K. A. SWAMI,C. J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is preferred by the Srirangam Cooperative urban Bank Limited, Srirangam. Trichy (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) against the order, dated 28 October 1995 passed by the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 7321 of 1995. In the writ petitiqn, the petitioner sought for quashing the award, dated 26 February 1985, passed by the Labour Court in Industrial Dispute No. 248 of 1993. That would come to be passed in the dispute raised on the following points : (1) Whether the non-employment of Sri K. Nagarajan it justified, if not to what relief he is entitled ? (2) To compute the relief, if any awarded in terms of money if it can be so computed. The facts which lead to the abovoe said dispute are as follows : "the petitioner, Sri K, Nagarajan, was appointed in the bank as clerk, from 1 April 1974 and he was paid a total salary of Rs. 261 per month. He continued as such lill 31 May 1975 when his services were terminated. He did not take any action with regard to his termination of services. However, he was re-employed on daily wages basis at the rate of Rs. 13 per day and paid monthly salary of Rs. 336 with effect from 1 August 1990. He continued in that position till 27 April 1982, on which date, he was removed from the services by the office communication, dated 27 April 1982, which reads as follows : "proceedings of the President' Srirangam Co-operative Urban Bank, ltd. , Sri Rangam present: Sri K. Padmanaban. Sub : Urban Bank Srirangam Co-operative Urban Bank Removal of sri K. Nagarajan and C. Mani from their services Orders issued. Ref: Review of the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, trichy Rs 14755/81-85 (i), dated 9 April 1982. As per Joint Registrar's review in the reference cited, the following two employees who are working as daily wagers in the Srirangam co-operative Urban Bank are hereby from their services of the Bank. 1. Sri K. Nagarajan 2. Sri C. Mani it is also hereby noted that Sri K. Nagarajan and Sri C. Mani are not to be allowed to report to the bank for any duty. Sd. l-president. 1. Sri K. Nagarajan 2. Sri C. Mani it is also hereby noted that Sri K. Nagarajan and Sri C. Mani are not to be allowed to report to the bank for any duty. Sd. l-president. ' therefore, the writ-petitioner raised the dispute which was referred to the labour Court, which by award, dated 26 February 1985, found that Registrar of Co-operative Societies alone was competent to make appointment and the bank, in defiance of the rules and regulations, appointed the petitioner as temporary clerk as the Board of Director of the bank was very much interested in the petitioner and initiative was taken by the Board to get the appointment ratified. Hence, the petitioner's contention that the bank had adopted unfair labour practice was rejected by the Labour Court as fallacious. Accordingly, the Labour Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to any relief. Aggrieued by the aforesaid award, the petitioner preferred Writ Petition No. 7321 of 1985, challenging the award and further sought for a direction to reinstate him as clerk twith continuity of service, back-wages and all other attendant benefits with costs. Learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition as prayed for on the ground that Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was attrasted to the case and as the condition precedent to retreuchment of a workman was not complied with removal of the petitioner from the services was bad in law. The relevant portion of the order of the learned Single Judge is as follows ;"it is admitted fact by both sides that the writ-petitioner was initially appointed by the second respondent management and subsequently for want of vacancy his services were terminated, It is evident that as and when the retrenchment is going to be effected under the Industrial Law, the fact entrant has to go. Applying the above said principle, the second respondent rightly terminated the service of the writ-petitionerfor want of vacancy. Thereafter, when once another vacancy arose, the management took a right decision in reappointing the writ-petitioner and he was allowed to continue in service, for a period of two years. This fact has not been disputed by the respondents. Applying the above said principle, the second respondent rightly terminated the service of the writ-petitionerfor want of vacancy. Thereafter, when once another vacancy arose, the management took a right decision in reappointing the writ-petitioner and he was allowed to continue in service, for a period of two years. This fact has not been disputed by the respondents. It is not a case where the workman did not work to the satisfaction of the management and it is not a case where the workman was appointed on daily wages and it is not a case where his services were terminated on proof of misconduct. The writ-petitioner was allowed to continue to work for a period of two years. No doubt the second respondent is all liberty to terminate the services as and when retrenchment is going to the effected. But it is the duty of the management to satisfy the ingredients of Section 25-F of the industrial Disputes Act it is mandatory on the part of the appointing authority, viz. , the second respondent herein to pay wages and also to pay the terminal benefits and it is the case where the second respondent has not even paid the terminal benefits. It is clear that the second respondent has not followed the ingredients of Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act. As such, the order of termination passed by the second respondent, without applying the conditions laid down under Section' 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act cannot sustain under law and it is liable to be set aside"hence, the bank has come up in appeal. ( 2 ) IN the light of the contentions urged on both sides the folloing points arise for consideration : (I) Whether the provisions of Secsion 25-F of the Industrial Disputes act are attracted to the case having regard to the contention that the termination was due to the fact that the Registrar of Cooperative societies had not approved the appointment as the petitioner was not qualified ? (II) Whetherthere was no termination of the services of the petitioner in the eye of law as the very appointment itself was void. (III) That the question of termination of services of the petitioner did not arise as the services of the petitioner was not capable of continuation having regard to the fact that the petitioner did not possess the requisite qualification for appointment as clerk. (III) That the question of termination of services of the petitioner did not arise as the services of the petitioner was not capable of continuation having regard to the fact that the petitioner did not possess the requisite qualification for appointment as clerk. ( 3 ) WE may point out at the outset that all these contentions, on the basis of which the aforesaid points are raised are used for the first time before this Court. There was no such plea whatsoever raised before the Labour court. However, we have allowed them to be urged. As the facts and contentions relating to all ths three points overlap, we consider all the three points together. ( 4 ) IT is not in dispute that the petitioner was re-employed in the bank on 1 July 1980 as the clerk on daily-wages basis. However, his wages were paid monthly, in a sum of Rs. 336. He continued to work as such till 27 april 1982 on which date his services were terminated. Clause 2 (ii) of the employees of the bank specifically provides that a clerk should possess the qualification of SS. LC. and must have undergone a full course training in the Central Co-operative Institute, Madras or in any of the Mofussil Cooperative training Institutes or inany of the Co-operative Training Colleges for intermediator senior personnel conducted by the National Council for co-operative Training and a pass in the Government Technical Examinations book-keeping, banking and auditing or the examination on those subjects conducted by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission or the Examinations for Co-opsrative Supervisor's Training course conducted by the Tamil nadu Co-operative Union or the examination for Higher Diploma in Cooperation conducted by the Co-operative Training Colleges. Admittedly the petitioner did not possess the qualifications laid down in aforesaid by-law. 4a. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies had issued a circular directing that no appointment of any ineligible persons and no appointment in excess of the requirement should be made. If such appointment be made, it shall be subject to the approval of the Registrar. It is contended that as the petitioner did not possess the requisite qualifications and he was appointed without the approval of the Registrar, the appointment itself was void and it did not confor any right upon the petitioner, therefore, his services did not even require to be terminated. It is contended that as the petitioner did not possess the requisite qualifications and he was appointed without the approval of the Registrar, the appointment itself was void and it did not confor any right upon the petitioner, therefore, his services did not even require to be terminated. The fact that his services were terminated could not by itself confer any right upon him to claim that termination of his services amounted to retrenchment. It is also further contended that the appointment being void, the petitioner could not have been continued therefore, there was no question of termination of services and the impugned order, dated 27 April 1982 issued by the president of the bank, removing the petitioner from service had no effect in the eye of law except indicating that his appointment was void. ( 5 ) WE find it very difficult to accept these contentions. Firstly, the bank, which had appointed the petitioner, had taken his services and paid wages during the period he worked, cannot now be permitted to say that the appointment was bad in law,. therefore, it was entitled to terminate the services without following the procedure prescribed under the Industrial dispute Act. The bye-law referred to above, does not require that the appointment to be approved by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. Further, the petitioner was not appointed as regular employee. He was appointed only on daily-wage basis. The services contemplated under the bye-laws are the regular appointments, and not the appointments on daily-wage basis, therefore, the contentions based upon the special bye-law and the circular of the Registrar, which cannot be applied to the present case, as it is a pure and simple case of appointment on daily-wage basis, cannot be accepted. When once the workman is appointed on daily-wage basis and if he works for 240 days in a year, he must be said to be in continuous service as per Section 257 of the Act, as such he is entitled to be made permanent. However, we do not propose to enter into this aspect of the matter and record any finding on this because it is not one of the points raised in the dispute referred to the Labour Court. The dispute referred to the Labour court. However, we do not propose to enter into this aspect of the matter and record any finding on this because it is not one of the points raised in the dispute referred to the Labour Court. The dispute referred to the Labour court. The dispute referred to the Labour Court was only with regard to the non-employment of the petitioner and the computation of relief in term of money if is held that the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement with back-wages. Forthe purpose of this case it is sufficient to pnint out that the writ petitioner worked for over two years. Thus, he was in continuous service for more than one year as such he was entitled to the benefit of section 25-F of the Act. The expression "retrenchment" as per Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial, disputes Act means the termination by the employer of service of a workman for any reason whatsoever otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action as long as such termination does not fall within the category of the voluntary retirement of a workman or retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains stipulation in that behalf. Thus, Section 2 (oo) does not make any difference between regular appointment or temporary appointment or appointment on daily-wage basis or appointment of a person not possessing requisite qualification. Clause (bb)in Section 2 (oo) came to be inserted only with effect from 18 August, 1984, therefore the said provision is not applicable to the present case. The present case also does not fall under Clause (c) because the services of the petitioner have been terminated on the ground of continued ill-health, similarly, Section 257 of the Act specifically provides that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until : (A) the workman has been given one months notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice ? (B) the workman has paid at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part therefore in excess of six months. This is a case in which the petitioner was in continuous service for more than one year under the bank irrespective of the fact whether the appointment made by. the bank was valid one or not. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was temporarily appointed by the Board of the Bank on 1 August, 1980 as it is specifically stated in the counter filed by the bank before the Labour Court, Madurai, which reads thus :"the Board of respondent bank decided on 25 July, 1980 to appoint the petitioner temporarily with effect from 1 August, 1980 on wages at Rs. 5 per day and to request the Deputy Registrar df co-operative Societies to exempt the case of appointment of the petitioner from the circular of the Registrar, dated 17, September, 1977 as the appointment would be against that circular. "it is also further stated in Para 13 of the counter that the petitioner was to be confirmed on the dated of termination of the employment, but the bank could not help terminating his employment instead of confirming him. ( 6 ) FROM the impugned order of termination of the petitioner, it is clear that the same has been done pursuant to the direction issued by the joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Trichey, in the report made by him in Re. No. 14755/81-85 (i), dated 9. April, 1982. It may be pointed out have that even though the termination was made pursuant to the direction of the joint Registrar, nevertheless such a termination was required to be made in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the Act ia as the said section does not make any difference whether the appointment has been made in accordance with law or not. The expression used in that section is, "workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer. " therefore the factum of employment is relevant an d not the legality or otherwise of it. The expression used in that section is, "workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer. " therefore the factum of employment is relevant an d not the legality or otherwise of it. ( 7 ) IN Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala, 1980 (2) ILN 70, the supreme Court considered the case of retrenchment of a workman and also considered the definition of the expression "retrenchment" in Section 25-F of the Act and held thus, in Para 6, at page-173 :"in interpreting these provisions, i. e. , Sections 25-F, 25-FF and 25-FFF, one must not ignore their object. The manifest object of these provisions is to so compensate the workmen for loss of employment as to provide him the wherewithal to subsist until he finds fresh employment. The non-inclusion of 'voluntary retirement of the workmen' 'retirement of workman on reaching the age of superannuation' 'termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued health, in the definition of 'retrenchment' clearly indicate and emphasise what we have said about the true object of Sections 25-F, 25-FF and 25-FFF and the nature of the compensation provide by these provisions. The nature of retrenchment compensation has been explained in indian Hume Pipe Company Ltd v. Workman, AIR 1960 SC 251 as follows : 'as the expression 'retrenchment compensation' indicates it is compensation paid to a workman on his retrenchment and it is intended to give him some relief and to soften the rigour of hardship which retrenchment inevitably causes. The retrenched workman is, suddenly and without his fault, thrown on the street and has to face the grim problem of unemployment. At the commencement of his employment a workman naturally expects and look forward to security of service spread over a long period ; but retrenchment destroys his hopes and expectations. The object of retrenchment compensation is to give partial protection to the retrenched employee and his family to tide over the hard period of unemployment. ' once the object of Sections 25-F, 25-FF and 25-FFF is understood and the true nature of the compensation which those provisions provide is realised, it is difficult to make any distinction between termination of service for one reason and termination of service for another. ' once the object of Sections 25-F, 25-FF and 25-FFF is understood and the true nature of the compensation which those provisions provide is realised, it is difficult to make any distinction between termination of service for one reason and termination of service for another. "in the above case, the discharge of the workman was made on the ground that she did not pass test which would have enabled her to be confirmed It was held that the fact that the workman was not entitled to be confirmed was not a ground to overcome the provisions contained in section 25-F and Section 2 (oo) of the Act. ( 8 ) IN Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Labour Court, Chandigarh, and others, 1990 (1) LLN 1054 the question of termination of the workmen without following Section 2 (oo) and Section 25-F of the Act was considered. In that case the services of the workmen, were terminated on the ground that the Chairman had no power to appoint them. The Labour Court held that services of the workmen were terminated illegally without payment of retrenchment compensation under the Act and that they were entitled to reinstatement. The Supreme Court held that the termination by the employer of the service whatsoever, other than those expressly excluded by the definition in Section 2 (oo) of the Act would attract section 24-F of the Act. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows, in Paras 82, and 83, at pp. 1082 and 1083 :"applying the above reasonings, principles and precedents, to the definition in Section 2 (oo) of the Act, we hold, that 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever except those expressly excluded in the section. The result is that Civil Appeals No. 3241-48 of 1981, 686 (NL), 1817 and 1989, 3261, 1866 and 1868 of 1982, 8456 and 13828 and the appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 3149 of 1983 are dismissed with costs qualified at Rs. 3,000 in cash appeal. The result is that Civil Appeals No. 3241-48 of 1981, 686 (NL), 1817 and 1989, 3261, 1866 and 1868 of 1982, 8456 and 13828 and the appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 3149 of 1983 are dismissed with costs qualified at Rs. 3,000 in cash appeal. It is stated that in Civil Appeal No. 686 of 1982 the respondent has already been reinstated pursuant to the order, dated 24 October 1983, passed by this Court, having regard to the fact that he has served since 1983, he shall be considered for confirmation with effect from his due date according to rules, if he is not already confirmed by the Corporation". ( 9 ) SIMILARLY in Prabhu Dayal Jat v. Alwar Saharik Bhumi Vikas Bank, ltd. , and others, 1991 (2) LIN 1042, a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High court considered the case of termination of the services of the workman on the ground that the appointment was irregular and as such the Registrar of co-operative Societies, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur issued the direction to terminate his services and in compliance of that direction, the Bank-terminated the services without following Section 25-F of the Act the held that section 25-F of the Act was attracted. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows, in Paras. 9 and 10, at page 1044 ;"admittedly, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act were not complied with. Any retrenchment in violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act is bad and non est. Such a retrenchment is invalid. In the results, we allow the writ petition and quash the impugned order, dated 12 October 1987 Annexure 7. The respondents are directed to forthwith reinstate the petitioner on the post he was working on 12 October 1987. As regard the back-wages, the petitioner is advised to initiate the legal proceedings under sectian 33-C (8) of the Act; because it is a disputed question whether he remained in gainful employment or not for the period from 13 October 1987 till today. " ( 10 ) A Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Rajeshkumar and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1993 (1) LLN 1009, has' considered the case of termination of services of a workman on the ground that the appointment was invalid. " ( 10 ) A Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Rajeshkumar and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1993 (1) LLN 1009, has' considered the case of termination of services of a workman on the ground that the appointment was invalid. The contention raised in that case, similar to the one raised before us, was that as the appointment itself was invalid, the services of workman could bs terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act. It was held thgt an invalid appointment was not one of the exceptions found in Section 2 (00) of the Act ; that any retrenchment not falling under in any one of the exception mentioned in Section (00)of the Act would amount to retrenchment and for such termination conditions prescribed in Section 25-F of the Act were to be complied with, therefore the order of termination was held to be illegal and the workman was directed to be continued in the employment with all the benefits. ( 11 ) A learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court in Mithilesh Kumar singh v. State of Bihar and others, 1995 (1) LLN 1048, has considered the case of termination of the services of a workman on the ground that he was appointed illegally. The learned Single Judge has held that, in Para. 7, at page 1049 :". . . . . . THE idea of illegal or invalid appointments is quite foreign to the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act. . . . . . The termination of employment of a workman on the ground that his initial appointment was not legal and valid itself qualifies are retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (00) as termination for illegal and invalid appointment has not been made an exception to the definition of retrenchment. . . " ( 12 ) THUS it is clear from aforesaid decisions and more specially the two decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above that the nature of employment, viz. , whether legally made or not or on irregular appointment or an appointment by a person not competent to appoint, would not be a ground to refuse to follow the provisions contained in Section 25-F of the act. However, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a judgment of the Kerala High Court in Eranalloor Service Co-operative Bank, ltd. However, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a judgment of the Kerala High Court in Eranalloor Service Co-operative Bank, ltd. v. Labour Court and others, 1986 (2) LLN 1132. That was a case wherein the workman while working as commission agent was appointed as salesman on a temporary basis, subject to the approval of the Registrar of co-operative Societies. At the time when he was appointed as salesman, he did not have the requisite qualification prescribed under the rules. His request for appointment as salesman was turned down by the Registrar of co-operptive Societies, therefore, the bank resolved to terminate his services and accordingly terminated the services. The learned Single Judge held that the fact that the appointment was contrary to the rules the award passed by the Labour Court directing reinstatement on 'applying Section 25-F of the act was not warranted as Section 25-F of the Act did not apply to such a case. The relevant point of the judgment of the learned Single Judge is as follows, in Paras. 11 to 14, at pages 1134 and 1135 :11. "in order to appreciate this line of approach to the issue it is necessary to consider the scope of Sections 25-F and 2 (00) of the industrial Disputes Act. Section 2 (00) suggests that the person who claims the benefit of Section 24-F must be one, validity appointed in the service of the employer. The service must be capable of being continued until any of the events envisaged under Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 2 (00) happens. In short the person who claims the benefit of Section 25-F shall establish that he is in the service of the employer having been appointed validly. It should be remembered that it is the contract of service that is the terminated. A service cannot be terminated unless it is capable of being continued. The Suprame Court has held so in Workmen of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton, and Silk Mills company, Ltd. v. Bangalore Woolen Cotton and Silk Mills company, Ltd. , AIR 1962 SC 1363 . 12. It should be remembered that it is the contract of service that is the terminated. A service cannot be terminated unless it is capable of being continued. The Suprame Court has held so in Workmen of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton, and Silk Mills company, Ltd. v. Bangalore Woolen Cotton and Silk Mills company, Ltd. , AIR 1962 SC 1363 . 12. Having understood the law, thus, we will consider the scope of the expression capable of being continued in service, in Section 2 (oo), 'capable of being continued' suggests that the employee should have entered the the service under a valid contract of service which cannot be terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F. The workman in order to valid of the benefits of Section 25-F should, therefore, establish that he has the right to continue in service and that the said service has been terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F. 13. It is in this backdrop the scope of the dictum of the Supreme court in Santosh Gupta case, 1980 (2) LLN 170 (supra), has to be considered In the said decision the Supreme Court has referred to an earlier decision, in State Bank of India v. N. Sundaramony, 1976 (2) LLN 5, where the Supreme Court while considering the scope of Section 2 (cc) has indicated that the order of termination which would attract the provisions of the Industrial disputes Act is the result of the exercise of volition by the employer. This is what the Supreme Court has said : ". . . True, the section speaks of retrenchment by the employer and it is urged that some act of volition by the employer to bring about the termination is essential to attract Section 25-F and automatic extinguishment of service by efflixition cannot be sufficient. . . ' when I refer to this passage I shall not be understood to have said that the Supreme Court has finally spoken on this aspects. Whatever that be, it can be seen from Santosh Gupta case (supra)that the Supreme Court had no occasion the consider the case of a workman whose appointment indisputably was void ab intio. . . ' when I refer to this passage I shall not be understood to have said that the Supreme Court has finally spoken on this aspects. Whatever that be, it can be seen from Santosh Gupta case (supra)that the Supreme Court had no occasion the consider the case of a workman whose appointment indisputably was void ab intio. The content of the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes act positively indicate that the workman who is entitled to the benefits of the said enactment, must be one who came into, the service under a valid order of appointment. Hisservice must be capable of being continued unless any of the events contemplated under Clauses (a) to (c) of Section 2 (oo) exist. 14. The fact available on record would show that the order appointing the petitioner as salesman was abiaitic void and if that be so it cannot be said that the second respondent is a workman entitled to the benefits of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes act. The award directing reinstatement of the second respondent into service with back-wages 'therefore' is not sustainable in law. Exhibit P-6 therefore is liable to be quashed, I accordingly quash Exhibit P-6. " the learned Single Judge has tried to distinguish the decision of the Supreme court in Santosh Gupta case, 1980 (2) LLN 170 (supra), which in pur view is not contract, therefore we find it difficult to agreed with the view expressed in Eranalloor Co-operative Society case (supra) which is quite opposed to the ratio of the decisions in Santosh Gupta case (supra), and punjab Land Developmant Bank case, 1990 (1) LLN 1054 (supra ). ( 13 ) THUS for the reasons stated above all the three points raised for determination are to answered against the appellant. Consequently, the writ appeal to be dismissed. However, it is noticed that the petitioner had prayed for quashing the award and further directing the second respondent to reinstate him as clerk with continuity of service, back-wages and all other attendant benefits. The learned Single Judge, on quashing the award, has allowed the writ petition as prayed for. We are of the view that it is necessary to modify the order of the learned Single Judge in so far as the said order grants the relief. The learned Single Judge, on quashing the award, has allowed the writ petition as prayed for. We are of the view that it is necessary to modify the order of the learned Single Judge in so far as the said order grants the relief. ( 14 ) IT is not in dispute that the writ-petitioner was working pn daily-basis and he was being paid a sum of Rs. 13 per day, excluding Sudays, as the time when his services were terminated. In such a case when the termination has been made in violation of Section 25-F of the Act, the direction for reinstatement should be only to the effect that the workman should be reinstated in the same position and the same nature of employment which he was enjoing on the date of termination. The order passed by the learned single Judge does not make that point clear, therefore, we modify the order of the learned Single Judge in so far as it directs reinstatement of the writ-petitioner with continuity of service, back-wages and all other attendant benefits in the following terms : the second respondent-woruman be reinstated a daily-wage workman at the rate of Rs. 13 per day. However, me make it clear that if on the daily wages, he would be entitled to such increase. As far as the arrears of wages from the date of termination till 31 march 1996 is concerned it has been calculated at the rate of rs. 13 per day, excluding Sundays, by the appellant-beck, amounting to Rs. 54,275. Sri K. Chandru, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent. workman submits that the workman accepts the said amount as arrears of wages subject to any statutory benefits, if available for the daily-wage workmen and subject to payment of the daily-wages as may be obtaining on the date of reinstatement. Learned counsel for the appellant-bank submits that the bank has no objection for payment of Rs. 54,275 as arrears of wages from the date of termination till the end of March 1996. We place these submissions on record and on the basis of those submissions, we issue further directions in addition to the one issued above : (1) The second respondent-workman shall report to duty on 15 May 1996. On the date of reporting to duty the appellant-bank shall pay the arrears of wages upto 31 March 1996 amounting to Rs. We place these submissions on record and on the basis of those submissions, we issue further directions in addition to the one issued above : (1) The second respondent-workman shall report to duty on 15 May 1996. On the date of reporting to duty the appellant-bank shall pay the arrears of wages upto 31 March 1996 amounting to Rs. 54,275 plus the wages for the month of april 1996 on or before the end of May 1996. (2) The second respondent-workman is entitled to wages that are payable to a daily wage worker as obtaining on the date the reports to duty. (3) The second respondent will be entitled to other statutory benefits, if any, available to a daily-wage worker. ( 15 ) IN the result, subject to aforesaid modification and directions, the Writ appeal is dismissed. Connected Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 2734 of 1996 is rejected. No costs. Appeal dismissed. .