Judgment :- K.A. SWAMI, C.J. 1. These two appeals are preferred against the common order dated 28.4.1994 passed by the learned single Judge in Writ Petition 8493 and 10282 of 1984 respectively. W.A. No. 1262 of 1995 is preferred against the order passed in W.P. No. 8493 of 1984, whereas W.A. No. 1263 of 1995 is preferred against the order passed in W.P. No. 10282 of 1984. As the writ petitions have been dismissed subject to certain directions contained therein, the petitioner, who is common, in both the writ petitions, has come up in appeals. 2. In W.P. No. 8493 of 1984, the petitioner sought for the issue of writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the Corporation of Madras (first respondent in the writ petition to take appropriate action against the second respondent (S. Marimuthu) as per order of the Government of Tamil Nadu in G.O.Rt. No. 236 dated 20th May, 1983 and under Sections 364-A and 380 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) for furnishing false information and to demolish the una uthorised construction put up by him at No. 19, Kamarajar Salai, Madras- 18. 3. In W.P. No. 10282 of 1984 the very same petitioner sought for the issue of a direction in the nature of Mandamus directing the Commissioner of Police, Egmore, Madras-8 (first respondent in the writ petition) to investigate and take appropriate action against the second respondent therein (S. Marimuthu) on the complaint dated 9.3.1984 given by the petitioner against the said Marimuthu and pass such other orders as this Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case. 4. We will first take up W.A. No. 1263 of 1995, wherein not much arguments are advanced. 4. We will first take up W.A. No. 1263 of 1995, wherein not much arguments are advanced. The writ petition out of which this appeal arises has been dismissed by the learned single Judge on the ground that the question as to fabrication of documents such as sale deeds and other documents is involved in O.S. No. 6725 of 1991 on the file of the City Civil Court filed by the second respondent in the writ petition against the writ petitioner and others; that those documents are the basis for the tide claimed by the plaintiff in that suit who is second respondent in the writ petition, therefore, it would not be proper for this Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution either to decide the question as to whether the documents have been fabricated or issue a direction to the Commissioner of Police to investigate into the matter, as the fate of the complaint would depend upon the findings that would be recorded by the civil court in the said suit. We do not see any flaw in the reasoning of the learned single Judge, nor any flaw is pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant. The very documents the fabrication of which is alleged by the petitioner/appellant are the subject matter of the civil litigation between the parties. It is also submitted at the Bar that the parties have also adduced evidence in the said suit and the matter is at the final stage of hearing. Therefore, it is neither proper nor appropriate to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and to issue a direction of the nature sought for in the writ petition. However, we make it clear that the refusal to issue a direction shall not be construed as accepting the case of either of the parties. The question as to fabrication of the documents has to be decided independently by the civil court, which is seized of the matter, without reference to the dismissal of the writ petition or writ appeal. We accordingly, dismiss W.A. No. 1263 of 1995, and keep open all the contentions raised. There will be no order as to costs. 5. W.A. No. 1262 of 1995: As already pointed out, this appeal is preferred against the order passed in W.P. No. 8493 of 1984. We accordingly, dismiss W.A. No. 1263 of 1995, and keep open all the contentions raised. There will be no order as to costs. 5. W.A. No. 1262 of 1995: As already pointed out, this appeal is preferred against the order passed in W.P. No. 8493 of 1984. The learned single judge has declined to issue a direction for demolition of the building standing on the property in question comprised in Door No. 19, Kamarajar Salai, Madras-18, only on the ground that the matter is involved in the aforesaid civil suit in O.S. No. 6725 of 1991, though the learned Judge has come to the conclusion, that the construction was an unauthorised one, that order of the Government in question had become final and that has to be implemented. However, the learned single judge has issued a direction to the Corporation of Madras to take appropriate action against the second respondent (S. Marimuthu) as per the order of the Government in this regard in G.O.Rt. No. 236 dated 20.5.1983 and levy penalty under Section 244-A of the Act within 2 months from the date of the order. In other respects, W.P. No. 8493 of 1984 has been dismissed. 6. Before we proceed to consider the contentions advanced on both sides, it is just and appropriate to refer to the actual findings recorded by the learned single Judge because, before us the correctness of those findings has not been disputed, in as much as the second respondent (Marimuthu) has not come up in appeal and no argument advanced on his behalf, that the findings recorded by the learned single Judge are not warranted on the evidence on record. Shri Masilamani, learned Senior counsel appearing f or the appellant also does not challenge the correctness of those findings. On the contrary, he has based his arguments on the basis of the findings recorded by the learned single Judge. Therefore, it is just and necessary that the actual findings recorded by the learned single Judge should be extracted and the same are as follows:— “Admittedly, the first respondent refused to sanction the planning permit to the second respondent to put up additional construction in premises No. 19, Kamarajar Salai, Teynampet, Madras-18. The appeal filed by the second respondent against the said order of the first respondent refusing to sanction the planning permit was also dismissed by the Government in G.O.Rt. No. 236, dated 20.5.1983. The appeal filed by the second respondent against the said order of the first respondent refusing to sanction the planning permit was also dismissed by the Government in G.O.Rt. No. 236, dated 20.5.1983. While dismissing the appeal, the Government directed the first respondent, to levy penalty for the unauthorised construction already made in the premises in question. Admittedly the second respondent has not challenged the Government order in Rt. No. 236, dated 20.5.1983 and the said order has become final. It is also seen from the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent that after the dismissal of the appeal filed by the second respondent in G.O.Rt. No. 236 the second respondent again applied for planning permission to the first respondent and it was sanctioned on 6.6.85. However, by order dated 21.12.1990, the first respondent revoked the permit issued to the second respondent on 6.6.85 and as against the said order dated 21.12.1990 the second respondent has filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority and the same is till pending. It must be pointed out here that the pendency of the appeal filed against the order dated 21.12.1990 will not in any way take away the power of the first respondent to implement the G.O.Rt. No. 236 and levy penalty under Section 244-A of the Act as directed in the said order. In these circumstances, I am of the view that there is absolutely no justification for the first respondent in not levying penalty under section 244-A of the Act as directed in G.O.Rt. No. 236, dated 20.5.1983 at least after the revocation of the building permit dated 6.6.1985 by the first respondent by his order dated 21.12.1990. Therefore, the first respondent is bound to implement G.O.Rt. No. 230 and levy penalty under section 244-A for the unauthorised construction already made in the premises in question. Accordingly first respondent in Writ Petition No. 8394/84 is directed to implement G.O.Rt. No. 236, dated 20.5.1983 and the unauthorised construction already made in the premises in question. Therefore, the first respondent is bound to implement G.O.Rt. No. 230 and levy penalty under section 244-A for the unauthorised construction already made in the premises in question. Accordingly first respondent in Writ Petition No. 8394/84 is directed to implement G.O.Rt. No. 236, dated 20.5.1983 and the unauthorised construction already made in the premises in question. It is seen from the various orders passed by the City Civil Court in I.A. No. 16282 of 1991, that on 28.10.92 the order of interim injunction already granted was extended and the said order of interim injunction granted by the City Civil Court against the petitioner and the first respondent and two others restraining them from interfering with the second respondents possession of the suit property is still in force. In view of the order of temporary injunction granted by the City Civil Court in I.A. 16282 of 1991 restraining the first respondent from interfering with the second respondents possession of any portion of the suit property, the first respondent cannot take any action for demolition of the unauthorised construction under Sec. 380 of the Act so long as the said order of interim injunction granted in I.A. 16282/91 is in force. Though the said I.A. was adjourned on 28.10.92 to 9.11.92 for arguments, the records show that no final order is passed in the said I.A. till today. In view of the fact that there is an order of interim injunction restraining the first respondent from interfering with the possession of any portion of the suit property, I am of the view that no direction can be issued to the first respondent to taken action to demolish the unauthorised construction under section 380 of the Act. However, it is open to the first respondent to take appropriate action in this regard depending upon the ultimate verdict of the City Civil Court in O.S. 6725/91. In these circumstances, in t he interest of all the parties concerned I consider that it is proper to direct the City Civil Court, Madras to dispose of the suit O.S. No. 6725/91 on or before 15.11.1994 because a final decision in that suit will set at rest all the contraversies between the parties to the present proceedings. In these circumstances, in t he interest of all the parties concerned I consider that it is proper to direct the City Civil Court, Madras to dispose of the suit O.S. No. 6725/91 on or before 15.11.1994 because a final decision in that suit will set at rest all the contraversies between the parties to the present proceedings. A perusal of the plaint in O.S. No. 6725/91 shows that the second respondent has relied on the sale deeds dated 10.6.1974 and 4.2.1981, which were produced before the first respondent along with the applicat ion seeking building and planning permit, in support of his case that he has title to the entire suit property. The questions whether the said documents produced by the second respondent before the first respondent for obtaining sanction of the plan are genuine or whether they are fabricated documents and whether the particulars in those documents are correct or not are all matters which have to be decided by the civil court in O.S. No. 6725/91. Till such an adjudication is made by the Civil Court, a direction cannot be issued to the first respondent to taken action against the second respondent under Sec. 366-A of the Act.” Therefore, it is clear from the aforesaid findings that the construction in question had been put up unauthorisedly without obtaining permission, and subsequently permission has been obtained, but the same has been revoked by the Corporation and the appeal preferred against the revocation order, under section 366(e) of the Act is pending before the Standing Committee. The permission has been revoked in exercise of the power under subsection (4) of section 365 of the Act. 7. The permission has been revoked in exercise of the power under subsection (4) of section 365 of the Act. 7. In the light of the contentions urged on both sides, the following points arise for consideration: (1) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the findings recorded by the learned single Judge, is it a case warranting suo motu exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution or under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to set aside the order dated 6.12.1991 granting an order of temporary injunction in I.A. No. 16282 of 1991 in O.S. No. 6725 of 1991 by the Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras and issue a direction to the Corporation to demolish the unauthorised construction and further to direct the second respondent to restore possession to the writ petitioner as per the decree passed in C.R.P. 1382 of 1985? (2) To what order, the parties are entitled? 8. Point No. 1 : It is very strenuously contended by Shri Masilamani, learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant that in C.R.P. No. 1382 of 1985 preferred against the judgment and decree of the first Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, in O.S. No. 5884 of 1981 between the parties pertaining to the portion of the subject matter of the present proceedings comprised in premises Nos. 17 and 18, Kamarajar Salai, Madras-18 this Court reversed the decree passed by the 1st Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras and decreed the suit directing restoration of possession to the appellant and that the said suit was filed under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. 17 and 18, Kamarajar Salai, Madras-18 this Court reversed the decree passed by the 1st Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras and decreed the suit directing restoration of possession to the appellant and that the said suit was filed under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. As such, it was the bounden duty of the second respondent (Marimuthu) to restore possession, even though it was open to him to file a suit on title and for recovery of possession; that in the presence of the decree passed by this Court, the injunction order granted by the learned trial Judge in I.A. No. 16282 of 1991 in O.S. No. 6725 of 1991 is a nullity because there cannot be an order of injunction contrary to the decree for restoration of possession passed by this Court and that the very purpose of the suit filed under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is frustrated if in the suit filed on title subsequent to the decree for restoration of possession passed in the suit filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, an order of temporary injunction is passed preventing the decree holder in the suit filed under Section 6 of the specific Relief Act taking possession of the property. 9. On the contrary, it is contended that in a suit on title filed even after the decree passed in a suit filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act even though such a decree is passed by the High Court, it is open to the court which is seized of the title suit to grant injunction to protect the possession of the plaintiff. Alternatively it is contended that if at all the appellant, who is the first defendant in the suit was aggrieved with the order of temporary injunction, nothing prevented him from taking the matter in appeal against that order or to file a revision petition before this Court or insist upon the trial court to vacate the interim order of injunction, whereas on the contrary, the appellant had not only failed to take the aforesaid steps but has also allowed the trial of the suit to go on. It is stated at the Bar that the trial has been completed and the suit has been posted for final arguments. It is stated at the Bar that the trial has been completed and the suit has been posted for final arguments. It is also argued that when the party himself did not appeal against the order of injunction and allowed the order of injunction to operate and with that went on with the trial of the suit, it would not be just and proper for this Court to suo motu exercise jurisdiction and interfere with the order of temporary injunction and issue a direction to the Corporation of Madras to take action to demolish the building and further to direct the executing court to restore possession to the appellant. In support of the contention that such possession can be protected, learned counsel for the second respondent has placed reliance on a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Gopalakrishna Pillai v. Venkatesam Pillai (1967 I M.L.J. 346=80 L.W. 76), whereas Mr. Masilamani, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a decision of a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in M.C. Batra v. Lakshmi Insurance Company (AIR 1956 Allahabad 709) and also on another decision of the same High Court in Parma Nand v. S.M.M. Chimmawati (A.I.R. 1955 Allahabad, 64) 10. In C.R.P. No. 1382 of 1985 between the appellant and the second respondent, this Court has decreed the suit O.S. 5884 of 1981 filed under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. After assessing the evidence on record this Court has recorded the finding and decreed the suit as follows:— “.. Further, it is seen from Exhibit C-2 that the western wall of the property of the respondent, which according to the evidence, was in line with the western wall of Premas house, is shown to have been removed westwards by about 9 and that takes in a portion of the property No. 18 in the occupation of the petitioner and that would undoubtedly constitute trespass by the respondent into the property established by the evidence referred to earlier to be in the possession of the petitioner. The Court below, apart from its directing itself regarding the requirements relating the nature and character of possession, relevant for purposes of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, had overlooked vital documentary and other evidence establishing that the excess extent of the property in the possession of the respondent was referable to the encroachment on the western side into the property made out to be in possession of the petitioner and had proceeded to erroneously non-suit the petitioner. Thus on a careful consideration of the principles applicable to a suit instituted under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and the materials available in that regard, it is clearly established that the petitioner was in possession of the suit property on 8.8.1981 and was dispossessed by the respondent herein by an act of trespass committed on 8.8.1981 and that the petitioner is entitled to the relief of restoration of possession of the suit property in view of the institution of the suit on 10.8.1981, within six months from the date of dispossession, viz. 8.8.1981. The relief of permanent injunction is really outside the scope of a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed with costs and the judgment and decree of the Court below are set aside and the respondent is directed to restore the possession of the suit property to the petitioner and the suit will stand decreed to this extent with costs.” This decree has become final. 11. There is no doubt that the decisions cited by the respective counsel do support their rival contentions. In addition to the above decisions, Shri Masilamani, learned Senior Counsel strongly placed reliance on the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Official Trustee of Tamil Nadu v. A. Maqdoom Sheriff (1996-I-L.W. 148) and also another decision of a learned single Judge in Annapoorni v. Janaki (1995-I-L.W. 141) which was relied upon in the case of Official Trustee of Tamil Nadu (supra). These two decisions have been relied upon in support of his submission that we should exercise our suo motu jurisdiction either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution or under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 12. These two decisions have been relied upon in support of his submission that we should exercise our suo motu jurisdiction either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution or under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 12. There is no doubt that it is always open to this court in a case, which warrants suo motu exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, to exercise the same suo motu, But what is necessary is, the facts and circumstances of the case must warrant it. The conduct of the parties is also very much relevant. The conduct of the parties should not be such as to disentitle them to seek such a relief. It may be pointed out here that in the case of Official Trustee of Tamil Nadu (supra) a public trust property which was in the possession of the official trustee, was trespassed into by one Ramakrishna Mudaliar. As a result thereof the terms of trust deed could not be properly implemented. Therefore, a scheme was framed in the suit filed under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and the property was kept under the supervision and control of the Official Trustee. The plaintiff who was in possession of a portion of the property contrary to the undertaking given tried to continue his possession. As the interest of public trust was involved and as it was the property in the possession of the Official Trustee and as such public interest was also involved, it became the responsibility of this Court to ensure safety and security of the trust property. It was in those circumstances, the learned single Judge considered it necessary to exercise suo motu jurisdiction finding that the order passed by the trial court was contrary to the order passed by the High Court. As far as Annapoornis case (supra) is concerned, the learned single Judge was concerned with a case wherein it was contended that the restriction imposed by sub section (2) of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure for exercising jurisdiction by the High Court would also apply even when the High Court decides to exercise the suo motu power of revision. As such where the order, which is sought to be revised by exercise of suo motu jurisdiction is appealable such restriction would be applicable. As such where the order, which is sought to be revised by exercise of suo motu jurisdiction is appealable such restriction would be applicable. Therefore it would not be open to exercise suo motu power of revision. After referring to several decisions, the learned single Judge has held that such restriction would not be applicable when the power is exercised suo motu. We are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, we are not required to decide such a question. 13. As we have already pointed out, the exercise of suo motu jurisdiction either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution or under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, conduct of the parties, the fact situation obtaining on the date the court is called upon to exercise the jurisdiction suo motu the extent or nature of injustice going to be perpetuated if this Court were to decline to exercise the jurisdiction suo motu. Therefore, it cannot be laid down as a strait jacket formula that suo motu jurisdiction can be exercised at any time under any circumstance. Examining the facts of this case in the light of what we have stated above, we find it difficult to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. Firstly, the appellant himself is disentitled for such a relief by his conduct in not challenging the order of injunction, which he could have very well challenged through the process known to law. Secondly, apart from allowing the order of injunction to operate for several years, he has also gone on with the trial of the suit. Thirdly, in the suit itself, the question as to whether there is an unauthorised construction, or an encroachment is made by the second respondent/plaintiff in the suit, is involved and the suit is ripe for hearing of arguments. Fourthly, the second respondent was granted the planning permission by the Corporation on 6.6.1985 and the same was revoked on 21.12.1990. The appeal preferred by the second respondent against the said order of revocation is still pending before the Appellate Authority of the Corporation. Fourthly, the second respondent was granted the planning permission by the Corporation on 6.6.1985 and the same was revoked on 21.12.1990. The appeal preferred by the second respondent against the said order of revocation is still pending before the Appellate Authority of the Corporation. Further, to avoid any complication in the matter, we adjourned these appeals with a specific observation without making any record of the same that the appellant may be restored with the possession of about 250 sq. ft. with the building thereon and that the appellant shall not cause any damage to the property, till the disposal of the said suit. The second respondent had also agreed to it. Both the sides took time to inspect the property and file a report before this Court. On the next date of hearing, the appellant expressed inability to take possession with a condition that he should not cause any damage to the property when he is entitled to unconditional possession under the decree passed in C.R.P. No. 1382 of 1995. We directed the parties in the aforesaid terms only with a view to ensure that the appellant is put in possession and the suit can be decided within a short time, and ultimately in the event whosoever succeeds, possession delivered in the interregnum can be treated in accordance with the decree passed. We have referred to this only to show the conduct of the appellant. He having gone on with the trial of the suit, at the fag end of the suit wants to have the decree executed and put in possession unconditionally. Further the suit can be heard and decided within any time as may be fixed by this Court, for which both sides are willing. These circumstances dissuade us to decline to exercise jurisdiction suo motu. 14. There is also one more circumstance to be noticed. The construction, as held by the learned single Judge, was made without obtaining permission. But, subsequently permission was obtained as noticed by the learned single Judge and then the same was revoked. There is an appeal filed against that and it is pending with the Standing Committee. We see no reason why the Standing Committee has not decided the appeal till now as nothing prevented it to decide the appeal. We hold that the Standing Committee of the Corporation has failed to exercise its jurisdiction in not deciding the appeal. There is an appeal filed against that and it is pending with the Standing Committee. We see no reason why the Standing Committee has not decided the appeal till now as nothing prevented it to decide the appeal. We hold that the Standing Committee of the Corporation has failed to exercise its jurisdiction in not deciding the appeal. In the event the appellant therein, who is the second respondent herein (Marimuthu) succeeds in the appeal, the permission granted will be restored. Consequently, it would not be open to say that the construction is without permission. Such being the situation, this Court will not be justified in exercising suo motu power of Revision or writ jurisdiction and directing demolition. It would be causing injustice to the parties and it would also amount to rendering the statutory appeal filed before the Standing Committee infructuous. Further, it would also result in deciding certain issues involved in the suit. Hence, we decline to exercise suo motu jurisdiction. 15. We make it clear that by declining to exercise suo motu jurisdiction, we should not be taken to have approved either the conduct of the second respondent (Marimuthu) or the correctness of the contentions of any of the parties, since we are not deciding the question. We also make it clear that we shall not be taken to have approved the decision of the learned single Judge of this Court in Gopalakrishna Pillais Case (1967-I-M.L.J. 346=80 L.W. 76) (supra), as the correctness of the said decision is open to doubt. Therefore, we leave this question open to be decided in an appropriate case. Similarly, we shall not be understood as approving the aforesaid two decisions of the learned single Judge of this court cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in the case, of Official Trustee of Tamil Nadu v. A. Maqdoom Sheriff (1996 I L.W. 148); and Annapoornis case (1995-1-L.W. 141). 16. For the reasons stated above, point No. 1 is answered in the negative. 17. Point No. 2 : In the light of the finding recorded on point No. 1, the appeal in W.A. No. 1262 of 1995 has to be dismissed. 16. For the reasons stated above, point No. 1 is answered in the negative. 17. Point No. 2 : In the light of the finding recorded on point No. 1, the appeal in W.A. No. 1262 of 1995 has to be dismissed. However, having noticed the fact that the Standing Committee has failed to decide the appeal, it becomes necessary to issue a direction to the Standing Committee of the Corporation to decide the appeal preferred by the second respondent herein against the order in G.O. No. 236 dated 20.5.1983 under Section 366 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, within two (2) months from to-day. 18. Both sides have also agreed by filing a joint memo to exercise our power under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure to withdraw the said suit from the file of the City Civil Court to the Original Side of this Court without prejudice to their right to approach the Supreme Court against the instant Judgment. The said joint memo is as follows: “The appellant and the 2nd respondent jointly consent for the 2nd transfer of O.S. No. 6725/91 on the file of the 8th Asst. Judge, City Civil Court, Madras to be tried by the High Court, Madras, on the Original Side. The consent for transfer of the suit is without prejudice to the rights of the parties to file an appeal to the Supreme Court against the orders in the writ Appeals. sd/-xxxsd/- xx- 2nd RespondentAppellant sd/-xxxsd/- xx- Counsel for 2nd respondentCounsel for Appellant”. We accept the memo and withdraw the suit O.S. No. 6725 of 1991 on the file of the 8th Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras in exercise of the power under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code to the Original Side of this Court. All the records of the suit in O.S. No. 6725 of 1991 on the file of the 8th Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras have already been brought before this Court pursuant to our direction and there is no need to give any further direction to the City Civil Court to transmit the records to this Court. The records so received shall be treated as transmitted to this Court pursuant to the withdrawal of the suit under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code and the suit shall be re-numbered. The records so received shall be treated as transmitted to this Court pursuant to the withdrawal of the suit under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code and the suit shall be re-numbered. The Additional Registrar (Judicial) is directed to place this order before The Honble The Chief Justice and obtain necessary orders for posting the same before the learned single Judge of this Court, for deciding the same within a period of two months (See 1996-2-L.W. 243-Ed.). There will be no order as to costs.