Through this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for a writ in the nature vfcertiorari tor quashing a notice dated 23-1-98 issued by the Apar Zila Magistrate (Addl. District Magis trate), Mahamaya Nagar, under Section 3 of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970. Amongst other grounds, it was stated that the Addl. District Magistrate (for short, ADM) could not have issued the notice. It was further stated that the notice was bad in terms of decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ratnji Pandey (as reported in 1981 Crl. L. J. 1983 ). The learned AGA took up a preliminary objec tion stating that the notice was merely for showing cause and the petitioner should have approached the authority who issued the notice and should have raised all the points regarding illegality of the notice and the grounds mentioned there in and in view of the existence of an alternative remedy, the present writ petition was not maintainable. 2. So far the first point is concerned, papers were placed before us by the learned AGA to show that the ADM was specifically empowered by the State Government in this behalf. The definition of the term district Magistrate as given in the U. P Control of Goondas Act includes an Addl. District Magistrate specifically empowered by the State Government in that behalf. When there had been such empowerment, as per papers produced before us, the first objection taken by the petitioner is not sustainable. 3. The parties were heard on the preliminary objection raised by the learned AGA. Reliance was placed by the learned AGA on a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ballabh Chaubeys case (as reported in 1997 JIC 519 All ). Here was also there was an issuance of a notice under Section 3 (1) of the U. P Control of Goondas Act. The validity of the notice was challenged and the Court was of the view that an alterna tive remedy was available to the petitioner and, as such, the writ petition was not maintainable. It was observed in para graph 6 of the judgment. The validity of the notice was challenged and the Court was of the view that an alterna tive remedy was available to the petitioner and, as such, the writ petition was not maintainable. It was observed in para graph 6 of the judgment. "it is settled prin ciple that if proceedings are initiated under a statute which creates a liability and also provides for a remedy, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of and not a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. " The Division Bench relied on a decision of the Supreme Court as reported in AIR 1952 SC 64 , N. P Poonu Swami v. Returning Of ficer, An order of the returning officer rejecting the nomination papers of the petitioner was challenged in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and it was held that the Repre sentation of the Peoples Act was a self-contained enactment, so far elections were concerned and it provided for one remedy through an election petition. The High Court had dismissed the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy and the Supreme Court confirmed the view of the High Court. Reference was also made by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ballabh Chaubey to another decision of the Supreme Court as reported in AIR 1957 SC 2140, Nan-hoomalv. Heeramal. The Allahabad High Court had allowed a writ petition chal lenging the validity of the procedure adopted by the District Magistrate who had issued notice to the members of the Municipal Board to fill up a casual vacancy in the office of the President of the Board. The Supreme Court reversed the judg ment of the High Court upon a finding that the election to the office of the President of the Municipal Board could be challenged only in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the U. P Municipalities Act, i. e. by means of an election petition and the High Court could not have exercised its powers under Article 226 of the Con stitution of India to set aside an election. 4. The Division Bench in deciding the question of entertainability of the writ petitions on the faceof availability of alter native remedy had further relied on case-laws touching elections. 4. The Division Bench in deciding the question of entertainability of the writ petitions on the faceof availability of alter native remedy had further relied on case-laws touching elections. Reference was also made to a decision touching certain proceedings under the Income Tax Act against a notice which was challenged on the ground of illegalities. 5. Learned AGA further relied on a recent (unreported) decision of another Division Bench of this High Court in Crl. Misc. Writ Petition No. 1626 of 1997, Bhunesh Misra v. State of U. P. [since reported in 1998 JIC 186 (All)]. We had called for the records of this case and perused the judgment in it. Here also a notice under the U. P. Control of Goondas Act was challenged in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and a preliminary objection was taken on the ground of alternative remedy. The Division Bench relied on the decision given in Ballabh Chaubeys case (supra) and dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the objection could be raised before theauthority issuing the notice. 6. On behalf of the petitioner reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Ramji Pandey (supra ). This decision was referred to by the Honble Judges of the Division Bench deciding the matter of Bhuhesh Misra (supra ). The Division Bench was of the view that the defects in the notice, as observed by the Full Bench in the case of Ram Ji Pandey (supra), could well be agitated before the authority issu ing the notice. In Ramji Pandeys case the Court was of the view that the notice under Section 3 (1) must contain the general na ture of material allegations for being the basis of the opinion of the District Magistrate. It was further held that if a notice did not comply with the require ments of Section 3 (1), it was invalid and any consequential action taken upon such notice would affect the personal liberty of a citizen and such notices must be strictly construed. The Court had allowed the petition and quashed the notice on the ground of non-observance of provisions of Section 3 (1) of the UP. Control of Goon-das Act and this order was passed on the basis of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court had allowed the petition and quashed the notice on the ground of non-observance of provisions of Section 3 (1) of the UP. Control of Goon-das Act and this order was passed on the basis of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In Ballabh Chaubeys case, the Division Bench had observed that the question whether such a writ petition would lie or not, was not at all raised or considered in Ramji Pandeys case. The Division Bench observed in Bal labh Chaubeys case. "the only question which was canvassed and was considered by the bench was whether the notice was in accordance with the requirement of Sec tion 3 of the Act" no such argument that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Con stitution should not be entertained at the stage of notice seems to have been can vassed and, therefore, no decision has been given on this point. It is well-setted that a decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observa tion found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in it. " It was further observed, "doctrine of precedents is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it. Judicial authority belongs not to the exact words used in this or that judgment, nor even to all reasons given, but only to the principle accepted and applied as neces sary grounds of decision. " The petitioner further relied on another decision of a Division Bench of this High Court in the case otsubhash Singh, as reported in 1997 JIC 908 All. Here also a question of validity of the notice under Section 3 (1) of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act was raised in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. A question was raised before this Court with reference to Bal labh Chaubeys case if a writ petition could be maintainable. The Division Bench ob served as follows: "we without showing any difference and with d. ue regard to the judgment in the case of Ballabh Chaubey (supra), we examined this case, whether impugned notice on the facts and circumstances of this case would render the subsequent proceedings illegal or not. The Division Bench ob served as follows: "we without showing any difference and with d. ue regard to the judgment in the case of Ballabh Chaubey (supra), we examined this case, whether impugned notice on the facts and circumstances of this case would render the subsequent proceedings illegal or not. If yes, it would be futile to send him there to participate in the subsequent proceedings. We having perused the notice and finding, on the facts of this case, the said notice lo be directly in con tradiction with the judgment of the aforesaid Full Bench, which would make subsequent proceedings illegal, we feel it appropriate to exercise our discretion in this regard under Ar ticle 226 of the Constitution of India instead of rejecting the petition as not maintainable, held the impugned notice to be illegal. " 7. We are, thus, confronted with a decision of the Full Bench in which the validity of a notice was considered in a writ petition (Ramji Pandeys case) as also the decision of the Division Bench in Ballabh Chaubeys case and the further decision of another Division Bench in Subhash Singhs case wherein the principle laid down in Ballabh Chaubeys case was not differed from but was not acted upon on the facts of the case. Thus, there is a con flict of decisions as to whether a writ peti tion should be entertained to challenge the validity of a notice under Section 3 (1) of the U. P-Control of Goondas Act. 8. Together with this, we are also keeping on record a question as to what would be an alternate remedy in the frameworkof the U. P. Control of Goondas Act. A question would always arise if directing a petitions to succumb to the jurisdiction of a particular authority when the action of that authority itself is under challenge, could be ordered in the name of an alternate remedy. The instances that were cited in the case of Ballabhs case were all having a common feature. The impugned orders were passed by certain authorities and under the frame of the respective enactments, the remedy lay before some other authority. The instances that were cited in the case of Ballabhs case were all having a common feature. The impugned orders were passed by certain authorities and under the frame of the respective enactments, the remedy lay before some other authority. The provisions of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act may now be looked into to see if at all a show cause despite a wrong notice could be treated as an alternate remedy or if the law provides any real alternate remedy to a person noticed under Section 3 (1) of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act. 9. Section 2 of this Act (U. P. Control of Goondas Act) defines the term goonda and Section 3 provides for externment of a Goonda. Section 3 provides that if it ap peared to a District Magistrate (a) that any person was Goonda and (b) that his movements or acts in the district or any part thereof were causing or were calcu lated to cause alarm, danger or harm to persons or property on there were reasonable grounds for believing that he was engaged or about to engage in the district or any part thereof in the commis sion of an offence specified in Section 2 of the Act and (c) that witnesses were not willing to come forward to give evidence against him by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person or property, the District Magistrate could take steps for extern ment, subject to the condition that he would first by notice in writing inform him of the general nature of material allegations against him in respect of clauses (a), (b) and (c), as above and give him a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding them. After receiv ing the explanation, if the District Magistrate was satisfied that the condi tions specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c), as above, existed, then he could direct by an order in writing that the person so proceeded against would remove himself outside the area within the limits of his local jurisdiction, etc. 10. After receiv ing the explanation, if the District Magistrate was satisfied that the condi tions specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c), as above, existed, then he could direct by an order in writing that the person so proceeded against would remove himself outside the area within the limits of his local jurisdiction, etc. 10. The show-cause notice as thought of under Section 3 (1) is to indicate the prima facie existence of the requirements of the materials in Clauses (a), (b) and (c), as mentioned in that section and the only thing expected of a person proceeded against is an explanation regarding such general nature of material allegations in respect of clauses (a), (b) and (c ). The order of externment after consideration of the explanation is open to an appeal to the Commissioner, who may either confirm, modify or set aside the order recorded under Section 3. The provisions of Section 7 of the U. P. Control of Goondas further make it clear that the District Magistrate for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person against whom an order is proposed to be made under Section 3 may require such person to enter into a bond with or without sureties and the provisions of the Cr. P. C. would apply mutatis mutan dis in relation to such bond as they apply in relation to bonds executed or required to be executed under thesaid Code. Section 7 further provides that it is open for a Dis trict Magistrate while issuing notice to any person under sub-section (1) of Section 3 to issue a warrant for his arrest with endor sement thereon of a direction in terms of the provisions of Section 71 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. S. 8 provides for taking evidence for making an order under Section 3, but the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act would not strictly apply. 11. A reading of these provisions in dicate that the notice under Section 3 (1) not only requires certain details to be mentioned but it has certain consequen ces also. A person so noticed may be re quired to furnish bond for his appearance and whenever a bond is submitted in ac cordance with the provisions of Cr. PC. 11. A reading of these provisions in dicate that the notice under Section 3 (1) not only requires certain details to be mentioned but it has certain consequen ces also. A person so noticed may be re quired to furnish bond for his appearance and whenever a bond is submitted in ac cordance with the provisions of Cr. PC. , it is open for the District Magistrate to be satisfied on the propriety of the bond and there is every possibility of curtailment of the liberty or the person noticed. The provisions indicate that the District Magistrate is to examine the explanation in respect of clauses (a), (b) and (c) and unless these clauses are indicated the notice surely suffers from intrinsic defects. The District Magistrate has not been em powered under Section 3 (3) of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act to decide on the validity of the notice. For that, the person proceeded is to wait for an order of extern ment and then to file an appeal. In our view, therefore, the mere chance of filing a show cause before the authority who had issued the notice under Section 3 (1) may not be held as an alternate remedy avail able to him so far questing the validity of the notice is concerned. To wait for an externment order and then to avail the remedy of appeal is not a relief that can be availed of instantly. 12. So far our last observation is con cerned, we may be back to the j udgment of Honble A. P. Misra and Honble. S. Rafat Alam, JJ. in the case of Subhash Singh (supra ). In paragraph 4 of their judgment, their Lordships have held that: "there is no bar in the Constitution of India, nor in law nor there could be any to curb constitutional process of this Court under Ar ticle 226of the Constitution. " Their lordships also observed: ". . . . . . . . . . where the alternative remedy is not equally efficacious, encumbersome or if there be jurisdictional error in a statutory notice. . . . . the Court has discretionary power to consider the case on merit and not to push back the petitioner to contest on merit. " 13. . . . . . . . . . where the alternative remedy is not equally efficacious, encumbersome or if there be jurisdictional error in a statutory notice. . . . . the Court has discretionary power to consider the case on merit and not to push back the petitioner to contest on merit. " 13. We have given our opinion on the point whether making a show cause before the authority who had issued the notice is an alternative remedy and we have further found that on the point of maintainability of the writ petition there are two conflict ing decisions of two Division Benches of this High Court and there is a Full Bench decision of the High Court wherein a writ petition was accepted in view of patent illegalities in the notice under the U. P. Control of Goondas Act. Under these cir cumstances, we feel that the matter should be placed before a Full Bench for a decision on the following two points: " (1) If the opportunity of show cause before the authority, who issues a show-cause notice not in conformity with the provisions of S. 3 (1) of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act, could be considered an alternative remedy and (2) If a writ petition may be refused to be entertained only on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy even though the Court finds a particular notice illegal which makes con sequential acts also illegal. " 14. The matter may be placed before the Honble the Chief Justice for con stituting a Full Bench to decide the aforesaid two questions. 15. In view of the fact that the general nature of material allegations have been indicated through mention of certain case crime numbers only which, in our view, may not be a proper compliance of Section 3 (1) of the U. P. Control of Goondas Act, we direct that till the reference is answered by the larger Bench, no action against the petitioner may be taken in pursuance to the impugned noti6e dated 23-1-1998 (Annexure-1 to this petition ). Petition disposed of. .