BHAGTU SON OF SH. JHUNJHU v. RATTAN CHAND SON OF SH. GOPALU
1996-12-24
R.BHATTACHARYYA
body1996
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER R. Bhattacharya.—This revision petition filed by Shri Bhagat Ram Son of Sh. Jhunghu, Tehsil Dehra, District Kangra, before Divisional Commissioner Kangra has been recommended by him for acceptance under Section 17(3) of H.P. Land Revenue Act: 2. The facts giving rise to this petition are that Sh. Rattan Chand respondent No. 1 applied for partitioning of his share from the lands he held jointly with the other co-sharers recorded in revenue record before the Assistant Collector Dehra. The Assistant Collector commenced proceedings on the application for partition which culminated into an order on mode of partition vide his orders dated 6.6.1985. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Collector, Sub-Division on the ground that there was question as to tide on account of a private partition purportedly having taken place amongst the share-holders long ago. The Sub-Divisional Collector rejected contention of the petitioner and dismissed the appeal vide his orders dated 15.3.1988. The petitioners filed a revision petition before the Divisional Commissioner who agreed to the contentions made by the petitioner and accordingly recommended the same to us for acceptance under Section 17(3) of H.P. Land Revenue Act. 3. The matter has been heard. The parties have filed written statements also. The Court guardian also supported the statement made on behalf of the respondent No. 1, The relevant record of the case has also been scrutinized. The grounds taken in revision before the learned Divisional Commissioner by the party was that the application for partition by Sh. Rattan Chand was not maintainable since the lands stood already partitioned on account of a private partition amongst the parties, that according to petitioner took place long back. The learned Divisional Commissioner after hearing the parties has recommended as under:— "I have carefully gone through the lower Courts record and considered the arguments of both sides. The contention of petitioner in the present case is similar to that given in the partition sought by the respondent No. 1 in respect of land situated in village Hasol wherein the respondent had finally failed to get the partition sanctioned only on the question of title. In the case cited by the petitioner viz.; SLJ 1986 page 110, the dispute about partition in village Hasol was amongst the present parties and partition was finally disallowed on the question of title.
In the case cited by the petitioner viz.; SLJ 1986 page 110, the dispute about partition in village Hasol was amongst the present parties and partition was finally disallowed on the question of title. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also argued that the respondent No. 1 has filed civil suit in the Court of learned Sub-Judge Dehra for settlement of question of title which is pending in the Civil Court. This was not denied by the Counsel for the respondent No. 1. It has been proved beyond doubt that the respondent No. 1 has bought the share of land of Shri Gittu, one of the brother of the petitioner and he was never put in possession of the land of the share he bought from one of the brother of the petitioner. Further, there is no record about the private partition but only the petitioner is proved to be in continuous possession of the suit land as per entry in the Jamabandi of Mohal Kopra for the year 1977-78, copy of which has been submitted by the respondent with his application of partition." 4. It is seen that the plea of the private partition was not acceptable to the Divisional Commissioner, as, according to him there was no record of the private partition but he held the question as to title to exist on the ground of continuous possession of the land by the petitioner as per entry in the Jamabandi of Mohal Kopra for the year 1977-78. But the tenor of reasoning recorded by the Divisional Commissioner to arrive at the conclusion as to the existence of question of title appears to be based upon the case law contained in 110 SLJ 1986. This is a case decided by this Court between the same parties and issues were also substantively the same in which the partition application of Sh. Rattan Chand with regard to land in village Hasol was disallowed on the ground of question of title. But this order of my learned predecessor would have held water had it not been reviewed subsequently by my learned predecessor vide his order dated 2.2.1994, whereby the partition proceedings between the parties were directed to proceed ahead after the contention as to the question of title was brushed aside and all previous orders in the matter were also set aside paving the way for the partition of the land.
Making a reference to this order at this stage is germane and is warranted since this order constitutes the basis for the present recommendations made by the learned Divisional Commissioner. Besides that both the parties contend to substantiate their stand on the basis of this order viz. the present petitioner contends to make a point on the basis of this order dated 21.9.1985 reported in 1986 SLC 78, in which the question of title was found to exist against Sh. Rattan Chand and the respondents place their reliance on an order dated 2.2.1994, whereby the previous order dated 21.9.1985 was set aside and the question as to title was not found to exist. The learned Divisional Commissioner based his findings on the original order. Since the very order that constituted the basis for the present recommendations stands set aside by my learned predecessor and the latest order dated 2.2.1994 should prevail and accordingly the present recommendations deserve to be turned down on this short ground alone. Apart from this I have also examined other contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. The first point sought to be raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is with regard to the principle of res-judicata contending that Rattan Chand purchased land from a co-sharer and his application for partition was rejected by the settlement authorities on the question of title and application filed subsequently before A.C. 1st Grade Dehra without getting the earlier order set aside was barred by res-judicata. This contention can be discarded for number of reasons. This plea has been set up for the first time by the petitioner at this stage, when my intervention is sought only on specific recommendations made by the Divisional Commissioner before whom no such plea was ever taken. 5. Secondly, a Revenue Officer passing an order on an application for partition under the provisions of H.P. Land Revenue Act is merely a Revenue Officer and does not act as a Civil Court and the proceedings resulting into some order fall within the requisites of an "order" and not in a decree and such an order not shaping into the form of a decree, the principle of res-judicata as embodied in Civil Procedure Code does not apply.
Since the order passed under the Land Revenue Act does not possess the requisites of a decree as the proceedings are mainly summary in nature, application of Civil Procedure Code on such proceedings cannot be resorted to. But the crucial question is whether such a situation can be allowed to go on and whether there is no finality of the orders passed by a Revenue Officer under Section 127 of HP. Land Revenue Act, a Revenue Officer has discretionary authority to disallow partition and this authority should be used in cases where same question has been previously decided, unless it is shown that circumstances which made previous order appropriate, have changed. Where such circumstances are found to have changed and there are good and sufficient reasons to allow the partition, partition should be allowed. Adverting to the case at hand, whether there are/were sufficient circumstances to allow the partition. My considered view is in affirmative. The learned Divisional Commissioner has mainly relied on ruling of this Court for making the present recommendations as discussed here above to fore as he could not have been aware of an order passed subsequently by which the original order has been reviewed and the partition has been allowed to be effected amongst the parties. Therefore there should be no obstacle in allowing the partition proceedings to its logical conclusion now as other pleadings of the petitioner raised in the present petition also lack force as the subsequent discussion would show. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner calls into question the legality of the impugned order by submitting that the partition cannot be allowed to go on since there was a question of title involved on account of a private partition that took place long ago and Shri Bhagat Ram is in exclusive possession of the land in consequence thereof. He also argued that law does not require private partition to be brought on record. There is no evidence on record that private partition has taken place between the parties in respect of the lands in question. I am unable to agree to the learned Counsel that private partition need not necessarily be brought on record.
He also argued that law does not require private partition to be brought on record. There is no evidence on record that private partition has taken place between the parties in respect of the lands in question. I am unable to agree to the learned Counsel that private partition need not necessarily be brought on record. Section 40 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act envisage that any interest acquired by any person has to be reported to the Patwari concerned by that person about his acquisition of any such interest within a period of three months so that any such change could be brought on or incorporated in to the record of right. Inaction under this section entails even a fine on the person concerned. Even if the plea of the private partition is accepted, though not held, even if not embodied in record of rights then what could be other circumstances that could lead to the assumption of private partition having taken place. I am of the firm view that where a private partition has not found its way into the record of rights then it should be acceptable to the parties. In the case at hand the fact of private partition, as required under law, has not been incorporated into the revenue record to reflect any such partition having taken place and secondly the parties to the partition do not accept the partition having taken place earlier, rather one of the parties has sought a formal partition with the help of the revenue field agency. There does not seem to be any valid reason as to why this partition should not be allowed. The case law cited by the learned Counsel contained in 41 PLJ 1985, is not of much help to the petitioner in view of the discussion herein above as also the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable in as much as there was a valid document of private partition effected amongst the parties in that case, though not incorporated into the revenue record, the memorandum of private partition did not contain specific Khasra numbers allotted to the different parties. Here is a case where no record whatsoever has been brought on record by the parties to substantiate the plea of private partition besides it is not acceptable to the parties.
Here is a case where no record whatsoever has been brought on record by the parties to substantiate the plea of private partition besides it is not acceptable to the parties. The claim of the petitioner that he is in exclusive possession of the land should not present any impediment in the way of partition because possession of a co-sharer is a possession of all and the right to partitioning off ones share cannot be negated on this count. Therefore, the plea of the petitioner lacks force and is accordingly rejected. 7. The learned Counsel has ambiguously questioned the entitlement of one Shri Gittoo, the step brother of Shri Bhagtu, as the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent to the estate of his ancestors. He has not brought Out any evidence to suggest such a proposition. Hence this plea is dismissed as not substantiated and pressed. 8. It has also been contended that some proceedings in the Civil Court are also pending between the parties and hence the present proceedings should be stayed. The contention has not been substantiated by bringing on record the copy of any of such plaint etc. nor there is any embargo from the Civil Court to pend the proceedings. In any case if any of such proceedings are pending in the Civil Court, the order of the Civil Court would be binding on the Revenue Officer and would be given effect into the revenue record whenever brought to the notice by any of the parties. 9. In the result, the recommendations made by the learned Divisional Commissioner Kangra are not sustainable and I find myself unable to agree to them which are therefore turned down and the petition is dismissed. The Assistant Collector is directed to proceed ahead with the partition and complete the same within a period of three months. 10. Orders be communicated to the parties and file be consigned to record room after due completion. Petition dismissed.