Judgment :- Thomas, ag. C. J. In suit for eviction the defendant (a co-operative society) raised a contention, inter alia, that on the landed area leased out to the society sheds were constructed. On the sai d contention, the society claimed protection under S.106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (for short 'the Act'). In the trial court a plea was made for reference to the Land Tribunal as envisaged in S.125 of the Act. But learned Munsiff rejected the plea on the main premise mat the suit does not pertain to that landed portion but only to three different buildings leased out to the society. Another ground for rejecting the said plea was that the question raised by the defendant under S.106 of the Act does not genuinely arise though such a contention has been advanced in the written statement. Learned Munsiff relied on the decision of this court in Sundaran v. Mohammed Koya (1995(2) KLT 115). The order rejecting the said plea is challenged by the defendant society in this revision. 2. When this revision came up for admission before a learned single judge, it was contended that correctness of the above decision in Sundaran v. Mohammed Koya requires reconsideration in the light of a recent Supreme Court decision in Mathevan Padmanabhan v. Parmeshwaran Thampi (1995 Supp. (1) SCC 479). In view ofthe said contention learned single judge deemed it fit to refer the case to the Division Bench. 3. Legal principle laid down by the Division Bench in Sundaran's case is based on the interpretation ofthe word "arises" in s.125(3) ofthe Act. After noticing the well-settled position that unless the question legally arises there is no obligation for the civil court to make a reference to .the Land Tribunal, the 'Division Bench proceeded to consider whether such a question would legally arise in a case where the party has raised the claim without any bona fides and with the motive to procastinate the proceedings. It was held thus: "The amplitude of the expression "arises' must he constricted to what genuinely arises in a case in view of the very unsatisfactory function' of the present Land Tribunal system in Kerala. The courts have to give a useful and practical interpretation to lessen the abuse of the legal requirement envisaged in S.125(3) of the KLR Act. It was held thus: "The amplitude of the expression "arises' must he constricted to what genuinely arises in a case in view of the very unsatisfactory function' of the present Land Tribunal system in Kerala. The courts have to give a useful and practical interpretation to lessen the abuse of the legal requirement envisaged in S.125(3) of the KLR Act. The civil court can consider whether the plea raised by the defendant or the respondent in the case is bona fide or genuine. If there is no reasonable prospect of the plea being upheld by a Land Tribunal, the Civil court can justifiably take the view that the question does not reasonably these in the case. II" the question does not reasonably arise in the case, the civil court need not make the reference under S.125(3) of the KLR Act". 4. The said decision has since been brought to the notice of a Full Bench of this court in Venkitaramalyer v. Vesu Amnm (1995(2) KLT 295 (FB)) and we may point out with great respect, that the Full Bench has followed the ratio laid down in Sundaran's Case. 5. We heard the counsel on the contention that the ratio in Sundaran's case need reconsideration in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mathevan Padmanabha van case (1995 Supp. (1) SCC 479). In the said case, Supreme Court considered the scope of S.125(1) of the Act. A question of tenancy raised in that case was referred to the Land Tribunal and it was once answered by the Tribunal. The reference court thereafter acted on the finding of the Land Tribunal and passed a decree which was challenged in a regular appeal. But the appellate court remanded the case to (he trial court for fresh determination of the Question of tenancy by observing that "the trial court shall dispose of the suit without any reference to the Land Tribunal and based on the evidence already on record and also any evidence which it may allow the parties to adduce including cross-examination of PW.1". Supreme Court pointed out in that case that the appellate court was clearly in error in divesting the jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal to determine the dispute of tenancy as engrafted in sub-section 1 of S.125 of the Act and confer jurisdiction on the civil court which it inherently lacks. 6. Supreme Court pointed out in that case that the appellate court was clearly in error in divesting the jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal to determine the dispute of tenancy as engrafted in sub-section 1 of S.125 of the Act and confer jurisdiction on the civil court which it inherently lacks. 6. In Sundaran's case (cited supra) the Division Bench of this court has not adopted a view that jurisdiction to decide the question of tenancy can be exercised by the civil court. This court has, in that case, only considered whether there is any obligation to make a reference to the Land Tribunal if the question does not arise as envisaged in S.125(3) of the Act. Supreme Court decision (in Mathevan Padmanabhan) was on a different aspect and the ratio therein is not in conformity with what this court said in Sundaran's case. We, therefore; repel the plea for reconsideration of the principle laid down in Sundaran's case. 7. Learned counsel then argued that defendant's claim based on S.106 of the Act is a genuine plea raised with all bona fides. It is then pointed out by the learned counsel for plaintiff that the area in respect of which defendant claimed right under S.106 of the Act has not been included in the schedule to the plaint and no eviction 'has been sought by the plaintiff in respect of the said area. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/ respondent submitted after getting specific instructions from his client that plaintiff is not interested in this suit for getting eviction of the defendant from the land on which defendant claims to have put up constructions. In other words, the suit would be confined to the three buildings which are admittedly belonging to the plaintiff. In view of this definite stand of the plaintiff, there is no reason to interfere with the impugned order. We, therefore, dismiss this C.R.P.