JUDGMENT - R.K. BATTA, J.:---The petitioners (plaintiffs in the suit and hereinafter referred as plaintiffs) had filed a suit claiming easementary right of way through the property of the respondents (defendants in the suit and hereinafter referred as defendants) and alternatively prayed for passage on payment of compensation through the property of the defendants. The property of the defendants is bounded on the southern side by the property of the plaintiffs. The suit was for declaration in respect of the said right of way and alternatively a claim was put forward under Article 2309 of the Portuguese Civil Code for a passage on payment of compensation. The plaintiffs had prayed for temporary injunction seeking to restrain the defendants from obstructing the suit way and/or interfering with the suit way. The plaintiffs had also prayed for mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove all obstructions, plantation, barriers, etc. obstructing the suit way. The obstruction sought to be removed is spoken in para 6 of the plaint which consists of planting of drumstick tree, branches of other trees in the middle of the suit way, erection of katcha barrier on the suit way. The trial Court granted temporary injunction restraining the defendants from obstructing the suit way and/or interfering with the suit way, but no relief regarding prayer of mandatory injunction. 2.The defendants filed appeal against the said order before the District Court in respect of grant of temporary injunction and the plaintiffs filed cross-objections in the said appeal regarding non-grant of mandatory injunction. The appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial Court insofar as temporary injunction was concerned and consequently the cross-objections were not considered. The petitioners namely the plaintiffs have come in revision against the said order of reversal by the appellate Court. 3.Learned Advocate Shri J.P. Mulgaoncar submitted before me that the view taken by the trial Court insofar as temporary injunction prayer was judicious and the appellate Court was not entitled to reverse the said findings unless there were strong and cogent reason. In support of this proposition Advocate Shri Mulgaoncar relies upon the observations of the Apex Court in (Wander Ltd. and another v. Antox India P. Ltd.)1, 1990 (Supp.) S.C.C. 727. He attacked all the findings on the basis of which the appellate Court had reversed the order of the trial Court. In support of this proposition Advocate Shri Mulgaoncar relies upon the observations of the Apex Court in (Wander Ltd. and another v. Antox India P. Ltd.)1, 1990 (Supp.) S.C.C. 727. He attacked all the findings on the basis of which the appellate Court had reversed the order of the trial Court. Insofar as the question of non-joinder of co-owners is concerned, it was contended by him that an amendment has already been filed to join the co-owners in the suit and that temporary injunction was sought only against those co-owners who were interfering with the right of way and such order of injunction would bind only those co-owners who were joined in the suit and would not bind the other co-owners. According to Shri Mulgaoncar the findings of the appellate Court relating to alternate way are erroneous and that the question of prima facie title is different as against prima facie case. In this respect reliance has been placed on the ruling of the Apex Court in (Dalpat Kumar and other v. Prahlad Singh and others)2, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 276. According to Shri Mulgaoncar the reversal of order is bad and is liable to be set aside and the plaintiffs are also entitled to mandatory injunction regarding removal of obstructions put by the defendants which are referred in para 6 of the plaint. 4.On the other hand, learned Advocate Shri Ramani, submitted before me that the two prayers in the suit are mutually destructive of each other and on this count alone the plaintiffs were not entitled to any injunction. It has been further submitted that the appellate Court had rightly appreciated the controvery in proper context and perspective and had come to the conclusion that the other way existed on the eastern side and the plaintiffs could not be permitted to choose a convenient way. It was next contended by Advocate Shri Ramani that since all co-owners are not parties to the suit, the plaintiffs have no chance of success in the suit. He also dwelt on the question of opening of the gate in the southern wall in April, 1991 and submitted that the trial Court had come to erroneous conclusion that there did exist prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs. He also submitted that the plaintiffs have failed to prove irreparable loss and balance of convenience. He also dwelt on the question of opening of the gate in the southern wall in April, 1991 and submitted that the trial Court had come to erroneous conclusion that there did exist prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs. He also submitted that the plaintiffs have failed to prove irreparable loss and balance of convenience. 5.Before we deal with the merits of the case, it is considered necessary to note down the observations of the Apex Court in Wander Ltd. and other v. Antox Indian P. Ltd., 1990 (Supp.) S.C.C. 727, regarding the scope of appellate jurisdiction in such matters. The Apex Court has observed :--- "The appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the Court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the Court below solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial Court's exercise of discretion." 6.I shall first deal with the objections relating to joinder of co-owners. In this respect learned Advocate Shri Mulgaoncar has stated that the injunction application in the suit had been initially filed against those co-owners who were obstructing the right of way and that the plaintiffs have now moved the Court in the suit to join the other co-owners. I cannot accept the contention of learned Advocate Shri Ramani that on this Count the temporary injunction application of the petitioners could be defeated since the plaintiffs had sought limited relief against those co-owners who according to the plaintiffs, were interfering in the suit way and naturally the other co-owners who have not been joined would not bound by the temporary injunction order in case the same is sustained. 7.For the purpose of temporary injunction application. 7.For the purpose of temporary injunction application. I also do not find any force in the contention of Advocate Shri Ramani that the two prayers in the suit are destructive of each other and the plaintiffs cannot ultimately succeed. The plaintiffs claimed easementary right of way through the property of the defendants and alternatively they claimed right under Article 2309 of the Portuguese Civil Code on the ground that there is no other access available to them except for the easementary right of way through the property of the defendants. 8.Coming to the merits of the case, I am of the opinion that the appellate Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the order which was otherwise judicious and based upon the material on record. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the trial Court had exercised discretion arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely or had ignored settled principles of law relating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. The trial Court relied had upon old photographs showing beaten track in respect of the suit way claimed by the plaintiffs through the suit property. During inspection also such beaten track was seen. The alternate way which, according to the defendants, existed for the plaintiffs through the property on the eastern side did not have beaten track. 9.The plaintiffs case was that they had been using the said way through the property of the defendants for long through the gate in the southern wall. In this respect the stand of the defendants was that the suit gate was opened in April, 1991. The defendants certainly did not react to the said opening of the gate nor took steps for launching any proceedings. On the other hand, the plaintiffs had prima facie proved that the said gate had been installed as back as 25-4-1984 by producing a bill of the said gate and by filing affidavit of the mason who had done the work of construction of masonary pillars for the fixation of the iron gate. The trial Court found that the other access referred to by the defendants was a small opening having obstruction in between and was not a beaten track. Admittedly, the plaintiffs had purchased scooter sometime in the year 1984 and their case is that the suit access was being used not only as foot way but also for the purpose of travelling by scooter. Admittedly, the plaintiffs had purchased scooter sometime in the year 1984 and their case is that the suit access was being used not only as foot way but also for the purpose of travelling by scooter. 10.The appellate Court went on the footing that in none of the documents or survey records the said way was shown. Normally access through somebody else's property is not shown in any survey records. On the basis of the material on record the appellate Court wrongly concluded that another way from the property of the plaintiffs to the public road had been conclusively established. The issue relating to elongation of way from 3, 4 to 7 to 8 metres has absolutely no significance or bearing which could justify refusal of injunction. The appellate Court did accept that one cannot loose sight of beaten track through the property of the respondents namely the defendants but inspite of that chose to reverse the order of the trial Court. The appellate Court was certainly not justified in the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court to interfere with the order of the trial Court which was based on material on record. If the plaintiffs are restrained from using the right of way claimed by them, after they have established prima facie the said right, irreparable loss is bound to be there to the plaintiffs. The balance of convenience was certainly in favour of the plaintiffs. Once the defendants are ordered not to obstruct or interfere with the suit way, order of temporary mandatory injunction to remove the obstructions spoken in para 6 would naturally follow in the fact and circumstances of this case. 11.For the reasons mentioned above, the revision succeeds. The prayers of the plaintiffs relating to temporary injunction and mandatory injunction are hereby granted. Rule made absolute accordingly. In the facts and circumstances I will leave the parties to bear the costs. Revision allowed. *****