Honble MADAN, J. – The petitioner who is an Advocate and a resident of Ajmer, has moved this court by way of this writ petition in the matter of violation of his fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19, 21 & 300-A of the Constitution of India. (2). The short question which arises for consideration of this court is regarding acqusition of land in question by the respondents belonging to the petitioner and other adjoining land and the subsequent decision of respondent No.2 viz. Urban Improvement Trust, Ajmer (for short `UIT) to have denotified the said land by virtue of a notification dated 3rd May, 1990 under Section 41 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ( No. 1 of 1894) (hereinafter referred to as `the Act), whether it was open to the competent authority, i.e., the UIT for having once taken decision in letter and spirit to de-notify adjoining lands and the scheme for which the land was acquired having already lapsed and in view of the adjoining lands have already been de-notified and released from the purview of the impugned notification, whether it was open to the UIT not to have treated the petitioners land in question in a similar manner by releasing his land as well being adjoining land as it was also falling within the purview of same notification and scheme? (3). The petitioner is an adopted son of Late Shri Harish Chand Bhargava resident of Ajmer who owned and possessed a garden bounded by compound wall having various constructions over the said land including ancestral `Chhattries and wells situated in village Thok Maliyan and Kalyanipura District Ajmer, bearing kha- sra numbers as indicated in para 2 of the writ petition. Late H.C. Bhargava died on 14th August, 1951 without leaving any issue and the petitioner came to be subsequently adopted by the wife of Late H.C. Bhargava vide adoption deed dated 1st March, 1952 executed by Smt. Sampi Devi wife of Late H.C. Bhargave and registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Ajmer on 3rd March, 1952. Smt. Sampi Devi died in the year 1956. It has been contended in the writ petition that in view of the aforesaid adoption deed, the petitioner became owner of the above referred property in question. Smt. Sampi Devi died in the year 1956. It has been contended in the writ petition that in view of the aforesaid adoption deed, the petitioner became owner of the above referred property in question. It has been further contended in the writ petition that UIT, Ajmer intended to plan one residential scheme to be known as `Jwala Prasad Greh Nirman Yojna (for short `Yojna) and towards implimentation of the same reques- ted respondent No. 1 (State Government ) to issue notification under Section 32 of the Urban Improvement Trust Act, 1959 (for short `UIT Act). The notification was issued on 13th January, 1983 and the same was published in official gazette on 3rd May, 1990 under Section 4 of the Act. It included the land of the petitioner at serial Nos. 1,3 & 4 in Ex. 3 being a part of the above referred property of the petitioner. It has been further contended by the petitioner that the land was duly mutated in favour of the petitioner by virtue of the adoption deed referred to above. The petitioner filed objections against the impugned notification with respondent No.3 regarding acqusition of land in question. It has been further contended that after according hearing to the petitioner and also taking into consideration the totality of facts and circumstances of the matter, respondent No. 3 viz. Land Acquisition Officer, UIT, Ajmer submitted his report Ex. 7 dated 27th April, 1991 to the Government of Rajasthan (respondent No.1) with a recommendation that it will not be in the interest of UIT to acquire the land in question. From the perusal of the report it emerges that two decisions were taken by respondent No.2 simultaneously, i.e., (i) to issue notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which was published on 16th January, 1992 in the official gazette; (ii) respondent No.1 issued a letter dated 7th May, 1991 to respondent No.2 for clarification of Ex. 7 (report dated 27th April, 1991) and thereafter repeated correspondence was exchanged between the UIT and the State Government, the former recommending the de-notification of the land while the latter insisted on continuing with the acquisition on 5/7.1.1992 in pursuance of a decision taken by the State Government, a letter was issued to respondent No.2 informing the decision of the State Government to drop the Yojna from the purview of the notification vide Ex. 15. 15. In pursuance of this decision a noti- fication came to be issued on 27th January, 1992 whereby notification under Section 48 of the Act de-notifying some adjoining lands, was issued vide Ex.16. As soon as the petitioner became aware of the decision of the State Government, he made a representation dated 26th March, 1992 to respondent No. 1 for according similar treatment as meted out to other similarly placed persons for de-notifying his land as has been done in other similar cases. The brief description of the land of the petitioner is as under :– Sr. No. Bigha Bishwa Biswansi 1 1 03 00 2 8 02 10 3 9 11 00 Total area of land acquired 18 16 10 (4). In the reply to show cause notice the respondents have contended that the land in question is covered and forms part of `Jwala Prasad Nagar Scheme notified by the State Government under Section 32(1) of the UIT Act and the acqui- sition of land comprised in khasra Nos. 149 to 159, 4877, 4882, 4883, 4887 and 4890 and a portion of khasra Nos. 4891, 4893, 4894 and 4884 measuring in all 18 bighas 16 biswas and 10 biswansi had already been acquired and acquisition proceedings of the same have been completed for which an award has been passed by respondent No.3 on 29th January, 1993 which has also been approved by the State Government on 29th July, 1993. Out of the land acquired most of it is vacant and constructions are existing on a very small portion of the land and valuation has also been duly made and the value of the construction has been included in the award. It has been further contended in the reply that UIT had planned a housing scheme known as `Jwala Prasad Greh Nirman Yojna which has been notified and approved by the State Government. It has been further contended that the State Government vide notification dated 27th January, 1992 kept the land at serial No. 2 & 5 in Ex.3 out of acquisition. It has been further contended that State Government has extended the said scheme upto 31st December, 1994 implying thereby that there has been no extension of the said scheme after 31st December, 1994 when it stood lapsed. It has been further contended that State Government has extended the said scheme upto 31st December, 1994 implying thereby that there has been no extension of the said scheme after 31st December, 1994 when it stood lapsed. At the same breath respondent No.2 has taken a contradictory stand in para 14 of the reply to writ petition by contending inter-alia that since the land of the petitioner had already stood acquired vide award dated 29th January, 1993 which was approved and accepted by State Government on 29th July, 1993, there was no occasion for dropping the scheme in question as alleged by the petitioner which is quite contradictory to the stand taken and approved by State Government in its reply as referred to above. It has been further contended that Ex. 16 does not pertain to the land of the petitioner to which no reliance can be placed by this Court. It has been further contended in the reply that the scheme proposed by the UIT and approved by State Government is still in existence and has been extended under Section 32(2) (A) of the said Act till 31st December, 1994 which evidently means that the scheme has already lapsed w.e.f. 31st December, 1994 and there has been no further extension of the said scheme as referred to above. The respondents have further contended that since the Housing Scheme in question has not been abandoned by State Government, the acquisition made is sustainable and as such the same is justified and that there is no case of discrimination whatsoever to the petitioner to warrant any interference by this Court. (5). Similar stand has been taken by State Government in its reply to show cause notice wherein respondent No.1 has contended that the land in question forming part of khasra numbers as referred to above, was siwai chak and has got vested in the UIT, Ajmer by the order of the competent authority under Section 102-A of the Land Revenue Act, 1956. It has been further contended that State Government having decided to proceed with the acquisition in pursuance of which notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 2nd May, 1991 and it was duly published in the official gazette on 16th January, 1992, no occasion had arisen for the respondents to have de-notified the land. It has been further contended that State Government having decided to proceed with the acquisition in pursuance of which notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 2nd May, 1991 and it was duly published in the official gazette on 16th January, 1992, no occasion had arisen for the respondents to have de-notified the land. In para 14 of the reply respondent No.1 has made a categorical denial regarding the letter dated 17th January, 1992 Ex.15 to the writ petition which purports to have been issued by the Deputy Secre- tary, UIT Ajmer as never having been issued by the said department vide Annexure R 1/1 dated 19th December, 1994. The respondents have also placed reliance upon another letter dated 26th February, 1993 (Annex. R 1/2) by which a decision was taken by the State Government to extend the duration of the said scheme till 31st December, 1994. At the same time the respondents have again placed reliance upon notification, dated 27th January, 1992, which was duly published in the Rajasthan Gazette on 6th February, 1992 de-notifying the land of the petitioner forming part of khasra numbers as referred to above and denotifying the same from the purview of acquisition for the said Yojna. On the basis of the above discussion and correspondence exchanged between the parties as well as the notification issued in pursuance thereof it clearly emerges that decision taken by the respondents to denotify the land in question had achieved finality which is binding on the respondents for all intents and purposes. I am further of the opinion that in view of the decision taken by respondent Nos. 1 & 2 to de-notify the land some valuable rights had got vested with the petitioner in respect of the land in question which could not be divested to his disadvantage at a later stage. (6). It will be pertinent to mention here that while on one hand respondents have taken stand that purported letter dated 16th January, 1992 (Ex. 15) was never issued, surprisingly at the same time they have placed reliance upon the gazette notification dated 6th February, 1992 (Ex. 16) whereby a decision was taken by the State Govt. (6). It will be pertinent to mention here that while on one hand respondents have taken stand that purported letter dated 16th January, 1992 (Ex. 15) was never issued, surprisingly at the same time they have placed reliance upon the gazette notification dated 6th February, 1992 (Ex. 16) whereby a decision was taken by the State Govt. to de-notify the land from the Yojna in question and since duration of the said scheme even as per own stand of State Government has already stood lapsed w.e.f. 31.12.1994 and there has been no extension of the scheme and the land having already been de-notified, question of continuance of the said scheme launched by the UIT does not arise which fact is fully borne out from perusal of notification dated 6th February, 1992 vide Ex. 16 as referred to above. The decision to drop the scheme and de-notify the land was taken by the State Government on 5th Jan. 1992 and was confirmed on 7th January, 1992 and accordingly the land of petitioner should also have been de-notified falling within same area and the scheme as referred to above. (7). In support of his contentions advanced at the bar learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that once the State Government having taken a decision in its letter and spirit to drop the scheme and de-notify the adjoining lands which are similarly situated as the petitioners land and forming the part of the same area in question and for the same scheme as referred to above and the State Government having taken the decision to de-notify the land vide Ex. 16 dated 6th February, 1992, it was not open to the State Government to have discriminated against the petitioner by taking a contradictory stand against the petitioner that the scheme is still in operation and, therefore, the question of de-notifying the petitioners land does not arise. 16 dated 6th February, 1992, it was not open to the State Government to have discriminated against the petitioner by taking a contradictory stand against the petitioner that the scheme is still in operation and, therefore, the question of de-notifying the petitioners land does not arise. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard that the case of the petitioner is absolutely similar to the land of other khatedars who have been left out through de-acquisition and that the State Government having taken the decision to drop the scheme and to de-acquire the lands notified under the Gazette Notification dated 3rd May, 1990 in pursuance of the decision taken on 5th January, 1992 and confirmed on 7th January, 1992 as referred to above, it was not open to the respondents to have adopted a discriminatory stand towards the petitioner. (8). In order to verify the credibility of the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner this court had summoned the original official records which I have perused thoroughly. From the perusal of the official records it becomes evidently clear that the State Government had taken a decision not to proceed with the said scheme since it was restricted only to those constructions which had already been completed and for which there was no scope for any further expansion for economically weaker section of the society for whose bene- fits the scheme was launched. The Technical Committee of the State Government took the decision not to proceed any further with the said scheme since the acquisition had not been completed and since the statutory sanction as envisaged under Section 38 of the Act had not been obtained and in absence of which it could not be presumed that the said scheme had been duly framed and sanctioned. It will be pertinent to refer to Section 38 of the Act which stipulates : that whenever the State Government sanctions a scheme, it shall announce the fact by notification, and Trust shall forthwith proceed to execute the same. Publication of a notification under sub-sec. It will be pertinent to refer to Section 38 of the Act which stipulates : that whenever the State Government sanctions a scheme, it shall announce the fact by notification, and Trust shall forthwith proceed to execute the same. Publication of a notification under sub-sec. (1) of Section 38 of the Act in respect of any scheme shall be conclusive evidence that the scheme has been duly framed and sanctioned In this regard I am of the considered opinion that the State Government having once taken the decision not to proceed further in pursuance of the scheme as referred to above, since the same was not found feasible by the Technical Committee and in pursuance of which Gazette notification to de-notify the land came to be issued on 27th January, 1992 which was published in the Rajasthan Gazette on 6th Februa- ry, 1992 (Ex. 16), it is not open to the respondents to take a stand that the scheme in question is still in operation and, therefore, the land of the petitioner has not been taken out of the purview of the said scheme which already stood dropped on 7th January, 1992 and was temporarily extended upto 31st December, 1994. I am further of the opinion that from the perusal of the notings contained in the official record it is further apparent that since the scheme in question could not be finally approved and launched by the UIT and which was implemented only in part by allotting the part of the land to R.S.E.B. for construction of quarters for economically weaker section of the society and since the UIT having taken the decision not to continue with the scheme, no purpose would be served to continue with the acqui- sition of the land in question belonging to the petitioner. I am further of the opinion that as a matter of fact the petitioners land already stood de-notified alongwith other similarly placed lands and that the same yard stick should have been applied in the case of the petitioner for de-acquisition of his land as well, since it is the settled proposition of law that equals should not be treated as unequals, since otherwise it will amount to hostile discrimination in gross violation of right to equality before the law and equal protection of laws as enshrined under Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. (9). (9). In support of his contentions advanced at the bar learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in the matter of Smt. Somawanti & Ors. vs. The State of Punjab & Ors. (1), wherein the Apex Court has held that since evidence means and includes all statements which the court permits or requires to be made, when the law says that a particular kind of evidence would be conclusive as to the existence of a particular fact it implies that that fact can be proved either by that evidence or by some other evidence which the court permits or requires to be advanced. Where such other evidence is adduced it would be open to the court to consider whether, upon that evidence the fact exists or not. Where, on the other hand, evidence which is made conclusive is adduced, the court has no option but to hold that the fact exists, and once it is so, it would be meaningless to call a particular piece of evidence as conclusive evidence. Once the law says that certain evidence is conclusive it shuts out any other evidence which would detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence. Applying the ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court to the instant case, I am of the considered opinion that once having taken a decision to de-notify the ad- joining lands in pursuance of the notification dated 27th January, 1992 published on 6th February, 1992 (Ex. 16) it was not open to the respondents to have resiled from the stand taken earlier in favour of the petitioner by de-notyfing his land from the scheme in question and later on saying that the scheme is still in operation to the disadvantage of the petitioner which approach is grossly irrational, unjustified and contrary to natural justice, equity and fair play. From the perusal of the summoned records it is further apparent that the State Government took a specific decision in view of discontinuation of the scheme in view of the fact that thereafter notification under Section 6 of the Act could not be issued and the whole proceedings came to lapse. From the perusal of the summoned records it is further apparent that the State Government took a specific decision in view of discontinuation of the scheme in view of the fact that thereafter notification under Section 6 of the Act could not be issued and the whole proceedings came to lapse. In view of this position I am of the opinion that it was imperative for the respondents to have acceeded to the petitioners request to have considered his case by de-notifying his land on parity with the other similarly situated lands which have since been de- notified. (10). Learned counsel for the respondents in support of his contentions has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court in the matter of Aflatoon & Ors. vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors. (2), Smt. Ratni Devi & Anr. vs. Chief Commissioner, Delhi & Ors. (3) and The Ramjas Foundation and Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (4). In the matter of Aflatoon & Ors. vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors. (supra) the question which had arisen for consideration of the Apex Court was regarding the delay and laches in issuing the impugned notification in question and the validity of the same had not been challenged even after publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. In Smt. Ratni Devi & Anr. vs. Chief Commissioner Delhi & Ors. (supra) the question which had arisen for consideration of the Apex Court was regarding com- pulsory acquisition of the land for public purposes, whether reasonableness of the acquisition could be presumed in respect of such acquisition? In the Ramjas Foundation & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra), the question which had arisen for consideration of the Apex Court was regarding the applicabi-lity of doctrine of laches in respect of a challenge to the notifications under Section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. It was held by the Apex Court that the plea that no award had been passed and the owner is in possession of the land, is not a valid explanation vis-a-vis on the question of delay and the petition was dismissed on the ground of laches. In my considered opinion the ratio of the above referred decisions of the Apex Court are neither attracted nor applicable to this case. (11). In my considered opinion the ratio of the above referred decisions of the Apex Court are neither attracted nor applicable to this case. (11). During the course of hearing it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the notings in the Government records do not by themselves create any right in favour of a party because the said decisions are purely of administrative nature and are not subject to any scrutiny. I do not agree with this proposition advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent, since the subject of judicial review has undergone radical change and every administrative action which involves a question of public importance and in which vital decisions are taken by the administrative Authority, in my considered opinion is a subject to judicial review, scrutiny and public accountability, since otherwise the very purpose of judicial review will be lost and defeated. Hence it is not open to the executive Authority, i.e., respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein to back out from the decisions which they have already taken to the dis-advantage or detriment of the petitioner. (12). I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and also examined their rival claims and contentions and also perused the summoned files as referred to above. I am of the opinion that the petitioner deserves to succeed. (13). Consequently this writ petition is allowed and mandamus is issued by directing that notification dated 3rd May, 1990 (Ex.P.3) and notification dated 2nd May, 1991 (Ex. 8) published on 16th January, 1992 be quashed and set-aside. It is further directed that since impugned notification dated 27th January, 1992 published in Rajasthan Gazette dated 6th February, 1992 vide Ex. 16 whereby the operation of the scheme in question which was extended for a period of three years w.e.f. 31st December, 1991 to 31st December, 1994 under Section 32(2) (A) of the UIT Act already stood lapsed w.e.f. 31st December, 1994 question of extension of the said scheme for any further period does not arise. The parties are left to bear their own cost.