M. R. CALLA, J. ( 1 ) THIS matter comes up on Civil Application No. 172 of 1995 which was filed by the present applicant for vacating ad-interim relief. This application for vacating ad-interim relief was moved before this Court on 20. 7. 1995 with a copy to Mr. H. S. Munshaw (the learned counsel for original petitioner) supplied on 2. 8. 1995. The applicant seeks vacation of ex-parte ad-interim order dated 19. 1. 1994 which was passed by this court while issuing Rule and whereby the payment of backwages to the present applicant i. e. original respondent in the main Special Civil Application No. 642 of 1994 was stayed. The application for vacating ad-interim relief was filed with proper court fees stamp. ( 2 ) ALTHOUGH a copy of the application was served on 2. 8. 1995 upon the original petitioner who had obtained ex-parte ad-interim order on 19. 1. 1994 without furnishing copy of the Paper Book to the otherside, the application is still pending and has not been disposed of. Two weeks period expired on 16. 8. 1995, and therefore, in terms of Article 226 (3), the ex-parte ad-interim order dated 19. 1. 1994 stood vacated automatically. Article 226 (3) is reproduced as under:"226 (3 ). 1. 1994 without furnishing copy of the Paper Book to the otherside, the application is still pending and has not been disposed of. Two weeks period expired on 16. 8. 1995, and therefore, in terms of Article 226 (3), the ex-parte ad-interim order dated 19. 1. 1994 stood vacated automatically. Article 226 (3) is reproduced as under:"226 (3 ). Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, petition under clause (1), without (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard; makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated. " ( 3 ) I find from the facts and record of this case that all the ingredients to invoke the provision of Article 226 (3) are fully available in this case and by operation of the provision contained in Article 226 (3) by itself ex-parte ad-interim order dated 19. 1. 1994 stood vacated with the expiry of the period of two weeks from the date i. e. 2. 8. 1995 on which the copy of the application for vacating order had been duly received by Mr. H. S. Munshaw appearing for the original petitioner. Mr. Munshaw was therefore at pains to pursuade this court to hear the matter on merits but it is not necessary to go into the merits of the application for interim relief at this stage or to continue the order dated 19. 1. H. S. Munshaw appearing for the original petitioner. Mr. Munshaw was therefore at pains to pursuade this court to hear the matter on merits but it is not necessary to go into the merits of the application for interim relief at this stage or to continue the order dated 19. 1. 1994 because it stands automatically vacated with the expiry of two weeks period on and from 2. 8. 1995 i. e. the date on which the copy of the application for vacating order was duly received by the learned counsel for the petitioner. ( 4 ) IT is a dismal fact that provisions contained in Article 226 (3) are not being adhered to and for that purpose there are no rules for listing application under Article 226 (3) within the period of two weeks from the date the copy is served on the party in whose favour ex-parte ad-interim order has been passed. In view of the provisions of Article 226 (3) it must flow as consequential duty on the registry by way of rule or administrative circular to deal with such applications separately and it is the duty of the registry and it must also be expected by the party who has obtained ex-parte order that such applications are listed before the court within a period of two weeks from the date copy is served upon the party in whose favour the ex-parte ad-interim order has been passed. Article 226 (3) itself castes duty upon the court to dispose of such application either way within a period of two weeks. The court cannot dispose of the application unless the same is listed before the court and therefore, the party moving application for vacating order, the party which has obtained the ex-parte ad-interim order and the registry have to see that the matter is brought before the Court within the time prescribed under Article 226 (3 ). Whether the parties take care or not, at least the registry has to see that the matter comes up before the court and it is shown on the board within a period of two weeks. Once the matter is shown in the board and the party seeks time and the ex-parte ad-interim order is extended further, that will be a different matter altogether. Once the matter is shown in the board and the party seeks time and the ex-parte ad-interim order is extended further, that will be a different matter altogether. Because in that case with the consent of the parties the matter is adjourned and the order may be continued by the court. But the registry has to classify such application for vacating ex-parte ad-interim orders separately under Article 226 (3) so as to serve the object sought to be achieved by Article 226 (3) of the Constitution rather than defeating the same by not listing the case in time. I find that in the present case the registry had noticed and had mentioned in its report that it was the application to vacate interim relief and after 2. 8. 1995 the matter was listed time and again and the same was adjourned on several dates with the consent of the parties but at no stage any prayer was made for continuing ex- parte ad-interim order. Be that as it may, direct consequence of not disposing of application for vacating interim relief within a period of fourteen days after 2. 8. 1995 in the facts of this case is that the ex-parte ad-interim order dated 19. 1. 1994 stood vacated on 16. 8. 1995 and as such there is no question of continuing the same now. ( 5 ) SINCE the ex-parte ad-interim order stands vacated only on the ground of the operation of Article 226 (3), it will be open for the original petitioner to move any appropriate application afresh in which he is free to obtain any appropriate order on merits of the case after hearing both the sides. At this stage Mr. Munshaw has cited before me a decision of this court rendered by Single Bench in the case of Mrs. S. N. Pandor vs. District Judge, District Court, Sabarkantha reported in 1995 (2) GLH 976 and has submitted that lodging of application in the Registry cannot be construed as making of application to the High Court and further that the time as specified starts running from the date of the cognizance by the learned Judge and the party seeking vacation of interim relief must move preferably within two weeks from receipt of order and not at any time. From this judgment, the proposition appears to have been laid down that the period of two weeks is to commence from the date of cognizance by the learned Judge and lodging of the application in the Registry cannot be construed as making of the application in the high Court. While dealing with this aspect of the matter, the learned Single Judge in Mrs. S. N. Pandors case (supra) has referred to the decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 1991 Calcutta 272 and another decision rendered by Rajasthan High court in the case of Gheesalal vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1981 Raj. 65 . While making a reference to the Calcuttas case and the observation made in the decision rendered by the Calcutta High Court, it has been noted that according to the observations made in para 8 of the Calcuttas case when a statutory provision not only directs a thing to be done in a specified period, but at the same time provides for the inevitable consequence of non compliance with the direction, the direction must be held to be mandatory and not merely directory. It has been further held in para 12 of the same judgment in Calcuttas case that although after such an eventuality the interim relief will stand vacated, "nothing shall prevent the Court to grant an interim order afresh hearing the parties, on the application for vacation or otherwise, if the Court finds sufficient grounds to make such fresh order. " Thereafter, the reference has been made to the decision rendered by Rajasthan High Court in Gheesalal vs. State of Rajasthan. Having noted both the decisions in the case of Mrs. S. N. Pandor (supra) which has been cited by mr. Munshaw, it has been observed in para 8 that as far as the proposition laid down by the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court is concerned, there is no reason to depart therefrom. Having noted both the decisions in the case of Mrs. S. N. Pandor (supra) which has been cited by mr. Munshaw, it has been observed in para 8 that as far as the proposition laid down by the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court is concerned, there is no reason to depart therefrom. With due respect I am of the opinion that if there is no reason to depart from the view taken by the Calcutta High Court, the period of fourteen days has to commence from the date the copy is made available to the counsel or the party having exparte ad interim order after the application is lodged in the Registry and if the reasoning that judicial order cannot be vacated by the administrative inaction holds good, at the same time, it cannot be denied that the natural consequences which the constitutional mandate has to follow cannot be defeated and as such constitutional provisions have to be operated so as to reach the object sought to be achieved and the object which we cherish the most. The provision contained in the Constitution makes it clear that such application moved in the High Court has to be disposed of within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which copy of the application was furnished and therefore the point of commencement has been specifically provided in the constitution itself. View which has been taken that the period should commence from the date it is brought to the notice of the concerned Judge is not discernible from the language contained in Article 226 (3) wherein it is provided that the application is to be made to the high Court for the vacation of such order and the copy of such application is to be furnished to the party in whose favour such order has been made. Thus, it is clear that article 226 (3) postulates making of application to the High Court and not to the Judge to whom the business of hearing such matters is assigned. Thus, it is clear that article 226 (3) postulates making of application to the High Court and not to the Judge to whom the business of hearing such matters is assigned. Under Article 226 of the constitution of India, every High Court consists of Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint and therefore the High court would mean the Chief Justice and other Judges appointed for that State by the president of India and not a particular Judge to whom the business has been assigned by the Chief Justice to hear particular type of matters. In fact, all the applications which are lodged in the Registry are lodged and addressed to Honourable the Chief Justice and his other companion Judges of that particular High Court and therefore, I respectfully disagree with the view taken in the case of Mrs. S. N. Pandor (supra) laying down that the period would commence from the date of matter is brought to the notice of the concerned bench or from the date on which such. bench takes cognizance of the matter and not from the date the copy of the application is furnished after it is lodged in the Registry. In my humble opinion, the application lodged in the Registry for vacation of ex-parte ad-interim order under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India has to be listed before the Court within a period of fourteen days from the date the copy of such application is furnished to the learned counsel or the party who has obtained ex-parte order from the court. It is not a case of defeating or bringing judicial order to an end by administrative inaction but it is on account of the operation of the constitutional mandate and the Calcutta High Court for which it has been stated at the outset in para 8 in the Mrs. S. N. Pandors case (Supra) that proposition laid down by the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court is concerned, there is no reason to depart therefrom has itself taken the view that when a statutory provision directs the thing to be done in a specified period, but at the same time provides for the inevitable consequence of non-compliance with the direction, the direction must be held to be mandatory and not merely directory. It was also held as a question of principle in the case of Taylor vs. Taylor reported in (1876) 1 Chd 426 relied upon in Nazir Ahmeds Case AIR 1936 PC 253 (2) and followed in the case of the State of uttar Pradesh vs. Singhara Singh reported in AIR 1964 SC Pg. 358 that if the power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden and if a Statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted. In view of such a proposition of law which is being followed and refollowed and adhered to time and again by the Apex court in various decisions how it can be said that even if the Constitution provides that application under Article 226 (3) has to be disposed of within a period of two weeks the non disposal of such application within a period of two weeks as provided under Article 226 (3) would not result in vacation of the order and the order can yet be continued. So far as the question-of extension of the order with the consent of the parties is concerned, that is a different matter altogether. It has been observed in the earlier part of the order that if the matter comes before the court on such application and request is made and granted by the court and the time is extended with consent, it will follow different consequences. But as has happened in the instant case, no prayer was made at any time for extending the interim order even after expiry of a period of two weeks, how the provision of the Constitution be made defeasible because of the inaction of any party or the registry. In Mrs. But as has happened in the instant case, no prayer was made at any time for extending the interim order even after expiry of a period of two weeks, how the provision of the Constitution be made defeasible because of the inaction of any party or the registry. In Mrs. S. N. Pandors case (Supra) in para 8, it has been observed that the learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court has not taken into consideration one aspect namely that the interpretation that he was accepting will lead to a judicial order being vacated by an administrative inaction such an interpretation cannot be contemplated. It has been then observed that when Article 226 (3) specifically requires an aggrieved party to make application to the High Court for vacation of order, the making of such an application will have to be construed as to be made to the learned Judge making up the assignment and the period will start from the day the application for vacation is made to the learned Judge, otherwise the ex-parte order passed by the learned judge will stand vacated even before the matter comes up before the learned Judge and therefore the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court-as expressed in para 10 of Gheesalal. s case has not been accepted. According to me, this view taken in Mrs, S. N. Pandors case (Supra) is not in confirmity with the clear language of Article 226 (3) rather it seeks to thwart the very purpose of Article 226 (3 ). I also do not agree with the following observations made in paras 8 and 11 of S. N. Pandors case:"8 xxx xxx When the Article speaks of the High Court disposing of the application it will have to be construed as disposing the application on merits and hence that is the responsibility of the learned Judge taking up the assignment. . . . ""11. xxx xxx If the High Court is expected to decide an application for vacation within two weeks, it is implied that the party concerned is very much aggrieved and it will not be improper to read that such a party ought to rush to the court expeditiously and preferably within two weeks of receipt of the order. . . ""11. xxx xxx If the High Court is expected to decide an application for vacation within two weeks, it is implied that the party concerned is very much aggrieved and it will not be improper to read that such a party ought to rush to the court expeditiously and preferably within two weeks of receipt of the order. In a case where a party approaches the High Court beyond this period, the high Court may still entertain the application if circumstances are explained. However, the Article cannot be read to mean a right to a respondent to move the High Court any time when the party feels like moving. " ( 6 ) THE concept of automatic vacation of an exparte order was included by amending article 226 and introducing 226 (3) only to take care of the administrative inaction and the inaction of the interested party in dealing with the orders obtained exparte and their continuance indefinitely. ( 7 ) SO far as this particular Civil Application No. 1724 of 1995 is concerned, I have finally disposed it of but whereas my attention was invited by Mr. Munshaw to this decision rendered by this Court in Mrs. S. N. Pandors case (Supra), and I could not find myself in full agreement with the reasoning and view which has been taken on overall basis in Mrs. S. N. Pandors case, I find that clarification is required to be given by a Larger Bench to be constituted by the Honourable the Acting Chief Justice, so that the correct ratio of the decision of the Calcutta High Court and the decision of the rajasthan High Court and that which has been laid down in Mrs. S. N. Pandors case may be clarified particularly on the following questions: in case an application under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution of India for vacating an exparte ad-interim order is lodged in the registry of the High Court. 1. Whether the time period of two weeks provided under Article 226 (3) of the constitution of India begins from the date the copy of the application for vacating ex-parte ad-interim order is furnished to the party in whose favour ex-parte ad- interim order is operative? or it would commence only from the date cognizance of such application is taken by the learned Judge taking up such matters?2. or it would commence only from the date cognizance of such application is taken by the learned Judge taking up such matters?2. Whether the disposal of such application under Article 226 (3) would only mean the disposal of such application on merits and the ex-parte ad-interim order shall continue even after the expiry of two weeks from the date the copy of the application for vacating the order is made available to the party in whose favour ex-parte ad-interim order is operative?3. In case, the application for vacating ex-parte ad- interim order is not disposed of within time limit as prescribed under Article 226 (3) and interim order comes to an end by afflux of time by operating the provision of Article 226 (3), will it be a case of vacation of judicial order by the inaction on the part of the Registry or it will be a case of natural consequences flowing from the provision contained in Article 226 (3) of the Constitution?4. Whether the party against whom an ex-parte ad-interim order has been passed is under any obligation to move the court for vacating ex-parte ad-interim order within the period of two weeks and not at any time thereafter? ( 8 ) THE papers may therefore be appropriately placed in accordance with the gujarat High Court Rules before the Honourable Acting Chief Justice for constituting the Larger Bench for adjudication of the aforesaid points. ( 9 ) THE observations made in the earlier part of the order that Registry may list such cases within the period of two weeks may be brought to the notice of the Registrar so that he may proceed further to take appropriate steps for laying down the procedure and for that purpose if need be the appropriate steps may be taken for making amendment in the gujarat High Court Rules, if necessary. .