Judgment :- K.S. Radhakrishnan, J. Divisional Forest Officer dismissed a petition submitted by the petitioners under S.53 of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961 for release of a jeep bearing registration No. KLO 2362. Petitioners have now approached this Court for a direction to the Divisional Forest Officer to release the jeep under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. 2. Range Officer, Flying Squard, Kothamangalam and other officers, while conducting night patrolling along Chathamattom-Paingottoor Road on 20.11.1995, found the jeep No. KLO 2362 loaded with timber at about 7.30 pm. Since the vehicle was driven away in high speed, Flying Squad could not seize the vehicle. On enquiry, it was revealed that the vehicle was owned by petitioners. They proceeded to the residence of the petitioners early morning on 21.11.1995 and took one Jose into custody. On questioning him, it was revealed that he was indulged in illicit transportation of forest produce. It was revealed that timber was unloaded at Thekkedath Saw Mill, Thodupuzha. The forest authorities then seized the timber from the yard of Thekkedath Saw Mill, and drew up a mahazar. Authorities were convinced that petitioners had committed forest offence and proceedings were initiated against petitioners under S.61-A of the Kerala Forest Act for confiscation of the vehicle. The third respondent, Divisional Forest Officer was also convinced that the vehicle was used for illicit transportation of forest produce. Under the above-mentioned circumstances, third respondent rejected the request of petitioner for release of the jeep under S.53 of the Kerala Forest Act. Aggrieved by the said order, petitioners have approached this Court. 3. The main contention raised by counsel for the petitioners is that while issuing the impugned order, third respondent failed to understand the scope and object of S.53 of the Kerala Forest Act. According to him, there is total non-application of mind by the third respondent. It is his case petitioners have not committed any offence under the Act and third respondent has acted on misconceived facts. Counsel submits the stand taken by third respondent that he would not release the vehicle is arbitrary and against the very purpose, and spirit of S.53 of the Act. 4. A statement has been filed on behalf of third respondent. It is stated the owner of Tekkedath Saw Mill disclosed that first petitioner and one Bhaskaran were known to him. Counsel submits the stand taken by third respondent that he would not release the vehicle is arbitrary and against the very purpose, and spirit of S.53 of the Act. 4. A statement has been filed on behalf of third respondent. It is stated the owner of Tekkedath Saw Mill disclosed that first petitioner and one Bhaskaran were known to him. It was they who brought timber to the Saw Mill on 20.11.1995 at night. 12 pieces of teakwood and one piece of rosewood dumped in the depot yard were also shown to the forest officials and the first petitioner identified the timber. According to statement, one Bhaskaran, resident of Chathamattom, who along with first petitioner came to Thekkedath Saw Mill and played pivotal role in illicit transportation of forest, produce. Bhaskaran is now absconding. It is alleged that first petitioner has admitted he had transported contraband timber in his vehicle many times to Thekkedath Saw Mill. It is averred that the Saw Mill is notorious for illicit storage of contraband timber and the thondy timber involved in many other cases were seized from the mill. Even during the course of investigation, large quantity of suchillicit timber were seized from the Mill and the source of collection of the same is under investigation. Divisional Forest Officer accordingly came to the conclusion that petitioners are also members of the racket of smugglers of forest wealth. 5. Number of cases invoking extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court for releasing the vehicles involved in forest offences are coming up before this Court. In some of the cases, contentions have been raised mat forest officials are rejecting requests for release of the vehicles without properly understanding the scope and object of S.53 of the Act. It is alleged many vehicles are seized merely on suspicion. In some cases, it is contended, if the vehicles are not released, the parties will be put to considerable prejudice, affecting their livelihood. In some cases, the complaint is that the forest officers are not exercising their discretion properly while entertaining petitions under S.53 of the Act. Therefore, it is only just and proper to examine the scope and object of S.53 of the Act. 6. S.53 of the Act is extracted below: "53. In some cases, the complaint is that the forest officers are not exercising their discretion properly while entertaining petitions under S.53 of the Act. Therefore, it is only just and proper to examine the scope and object of S.53 of the Act. 6. S.53 of the Act is extracted below: "53. Power to release property seized under S.52 - Any forest officer of a rank not inferior to that of a Ranger, who or whose subordinate has seized any tools, boats, vehicles or cattle under the provisions of S.52, may release the same on the execution by the owner thereof a bond for the production of the property so released, if and when so required before the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence on account of which the seizure lias been made". Forest Officer or police officer is empowered to seize tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles and cattle when there is reason to believe that a forest offence has been committed in respect of any timber or other forest produce. Every officer seizing any property under sub-s.(1) shall Place on such property or the receptacle, if any, in which, it is contained a mark indicating that the same has been so seized and shall, as soon as may be, make a report of such seizure to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence on account of which the seizure has been made. S.53 of the Act authorises any Forest Officer of a rank not inferior to that of a Ranger, who or whose subordinate should release the article so seized on execution of a bond for the production of the property so released, if and when so required before the Magistrate. 7. Kerala Forest Act 1961 was enacted to unify and amend the law relating to the protection and management of forests in the State of Kerala. Under S.52 of the Act a seizure is made by the forest officers only if there is reason to believe that a forest offence has been committed. The expression 'reason to believe' does not mean purely subjective satisfaction on the part of the forest officers. Belief must be held in good faith; it cannot be merely pretence. Belief must have a rational connection or a relevant bearing to the formation of the belief and is not extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of the Section. The expression 'reason to believe' does not mean purely subjective satisfaction on the part of the forest officers. Belief must be held in good faith; it cannot be merely pretence. Belief must have a rational connection or a relevant bearing to the formation of the belief and is not extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of the Section. After having seized the vehicle under S.52, S.53 operates and gives power to any forest officer of a rank not inferior to that of a Ranger to release vehicle on execution by the owner thereof a bond for the production of the property so released, if and when so required before the Magistrate. 8. Society in the Twentieth Century has become exceedingly complex and governmental functions have multiplied, which resulted in the concentration of considerable power in the hands of executive branch of Government. While exercising powers by the executive, they are also informed of various rights and liabilities of the private individuals. While they are remained of the necessity to protect and safeguard the forest and wild life of the country, they are also reminded of the rights and liabilities of the citizens with which they deal. S.53 gives the discretionary power to the Forest Officer to release the vehicle, which was involved in a forest offence. The mode of exercise of the power by an authority while dealing with forest offence cannot be equated with mode of power of exercise of discretion by an administrative authority, while issuing a licence, renewal of licence, etc. Various factors will go into the mind of the authority while exercising discretion as to whether he should release the vehicle, which is alleged to have been involved in a forest offence. The question as to whether a vehicle is involved in a forest offence previously and whether persons who have involved in forest offence are habitual offenders and also if the vehicle is released whether it would again be used for illegal purpose, and whether the vehicle if released would not be produced. All these factors may go into the minds of the officers while exercising discretion. The officer may also form his opinion from the materials he has gathered while questioning the offenders and also from the report he has received from the officers working under him. All these factors may go into the minds of the officers while exercising discretion. The officer may also form his opinion from the materials he has gathered while questioning the offenders and also from the report he has received from the officers working under him. After considering those variety of factors, he comes to a conclusion that the vehicle can be released or not, lest it may be used for forest offence or mat the non-release of the vehicle itself would be deterent to the offenders. 9. While exercising judicial review, the Court is called upon to test an administrative/quasi judicial order, only if it is satisfied that there is a failure to exercise jurisdiction or if there is excess or abuse of discretion. Even authorities imposing fetters on discretion by self-imposing rules of policy, if there is a non-application of mind, the Court may interfere in exercise of judicial review. When a discretionary power is conferred on an authority, the said authority must exercise that power after applying its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. Court, in exercise of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence. 10. As held by the Supreme Court in Bangalore Medical. Trust v.B.S. Mudappa, (1991) 4 SCC 54, the discretion is an effective tool in administration. It provides an option to the authority concerned to adopt one or the other alternative. But a better, proper and legal exercise of discretion is one where the authority examines the fact, is aware of law and then decides objectively and rationally what serves the interest better. Public interest or general good or social betterment have no doubt priority over private or individual interest, but it must not be a pretext to justify the arbitrary or illegal exercise of power. The scope of judicial review against the decision of public authority came up for a detailed examination by the Supreme Court in its decision reported in Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651. As held by the Supreme Court, the judicial review Is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision making process itself. It is different from an appeal. As held by the Supreme Court, the judicial review Is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision making process itself. It is different from an appeal. When hearing an appeal, the Court is concerned with the merits of the decision under appeal. Since the power of judicial review is not an appeal from the decision, the Court cannot substitute its own decision. Apart from the fact that the Court is hardly equipped to do so, it would not be desirable either. It is not the function of a judge to act as a super board, or with the zeal of a pedantic schoolmaster substituting its judgment for that of the administrator. The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. That does not mean the Court cannot sit in judgment on a decision of an administrative authority exercising its discretion. 11. In cases where the authority has exceeded its jurisdiction or relied on irrelevant materials or actuated by mala fide, or for improper purpose or acted in total disregard of the principles of natural justice, court may interfere in exercise of judicial review. However, while exercising the power of judicial review, court is reviewing not the merits of the decision, but the decision-making process. In view of the above-mentioned legal principles, the impugned order is to be tested. Divisional Forest Officer has not exceeded his jurisdiction or failed to apply his mind while issuing the impugned order. Divisional Forest Officer has considered the report prepared by the Flying Squad dt. 21.11.1995 and also considered the statement of the owner of the Saw Mill. In the statement filled by the third respondent, the owner of the Saw Mill disclosed that first petitioner and one Bhaskaran had brought timber into his Saw Mill on 20.11.1995 at night. It is also stated that the first petitioner has admitted that he had transported contraband timber in his vehicle many times to Thekkedath Saw Mill, Thodupuzha. It it also the opinion of Divisional Forest Officer that the said Saw Mill is notorious for illicit storage of contraband timber and the thondy timber involved in many other cases were seized from the said Mill. It it also the opinion of Divisional Forest Officer that the said Saw Mill is notorious for illicit storage of contraband timber and the thondy timber involved in many other cases were seized from the said Mill. In other words, the Divisional Forest Officer found that the first petitioner, Bhaskaran as well as the owner of Thekkedath Saw Mill are involved in illicit transport of timber. It is under the above-mentioned circumstances, that Divisional Forest Officer came to the conclusion that the jeep could not be released to habitual offenders who are involved in illicit transport of timber. 12. As already said, this Court is not expected to go into the correctness or otherwise of the decision taken by the Forest Officer on certain set of facts. This Court is concerned only with the manner in which Divisional Forest Officer has reached the said conclusion. It is evident that Divisional Forest Officer has given an opportunity of being heard to petitioners, tie had sufficient materials before him to reach the said conclusion. As already stated, a variety of factors will go into the mind of third respondent while exercising the discretion especially in a case where the offence is with regard to illicit transportation of forest produce. There is nothing to show that 3rd respondent has failed to exercise his discretion properly. Under the above mentioned circumstances, I do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by Divisional Forest Officer. Original Petition is accordingly dismissed.