JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—Brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that claimant filed a claim petition under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for compensation for injuries sustained by him in a motor accident on 1012-1990 at Shimla (Khalini) at about 10 p m. The case of the claimant was that he was Divisional Manager in the H. P. State Forest Corporation Limited and on 10-12-1990, he had come to Shimla in connection with his official duty in the office of Managing Director of respondent 2 in the official vehicle HIS-1311. This vehicle was insured with the appellant. Claimant further stated that on the fateful day at about 10 p. m , he was going to Khalini where he was to stay for the night but the vehicle met with an accident there It was being driven by Driver Jagdish Chand at a very high speed though the road had steep gradient and he had been asked not to drive it at such a high speed. The accident was the result of rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver. Claimant was 51 year old at the time of accident and he was drawing a monthly salary of Rs 4,800. He further averred that he suffered multiple injuries and paralysis and after receiving the injuries, he cannot work throughout his life He claimed Rs. four lac as compensation Respondent 2 while admitting the factum of accident, pleaded that the claim of the petitioner was highly exorbitant and he was not entitled to the compensation claimed. Appellant raised numerous objections such as the claim petition was lacking in material particulars, non-joinder of necessary parties and the same being not maintainable against it ; the vehicle was not being driven in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy and the driver of the vehicle was not holding a valid driving licence and the vehicle was insured in the name of the petitioner While repudiating the allegations of the claimant, the injuries sustained by him were not denied, 2. It was on the aforesaid pleadings that the parties went to trial before the learned Tribunal below, which on 4-1-1992, framed the following issues :— 1. Whether the vehicular accident was caused due to the rash and negligent driving of an employee of respondent No. 1, as alleged? OPP. 2. It was on the aforesaid pleadings that the parties went to trial before the learned Tribunal below, which on 4-1-1992, framed the following issues :— 1. Whether the vehicular accident was caused due to the rash and negligent driving of an employee of respondent No. 1, as alleged? OPP. 2. If issue No. 1 above is held in affirmative, what is the appropriate amount of compensation to which the petitioner may be entitled to ? OPP. 3. Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder of the necessary parties or mis-joinder of necessary parties as alleged ? OPR. 4. Whether the driver was not holding a valid driving licence at the time of vehicular accident, as alleged, if so, to what effect ? OPR. 5 Whether the insurer i. e respondent No 2 is not liable to idemnify the compensation, if any ? OPR. 6. Relief. 3. Both the parties led oral as well as documentary evidence on the aforementioned issues and the Tribunal while recording its findings on issues No. 1, 2, 5 and 6, held that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving by the employee of respondent 2 on issue No. 5, it was held that the appellant was liable for the payment of the entire amount of Rs. 2,16,000 plus Rs 29,673 medical expenses, total Rs. 2,45,673 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of petition i. e. 10-6-1991 till its realisation. 4. In support of their respective pleas on the aforesaid issues, the claimant examined as many as four witnesses. Claimant appeared in support of his case. Amongst other things, he pleaded that the vehicle was being driven at a high speed and the accident was due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver After the accident, he became unconscious and when he regained consciousness he found himself in Snowdon Hospital According to him, as a result of this accident, the entire right portion of the body became paralysed for sometime due to survical fracture. He also received head injury, injuries on the left leg and teeth He was under treatment upto 23-11-1990 at Snowdown Hospital, from where he was referred to P G. L Chandigarh where he remained under treatment for 15 20 days Thereafter, he got treatment in Sri Ganga Ram Hospital, Delhi, where he was operated for bone grafting. He also received head injury, injuries on the left leg and teeth He was under treatment upto 23-11-1990 at Snowdown Hospital, from where he was referred to P G. L Chandigarh where he remained under treatment for 15 20 days Thereafter, he got treatment in Sri Ganga Ram Hospital, Delhi, where he was operated for bone grafting. He had been going to the hospital for consultation and treatment every month for about 4-5 months and he had not fully recovered So, he had to consult a Neuro Surgeon at Delhi, who advised him M R. I. a special type of X-ray which he did and underwent that treatment that was prescribed by this doctor. Still he has not fully recovered and his right hand and foot are not perfectly in order He cannot properly work with the same speed as he used to work earlier and the doctors have opined that the defect is incurable. He produced copy of policy, Ext. PA and also the correction letter whereby the risk covered by Ext, PA was stated to be in respect of vehicle bearing registration No. HIS-1311 and not HIC-1311. He had produced other documents showing his admission at P. G. I, Chandigarh and at Sir Ganga Ram Hospital (Exts PC to PE) He has placed a detailed statement (Ext. PF) on record showing the expenses incurred by him Finally, he has prayed for the grant of rupees four lac as compensation. In his cross-examination, by both the appellant as well as respondent 2, nothing material has come out and the factual of claimant having sustained injuries, his having been operated upon etc. stood unrebutted. Dr. PF) on record showing the expenses incurred by him Finally, he has prayed for the grant of rupees four lac as compensation. In his cross-examination, by both the appellant as well as respondent 2, nothing material has come out and the factual of claimant having sustained injuries, his having been operated upon etc. stood unrebutted. Dr. Kashmir Singh (PW 2), Assistant Professor of Neuro Surgery, Indira Gandhi Medical College and Hospital, Shimla has stated that the claimant was admitted for multiple injuries from fracture cervical vertebra fifth (C-5) with right haemiparesis with bladder involvement on 10-12 1990 in the hospital at about 10.15 p m. and he remained there upto 23 12-1990, He was catherised and head halter traction was applied to him According to him, at the time of admission, there was weakness on the right half of the body (both upper and lower limbs on the right side), which is known as right haemeparasis and according to him, after the operation, the patient showed some improvement in power but still he was having weakness plus sensory impairment and mild bladder involvement in the form of hesitancy and frequency. This disablement is of permanent nature. With this disability the petitioner cannot work with the same vigour as he could prior to the accident and even the petitioner cannot properly walk as a result of the above injury. In these circumstances, for full investigation, the patient was referred to P G I Chandigarh In cross-examination of this witness also, nothing material has been elicited either by the appellant or respondent 2, HC Madan Lal (PW 2) has F I. R No 418/90 dated 11-12-1990, registered under sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A,IP C, (Ext. PP). Shri Shamsher Singh Dod (PW 4), who was also sitting in the same vehicle states that when the vehicle reached near Khalini Temple it was at a steep gradient, the speed was at once increased. When he asked the driver as to what he was doing but in the meantime, the vehicle firstly struck against the railing and then with another car just near the temple and according to him, another employee of the Forest Department had got down at a place known as Mist Chamber. At the time of accident, there were only four persons in the vehicle. At the time of accident, there were only four persons in the vehicle. As a consequence of the accident, Shri Roop Lal and one Pratap Singh, both fell unconscious, received injuries as a consequence of this accident. In his opinion, the accident was the result of negligence on the part of the driver, as he could not control the vehicle on account of high speed. He further says that he called his brother, Shri G. S. Dod and other persons The claimant was still not fully recovered and he walks limpingly. In cross-examination, he states that injuries were also sustained by him and he was treated at Snowdon Hospital though not admitted there. He has not filed any claim petition though he admits that the driver was driving the vehicle from D. C. office side, and that the speed of the jeep was 50-60 Kms per hour and he denied the suggestion that the accident was due to mechanical failure On behalf of the appellant, Shri Prakash Chand, Assistant Divisional Manager at Shimla has appeared as RW 2 and placed on record the complete copy of the Insurance Policy which is marked as RW 2/A, whereas on behalf of respondent 2, Shri Jagdish Chand, driver states that the accident was the result of failure of brakes and the speed of the vehicle was 25-30 Kms. per hour and the accident was not due to any mistake on his part, but was due to failure of breaks. He further states that the vehicle was being properly maintained. 5. Shri Deepak Bhasin, learned Counsel for the appellant made twofold submission in support of his appeal (a) the quantum fixed by the Tribunal is without any basis; (b) when the appellant has reserved the right to take all the defences in the name of the insured, it could challenge the Award on all available grounds, 6. On the other hand, Shri Gian Chand Gupta, learned Counsel for the claimant, has vehemently contended that both the grounds on which the appellant wants to challenge the impugned Award, are not open to it in view of the provisions of section 149 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988. 7. On the other hand, Shri Gian Chand Gupta, learned Counsel for the claimant, has vehemently contended that both the grounds on which the appellant wants to challenge the impugned Award, are not open to it in view of the provisions of section 149 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988. 7. Before we examine the respective contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to notice here that so far as the Insurance Company is concerned, its defences are limited and unless the case falls within the purview of section 149 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it is not open to it to challenge the Award on the grounds Shri Bhasin has tried to do so. Only exception to this is when either there is collusion between the persons making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made or the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the same, then in that event, for the reasons to be recorded in waiting, the Tribunal can direct the insurer like the appellant, which is liable in respect of such claim to be impleaded as a party to the proceedings and on its being so impleaded, it shall have thereupon without prejudice to the provisions contained in section 149 (2), the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds which are available to the person against whom the claim had been made, This permission has to be obtained from the Tribunal under section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. So far as the defences open to the Insurance Company under section 149 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are concerned, those are extracted hereinbelow : "149. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgment and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks—(1)..... So far as the defences open to the Insurance Company under section 149 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are concerned, those are extracted hereinbelow : "149. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgment and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks—(1)..... (2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment or award unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment or award is given the insurer had notice through the court or, as the case may be, the claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgment or award so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal ; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely :— (a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely :— (i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle— (a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or (b) for organised racing and speed testing, or (c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or (d) without side-car being attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle ; or (ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification ; of (iii) a condition excluding liability or injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war civil war, riot or civil commotion ; or (b) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular." To this general rule, exception is contained in section 170 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which is also reproduced hereinbelow :— "170. Impleading insurer in certain cases—Where in the course of any inquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that— (a) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or (b) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceedings and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have, without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 149, the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made." 8. In the context of aforesaid two provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it may be appropriate to refer to identical provision which was there in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 under section 96 (2) thereof is to the following effect :— "96. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments against persons insured in respect of third party risks—(1)....... ... In the context of aforesaid two provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it may be appropriate to refer to identical provision which was there in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 under section 96 (2) thereof is to the following effect :— "96. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments against persons insured in respect of third party risks—(1)....... ... (2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment unless before or after the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment is given the insurer had notice through the Court of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of any judgment so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal ; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely :— (a) that the policy was cancelled by mutual consent or by virtue of any provision contained therein before the accident given raise to the liability, and that either the certificate of insurance was surrendered to the insurer or that the person to whom the certificate was issued has made an affidavit stating that the certificate has been lost or destroyed, or that either before or not later than fourteen days after the happening of the accident the insurer has commenced proceedings for cancellation of the certificate after compliance with the provisions of section 105 ; or (b) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely :— (i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle- (a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or award, or (b) for organised racing and speed testing, or (c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or (d) without side-car being attached, where the vehicle is a motor cycle ; or (ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by ^any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification ; or (iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion; or (c) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular." 9. Similarly, under section 110 (C)-2A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, permission can be granted to the insurer as is permissible under section 170 of the Act of 1988. 10. In support of his appeal, Shri Deepak Bhasin has referred to number of cases to which a eference is being made hereinafter. First of all, he cited British India General Insurance Company Limited v. Captain Itbar Singh and others, AIR 1959 SC 1331. According to him, the ratio of this judgment was fully applicable to the facts of this case and, therefore, the appellant is entitled to raise all defences including on the quantum of compensation. In this behalf, the following observations in paragraphs 5 to 8 are material, which are to the following effect :— "(5) To start with it is necessary to remember that apart from the statute an insurer has no right to be made a party to the action by the injured person against the insured causing the injury. Sub-section (2) of section 96 however gives him the right to be made a party to the suit and to defend it. The right therefore is created by statute and its content necessarily depends on the provisions of the statute. The question then really is, what are the defences that sub-section (2) makes available to an insurer ? That clearly is a question of interpretation of the sub-section. (6) Now the language of sub-section (2) seems to us to be perfectly plain and to admit of no doubt or confusion It is that an insurer to whom the requisite notice of the action has been given "shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely" after which comes an enumeration of the grounds It would follow that an insurer is entitled to defend on any of the grounds enumerated and no others, If it were not so, then of course no grounds need have been enumerated. When the grounds of defence have been specified, they cannot be added to. To do that would be adding words to the statute. (7) Sub-section (6) also indicates clearly how sub-section (2) should be read. It says that no insurer to whom the notice of the action has been given shall be entitled to avoid his liability under sub-section (1) otherwise than in the manner provided for in sub-section (2)". To do that would be adding words to the statute. (7) Sub-section (6) also indicates clearly how sub-section (2) should be read. It says that no insurer to whom the notice of the action has been given shall be entitled to avoid his liability under sub-section (1) otherwise than in the manner provided for in sub-section (2)". Now the only manner of avoiding provided for in sub section (2) is by successfully raising any of the defences therein mentioned. It comes then to this that the insurer cannot avoid his liability except by establishing such defences. Therefore sub-section (6) clearly contemplates that he cannot take any defence not mentioned in sub-section (2) If he could, then he would have been in a position to avoid his liability in a manner other than that provided for in sub-section (2). That is prohibited by sub-section (6), (8) We therefore think that sub-section (2) clearly provides that an insurer made a defendant to the action is not entitled to take any defence which is not specified in it." 11. On the basis of the aforesaid judgment of the apex Court it is manifestly clear that this case does not support the plea raised by the appellant. Rather it negatives the plea of the appellant. Further Shri Bhasin wanted to take the advantage of judgment United Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Lakshmi Short Ganjoo and others, AIR 1982 J & K 105. A bare perusal of this judgment also negatives the plea raised on behalf of the appellant both in law as well as on facts. He further pressed into service judgments in Hemendra Dutta Choudhury and another v Anm Kumar Bordohi and others, 1988 ACJ 813 (Gau) and Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co Ltd v, Rajendra Kaur 1989 ACJ 96 (All) Both these cases are distinguishable on facts inasmuch as the Insurance Company and the insurer both had filed a joint appeal in these cases. Another case referred to was New India Assurance Co Ltd. v. Sarswati Samanta Sinehar and others, 1995 ACJ 416 (Orissa). Reliance was placed by Shri Bhasin on the observations contained in paragraph 5 of this case, which are to the following effect:— "5. I shall first deal with the question whether an insured can maintain an appeal. For resolving the dispute it is necessary to refer to section 110-D of the old Act. Reliance was placed by Shri Bhasin on the observations contained in paragraph 5 of this case, which are to the following effect:— "5. I shall first deal with the question whether an insured can maintain an appeal. For resolving the dispute it is necessary to refer to section 110-D of the old Act. The relevant portion of the said provision reads as follows: "Appeals.—(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may within 90 days from the date of award, prefer an appeal to the High Court. The provision remains indentical in section 173 of the Act. The expression person aggrieved defines an exact definition, Its meaning varies with the context of statutes wherein it occurs and depends upon diverse and varied factors. Taking the word as it is understood in common parlance, a person aggrieved should include a person whose interests are prejudicially affected by a decision ; a person who has a genuine grievance, that the decision has adversely hit him and has denied something which was otherwise legally due to him and has deprived certain benefits due and/or has imposed some burden on him to be discharged which, but for the decision, he would not have been required to undertake. The Supreme Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed, AIR 1976 SC 578, observed as follows : "The expression denoes an elastic and to an extent an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bonds of a rigid, exact and a comprehensive definition. At best its features can be described in a broad tentative manner. The Supreme Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed, AIR 1976 SC 578, observed as follows : "The expression denoes an elastic and to an extent an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bonds of a rigid, exact and a comprehensive definition. At best its features can be described in a broad tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends upon diverse and variable factors such as content and intent of the statute, the nature and extent of the prejudice and injury suffered by him.” The expression person aggrieved was defined as under by James, L. J. in re: Sidebotham, (1880) 14 Ch D 458 (at page 465) : “But the words person aggrieved do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order has been made A person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something." The person aggrieved is a person who is given a right to raise a contest in a certain matter and his contention is negatived. He is certainly aggrieved by the order disallowing his contention. Any person who makes an application to a court for a decision, or any person who is brought before a Court to submit a decision is, if the decision goes against him, thereby a "person aggrieved by that decision. Persons whom the court was bound to hear if they wished to be heard, on a validity of a case and the decision has been against them, it can be said that they persons aggrieved. It means a person injured or damaged in a legal sense: (See Re: Riviera, 26 Ch D 41). In A. G of Gambia v. N. Jio, (1961) AC 617, it was observed that the expression aggrieved person includes any person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made prejudicially affecting his interests. It is apparent that the law-makers did visualise filing of appeal by aggrieved persons. In A. G of Gambia v. N. Jio, (1961) AC 617, it was observed that the expression aggrieved person includes any person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made prejudicially affecting his interests. It is apparent that the law-makers did visualise filing of appeal by aggrieved persons. The provisions cannot be rendered otiose or an exercise in futility by saying that an insured cannot take advantage of it, as he is not a person aggrieved and the insurer, though an aggrieved person, cannot challenge the award in its vital parts regarding accrual of liability to pay compensation and the quantum of compensation, howsoever arbitrary and unjustified the findings might be. The dire necessity of the situation demands necessity of hearing a person who alone can really make a grievance about the passing of award. In some cases it would amount to slamming of the door of the High Court to prohibit entry of the insurer or the insured. It may be a case where the insurer has been saddled with a huge sum on the basis of a patently absurd conclusion of the Tribunal. Fair play in action demands a fair hearing of the insurer, whose rights to file appeal would really provide no remedy if it is denied the opportunity to assail the finding relating, inter alia, to the negligence of the driver and quantum of compensation. It is submitted that the right is limited. There cannot be any doubt about it. But the court has a duty to unveil the overt designs and not to be a mute spectator to the perpetration of injustice. The legislature cannot be said to be unaware of the fact that an insurer may be ultimately made liable to satisfy an award though arbitrary, unreasonable and unjust because of the insurance coverage. In such a situation the insurer has to come forward to file an appeal and challenge the award in its vital respects. A similar view was expressed by a Division Bench of Gauhati High Court in Hemendra Dutta Choudhury v. Arun Kumar Bordoloi, 1988 ACJ 813 (Gau). A Division Bench of this Court (to which I was a party) in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Harapriya Nayak, AHO No. 46 of 1993 ; decided on 5-11-1993, has also highlighted these aspects. A similar view was expressed by a Division Bench of Gauhati High Court in Hemendra Dutta Choudhury v. Arun Kumar Bordoloi, 1988 ACJ 813 (Gau). A Division Bench of this Court (to which I was a party) in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Harapriya Nayak, AHO No. 46 of 1993 ; decided on 5-11-1993, has also highlighted these aspects. If the insurer and the insured file a joint appeal and the appeal by at least one of them is maintainable, the appeal would be heard. But if neither of them are found to be competent to file the appeal, the joint appeal would not be maintainable in law and would be liable to be dismissed. A similar view was expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Kantilal and Bros v. Ramarani Debt, 1980 ACJ 501 (Cal). So far as insureds appeal is concerned, as observed by the Kerala High Court in K. R> Visalakshi v. Pookodan Hamaza, 1989 ACJ 600 (Ker), material deprivation is not essential. Assuming such an incident to be essential, even then the owner becomes a person aggrieved, as the award still deprives him of no claim bonus, which would otherwise be entitled to get under the contract of insurance. For a just and fair decision between the parties on the question of liability, it must be held that the driver and the insured owner have a right of appeal under section 110-D to challenge the award, if they dispute the findings of fault and consequent primary liability against them. Merely because the amount is passed on to somebody else, i.e., the insurer, it cannot be said that the insured is not a person aggrieved. In the view of the matter, the appeal is maintainable." 12. It may not be out of place to mention here that the appeal was filed by the Insurance Company as well as the insured, owner of the vehicle and, therefore, on facts the case was distinguishable and secondly both have been held to be persons aggrieved within the meaning of section 110-D of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988). So, this case also does not improve the case of the appellant. 13. On the other hand, Shri Gian Chand Gupta, learned Counsel for the claimant has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. So, this case also does not improve the case of the appellant. 13. On the other hand, Shri Gian Chand Gupta, learned Counsel for the claimant has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Naresh and others, 1990 ACJ 1085 (HP). While dismissing the appeal of the Insurance Company, the learned Single Judge has observed that the defences available to the Insurance Company are limited and the defence relating to the question of quantum of compensation was not open to the insurer. In addition to the above judgment, this is the consistent view of other courts as well (See New India Insurance Co v Saira, 1986 ACJ 724 (All) ; Sushila v. Sucha Singh, 1989 ACJ 226 (Raj) ; New India Insurance Co. v Lad Kanwar, 1994 ACJ 105 (Raj); United India Insurance Co Ltd. v. Pratibha Rathi and others, 1995 ACJ 819 (MP) ; Northern India General Insurance Co Ltd. v L. Krishnan, AIR 1973 (Mys) 107 ; Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Vinita Kalyani, 1972 ACJ 261 ; National Insurance Company Ltd, v. Magikhia Dass, AIR 1976 (Orissa) 175 ; New India Assurance Co. v. Shiv Kumar, 1978 ACJ 137 (MP) and Ramesh Chand v, Randhir Singh, 1978 ACJ 252 (All). Learned Single Judge of this Court in paragraph 12 of Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. v. Mast Ram9 1989 ACJ 1120 (HP), held that: "12 Now, coming to the issue of compensation, although the appellant has challenged the award of the Tribunal on merit, but it has not been specifically pointed out as to how and on what aspect the same suffers from any vice of illegality. Under section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, awards of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal can be challenged on specific grounds and in view of these provisions, neither the quantum of compensation nor the merits of the award can be challenged by the insurer. The appellant has filed an application (C. M. P. No. 2170 of 1981 in F. A, O. No, 75 of 1981) under sections 151, 152 and Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with sections 96 and 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act to allow to challenge the award on all grounds open to the insured. However, no arguments have been addressed on this aspect of the matter. However, no arguments have been addressed on this aspect of the matter. Even otherwise, the same cannot be done by appellant as it was a party before the Tribunal and it has duly contested the claim alongwith the insured. The application, aforesaid, is not tenable and is, therefore, disallowed In addition to this, the claimants have filed an application (C. M. P. No. 73 of 1989 in F. A O. No. 77 of 1981 under Order 6, Rule 17 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure urging therein to allow amendment of the claim petition so as to enhance the claim amount from Rs 40,000 to Rs 80,000 This appears to be the result of some anticipated objection by the appellant in F. A. O, No. 75 of 1981 to the effect that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has allowed compensation (Rs. 48,000) more than the one claimed by the claimants, which is not admissible. In opposition to this application, the owner of the vehicle (respondent No. 2) and insurer have, inter alia, asserted the compensation in accordance with law and facts of the case." 14. It may not be out of place to mention here that during the course of proceedings before the Tribunal, as well as respondent 2 contested the claim of the claimant and it was after thorough contest that the case was decided. Similarly, no permission was sought on any of the available grounds under section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by the appellant so as to enable it to raise all defences open to respondent 2, whose vehicle was involved in the accident and had been insured with the appellant, 15 A feeble attempt was made by Shri Bhasin that the Court should presume collusion between the claimant and the insured. When confronted with his defence in the reply filed to the claim petition, this plea has not been raised. Moreover, it cannot be so raised, unless permission was sought from the Tribunal under section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 16. When confronted with his defence in the reply filed to the claim petition, this plea has not been raised. Moreover, it cannot be so raised, unless permission was sought from the Tribunal under section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 16. In the light of the above legal position, the grounds on which the Award is sought to be challenged on behalf of the appellant, are not at all open to it nor it can be permitted to challenge the same beyond the defences which are open to it under section 149 (2) and permission having not been sought from the Tribunal under section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, As such, the appeal deserves dismissal and it is ordered accordingly. 17. Alongwith the appeal, an application C M P, No. 88 of 1994 was filed under section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure on behalf of the appellant for permitting it to contest the claim on general defences This application is neither bona fide nor there is anything on the file, particularly in its reply filed before the Tribunal on which the same can be maintained at this stage. Needless to reiterate here that the appellant was a party before the Tribunal and it contested the claim alongwith the insured and in these circumstances, there is no justification for allowing the application, and the same is also rejected. 18. On the other hand, Shri Gian Chand Gupta, learned Counsel for the claimant, has urged for enhancement of compensation and allowing interest at the rate of 15% per annum against 12% per annum awarded by the Tribunal. 19. We have examined both the submissions of the learned Counsel. It was admitted during the course of arguments by the claimant that medical claim of his client has been duly reimbursed by his employer Further, from the Award, it is clear that a sum of Rs 29,673 towards medical expenses has also been allowed. Further the amount awarded shows that it is just, reasonable and fair compensation to which the claimant is entitled to Similarly, we are of the view that interest allowed by the Tribunal does not call for any interference which is also upheld. Consequently, cross-objections are also dismissed 20. The result of the above discussion is that the appeal as well as cross-objections are dismissed. Consequently, cross-objections are also dismissed 20. The result of the above discussion is that the appeal as well as cross-objections are dismissed. Appellant shall pay costs of this appeal to both the respondents, which are quantified at Rs. 3,000 to be shared equally by respondent 1 as well as respondent 2. Appeal dismissed.