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1996 DIGILAW 293 (DEL)

LADY IRWIN COLLEGE SOCIETY v. UNION OF INDIA

1996-03-14

A.D.SINGH

body1996
ANIL DEV SINGH ( 1 ) BY this writ petition the petitioner seeks quashing of the order of the Estate Officer dated August 22, 1990, passed under section 5 (1} of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (for short the P. P. Act) and the order of the Appellate Authority dated February 14,1996, passed under section 9 of the P. P. Act. The facts leading to the writ petition, briefly stated, are as follows ( 2 ) ON August 21, 1947, Bungalow No. 5, Sikandra Road, New Delhi, was requisitioned under the provisions of section 3 of the Delhi Premises (Requisition and Eviction) Ordinance, 1947. After requisition of the property the same was handed over to the petitioner, namely, Lady Irwin College Society, for its use. Subsequently, the Delhi Premises (Requisition and Eviction) Ordinance, 1947, was superseded by Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (for short the Act of 1952 ), but the requisition made under the Ordinance of 1947 continued under the provisions of section 24 (2) of the Act of 1952. However, under section 6 (1-A) of the Act of 1952, the Central Government is required to release from requisition any property requisitioned or deemed to be requisitioned under this Act before the commencement of Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property (Amendment) Act, 1970, (for short the Amendment Act of 1970) (which came into effect from March 11,1970), on or before the expiry of a period of seventeen years from the date of such commencement. This means that the property which had been requisitioned before the Amendment Act of 1970 was required to be released on or before March 10, 1987. ( 3 ) ON February 11, 1988, one of the owners of the property Smt. Kant Kumari filed a writ petition being Writ Petition No. 599/88, wherein it was inter alia prayed that the vacant physical possession of the property should be handed over to the co-owners. In this writ petition the Union of India and the petitioner were arrayed as respondents. On July 8,1991, a Division Bench of this Court allowed the writ petition holding that the period of requisition having come to an end the Central Government was required to release the property in favour of the co-owners. In this writ petition the Union of India and the petitioner were arrayed as respondents. On July 8,1991, a Division Bench of this Court allowed the writ petition holding that the period of requisition having come to an end the Central Government was required to release the property in favour of the co-owners. It further directed respondents 1 to 3 therein (i. e. , Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply; Estate Officer and the Deputy Director of Estates.) and respondent No. 6 (Lady Irwin College) to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the property to Smt. Kant Kumari and respondents 4 and 5 (Smt. Prem Kumari and Smt. Madan Lata, widows of two sons of Smt. Kant Kumari) on or before December 31, 1991. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application seeking extension of time for vacating the premises. On April 29,1992, the Division Bench, after noticing the submission of the petitioner that the premises were occupied by 35 mentally retarded children and teachers, and the statement of Mr. Bhuchhar, counsel for the petitioner, made on a previous date before the Court that the petitioner "needed not more than four months time to make alternative arrangements", rejected the request and directed the petitioner to hand over possession of the premises to Smt. Kant Kumari and other co- owners within fifteen days of the order. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER, the petitioner challenged both the orders of this Court dated July 8, 1991, and April 29,1992, before the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition. On May 28,1992, the Supreme Court while disposing of the S. L. P. only extended the time for complying with the orders of the High Court by the end of the year 1992. Thereafter, the petitioner filed another application for seeking further extension of time to vacate the premises but the same was rejected by the Supreme Court on February 20, 1995. ( 5 ) AT this stage a reference may be made to the orders impugned in the writ petitions. On August 22, 1990, the Estate Officer passed an order under section 5 of the P. P. Act directing the petitioner to vacate the premises within fifteen days. This order was challenged before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority by its order dated February 14,1996, rejected the appeal of the petitioner. On August 22, 1990, the Estate Officer passed an order under section 5 of the P. P. Act directing the petitioner to vacate the premises within fifteen days. This order was challenged before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority by its order dated February 14,1996, rejected the appeal of the petitioner. The petitioner being dis-satisfied with the abovesaid orders has filed the instant petition. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the Estate Officer did not have any jurisdiction to pass an order under section 5 ofthe P. P. Act as after the expiry ofthe period of seventeen years from the commencement of the Amendment Act of 1970, the premises in question ceased to be public premises and are not covered by the definition of "public premises" under section 2 (e) of the P. P. Act. It was further contended that eviction from the requisitioned property can only be effected under section 6 (2) of the Act of 1952 read with rule 7 ofthe Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Rules, 1953 (for short the Rules ) and not under the P. P. Act. According to the learned counsel, it is the Competent Authority which after necessary enquiry can direct delivery of the possession of the requisitioned property to the person from whom the possession of the property was taken at the time ofthe requisitioning or to the successor-in-interest of such person. It was also pointed out that the eviction of the petitioner under the P. P. Act was not pursuant to either the order of the Division Bench dated July 8,1991, or as a consequence ofthe order ofthe Supreme Court dated May 28, 1992, or its subsequent order dated February 20, 1995. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, pointed out that the Supreme Court on January 30, 1996, issued notice to the Vice Principal of the petitioner college and the Deputy Director (Estates) to show cause why action in contempt should not be taken against them for not vacating/securing the vacation ofthe premises in question. It was submitted that in case the Deputy Director (Estates) fails to secure the vacation of the premises in question he may be held liable for contempt. It was submitted that in case the Deputy Director (Estates) fails to secure the vacation of the premises in question he may be held liable for contempt. He also submitted that the petitioner was not justified in not vacating the premises after the time granted by the Supreme Court to vacate the premises had expired. ( 8 ) I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. It is not disputed that the Division Bench by its order dated July 8, 1991, had issued a mandamus directing the petitioner to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the instant property to Smt. Kant Kumari and other co- owners on or before December 30, 1991, and subsequently the Supreme Court by its order dated May 28, 1992, extended the time for complying with the order of this Court upto the end of the year 1992. This means that the petitioner had to vacate the premises on or before December 31, 1992. The petitioner, however, did not vacate the premises and moved another application before the Supreme Court for grant of further time to vacate the premises. But the request of the petitioner was turned down. In spite of this, the petitioner did not vacate the premises. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner has failed to vacate the premises despite the orders of the High Court and the Supreme Court and keeping in view the fact that there is no equity in favour of the petitioner, I am not inclined to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Even otherwise, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the P. P. Act is not applicable is also without force as under section 2 (e) of the P. P. Act, the premises, which are requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government, come within the purview of the definition of "public premises". The fact that the premises are required to be released after the expiry of the specified period of time, does not mean that the property which has been requisitioned and not released would cease to be a public premises . Therefore, the Estate Officer was fully justified in acting under section 5 (1) of the P. P. Act. The fact that the premises are required to be released after the expiry of the specified period of time, does not mean that the property which has been requisitioned and not released would cease to be a public premises . Therefore, the Estate Officer was fully justified in acting under section 5 (1) of the P. P. Act. It needs to be noticed that neither before the Estate Officer nor before the Appellate Authority the petitioner challenged their jurisdiction to pass orders under the P. P. Act. Rather the petitioner filed an appeal from the order of eviction passed by the Estate Officer before the Appellate Authority under section 9 of the P. P. Act. The plea that the P. P. Act is not applicable seems to be an after thought. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the Act of 1952 being a special Act and the P. P. Act being a general Act, the provisions of the former Act would be applicable for seeking eviction of the petitioner from the premises in question. She submitted that the procedure prescribed by section 6 (2) of the Act of 1952 read with rule 7 of the Rules would be applicable. I am afraid, the contention of the learned counsel is not well founded. It seems to me that the P. P. Act is not a general Act but is a special Act dealing with the specific problem of taking speedy action against unauthorised occupants of public premises. Eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises requires special consideration and the process of eviction from such property must not be a long drawn process. According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the P. P. Act, it was enacted to provide a speedy machinery for the eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises and certain incidental matters thereto. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted it would defeat the purpose for which the Act was enacted. According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the P. P. Act, it was enacted to provide a speedy machinery for the eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises and certain incidental matters thereto. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted it would defeat the purpose for which the Act was enacted. In my view, the P. P. Act is a special law providing for eviction of unauthorised occupants of the public premises and section 6 (1-A) of the Act of 1952 read with rule 7 of the Rules does not come in the way of application of the P. P. Act for evicting an unauthorised occupant from the premises which had been requisitioned by the Central Government under the Act of 1952. It is only after securing the eviction of an unauthorised occupant under the P. P. Act that the Central Government or the Competent Authority would be in a position to hand over possession of the property to its owner (s) in accordance with section 6 (2) of the Act of 1952 read with rule 7 of the Rules. ( 10 ) IT was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that on January 3, 1992, the Delhi Administration issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. 1894 for the purpose of acquiring the property for the petitioner as well as for setting up a National Institute of Adult Education. She submitted that if the purpose for acquiring the property was to hand over the same to the petitioner there w as no reason why in the first place the petitioner should be evicted by the Estate Officer. This contention is of no avail to the learned counsel for the petitioner as a Division Bench of this Court by its order dated February 4,1993 in Writ Petition No. 597/93 has stayed the acquisition proceedings. Besides, even after the property was notified under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act the petitioner applied for grant of further time to vacate the premises which request, as pointed out above, was not acceded to by the Supreme Court. ( 11 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition is dismissed in limine. .