JUDGMENT 1. Arun Kumar Goel, J.—Heard learned Counsel for the parties. 2. This is defendants Second Appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge, Mandi, Kullu and Lahaul-Spiti Districts at Mandi, whereby the judgment and decree of injunction passed in Civil Suit No. 86/1984, dated 30-8-1986, by Sub-Judge 1st Class, Court No. If, Mandi, District Mandi in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants has been upheld. 3. Brief facts of the case are that Parma Ram plaintiff filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction on the plea that and comprised in Khasra No. 116, 120, 189 and 199 measuring 17-12-10 bighas situate in Mauza Kasarla of lllaqa Balh, District Mandi is recorded in the joint ownership of the plaintiff, defendants No. 5 and 6 and one Mast Ram as well as proforma defendant Pratap Singh. It was further pleaded by the plaintiff that this land was in possession of the plaintiff and proforma defendant Partap Singh qua their own shares and qua the shares of other defendants, both of them are recorded as non-occupancy tenant as per Jamabandi for the year 1979-80. In these circumstances, the plaintiff claimed tenancy over the land which was in the shares of defendants No. 1,5,6 and Mast Ram. Further case of the plaintiff was that since he was non-occupancy-tenant qua the shares of the said defendants and Mast Ram, thus, by operation of law i. e. H. P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, be as well as proforma defendant Pratap Singh became owners. In this background since according to plaintiff, the defendants were stated to be causing interference with the peaceful enjoyment of the land in question by the plaintiff and proforma defendant, as such, the necessity of filing of t he suit for permanent prohibitory injunction has arisen thereby prayer was made to restrain the defendants from causing any interference over the suit land of the plaintiff. 4. This suit was contested and resisted by the defendants who pleaded that the suit land is joint and had not been partitioned, both the parties were co-sharers and as such the suit is not maintainable in the present form. Locus standi of the plaintiff to maintain the suit was also disputed. It was further pleaded by the defendants that they are in exclusive possession of the land measuring 9-3-12 bighas, comprised in Khasra Nos. Locus standi of the plaintiff to maintain the suit was also disputed. It was further pleaded by the defendants that they are in exclusive possession of the land measuring 9-3-12 bighas, comprised in Khasra Nos. 116, 120/1, 189 and 199 and according to them out of the total joint holding of the parties, measuring 31-15-16 bighas, the share of the defendants comes to 10-11-19 bighas as against which they were in exclusive possession of 9-3 12 bighas. Entries showing the plaintiff as non-occupancy tenant qua the shares of the defendants were also disputed being incorrect and it was pleaded that in law a co sharer cannot be a tenant under another co-sharer and the revenue entries were the result of collusion between the revenue staff and the plaintiff. It was further pleaded that the holding continued to remain joint between the parties to the suit and the defendants were in exclusive possession without any interruption in respect of the area detailed in their possession in their written statement. 5. On the pleadings of (he parties, following issue s were framed : 1. Whether the defendants are in exclusive possession of suit land to the extent of land as comprised in Khasra No. 116,120/1, 189 and 199? OPD 2. Whether the revenue record entries showing the plaintiff as non-occupancy tenant qua the share of defendants are wrong and incorrect ? OPD 3. Whether the suit land jointly owned by the parties as co-sharers, if so its effect ? OPD 4. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit ? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction as prayed for ? OPP 6. Relief. Issues No, 1 to 4 were held in negative and Issue No. 5 was held to be in the affirmative and consequently under Issue No 6 while allowing relief decree for permanent injunction was passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. Against the said judgment and decree of the trial court, defendants took up the matter in appeal where the same was dismissed by the lower Appellate Court and decree for injunction was Upheld. It is in this background that the judgment and decree of the courts below has been impugned by the defendants in the present second appeal, 7. Against the said judgment and decree of the trial court, defendants took up the matter in appeal where the same was dismissed by the lower Appellate Court and decree for injunction was Upheld. It is in this background that the judgment and decree of the courts below has been impugned by the defendants in the present second appeal, 7. Shri K. D. Sood, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that how the entry in Ex, Dr3 in the settlement record showing plaintiff and proforma defendant Pratap Singh as non-occupancy-tenant qua the shares of defendants came into existence has not been shown, as according to him it could be either by consent of parties or under the orders of some authority competent to order making all such entries. It was further pointed out on behalf of the defendants that though it was the case pleaded by the plaintiff that he became non-occupancy tenant qua the share of the defendants during the settlement of 1963-64, but for producing Ex PA Jamabandi for the year 1979-80 and Ex P3, no other evidence has been produced by him in support of his claim. According to Shri K D. Sood, the courts below have wrongly held that the provisions of Punjab Tenancy Act are applicable, as according to him after the coming into force of H. P. Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) It is this Act which governs the case in hand. Regarding applicability of the Act ibid, learned Counsel for the plaintiff has clearly stated that Punjab Tenancy Act is not applicable and it is the Act (H P. Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953) which will govern the present case. 8. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants pointed out that creation of a tenancy is a bilateral agreement which is to be proved to have come into existence either by agreement or by operation of law9 nothing has been pleaded much less proved in this behalf. For these reasons, it was urged with vehemence that the courts below have fallen into error in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff against the defendants. 9. For these reasons, it was urged with vehemence that the courts below have fallen into error in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff against the defendants. 9. On the other hand Shri Vijay Thakur, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff has submitted that in the present case, it is conceded by the defendants that settlement had taken place during the years 1963 to 1965 in the village, thus entry showing his client to be non-occupancy-tenant qua the shares of the defendants was made in accordance with Section 33 of the H. P Land Revenue Act, 1954 to which the presumption of correctness is attached. la support of this submission, Shri Vijay Thakur has referred to the provisions of Sections 53, 54 and 68 of the Act. It was further urged by Shri Vijay Thakur that both the courts have concurrently recorded the findings regarding his client being non-occupancy tenant and subsequently having become owner by operation of law i. e. H P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, as such this court may not interfere with these concurrent findings of fact under Section 100 of the C. P. C. and on this ground he has prayed for dismissal of the present appeal thereby upholding the decree of the courts below. 9, No doubt entry came to be made in favour of the plaintiff as non-occupancy tenant qua the share of the defendants and is recorded for the first time in Ex. D-3 and in this document which is a copy of Mishal Haquiyat Bandobast Jadid in remarks column entry of ownership having been conferred on plaintiff is also there How this entry came to be made has not been shown by the plaintiff except placing reliance on Section 33 of the H. P. Land Revenue Act. According to defendants, suit was filed after more than 2" years of the entry having come into existence. So far creation of sub tenancy by an occupancy tenant is concerned, under the provisions of Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1987. Section 58 permitted that to be done and this Act was in force before coming into force of the Act and it stood repealed under Section 148 of the Act. In case the legislature intended to make provisions by permitting an occupancy/non-occupancy tenant to create sub-tenancy it would have incorporated some pro-visions in the Act, but admittedly no such provision exists therein. In case the legislature intended to make provisions by permitting an occupancy/non-occupancy tenant to create sub-tenancy it would have incorporated some pro-visions in the Act, but admittedly no such provision exists therein. Section 53 of the Act deals with the grounds for ejectment of a tenant not having a right of occupancy. So far transfers are concerned those are governed by Section 68 of the Act which is to the following effect: "68. Irregular transfer —Any transfer of the interest of a tenant except as permitted by the proviso to clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 54 shall be void ” In view of this provision of law any transfer except the one saved under Section 68 of the Act is void and thus even after entry of tenancy came to be recorded in Ex. D-3 during the course of settlement being not in accordance with the provisions of Section 68 supra is void. There is no legal sanction behind creation of non-occupancy-tenancy in respect of the share of defendants in favour of plaintiff as claimed by him qua the rights of occupancy admittedly held by both the parties. In this view of the matter, the defence raised on behalf of the defendants has substantial weight and it deserves to be upheld, 10. Further it is also admitted case of the parties that ownership qua the land in suit was conferred somewhere in the year 1968, as such, on this ground also the case of plaintiff must fail In case the non-occupancy-tenancy was created in favour of the plaintiff after the defendants became owners, something could be said in support of his claim, but it is not the case here. Presumption of correctness attached to the record of rights is rebuttable. Further how the earlier entries came to be changed in latter revenue entries and in the absence of their being any material to justify the change of entries presumption of correctness would stand rebutted. In taking this view, I am supported by the judgment of Honble Apex Court in 1969 Punjab Law Journal, 105, Darga deceased and others v Milkhi Ram and others. Section 33 of the H. P. Land Revenue Act from which help was sought by Shri Vijay Thakur in support of his case only authorises the preparation of records of right and nothing beyond that. It does not make such entries conclusive. Section 33 of the H. P. Land Revenue Act from which help was sought by Shri Vijay Thakur in support of his case only authorises the preparation of records of right and nothing beyond that. It does not make such entries conclusive. Besides this, Shri Vijay Thakur was not in a position to justify from record the coming into existence of entry showing his clients to be non-occupancy tenant qua the share of the defendants. While both the parties were occupancy tenants qua the entire land held by them as such. 11. On a question of interpretation of Section 68 of the Act, the transfer not being under Section 54 (1) (c) proviso thereof, is void ab intiio, meaning thereby that it is non est and without any consequence, unless of course the plaintiff could justify it on the basis of other material or order of competent authority under law which he has failed to demonstrate even during the course of hearing of this appeal with reference to the records of the case, 12. In the face of the aforesaid legal position applicable to the facts of the present case, it is evidently clear that both the courts have fallen into error in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff and accordingly the judgment and decree under appeal deserves to be set aside and it is ordered accordingly. As a result thereof the present appeal succeeds and the judgment and decree under appeal is hereby set aside, consequently the suit of the plaintiff shall stand dismissed. 13. Costs on the parties. Appeal allowed.