Judgment :- Raj an, J. The appellants in the above appeals are tenants. The appellant in W.A.No. 6537 96 is the petitioner in O.P. No. 3736/96. He is also the first respondent in O.P. No. 26867 96, The contesting respondents are the landlords. They are respondents 2 to 5 in O.P. No. 3736/96 and petitioners in O.P. No. 2686/96. The exhibits referred to in this judgment are the exhibits produced by the appellant in O.P. No. 3736 of 1996. 2. The tenant filed Ext. P8 before the Accommodation Controller under S.17 of the Act 2/65 praying for a direction to effect necessary repairs in the tenanted premises and in case the landlord fail to carry out the repairs to allow him to effect the said repairs. The landlords filed Ext. P9 objection. The Accommodation Controller passed Ext. P10 order which is as follows: "I hereby order to repair and plaster the northern and western walls of the easternmost room of the tenanted premises and to thatch the roof of the said Chapra with coconut leaves instead of the existing asbestos sheets as specified in the rent deed to avoid dripping of the water in the said chapra. The repairs will be done by the counter petitioner, the building owner within 15 days of this order failing which the tenant will arrange for the repairs at his own cost which will be adjusted from the future rent payable to the building owner". Thereafter the Accommodation Controller issued Ext. P11 stop memo on the ground that the tenant was executing the work violating the directions given in Ext. P10 order. The matter was enquired into by the Firka Revenue Inspector. He reported that the three sides of the chapra were enclosed with hollow bricks and concrete slabs retaining the already existed wooden planks outside the newly constructed walls. It was further reported that this was a clear violation of the order of the Accommodation Controller. After hearing the arguments of the tenant and the landlords and basing on uk enquiry report, the Accommodation Controller by Ext. P12 order directed the tenant to remove the abovesaid walls constructed on the three sides. The appellants challenge the above order in O.P. No. 3736/96. The learned Single Judge set aside Ext. P10 order (Ext P1 in O.P. No. 2686/96 filed by the landlord). P12 order directed the tenant to remove the abovesaid walls constructed on the three sides. The appellants challenge the above order in O.P. No. 3736/96. The learned Single Judge set aside Ext. P10 order (Ext P1 in O.P. No. 2686/96 filed by the landlord). The learned Single judge also directed the landlords to carry out the repairs within four weeks after demolishing the brick walls constructed by the tenants in violation of the order of the Accommodation Controller. The tenant has now come up in appeal against the common judgment passed by She learned single judge. 3. Sri. Sanal Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants contended that under S.17 of the Act 2/65, the Accommodation Controller has no jurisdiction to pass an order in the nature of Ext. P12 directing to undo the repair already done by the tenant. According to the learned counsel once the Accommodation Controller passes an order directing the tenant to repair the building, he becomes functus officio and thereafter there is no jurisdiction either to modify or to annul the order. The only provision contained in Act 2/65 for execution of various orders is S.14. But S.14 does not cover an order passed by the Accommodation Controller under S.17 of Act 2/65. Therefore, Ext. P12 order was passed by the Accommodation Controller without any jurisdiction. 4. Sri. Roy Chacko, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents put forward the argument that every Court has got inherent jurisdiction to pass any order in order to see that the order passed by the Court is properly carried out or executed. In this connection, it is worthwhile to remember that no court is helpless when the order passed by it is violated. No Court can remain as a silent spectator when its orders are being flouted with immunity. The power of this Court to prevent such illegal action on the part of the parties is implied. Celebrated author Maxwell in his famous book on Interpretation of Statutes has dealt with the above subject in the following terms: "Where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution. Cui jurisdictio data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur, sine quibus jurisdictio explicari non potuit". 5. Cui jurisdictio data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur, sine quibus jurisdictio explicari non potuit". 5. Craies on Statute Law elaborates the same principle as follows: (Page 111 of 7ih edition): "If the statute is passed for the purpose of enabling something to be done, but omits to mention is terms some detail which is of great importance (if not actually essential) to the proper and effectual performance of the work which the statute has in contemplation, the courts are at liberty to infer that the statute fry implication empowers that detail to be carried out". Sutherland on Statutory Construction, third edition, Vol. 3, S.5402 states: "Where a statute confers powers or duties in general terms, all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make such legislation effective are included by implication. Thus, it has been stated "An express statutory grant of power or the imposition of a definite duty carries with it by implication, in the absence of a limitation, authority to employ all the means that are usually employed and that are necessary to the exercise of the power or the performance of the duty. That which is clearly implied is as much a part of a law as that which is expressed". Crawford in his book on Statutory Construction has given reasons for such powers conferred on the courts in the following manner: "The reason for allowing the court to give effect to necessary implication is quite apparent. Many matters of minor detail are often omitted from legislation. If these details could not -be inserted by implication, the drafting of legislation would be an interminable process and the legislative intent would likely be defeated by the most insignificant omission. Consequently, these minor details are considered as if included in the general terms of the enactment as well as in the purpose sought to the achieved by the legislature, and therefore, are regarded as actually intended by the legislature. In a broad sense, true implications are as much a part of the language which makes up the statute as the meanings of the various words are a part of it. Viewed from this standpoint, no exception is created to the general rule that the intent of the lawmakers must be derived from the language used in the enactment. And the Court in ascertaining a necessary implication is simply determining and making effective the legislative will". Viewed from this standpoint, no exception is created to the general rule that the intent of the lawmakers must be derived from the language used in the enactment. And the Court in ascertaining a necessary implication is simply determining and making effective the legislative will". Similar questions under other enactments came up for consideration before this Court in two decisions. In Dhartnadas v. State Transport appellate Tribunal (1962 KLT 505), the question as to whether the appellate authority under the Motor Vehicles Act has power to remand the case to subordinate authority was answered in the affirmative by a Full Bench of this Court. Chief Justice M.S. Menon relying on Sutherland's observation quoted above held that where a statute confers powers or duties in general terms, all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make such legislation effective are included by implication. 6. In the ruling reported in Muhammed Kunhi v. Income Tax Officer (1965 KLT 1055), a Division Bench of this Court had to consider the question whether granting stay of recovery of tax was part of the appellate jurisdiction when there was no specific power conferred on the Tribunal. This Court held that the power to grant a stay is incidental or is a necessary corollary to the appellate power. Even without an express conferment, the appellate authority has the power to stay the proceedings and the collection pending appeal, an incidental or ancillar to its appellate jurisdiction. 7. In the ruling reported in Radha Textiles v. Kara Easo (1980 KLT 235), this Court had occasion to consider whether Rent Control Court becomes functus officio after it passes an order for eviction under S.11(4)(iv). It was argued in the above ease by the landlord that Rent Control Court is not empowered to pass orders directing allotment of the reconstructed building to the old tenant. Negativing the above contention, Justice Chandrasekhara Menon held that the power to pass an order of eviction under S.11(4)(iv) which gives the tenant the first option to have the reconstructed building allotted to him carries with it the power to pass such order which is necessary and incidental to make the landlord to conform to such order. 8. Negativing the above contention, Justice Chandrasekhara Menon held that the power to pass an order of eviction under S.11(4)(iv) which gives the tenant the first option to have the reconstructed building allotted to him carries with it the power to pass such order which is necessary and incidental to make the landlord to conform to such order. 8. In view of the authoritative pronouncements of this Court relying on the observations of authors like Maxwell, Sutherland etc., we do not think that the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that the Accommodation Controller is having no jurisdiction to pass an order like Ext. P12 when he is convinced that the repairs carried out by the tenant were against the earlier order passed by him, is sustainable. 9. When Ext. P10 order authorised the tenant only to repair and plaster the northern and western walls of the easternmost room of the tenanted premises and to thatch the roof of the chapra with coconut leaves, there was no jurisdiction on the part of the tenant to enclose the walls with hollow bricks and concrete slabs. The Accommodation Controller rightly came to the conclusion that the above repair (really a new construction) was beyond the order passed by him. Therefore, the direction in Ext. P12 to remove the structure constructed under the shadow of Ext. P10 order was quite in order. The "learned single judge was right in ordering to undo the above structure and in directing the landlord to carry out the repair. We do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The time granted by the learned single judge for dismantling the present construction and to do the repair is extended by four weeks from today. Writ Appeals are dismissed without any order as to costs.