JUDGMENT M. Srinivasan, C. J.—In this writ petition two questions are raised. The first question relates to the validity of section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Act, 1982. According to the petitioners it is ultra vires and therefore, invalid. In other words the petitioner contends that the Legislature has no competence to enact section 4 of the Act. It is also contended by the petitioner of the Legislature is in error in defining the Forest produce in such a way as to include the trees which are set out in the Schedule which are according to the petitioners only agricultural produce and not Forest produce as such. 2. Neither of the contentions is sustainable We find that in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution forests are found in Entry 17-A Thus, it is a concurrent subject and it is open to the State Legislature also to enact legislation subject to the provisions of Articles 245 to 255. Hence the contention that it is ultra vires the powers of the State Legislation has to fail. The second part of the contention that the definition is erroneous cannot be considered at all once the competence of Legislature is upheld. It is open to the Legislature to prescribe such trees as would fall under the expression Forest produce. The definition as found in section 2(d) it reads as follows :-~ " Forest Produce means trees of any of the species standing, felled or otherwise fashioned, specified in the Schedule annexed to this Act and any other produce declared as such by the State Government from time to time by a notification published in the official Gazette” 3 In the Schedule apart from other trees the Chil, Deodar, Fir and Kail trees are included as items 2, 3, 4 and 7. In the petition in paragraph 3, it is stated by the petitioners that the land in dispute is covered by the trees of Deodar. Kail and Fir. Thus, all the three varieties are found in Schedule to the Act Consequently, they are forest produce’ as defined in the Act. There is no merit in the contention of the petitioner that it is only agriculture produce and it is being grown in their private lands. Kail and Fir. Thus, all the three varieties are found in Schedule to the Act Consequently, they are forest produce’ as defined in the Act. There is no merit in the contention of the petitioner that it is only agriculture produce and it is being grown in their private lands. There is no merit in the petition as no right has accrued to them to dealing with such trees and it has to fail. 4 The next contention of the petitioner that no restriction should be put on the forest produce grown by the individual owners on their own private land and it should be declared as void and struck off. The bone of contention is that the act creates as monopoly in favour of the Forest Corporation and the same is unconstitutional. We are unable to accept this contention in view of the express provision found under Article 19 (6) (ii). Article 19 (g) declares the fundamental right of citizens to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. Clause (6) reads as follows :— "(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause and, in particular, (nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,— (i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial of (citizens or otherwise). partial, or 5. It is very clear from clause (6) (ii) that the State entitled to introduce a monopoly in the trade, business Industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise. Hence the contention has to fail.. 6. The other prayers in the writ petition in the writ petition are only consequential. In view of the fact that we have rejected the aforesaid contentions the other prayers have to fail. 7. Hence the contention has to fail.. 6. The other prayers in the writ petition in the writ petition are only consequential. In view of the fact that we have rejected the aforesaid contentions the other prayers have to fail. 7. The writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.