A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THE order passed by the Assistant Collector at Baroda on 29th July 1982 is also by the Collector of Baroda (respondent No. herein) on 2nd June 1983 as affirmed in revision by the decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at ahmedabad (the Tribunal for convenience) on 28th January 1985 in Revision Application no. TEN. B. A. 284 of 1983 are under challenge in this petition under Article 227 of the constitution of India. By his impugned order, the Assistant Collector at Baroda set aside his own order passed on 1st January 1982 granting permission to the petitioner to purchase three parcels of land bearing survey Nos. 67/2, 68 and 69 (the disputed lands for convenience) under sec. 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (the Tenancy Act for brief ). By his impugned order, respondent No. 2 refused to grant permission to the petitioner for purchase of the aforesiad parcels of land. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this petition move in a narrow compass. The petitioner made an application to respondent No. 2 herein on 26th March 1981 for purchase of the disputed lands from their respective owners. Its copy is at Annexure-A to this petition. By his reply of 14th July 1981, respondent No. 2 gave intimation to the petitioner that his application was transferred to the Assistant Collector for obtaining the necessary certificate under sec. 63 of the Tenancy Act. Its copy is at Annexure-B to this petition. It appears that respective owners of the disputed lands applied to the competent authority at baroda for permission to sell the lands to the petitioner in view of the relevant provisions contained in the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (the Ceiling Act for brief ). By his communications of 31st January 1981, the competent authority informed the respective landholders that such permission would not be necessary. Their copies are at annexure-C collectively to this petition. Thereafter, by the order passed on 1st June 1982, the Assistant Collector at Baroda granted to the petitioner permission to purchase the disputed lands from their respective owners on certain terms and conditions. Its copy is at annexure-D to this petition. Their copies are at annexure-C collectively to this petition. Thereafter, by the order passed on 1st June 1982, the Assistant Collector at Baroda granted to the petitioner permission to purchase the disputed lands from their respective owners on certain terms and conditions. Its copy is at annexure-D to this petition. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner purchased the disputed lands from their respective owners and got executed and registered the necessary sale deeds some time on or about 9th July 1982. It appears that the Assistant Collector at Baroda later on realised that permission inter alia under Sec. 63 of the Tenancy Act could not have been granted by him but could have been granted by respondent No. 2 Therepon, by his order passed on 29th July 1982, the Assistant Collector at Baroda set aside his own order passed on 1st June 1982 at Annexure-D to this petition. A copy of the aforesaid order passed on 29th July 1982 is at Annexure-F to this petition. It appears that the petitioner thereupon approached respondent No. 2 with his representation of 26th August 1982. Its copy is at Annexure-G to this petition. It appears that he issued one reminder on 10th May 1983. Its copy is at Annexure-H to this petition. Thereafter, by his order passed on 2nd June 1983, respondent No. 2 rejected the petitioners application made on 26th march 1981. Its copy is at Annexure-J to this petition. The aggrieved petitioner carried the matter in revision before the Tribunal under sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act. It came to be registered as Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 284 of 1983. By its decision rendered on 28th January 1985 in the aforesaid revisional application, the Tribunal rejected it. Its copy is at Annexure-K to this petition. The aggrieved petitioner has thereupon approached 613 this court by means of this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for questioning the correctness of the order at Annexure-F to this petition as also the order at annexure-J to this petition as affirmed in revision by the decision at Annexure-K to this petition. The aggrieved petitioner has thereupon approached 613 this court by means of this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for questioning the correctness of the order at Annexure-F to this petition as also the order at annexure-J to this petition as affirmed in revision by the decision at Annexure-K to this petition. ( 3 ) LEARNED Assistant Government Pleader Shri Sompura for the respondents has urged that this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable at least qua the order of the Assistant Collector at Annexure-F to this petition and also qua the order of respondent No. 2 at Annexure-J to this petition as affirmed in revision by the decision at Annexure-K to this petition. Thereupon, learned Advocate Shri Patel for the petitioner has orally applied for leave to convert this petition as also under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Such oral request is accepted and this petition is ordered to be treated as also under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on payment of the deficit court fees, if any, within eight weeks from today. ( 4 ) THE grievance voiced by learned Advocate Shri Patel for the petitioner against the impugned order at Annexure-F to this petition is that no opportunity of hearing was given to him and it was in contravention of the rule of audi alteram partem. As against this, learned Assistant Government Pleader Shri Sompura for the respondents has urged that the order at Annexure-D to this petition was an administrative order and it was revoked by the order at Annexure-F to this petition in exercise of the powers under sec. 21 of the bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 (the G. C. Act for brief ). By way of rejoinder, learned advocate Shri Patel for the petitioner has urged that the order at Annexure-D to this petition could not have been revoked under sec. 21 of the G. C. Act in the name of correction of mistake more particularly when the order at Annexure-D to this petition came to be acted upon by and on behalf of the petitioner. In that view of the matter, runs the submission of Shri Patel for the petitioner, an opportunity of hearing ought to have been given before passing the impugned order at Annexure-F to this petition. In that view of the matter, runs the submission of Shri Patel for the petitioner, an opportunity of hearing ought to have been given before passing the impugned order at Annexure-F to this petition. ( 5 ) IT cannot be gainsaid that, pursuant to the order at Annexure-D to this petition, the petitioner had purchased the disputed lands from their respective owners and got the sale deeds executed and registered some time on 9th July 1982. Copies of such sale deeds are at Annexure-E (collectively) to this petition. It thus becomes clear that the order at Annexure-D to this petition was acted upon. It therefore got exhausted by acting upon. Once it came to be exhausted, it could not have been recalled or revoked or rescinded under sec. 21 of the G. C. Act, in any case, without giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. If the order at Annexure-D to this petition was found to have been erroneous, the error in that regard could have been corrected only after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. ( 6 ) I am fortified in my view by the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of divisional Superintendent, Eastern Railway, Dinapur vs. L. N. Kashri, reported in AIR supreme Court at page 1889. In that case, the pay scale of certain employees was fixed at rs. 110-180 as against the correct scale to be given to them at Rs. 105-135. The order of fixation of their pay in the scale of Rs. 110-180 was sought to be corrected by the order passed on 16th August 1966 on the ground that their pay was mistakenly fixed in that scale. No opportunity of hearing was given in that regard. In that context, the Supreme court has held that an opportunity of hearing ought to have been given before changing the scale of those employees to their disadvantage. ( 7 ) THE aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court will be applicable to the facts of the present case by analogy. It cannot be gainsaid that the order of fixation of pay qua certain pay scale would be an administrative order. ( 7 ) THE aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court will be applicable to the facts of the present case by analogy. It cannot be gainsaid that the order of fixation of pay qua certain pay scale would be an administrative order. If it is implemented and if it is sought to be revoked or modified or rescinded on the ground of a mistake under the relevant provisions contained in the G. C. Act, it can be done only after giving an opportunity of hearing to the concerned affected parties in view of the aforesaid binding ruling of the supreme Court. In the present case, it cannot be gainsaid that the order at Annexure-D to this petition passed on 1st June 1982 was more or less an administrative order. It was acted upon by and on behalf of the petitioner. Before its revocation under sec. 21 of the g. C. Act, it was incumbent on the part of the Assistant Collector at Baroda to give an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Since no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner, it can be said to be null and void as it has been passed in contravention of the audi alterant partem rule. ( 8 ) A reference deserves to be made to the ruling of this court in the case of S. H. Shirekar vs. Union of India, reported in 1985 (1) Services Law Reporter at page 144. In that case, an employee was promoted to a higher position by mistake. He was paid additional salary on the promotional post. That order was sought to be set aside on the ground of correction of mistake in granting promotion and for recovery of the additional salary paid to the employee on the promotional post. In that context, this court has held that it could not have been done without affording an opportunity of hearing to the concerned employee as such an order would prejudicially affect him. Sitting as a single judge, the aforesaid ruling of this court is binding to me. Even otherwise, I am in respectful agreement therewith. By analogy, the aforesaid decision of this court would be applicable in the present case. It cannot be gainsaid that an order of promotion of an employee will be an administrative order. If there is any mistake, it can be modified or revoked or rescinded under sec. Even otherwise, I am in respectful agreement therewith. By analogy, the aforesaid decision of this court would be applicable in the present case. It cannot be gainsaid that an order of promotion of an employee will be an administrative order. If there is any mistake, it can be modified or revoked or rescinded under sec. 21 of the G. C. Act. However, if such order is acted upon, it can be modified or rescinded or revoked only after giving an opportunity of hearing in view of the aforesaid ruling of this court. In the present case also, the order at annexure-D to this petition could be said to be an administrative order. However, it came to be acted upon as transpiring from the sale deeds at Annexure-E (collectively) to this petition. It therefore, becomes clear that before rescinding or revocation of the order at Annexure-D to this petition by the impugned order at Annexure-F to this petition, an opportunity of hearing ought to have been given to the petitioner in view of the aforesaid ruling of this court. ( 9 ) IT is true that the impugned order at Annexure-F to this petition has been challenged in this petition nearly four years thereafter. This delay should not come in the way of the petitioner for certain very good reasons. In the first place, the petitioner made his representation to respondent No. 2 on 26th August 1982 at Annexure-G to this petition and another reminder on 10th May 1983 at Annexure-H to this petition. It is true that the petitioner ought to have challenged the impugned order at Annexure-F to this petition by way of an appeal or a revision before an appropriate authority or forum according to law. It however appears that the petitioner remained in a bonafide impression that, pursuant to his representations at Annexure-G and H to this petition, respondent No. 2 would quash and set aside the impugned order at Annexure-F to this petition. As luck would have it, respondent No. 2 took up the petitioners application at annexure-A to this petition for the purpose of deciding its fate by the impugned order at annexure-J to this petition. Respondent No. 2 was certainly not unjustified in considering that application on its own merits since the order at Annexure-D to this petition was revoked by the impugned order at Annexure-F to this petition. Respondent No. 2 was certainly not unjustified in considering that application on its own merits since the order at Annexure-D to this petition was revoked by the impugned order at Annexure-F to this petition. However, in view of the representations made by the petitioner at Annexures-G and H to this petition, respondent No. 2 ought to have examined the correctness of the impugned order at annexure-F to this petition rather than taking up the petitioners application at annexure-A to this petition for deciding its fate. It appears that respondent No. 2 completely ignored the petitioners representations at Annexures-G and H to this petition. In that view of the matter, the impugned order at Annexure-J to this petition as affirmed in revision by the impugned order at Annexure-K to this petition can be said to be suffering from the vice of non-application of mind on the part of respondent No. 2 herein. Such an order cannot be sustained in law. ( 10 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the impugned order at Annexure-F to this petition as well as the impugned order at Annexure-J to this petition as affirmed in revision by the decision at Annexure-K to this petition cannot be sustained in law. Both the impugned orders at Annexure-F to this petition and at Annexure-J to this petition as affirmed in revision by the decision at Annexure-K to this petition deserve to be quashed and set aside. This judgment of mine shall not preclude the concerned officers to examine the validity of the order at Annexure-D to this petition according to law if it is so desired after passage of more than one and half decades from its date. ( 11 ) IN the result, this petition is accepted. The order passed by the Assistant Collector at Baroda on 29th July 1982 at Annexure-F to this petition and the order passed by the collector of Baroda (respondent No. 2 herein) on 2nd June 1983 at Annexure-J to this petition as affirmed in revision by the decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad on 28th January 1985 in Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 284 of 1983 at Annexure-K to this petition are quashed and set aside. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs. .