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1996 DIGILAW 291 (ALL)

SNEHLATA DWIVEDI v. KANPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

1996-03-13

A.B.SRIVASTAVA, R.S.DHAVAN

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These two writ petitions have been pending at the High Court for about eleven years. The issues are common in both the writ petitions and com mon arguments were addressed on them. The aspect relates to the let in the dis cipline of urban planning whether the advantage is taken by those who may have vested rights or others who are incharge of urban planning and arranged to vest these rights in others. For the Court the interpretation of the law has to be seen in this context as a standarised measure so that this applicability is universal and the discharge of obligations by those who are incharge of urban planning have clearcut guidelines on what they have to do. 2. The petitioners were admittedly granted a lease by the local authority known as the Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, and the Kanpur Development Authority. The lease granted to Smt. Snehlata Dwivedi, is by a covenant dated 17 August, 1972, (Annexure-1 to the writ petition ). In the matter of Umanath Tripathi and another, the lease is dated 24th December, 1972. In the first matter the lessor is the Nagar Maha Palika, Kanpur, in other the Kanpur Development Authority. The Nagar Maha Palika, Kanpur, functions under the Uttar Pradesh Nagar Maha Palika Ad-hiniyam, 1959. The Kanpur Development Authority functions under the U. P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. 3. Be that as it may, upon the petitioners securing lessee rights and receiving maps duly sanctioned, as they claim, by the respective local authorities, aforesaid, they set about the construct a set of shops and residential quarters. In the meantime, both of them received notices from the Public Works Department that they had violated the provisions of the U. P. Roadside Land Control Act, 1945 and a complaint was instituted in the appropriate court for their prosecution. The. notices to the petitioners for the violation of the U. P. Roadside Land Control Act, 1945, rests on the hypothesis that the State Government had issued a notification dated 7th Sep tember, 1970, so mentioned in the notices itself, that the width on either side of the centre of the road stood at 200 ft. The. notices to the petitioners for the violation of the U. P. Roadside Land Control Act, 1945, rests on the hypothesis that the State Government had issued a notification dated 7th Sep tember, 1970, so mentioned in the notices itself, that the width on either side of the centre of the road stood at 200 ft. The road and/or the highway in question being the Hamirpur Road was announced as part of the development area and the width of the road stood protected from any encroachment as clearly the purpose of the law under the U. P. Roadside Land Control Act, 1945 was that the highway was meant for passage and for no other purpose. The notices by which the petitioners were intimated of violation of the provisions of the U. P. Roadside Land Control Act, 1945 in the matter of Smt. Snehlata Dwivedi is dated 30th October, 1975 and is appended as Annexure-2 to the writ petition and in the matter of Umanath Tripathi and another, the notice is undated, as placed before the Court, and is appended as Annexure- 2 to the writ petition. In both cases, in the notices, the reference to the width from the centre is to a width on each half side as being 200 ft. , implying thereby that from the centre on either side two halfs of 200 ft. , the gross width being 400ft. 4. While the record stands by requiring the petitioners to face prosecution for violation of the law, in the meantime, the Nagar Maha Palika, Kanpur, and the Kanpur Development Authority, as the case may be, took out recoveries against the petitioners requiring them to pay the balance of the consideration upon which lease had been granted to them. 5. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is two fold. Firstly it is contended that on the one hand the petitioners face an apprehension of being questioned on having violated the law being the U. P. Roadside Land Control Act, 1945, and the danger of being wrested out of possession so as to reduce the area of the plots which were leased to them, secondly, on the other hand the local bodies press for recoveries for the balance of the consideration as lease money, which lease may be of a reduced area. It is further submitted that the action of the local bodies and/or the State department is contradictory because should be prosecution succeed they would have to vacate, in which case there is no occasion for the local bodies to press for recoveries for the balance of the consideration for the leases which had been granted as, in effect, the area of the land leased so far would stand reduced. The last submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioners have com mitted no fault when they signed their respective covenants with the local authorities, that is, the Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, or the Kanpur Development Authority, and having been assured of the grant of lease they made constructions on the plots and they, in the circumstances, should not be divested of the lease or be dispossessed. 6. What the, petitioners forget is that they have invoked the prerogative writ jurisdiction of the High Court, which, in effect, implies that the Court is to certify the record before it is inclined to interfere on a State action, or for that matter, an action of a local authority. On record is the aspect that before any lease could have been granted, the law has taken its course under the U. P. Roadside Land Control Act, 1945 to declare universally that in the area, in the context of the present writ petitions, the road stood in its breadth with certain measurements. The width of this public highway, the Hamirpur Road in its specifications, cannot be compromised or reduced merely because between the petitioners as lessees and their lessors, they broke the law to arrange to sell a public road. 7. Public roads, streets, sidewalks are to be free from all encroachments, oc cupations or encumbrances as the purpose for this part of specific planning is that the road is for passage and for no other. On this aspect, the Court is guided by a very old law which has been settled by the Supreme Court in the matter of Manglaur Municipality v. Mahadeoji, AIR SC 1965 1147 that on a public highway or a road nothing may come not even facilities as the sole purpose of a road is that it is for the free flow of passage. The Supreme Court has given illustrations to explain that it has reservations on even putting facilities on a public road. The Supreme Court has given illustrations to explain that it has reservations on even putting facilities on a public road. In this particular case the facilities which were objected to were a piaun (drinking water facility), a library and a statue of Mahatma Gandhi. The law, apparently, has developed on this aspect and there can be no let, indulgence or demure by sufference or otherwise to compromise on the conforming uses of land which the law protects and the road is no different. 8. On the other hand glaring on record is a lease granted to the petitioners by the local authorities. The Court does not know what may be the reason why these local authorities, whether the Nagar Maha Palika, Kanpur, or the Kanpur Develop ment Authority, despite having notice of these writ petitions, for eleven years have evaded to enter appearance and chosen not to file a counter affidavit. The only presumption which the Court can draw is that these two local bodies are in collusion in selling public places and this could be the only reason which prevents them from putting appearance at the High Court in answering the petitioners case that a lease had been granted and not only that they even sanctioned a plan for developing constructions on land which was protected in its conforming use as a road or a highway. The fact these two authorities chose not to file a counter affidavit in these two present writ petitions is a matter which needs to be probed very seriously by the Government, as this may amount to a public scandal of selling public lands for occupation in private hands. 9. The issue before the Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur, in reference to the prosecution which the petitioners may face, has set the Court wondering why the prosecution has lingered for eleven years. On this aspect the Court required infor mation from the State but it has not been given to the Court. The Court does not expect the Public Works Department to give an answer for the simple reason that the petitioners chose not to make the Public Works Department a party respondent. The contention has been feebly explained that the state has been made a party respon dent. The Court does not expect the Public Works Department to give an answer for the simple reason that the petitioners chose not to make the Public Works Department a party respondent. The contention has been feebly explained that the state has been made a party respon dent. The Court needs to remind the petitioners that the law is very clear in its terms that if the State, in the present case the State of Uttar Pradesh, or the Union of India is made a party respondent, then it is to be arrayed through the Ministry or the Department concerned. It is only in such a circumstances that an effective reply can be forthcoming from the concerned ministry. The petitioners in both the cases were not unaware that the notices received by them was from the provincial Division, Public Works Department, Kanpur and the office of the Assistant Engineer. 10. The balance of the record which remains is that the U. P. Roadside Land Control Act, 1945, is alleged to have been violated by the petitioners and for this purpose they face prosecution. The issue of the notification of 7th September, is not denied. The notification is prior to the lease deeds. Thus, while the notification stands violated as also the conforming use of the road which has sanctity to receive protection of the law, whether the petitioners be prosecuted is an entirely different aspect of the matter. In so far as the prosecution is concerned, the Court recommends to the Court concerned that in the proceedings for prosecution the trial court may add the name of the Nagar Maha Palika, Kanpur and "the Kanpur Development Authority through the officials concerned so that the court gets a clear picture, whether it is a conspiracy or a collusion, whichever may be the case, in the grant of the leases in the face of the notification dated 7th September, 1970 under the U. P. Roadside Land Control Act, 1945. 11. On the lease deeds which were granted to the petitioners, the law is very clear in its terms when it says that no other person has a better title to a property than a true owner. The petitioners in this case are not the true owners, as at best their status is that of a lessee. 11. On the lease deeds which were granted to the petitioners, the law is very clear in its terms when it says that no other person has a better title to a property than a true owner. The petitioners in this case are not the true owners, as at best their status is that of a lessee. The title of the true owner whether it is Nagar Maha Palika, Kanpur or the Kanpur Development Authority stands removed in the face of an announcement of a conforming use of the width of a road and if the leased plots stand eclipsed by the notification, aforesaid, the leases granted to the petitioners are against the law. In that case, the municipality only takes care of the road to preserve it; the soil underneath it belongs to the State. State of U. P. v. Ata Mohd. , AIR 1980 SC 1785 . 12. In the circumstances, these are clearcut cases in which the High Court ought not to interfere on the prerogative writ of certiorari. These were misadvised petitions and are, accordingly, dismissed with costs. 13. The petitions are dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed. .