JUDGMENT 1. - This civil second appeal has been directed against the judgment and decree dated 4th December, 1981 passed by Addl. District Judge, Kishangarh Bas in Appeal No. 122/1980 confirming the judgment and decree passed by Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Kishangarh Bas dated 5th July, 1977 decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent. 2. The facts giving rise to the filing of this appeal briefly stated are that the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit against the defendant-appellants on 6th February, 1973 in the Court of Munsif, Kishangarh Bas, District Alwar for permanent injunction in respect of the property in dispute and had also sought a relief from Trial Court against the defendant-appellants by restraining them from dispossessing the plaintiff from the property in dispute. It was contended by the plaintiff before the Trial Court that he is in possession of the property in dispute as a owner since his ancestrals and that it was his ancestral property. It was further pleaded that the defendants have no interest in the property in dispute and that they forcibly want to dispossess the plaintiff from the premises, it was prayed that the defendants be restrained by means of a permanent injunction from dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit premises. 3. The defendant-appellants contested the suit by pleading inter alia that the property in dispute was purchased by them by a registered sale-deed dated 29th January, 1973 for a sum of Rs. 2,500/- from the vendee who was having a title and possession of the same. It was further contended that with regard to the property shown in green colour in the site plan, the Plaintiff had permissive possession from one Purshottam Das Bhargava and the defendants were told by the plaintiff that he would be vacating the same within 5-7 days of its sale. It was further pleaded in the pleading that since the plaintiff was neither the owner nor in possession of the property in question which belonged to Purshottam Das Bhargava predecessor in title of the appellants, there was no question of dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit premises. The learned Trial Court on the pleadings of the parties and on the basis of evidence tendered on the record decreed the plaintiff's suit by its judgment and decree dated 5th July, 1977 which was affirmed in appeal by the learned Addl. The learned Trial Court on the pleadings of the parties and on the basis of evidence tendered on the record decreed the plaintiff's suit by its judgment and decree dated 5th July, 1977 which was affirmed in appeal by the learned Addl. District Judge, Kishangarh Bas by its judgment and decree dated 4th December, 1981. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Kishangarh Bas the present second appeal has been preferred to this Court by the defendant-appellants. 4. The following substantial questions of law have been raised in this appeal : 1. Whether the first Appellate Court was justified in holding that the property in dispute was in adverse possession of the plaintiff, when no plea of adverse possession was taken nor any issue was framed in this regard ? 2. Whether the first Appellate Court was justified in holding that the plaintiff was the owner of the property in dispute by adverse possession in face of his admission that the suit property belong to Purshottam Das Bhargava ? 5. During the course of hearing it was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that there are two properties described in the site-plan Ex.l shown in red and green colours respectively and both properties are adjoining to each other. The appellants purchased the said properties from its original owner Purshottam Das Bhargava vide registered sale deed dated 29th January, 1973 vide Ex. A-1 on the record and ever since then the appellants are in possession of the property in dispute shown in red colour in the site-plan, while the portion described in green colour in the site plan is in possession of the plaintiff- respondent. It has been further contended that the plaintiff- respondent filed a suit for permanent injunction in respect of the whole property shown in the site-plan referred to above, wherein he had specifically averred that the property shown in green colour is his residential premises while the property shown in red colour is in a dilapidated condition. The plaintiff pleaded that he was in possession of the said property as owner. It was further pleaded in the plaint that the defendant- appellants wanted to take forcible possession for which he may be restrained by a permanent injunction from dispossessing the plaintiff from the property in question. 6. The plaintiff pleaded that he was in possession of the said property as owner. It was further pleaded in the plaint that the defendant- appellants wanted to take forcible possession for which he may be restrained by a permanent injunction from dispossessing the plaintiff from the property in question. 6. The defendant-appellants contested the suit by filing their reply wherein they pleaded that the property shown in the site plan Ex.1 was purchased by them by a registered sale deed dated 29th January, 1973 (Ex.A. 1) from one Purshottam Das Bhargava owner of the property in question who was having title and possession of the same. It was further contended that the plaintiff had permissive possession from its previous owner Purshottam Das Bhargava and the appellants were told by the plaintiff that he would vacate the same within 5-7 days. It was further pleaded by the appellants that the plaintiff-respondent was neither the owner nor in possession of the property in dispute. On the pleadings of the parties learned Trial Court framed four issues : Issue No. 1 related to the fact as to whether the plaintiff was the owner and in possession of the property in question. Second issue was as to whether Purshottam Das Bhargava was the owner of the property in question which was sold by a registered sale deed dated 29.1.1973 to the defendant-appellants for a sum of Rs. 2,500/- and the third issue was whether the plaintiff had permissive possession on the portion shown in green colour of the property in question in the site-plan Ex. 1. The learned Trial Court decreed the suit of plaintiff-respondent as indicated above. 7. During the course of hearing learned Counsel for the appellants has further contended that it is an admitted position on the record that Purshottam Das Bhargava was the owner of the property in question which fact is evident from the statement of Paltu Nath plaintiff PW 1 who has deposed in his statement that the property except the huts is of Purshottain Das Bhargava, the plaintiff-respondent claimed the ownership by adverse possession as against the true owner, i.e., Purshottam Dass Bhargava from whom the defendant- appellants purchased the property in question. This fact is apparent from the evidence tendered on the record. 8. This fact is apparent from the evidence tendered on the record. 8. It was next contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that it is an established position in law that if a person claims right by setting up a plea of adverse possession, then in that event he must specifically plead title to the property by virtue of adverse possession. Learned Counsel for the appellants placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakira, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1254; wherein it was held by the Apex Court that where a party sets up the plea of adverse possession as against true owner, it must plead and show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner which amounts to a perfection of his title to the property claimed by him. A perusal of the plaint reveals that the plaintiff had asserted that he is the owner of the property in question and in possession from his ancestors and no plea of adverse possession has been taken in the plaint and in absence of this plea in the pleadings, it was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that when the plaintiff had not set any case for adverse possession, the learned Trial Court has gravely erred in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff on the ground of adverse possession. I have examined the pleadings i.e., the plaint, written statement as well as the evidence tendered on the record. I am of the considered opinion that the appellant had purchased the property in question by a registered sale-deed dated 28th January, 1973 from Purshottam Das Bhargava for Rs. 2,500/- and when the property was purchased the plaintiff respondent was in permissive possession of the same. He had agreed to vacate the property and hand over its peaceful possession to the defendant-appellants within 5-7 days of its sale by Purshottam Das Bhargava to the defendant- appellants but instead of handing over its peaceful possession the plaintiff raised a dispute by claiming that he is the owner of the property by adverse possession, particularly when no plea of adverse possession has been raised in the pleadings nor any evidence in this regard has been tendered on the record. I am further of the opinion that it is an established proposition of law that a party cannot be granted relief in respect of a case which is contrary to the case initially set up by him, particularly when there is no foundation in the pleadings and also when the Opposite Party has no opportunity to meet the case set up by a party which gives surprise to him. Applying the above principle to the present case, I am of the view that since the plaintiff who had taken the plea of claiming title by adverse possession against the true owner, in order to succeed should have not only raised issue in the pleadings but also a specific issue should have been framed in this regard by learned Trial Court. In absence of pleadings and proof, learned Trial Court has gravely erred in setting up a new case for the plaintiff for which the defendant-appellants had no opportunity to meet the same. 9. During the course of hearing it was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the plaintiff had miserably failed even to prove his permissive possession over the rest of the portion of the property in dispute. In these circumstances the only evidence which has been shown to this Court is the resolution of the Executive Committee of the Panchayat Samiti, Kathahim, District Alwar vide Ex. A-2 which in fact is a vacant land now in possession of the defendant- appellants. From this resolution of the Panchayat Samiti Ex.A-2 dated 27th July, 1976 it can be inferred that the plaintiff was earlier in possession of the said vacant land. No evidence in rebuttal has been led by the appellants against the said resolution affirming the possession of the plaintiff over the said land. I am further of the opinion that in these circumstances it was not proper for both the Courts below to have passed a decree against the defendant-appellants in respect of entire property in question including the portion shown in red colour which is lying vacant towards the South to the property in question shown in green colour in the site-plan. I am further of the opinion that in these circumstances it was not proper for both the Courts below to have passed a decree against the defendant-appellants in respect of entire property in question including the portion shown in red colour which is lying vacant towards the South to the property in question shown in green colour in the site-plan. I am further of the opinion that in order to succeed the plaintiff should have proved on the record as to from which time or year he was claiming adverse possession against the true owner which would have perfected his title by adverse possession over the suit property. This admittedly not having done the plaintiff was not entitled to succeed on the basis of plea of adverse possession. I am further of the opinion that the appellants have successfully tendered all the relevant evidence on the record to prove that the possession of the plaintiff over the suit property was only permissive, and that it is cardinal principle of law that in order to prove adverse possession, the party has to prove the fact that its adverse possession over the same has been for more than 12 years which would only be as against the true owner and this having not been pleaded and proved, the suit of the plaintiff could not have been decreed even in respect of the portion shown in green colour in the site-plan as well. 10. In support of his contentions advanced at the bar, learned Counsel for the appellants has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court in the matters of S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakira (supra), Sheodhari Rai and Others v. Suraj Prasad Singh, AIR 1954 Supreme Court 758, Ram Vilas and Others v. Baboo Lal and Others, WLN (UC) 1981 page 348 (D.B. judgment), Hasan Ali v. Hafiz Mushtak All, 1986 RLR 48 and Asaram v. Devraj: 1961 RLW 274 .In the matter of the M.S. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakira (supra), it was held by the Apex Court that a mere suggestion in the prayer clause that there was uninterrupted possession of a party for 12 years or that the plaintiff had acquired an 'absolute title' was not enough to succeed. Bibi Sakira (supra), it was held by the Apex Court that a mere suggestion in the prayer clause that there was uninterrupted possession of a party for 12 years or that the plaintiff had acquired an 'absolute title' was not enough to succeed. It was further held that long possession is not a substitute for a plea without a specific plea of adverse possession in the pleadings, in absence of which a suit cannot be decreed.In the matter of Sheodhari Rai and Others v. Suraj Prasad Singh (supra), the question which had arisen for consideration of the Apex Court was whether there was variance between the pleadings and proof, and where the defendant in his written statement sets up a title to the disputed land as the nearest reversioners the Court cannot, on the failure of the defendant to prove his case make out a new case for him which is not only made in the written statement but which is wholly inconsistent with the title set up by the defendants, namely, that the defendants were holding under a Shikri settlement from the nearest reversioner. Likewise the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Ram Vilas and Others v. Baboo Lal and Others , (supra), held that where a party sets up a plea of adverse possession as against the lawful owner, it cannot succeed by mere assertion that he has been using the property on the basis of adverse possession but in order to succeed has to prove the entire factum of adverse possession by leading substantial evidence on record which admittedly has not been done in the present case by the plaintiffr respondent. Likewise this Court in the matter of Hasan Ali v. Hafiz Mushtak Ali (supra) has held that where a party sets up a case of adverse possession, in order to succeed, has not only to plead the said fact specifically in the pleadings but should also make averments of hostile, uninterrupted continuance and possession adverse to the plaintiff for the prescribed period, and in absence of this from mere assertion in the written statement, no presumption can be drawn in favour of the party pleading adverse possession as against the true owner. In the matter of Asaram v. Devraj (supra), this Court held that a party cannot be granted relief on a case (a) which is contradictory to the case initially set up; (b) when there is no foundation of the case in the pleadings and the other party had no opportunity to meet the same and when the new case set up caused a surprise to him. 11. While controverting the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellants it has been contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the plaintiff-respondent had specifically raised the plea of adverse possession and had also led evidence on the record and that learned Trial Court had rightly decreed the suit in his favour on 5th July, 1977 against which the appellants preferred an appeal before learned Addl. District Judge, Kishangarh Bas, District Alwar who had a affirmed the findings of the Trial Court vide its order dated 4th December, 1981 by dismissing appeal preferred by the appellants. It has been further contended that in view of Section 100 Civil Procedure Code the present appeal is not maintainable, since both the Courts below have given concurrent findings of fact which are not assailable. The above contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent are not sustainable, since it is a cardinal principle of law that notwithstanding the fact that the concurrent findings of the two Courts below on the pure question of fact are not assailable in second appeal yet this Court is not precluded from reversing the same in second appeal, particularly when the findings appear to be grossly perverse, contrary to law and if they are arrived at contrary to the pleadings and evidence on the record and if they are perverse on the face of it and in my considered opinion the findings of the two Courts below are certainly perverse, manifestly unjust and contrary to the pleadings and evidence on the record and have resulted in grave injustice to the appellants. Applying the ratio of the decisions of the Apex Court as well as of this Court referred to above I am of the opinion that the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court on 5th July 1977 and affirmed by learned Addl. District Judge vide its order dated 4th December, 1981 deserve to be quashed and set aside. 12. Applying the ratio of the decisions of the Apex Court as well as of this Court referred to above I am of the opinion that the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court on 5th July 1977 and affirmed by learned Addl. District Judge vide its order dated 4th December, 1981 deserve to be quashed and set aside. 12. In support of his contentions advanced at the bar by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the matters of Maniar Ismail Sab and Others v. Maniar Fakruddin and Others, AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1509, Bhairab Chandra Nandan v. Randhir Chandra Dutta, (1988) 1 SCC 383 , Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. M/s. Kutta Flush Doors and Furniture Co. (P) Ltd. AIR 1988 Supreme Court 164 and Smt. Annapoorani Ammal v. C. Thangapalam, (1989) 3 SCC 287 . 13. The ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court is to the effect that consideration and appreciation of material available on the record is conclusive and binding and misappreciation of evidence is not a ground for interference in second appeal. I am of the considered opinion that the said proposition of law is neither attracted nor applicable to this case for the reason that the findings recorded by the two Courts below are not only contrary to the evidence on record but the Courts below have set up a new case in favour of the plaintiff on the basis of adverse possession of the property in dispute, when neither the plea of adverse possession was taken specifically in the pleadings nor any issue was framed in this regard by the Trial Court and nor any evidence was tendered on the record by the plaintiff in support of the said contentions and in the absence of which Courts below have gravely erred in recording the findings that plaintiff was the owner of the property in dispute by adverse possession in face of clear admission by him that the suit property belongs to one Purshottam Das Bhargava from whom the appellants purchased the said property by a registered sale deed dated 28th January, 1973 which has been duly proved on the record and on the basis of which a valid title has passed on to the appellants. Hence substantial questions of law do arise for consideration of this Court on the basis of which I am of the opinion that in view of the discussions made above, defendant appellants deserve to succeed in this second appeal. 14. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Kishangarh Bas dated 5th July, 1977 and the order dated 4th December, 1981 passed by Addl. District Judge, Kishangarh Bas are quashed and set aside. Parties are left to bear their own cost.The record of the Courts below be sent back immediately. Appeal allowed. *******