executive Council on 21-1 1-1985 fails. VII. CONCLUSION 43. In the result, it follows that the writ petition should suffer a dismissal .. It is hereby dismissed. In any event, the reasoning of the Division Bench in that case will not apply in the present case. Hence, the petitioners challenge to the validity of the notification issued by the Executive Council on 21-1 1-1985 fails. VII. CONCLUSION 43. In the result, it follows that the writ petition should suffer a dismissal .. It is hereby dismissed. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner has since retired from service, we are not mulcting him with costs in this proceeding. Petition dismissed.