JUDGMENT - T.K. CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS, J.:---The petitioner is a tenant and she was ordered to be evicted by the Deputy Collector and Additional Controller, from the premises bearing House No. DMC-9-55, at main road, Nani Daman, which belongs to the respondents Nos. 3 to 11. Respondents Nos. 3 to 11 sought eviction of the petitioner on the ground of bona fide requirements under section 23 read with section 25 of the Goa, Daman and Diu, Rent Control Act. By its order dated 12-11-1992, the Deputy Collector ordered eviction of the petitioner. The petitioner took the matter in appeal in the Administrative Tribunal, Goa, Daman and Diu as Eviction Appeal No. 43/92. The Administrative Tribunal, by its Judgment dated 30-11-1995, also dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner. It is in this context that the petitioner approached this Court by way of this writ petition to challenge the orders of the Deputy Collector and Additional Controller and the Administrative Tribunal. 2.The above proceedings were originated on a notice issued by and on behalf of Mr. Joseph Fernandes, Luise Fernandes, Thomas Fernandes and Armino Fernandes. Admittedly, the house bearing No. DMC-9-55 at main road, Nani Daman jointly owned by these four brothers. It is also not disputed that these four brothers were employed outside Daman and residing outside Daman. On 7-4-1984, a notice has been issued to the petitioner by the aforesaid 4 brothers jointly stating that the premises, in question, is required for them, i.e. their brother Shri Luise Fernandes who has retired in 1983. It is also stated that the present accommodation at Bandra where he was staying is insufficient and difficult for all other purposes to stay at Bandra, as a retired person. The Eviction Case No. 2/85, as stated above, has thereafter been filed before the Deputy Collector and Additional Rent Controller by these four brothers. After the order of the Additional Rent Controller, when the appeal was pending before the Administrative Tribunal, applicant No. 1 Luise Fernandes and applicant No. 4, Mr. Armino Fernandes died. 3.One of the objections raised by the Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Thali, in this context, is that the petition ought to have been dismissed by the Appellate Court on the ground that as the bona fide requirement stated in the notice and also in the eviction proceedings before the Lower Court is no more in existence. Armino Fernandes died. 3.One of the objections raised by the Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Thali, in this context, is that the petition ought to have been dismissed by the Appellate Court on the ground that as the bona fide requirement stated in the notice and also in the eviction proceedings before the Lower Court is no more in existence. I do not find much merit in this contention. As pointed out earlier, the house in question, is belonging to the applicants. It is averred in the petition that applicants Nos. 2 and 3 are due for retirement and also wanted to pass their retired life at Daman and they also require the house for their occupation. Therefore, the contention of Shri Thali, Counsel for the petitioner that no cause of action survives as applicant Nos. 1 and 4 have expired, cannot be accepted. This line of argument could have been perhaps relevant, if the L.Rs. of the deceased landlord are joined in the petition and prosecuted the petitioner for eviction, which is based on bona fide requirements. But, as I pointed out earlier, it is a joint case, filed by four brothers, who are placed more or less in a similar situation and who wanted to come down to Daman at their native place and reside on their retirements, in the house in question, it cannot be said that the cause of action is ceased to exist as far as remaining applicants are concerned. Therefore, the objection raised by the Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Thali is only to be overruled. 4.Coming to the next contentions of the Counsel for the petitioner, which are two fold, viz. (1) that the pleadings in the petition are not sufficient enough to constitute bona fide requirements; and (2) that the evidence adduced on behalf of the original applicants, is at variance with the pleadings. 5.Regarding insufficiency of pleadings, I may quote the pleadings before the Court below. In the application at paras (4), (5) and (6) the pleadings are: "(4)The applicants say that the applicant No. 1 Luis Fernandes is retired from the services from General Insurance Corporation in the year 1983 and as stated above, the applicants are from Daman, the applicant No. 1 desires to pass his retired life in his native place at Daman. In the application at paras (4), (5) and (6) the pleadings are: "(4)The applicants say that the applicant No. 1 Luis Fernandes is retired from the services from General Insurance Corporation in the year 1983 and as stated above, the applicants are from Daman, the applicant No. 1 desires to pass his retired life in his native place at Daman. Further the applicant No. 1 used to stay at Bandra, as he was serving at Bombay. The accommodation at Bandra where the applicant No. 1 used to stay is insufficient and it is not possible for the applicant No. 1 to pass his retired life at Bandra for want of sufficient accommodation and even on ground of his health and monetary consideration. (5)The applicant No. 2 and 3 are also now due for retirement and who also desire to pass their retired life at Daman. (6)The applicants say that the applicants have no other house for their residence in Daman except the suit premises, the applicants therefore, require the suit premises for their personal bona fide use i.e. for their residence at Daman." 6.These paragraphs constitute sufficient pleadings for bona fide requirement of the petitioner. It shows that the applicant No. 1, Luise Fernandes has retired from the services from General Insurance Corporation in the year 1983 and he is staying in a rented house at Bandra, after his retirement, where he finds it very difficult to lead his retired life and he wanted to pass his retired life at Daman in his own house. It is also stated that the applicants No. 2 and 3 are also due for retirement and, who also desire to pass their retired life at Daman. It is also stated that they do not have their own house for residence in Daman, except the suit premises. 7.The main contention of the Counsel for the petitioner is that these pleadings lack so many material particularly, namely the applicants do not have their own house to stay either at the place where they were working or at Daman and applicant No. 1 is already died, the suitability or otherwise of the present accommodation, etc. The learned Counsel submits that it does not constitute the bona fide requirement of the petitioner and, therefore, on this ground alone lower Court ought to have dismissed the application. The learned Counsel submits that it does not constitute the bona fide requirement of the petitioner and, therefore, on this ground alone lower Court ought to have dismissed the application. 8.It is not disputed that the property jointly belongs to the original applicants. It is also not disputed that they were staying away outside Daman for the purpose of their job. It is also not disputed that the elder brother Luise Fernandes has already retired and the other applicants Nos. 2 and 3 were due for retirement. They have expressed their desire through the pleadings to pass their retired life in their native place in Daman. A person who is employed elsewhere, leaving his own house in his native place and on his retirement expresses his desire to come back to stay in his own house, cannot be said to be a mere desire or a desire which is expressed with mala fide intentions. It can also not be rejected as a mere ipse dixits of the petitioner. Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that the desire expressed by a retired employee that he wanted to stay in his own house, which was rented during the period of his service and to come and stay in his own house with his friends and relatives, constitute sufficient pleadings for bona fide need and it cannot be said a mere desire. It is, in fact, a genuine desire so long it cannot be shown by the tenant that the owner has other property of his own to stay. Therefore, I cannot agree with the contention of the Counsel for the petitioner. The lower courts were justified in holding that the respondents have established their bona fide need before the courts, particularly in absence of any positive evidence against the desire of the respondents to stay in their own house. 9.It is next contended by the Counsel for the petitioner that the evidence is at variance with the pleadings. Mr. Thali, the Counsel for the petitioner, contended that the bona fide requirement, stated in the petition, is that of Luise Fernandes, but in the evidence it has been proved that bona fide requirement is of respondents Nos. 2 and 3. Therefore, he submitted that the evidence adduced in this petition cannot be accepted as it is at variance with the pleadings. This ground is also liable to be rejected. 2 and 3. Therefore, he submitted that the evidence adduced in this petition cannot be accepted as it is at variance with the pleadings. This ground is also liable to be rejected. As already pointed out, of course, the pleadings in great details stated the sorry state of affairs of Luise Fernandes who had retired even before filing of the eviction proceedings before the Additional Rent Controller, but at the same time, the petitioners stated in the petition that the applicants Nos. 2 and 3 are also due to retire and they also want to come and stay in their own house at Daman and evidence has been adduced in support of these pleadings. Therefore, it cannot be said that the evidence adduced in this case is at variance with the pleadings. Of course, there are other materials, which have not been actually pleaded, but has been found before the Court below. However that does not in any way mitigate against the case of the respondents and, therefore, that evidence cannot be rejected on the ground that it is at variance to the pleadings. On important and basic facts pleaded, I find no evidence at variance. 10.Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following decisions in order to fortify his contention :---(Ganpat Bapurao Babekat v. Rameshwar Shalligram Pitambarwale and another)1, A.I.R. 1975 Bombay 225; (Janba Daulatrao Borkar v. Rajeshkumar Ramjiwan Agarwal)2, A.I.R. 1976 Bombay 70; (Sukhadeo Krishnarao Ghatode v. Laxmibai Dattatraya Mohoril)3, 1979 M.L.J. 545; (Mohan Lal v. Tirath Ram Chopra and another)4, 1982(2) Rent Control Journal 161; (Nanalal Goverdhandas and Co. and others v. Smt. Samratbai Lilachand Shah)5, A.I.R. 1981 Bombay 1. In (Ganpat B. Bibekat v. Rameshwar Shalligram Pitambarwala and another), (supra) certain observations are relevant. It has been laid down in this decision that a vague plea of bona fide requirement is in-sufficient to seek a relief of eviction of the tenant. It observed that a mere ipse dixit of the petitioner that he required the accommodation for his personal occupation is not enough. As pointed out earlier that the above pleadings are not merely a feeble expression of desire of the applicant. It is a bona fide requirement and desire of a retired employee to come and stay in his own house at native place. That cannot be rejected on the ground of mere desire or desire without any genuineness. As pointed out earlier that the above pleadings are not merely a feeble expression of desire of the applicant. It is a bona fide requirement and desire of a retired employee to come and stay in his own house at native place. That cannot be rejected on the ground of mere desire or desire without any genuineness. 11.In (Nanalal Goverdhandas and Co. and others v. Smt. Samratbai Lilachand Shah), (supra) has also taken a similar view of the matter. Counsel for the petitioner Shri Thali relied upon para (22) of this decision, which reads thus :- "Underlying the above propositions is the basic fact that the requirement is by the landlord and not by somebody else on his behalf. It may be the requirement for somebody else but not by somebody else. In all cases the requirement must be by the landlord himself. It is also implicit in the above propositions which have emerged from the examination of the various cases that there must be a nexus between the interests of the landlord and the occupation of the premises by himself or by somebody else. If there is no nexus of the interest of the landlord with the occupation of the premises, then the condition mentioned in section 13(1)(g) cannot be said to have been fulfilled. Section 13(1)(g) says that the premises must be reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord. The bona fide requirement is in the first place a state of mind though it may be something more. It must, therefore be deposed to by the person who is requiring the premises under section 13(1)(g) namely the landlord. If the landlord does not step into the witness-box to bring before the Court legal evidence for providing his requirement, then it cannot be said that he reasonably and bona fide requires the premises as mentioned in section 13(1)(g)." On close reading of all these decisions, I do not find that these would lent any support to the contentions of the Advocate for the petitioner. These decisions, on the other hand, support the orders of the courts below. 12.Examining the facts of the case in hand, as already pointed out, the application was filed jointly by four brothers, who are joint owners of the premises. Admittedly, the petitioner had stepped into the witness box to prove the bona fide need pleaded in the petition. These decisions, on the other hand, support the orders of the courts below. 12.Examining the facts of the case in hand, as already pointed out, the application was filed jointly by four brothers, who are joint owners of the premises. Admittedly, the petitioner had stepped into the witness box to prove the bona fide need pleaded in the petition. It cannot be said that she deposed not for herself or not for the landlord. Therefore, these decisions cited above have no application on the facts of the case. 13.In (Janba Daulatrao Borkar v. Rajeshkumar Ramjiwan Agarwal), (supra), it has been held at para (11) thus :--- "From the phraseology used in Clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order, it is further clear that the landlord has to prove that he needs the house or a portion thereof for his bona fide occupation. The expression "needs the house for bona fide occupation" has been considered by this Court on several occasions. Broadly stated mere wish, convenience, whim or fancy of the landlord would not be enough to show that the landlord needs the premises bona fide. The landlord must allege and prove certain circumstances or facts which go to prove his need. The law does not require a landlord to establish absolute need or absolute requirement, without which he shall have no shelter over his head. What is meant by "bona fide need" is that the landlord requires the premises for his reasonable needs and that he is not seeking eviction on the pretext of requiring additional accommodation with an oblique motive of realising some extraneous purpose. The need has to be reasonable and bona fide. The onus of proof of this is certainly on the landlord. Although the word "reasonable" does not appear in the Rent Control Order the question of reasonableness is relevant in deciding the bona fides of the landlord. Gross unreasonableness may in proper circumstances lead to the Court to reach a conclusion that the landlord's requirement is not bona fide. Therefore, while deciding the question of bona fides, the reasonableness of the need or requirement is relevant. Full effect will have to be given to the expression used in the clauses, namely, "bona fide need". The word "bona fide" means honestly and not actuated by bad faith or oblique motive. Therefore, while deciding the question of bona fides, the reasonableness of the need or requirement is relevant. Full effect will have to be given to the expression used in the clauses, namely, "bona fide need". The word "bona fide" means honestly and not actuated by bad faith or oblique motive. Mere wish or intention of the landlord is not sufficient to give him a right to evict the tenant. As already observed, the Rent Control Order is enacted with the avowed object of protecting tenants against unreasonable eviction and at the same time it makes a provision that the landlords will be entitled to get the possession of their premises on the grounds enumerated therein. One of such grounds is that a landlord is entitled to get permission from the Controller to evict a tenant if he needs the house or a portion thereof for the purpose of his bona fide occupation. Sub-Clause (8) of Clause 13 further enjoins a duty upon the Controller to enquire into the needs of the landlord and if on enquiry the Controller is satisfied that the needs of the landlord will be met by occupation of a portion of a house, then he has to give permission in respect of such portion only. Therefore, all the relevant factors will have to be objectively considered before such a question is decided by the Rent Controller. Of course, each case will have to be considered on its own facts." 14.In view of the above discussions, the grounds urged by the petitioner are not sustainable. The Additional Rent Controller and the Administrative Tribunal were right in holding that bona fide requirement has been established by the landlord and accordingly, the eviction of the petitioner was rightly and justly ordered. 15.Learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Thali has advanced yet another argument that this Court should take into account the "subsequent event". He submits that subsequent to the order of the appellate authority and before filing of the writ petition, the petitioner came to know that the respondents have acquired their property and are staying in their own flat and these subsequent events are to be taken into consideration while actual eviction of the petitioner is ordered. He submits that subsequent to the order of the appellate authority and before filing of the writ petition, the petitioner came to know that the respondents have acquired their property and are staying in their own flat and these subsequent events are to be taken into consideration while actual eviction of the petitioner is ordered. In the light of this contention, it is desirable to extract the pleadings before this Court by the petitioner at para (22) of the petition, which are : "(22).The petitioner's daughter by name Amalia Fernandes runs a Beauty Parlour at Daman. The petitioner through one of the clients of her daughter by name Smt. Antonio Fernando Rosario who has been residing in a building by Sea Gull Apartments (Flat No. 5-14/S-3 at Luhar Falia, Moti Daman) accidently came to know recently that the respondent No. 4 (Thomas Fernandes) has been residing and in occupation of two flats in the same building Sea Gull Apartments. The said building was built by M/s. R.M. Mehta Developers and Builders in or about year 1993." 16.On examination of these pleadings, I do not find that the petitioner was ascertaining any facts that on such and such date and as per such and such a document, the respondent was occupying the flat. What the petitioner tried to make out in paras 22 and 23 is that a hearsay story heard by the petitioner's daughter, which has been incorporated in these paras. Any Court much less than this Court cannot act on such a vague and whimsical hearsay statements to upset the effect of the order passed by the Court below. I have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that the contention of the Counsel for the petitioner that the subsequent events have to be taken into account, cannot be taken very seriously and this Court cannot counter such pleadings. This Court cannot act on vague and ambiguous statements as extracted above. Therefore, the argument based on subsequent events contended by the Counsel for the petitioner, is only to be rejected. In these circumstances, the petition fails. No order as to costs. After pronouncement of the judgment, learned Counsel for the petitioner makes an oral prayer that the Judgment may be stayed for a period of four weeks. The oral prayer is granted. The judgment is stayed for a period of 4 weeks from today. Civil Application is also dismissed. Application dismissed.