Judgment :- 1. The defendant in O.S. No. 4785 of 1995 on the file of the 6th Additional City Civil Judge, Madras has preferred these Civil Revision Petitions against the reversing common order dated 27.11.1995 in C.M.A. Nos. 168 of 1995 and 169 of 1995 respectively. The said C.M.A.s filed by the plaintiff-respondent are against the common order dated 2.11.1995 in I.A. Nos. 9418 of 1995 and 11736 of 1995 respectively. In I.A. 9418 of 1995, the plaintiff sought for temporary injunction pending the said suit and ex parte injunction was granted on 12.7.1995 and in order to vacate the said ex parte injunction the abovesaid I.A. No. 11736 of 1995 was filed by the defendant-petitioner herein. The trial court, while finally disposing of the said I.A.s., dismissed the abovesaid I.A. No. 9418 of 1995 filed by the plaintiff and allowed the abovesaid I.A. No. 11736 of 1995 and thereby vacated the ex parte injunction already granted. 2. Admittedly, the defendant-petitioner is the owner of the suit land and the prayer in the suit is for permanent injunction, restraining the defendant from developing the said suit land. In the abovesaid I.A. No. 9418 of 1995, the temporary injunction pending suit, sought for, is also similar. 3. According to the supporting affidavit to I.A. No. 9418 of 1995, on 5-4-1994, in consideration of Rs. 1,00,000/- received on the said date by the defendant from the plaintiff, the defendant gave “a receipt and written understanding-cum-contract” agreeing to execute a formal joint development agreement and other documents with respect to the Schedule mentioned property and agreed to receive 50% of the developed and constructed area, leaving 50% of the developed and constructed area to the plaintiff. The further plea therein is that on 28.4.1994, the respondent received another sum of Rs. 1 lakh from the plaintiff and made an endorsement on the backside of the aforesaid “receipt-cum-written commitment”. It is also alleged by the plaintiff therein that in furtherance of the said alleged agreement, the plaintiff has spent Rs. 25,000/- and obtained patta for the abovesaid pro perty on 19.5.1994 and the defendant handed over the original books, corporation tax card, Metro water and Water charges card and M.M.W.S. and S. Board Water and Sewerages Taxes card and asked him to clear all the arrears and that accordingly the plaintiff has paid and cleared all taxes through cheques dated 11.5.1994 and 21.4.1994. The further plea is that the plaintiff has purchased necessary stamp papers and prepared necessary documents and asked the defendant to execute them and asked her to hand over the originals of the title and other documents, but that the defendant, on some pretext or other, postponed the execution of those documents. It is also alleged by the plaintiff that he came to understand that the defendant was negotiating with some other person to develop the same suit property “discarding the agreement dated 5.4.1994 made in favour of” the plaintiff. Therefore, according to the plaintiff, the suit was laid and the abovesaid temporary injunction was sought for. 4. But, in the counter affidavit, though the defendant averred that the abovesaid ‘receipt’ is fabricated, the payment of the abovesaid two sums of Rs. 1 lakh each, one on 5.4.1994 and another on 28.4.1994, is not now in dispute. What is further contended in the counter affidavit is that there was “no agreement relating to the development of the abovesaid property at all”. Further his contention is that in any event, based on the abovesaid receipt, the plaintiff cannot seek for the injunction relief since according to the plaintiff, injunction can be granted only if there is a prima facie case made out for specific performance of any contract. The defendant also denied that the plaintiff purchased stamp papers on 19.5.1994 and prepared the development agreement, etc. He also denied the handing over of the documents etc. He also asserted that he never undertook to sign any joint development agreement with the plaintiff, nor agreed to receive 50% of the developed area. He also denied that the plaintiff spent Rs. 25,000/- for getting patta and stated that he never asked the plaintiff to obtain patta or to pay any tax. He also contended that the plaintiff has no capacity to develop the property at all and that in any event the clearance of the Appropriate Authority under Income-tax Act, was not got. 5. 25,000/- for getting patta and stated that he never asked the plaintiff to obtain patta or to pay any tax. He also contended that the plaintiff has no capacity to develop the property at all and that in any event the clearance of the Appropriate Authority under Income-tax Act, was not got. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner made the following submissions:— (1) The suit itself, praying for bare injunction, will not lie when a substantial remedy of seeking specific performance or damages coupled with injunction or attachment, as the case may be, is available, even assuming that an agreement as such has come into being between the parties, whereby the plaintiff is entitled to develop the suit land by putting up a building therein for the benefit of the defendant. In this connection, he relies on S. 41(e) and (h) of the Specific Relief Act. He also relies on Jasmer Singh v. Kanwaljit Singh (AIR 1991 P & H 194), Rajendra Kumar v. Mahendra Kumar Mittal (AIR 1992 Allahabad 35) and Aboobucker v. K. Kunhamoo and others (71 L.W. 211 = AIR 1958 Madras 287). He also submits that pursuant to S. 14(a) and (d) of the Specific Relief Act, the Court cannot grant specific performance in this case. (2) There is no agreement as such between the parties for developing the abovesaid suit land, since Ex. P9, the receipt dated 5-4-1994 itself shows that the alleged agreement has “to be entered into” between the parties. He also points out that admittedly no sanctioned plan has been obtained so far, for putting up any building on the suit land. In this connection, he also relies on H.G. Krishna Reddy v. M.M. Thimmiah (96 L.W. 88 = AIR 1983 Madras 169). Disclaimer: The text is computer generated. The user must verify the authenticity of the extracted portion with the certified copy of the judgment. water and Water This extract is taken from Ranjani Menon v. Gopi, (1996) 2 LW 146 , at page 149 : (3) Even assuming that there is a concluded development agreement between the parties, the said agreement will not be valid in view of S. 269 UC and S. 269 UL of the Income-tax Act and S. 23 of the Contract Act. (4) The plaintiff is not capable of doing the abovesaid construction work and that is why, the defendant is justifiably contending that no temporary injunction could be granted. The counsel further submits that though the abovesaid sum of Rs. 2 lakhs has not been returned so far, the defendant is now ready with a cheque for the said sum of Rs. 2 lakhs and the learned counsel also filed a memo and stated that his client would even pay the said sum of Rs. 2 lakhs with interest upto date at the rate of 24% per annum, which would come to Rs. 3,12,300/- in all. In the circumstances, there is no prima facie case for the plaintiff and no irreparable loss would be suffered by the plaintiff if temporary injunction is not granted. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent made the following submissions:— (1) The petitioner is making inconsistent arguments. At one breath she proceeds as if there was an agreement between the parties regarding the abovesaid development of the suit property and at another breath, she proceeds as if there was no such agreement. She also pleaded in the counter affidavit that Ex. P9 is fabricated. But, she now seeks to take a different stand. (2) In view of Ex. P9 and receipt of the abovesaid Rs. 2 lakhs and the surrounding circumstances, there is a prima facie case to hold that there is an agreement between the parties for the plaintiff putting up the building on the suit land belonging to the defendant. If really, there was no such agreement, the plaintiff would have returned the said sum of Rs. 2 lakhs. But, the defendant did not even make any attempt to return the said sum for the past nearly two years. The plaintiff, having taken necessary steps to obtain patta, etc., should be allowed to put up the proposed building. (3) The suit for bare injunction will lie and there will be no bar to it under the Specific Relief Act. The above provisions of the Income-tax Act and Contract Act will not at all help the defendant. The plaintiff has also secured leave of the Court under O. 2, R. 2, C.P.C. and in fact, has also recently filed an application for amending the plaint to include the specific performance relief. The above provisions of the Income-tax Act and Contract Act will not at all help the defendant. The plaintiff has also secured leave of the Court under O. 2, R. 2, C.P.C. and in fact, has also recently filed an application for amending the plaint to include the specific performance relief. (4) The plaintiff is quite capable of doing the work entrusted to him by the defendant. Learned counsel also relied on K. Shramulu v. Aswatha Narayana ( AIR 1968 SC 1028 ), Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. v. UlhasnagarMunicipality( AIR 1971 SC 1021 ) and Devi Prasad Sri Krishna Prasad Ltd. v. Secretary of State (AIR 1941 Allahabad 377). He also offered to deposit Rs. 25 lakhs as security for doing the work. 7. I have considered the rival submissions and taking into account the arguments on both sides, I feel that for more than one reason the lower appellate court has jurisdictionally erred in granting the injunction, which was refused by the trial court. No doubt, I feel that the plaintiff is really at fault in having retained the abovesaid sum of Rs. 2 lakhs for the past nearly two years without making any attempt to return the same, if really there was no agreement between the parties for the plaintiff putting up any building on the suit land, belonging to the defendant. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner no doubt offered to return the said sum of Rs. 2 lakhs with interest at 24% per annum upto this date and in the memo he has filed, he worked out the total sum, which he thus agreed to return, at Rs.3,12,300/-. 8. I now give below the reasons for concluding that the order of the lower appellate court has to be set aside and the order of the trial court has tobe confirmed, prima facie, it cannot be held in the present case that there is a concluded contract for the plaintiff putting up any specified building on the suit land, that is, a contract whereby it could be said that all the relevant terms and conditions for putting up the said building have been agreed to between the parties. In the present case, there is only the above referred Ex. P9 receipt dated 5.4.1994 which itself shows that the developers agreement between the parties has “to be entered into”. In the present case, there is only the above referred Ex. P9 receipt dated 5.4.1994 which itself shows that the developers agreement between the parties has “to be entered into”. It further states, “the formal Developers Agreement and necessary documentation will be entered into within a period of 10 days from this date”. But admittedly, such an agreement has not been entered into at all between the parties even after the abovesaid ten days time and till today. Further, even when, out of the abovesaid Rs. 2 lakhs, the latter sum of Rs. 1 lakh was paid on 28.4.1994 and when the corresponding endorsement was entered in Ex. P9 to that effect, it is only stated in the said endorsement that “further advance will be paid after the agreement is signed of Joint Venture”. So, even on 28.4.1994, an agreement has not come into being at all regarding the extent, specifications of estimated values , of the building to be put up. Details like how actually the building is to be put up by the plaintiff, what are the specifications therefor, what is the extent and value of the proposed building and within what time the building has to be completed, have all to be agreed to between the parties and put in writing and signed by the parties. Then only an enforceable contract for putting up such a building on the land would come into being. Only if there is such an enforceable contract, there can be a legally acceptable claim for specific performance of it. No doubt, in Ex. P9, it is stated that when a building is put up by the plaintiff, pursuant to the agreement to be entered into, 50 percent of such building is to be given to the defendant. But simply because this one piece of several necessary terms may be said to have been agreed to between the parties, it cannot be said that an agreement has come into being with all the requisite terms in relation to the putting up the said building. All the other terms, as indicated above, cannot be also be said to be formed or not substantial terms, as contended by learned counsel for the respondent. They are also equally substantial. 9. No doubt, as argued by learned counsel for the respondent, while making the abovesaid endorsement on 28.9.1994 in Ex. All the other terms, as indicated above, cannot be also be said to be formed or not substantial terms, as contended by learned counsel for the respondent. They are also equally substantial. 9. No doubt, as argued by learned counsel for the respondent, while making the abovesaid endorsement on 28.9.1994 in Ex. P9, regarding the receipt of the second sum of Rs. 1 lakh, it is said “Received on the same above AGREEMENT”. (Emphasis supplied). Even assuming that this use of the word “agreement” in the above endorsement may lead to the inference that. An agreement has been reached, that agreement, if at all can only be with reference to the defendant putting up “a” building on the suit land. But, s ince all the terms relating to such putting up of the building have not been agreed to, there is no possibility for granting any injunction as prayed for. 10. Further, admittedly no sanctioned plan has been obtained for the proposed construction and in fact no application even, has been made to the Municipal Authorities so far for getting sanction of the plan for the proposed building. 11. In such a situation, simply because the respondent has paid Rs. 2 lakhs as advance under the abovesaid Ex. P9 document, the plaintiff cannot have the injunction prayed for though he may have other remedies. Even if such injunction is granted, the defendant cannot proceed with the proposed construction unilaterally, without an agreement regarding the required specifications of the proposed building and without the sanctioned plan. Further, as already stated not even an application has been made for getting the said sanction. Such an application has to be signed by the owner of the land or by her power of attorney. But, it is not the case of the plaintiff that he has secured any such power from the defendant. 12. Therefore, the balance of convenience also lies only in favour of the defendant. Even if the injunction is not granted, the plaintiff should work out his remedies for obtaining damages on proof of breach of contract, apart from getting return of the said sum of Rs. 2 lakhs with interest. The main grievance alleged in the affidavit in support of I.A. No. 9419 of 1994 is that “in furtherance of this agreement”, I have spent Rs. 25,000/- and obtained patta for the property on 19.5.1994 . 2 lakhs with interest. The main grievance alleged in the affidavit in support of I.A. No. 9419 of 1994 is that “in furtherance of this agreement”, I have spent Rs. 25,000/- and obtained patta for the property on 19.5.1994 . I have paid and cleared all taxes through cheques dated 11.5.1994, 21.4.1994. “No doubt, in this connection, the counter denied that the plaintiff spent Rs. 25,000/- for getting patta and stated that the plaintiff was not asked to obtain patta or to pay any tax. Anyway, if the plaintiff could prove the abovesaid allegations made in his supporting affidavit, it is also open to him to get appropriate relief accordingly. 13. In fact, the defendant now offers to pay back the abovesaid Rs. 2 lakhs with interest at 24% per annum and as per the memo of calculation filed by him, the abovesaid Rs. 2 lakhs plus the abovesaid interest was worked out at Rs. 3,12,300/- and learned counsel for the defendant even agreed to pay back the said sum of Rs. 3,12,300/-. If really the plaintiff has suffered any further damage by any breach of contract committed by the defendant, appropriate damages also could be claimed by the plaintiff. 14. Further, simply because originally the defendant pleaded that Ex. P9 was fabricated but later only agreed that it was a genuine document, injunction relief cannot be granted in favour of the plaintiff, taking into account the abovesaid conduct of the defendant. 15. Further, the decisions cited by learned counsel for the respondent cannot be of help to the respondent for getting the injunction prayed for, in the light of the abovesaid features. These decisions are also distinguishable. AIR 1968 SC 1028 (supra) is in relation to an agreement for sale of land, where price, area of land and time for completion of sale were already fixed. In such a context, it was held that mere omission to settle the mode of payment did not affect the completeness of the contract. Further, the relevant observation in the said decision is as follows:— “The question depends upon the intention of the parties and the special circumstances of such particular case”. In the present case, that question can be decided only in the suit at the time of the trial. Further, the relevant observation in the said decision is as follows:— “The question depends upon the intention of the parties and the special circumstances of such particular case”. In the present case, that question can be decided only in the suit at the time of the trial. AIR 1941 Allahabad 373 (supra) and 96 L.W. 88 = A.I.R. 1983 Madras 169 (supra) are also decisions in similar lines as A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1028 (supra). 16. In AIR 1971 S.C. 1021 (supra) no doubt the following observation was pointed out:— “A representation that something will be done in future may involve an existing intention to act in future in the manner represented. If the representation is acted upon by another person it may, unless the statute governing the person making the representation provides otherwise, result in an agreement enforceable at law; if the statute requires that the agreement shall be in a certain forms, no contract may result from the representation and acting therefor but the law is not powerless to raise IN APPROPRIATE CASES an equity against him to compel performance of the obligation arising out of his representation”. (Emphasis supplied) But, first of all it must be stated that in this observation, it is only stated that “in appropriate cases” the above remedy could be given. The present case cannot be one such appropriate case in the light of what all I have stated above. Further, in the said Supreme Court decision, the question was whether octroi duty was leviable on the writ petitioner company pursuant to a notification dated 31.10.1963, contrary to earlier notifications and resolutions right from 1959 and when the writ petitioner claimed that it had expanded its activities and commenced manufacturing new products by setting up additional plant, which it would not have done “but for the concessions given, assurances and representations made an agreement arrived at on May 21, 1963”. In the said decision, the abovesaid claim made by the Writ petitioner-company about the above referred to expansion activities etc., does not seem to have been seriously disputed. The facts are different here in the present case, as already stated. 17. Further, in the above circumstances, it cannot also be said that the plaintiff would suffer any irreparable injury if the above referred temporary injunction is not granted. 18. The facts are different here in the present case, as already stated. 17. Further, in the above circumstances, it cannot also be said that the plaintiff would suffer any irreparable injury if the above referred temporary injunction is not granted. 18. In view of the abovesaid reasons, there is no necessity to go into the other contention of learned counsel for the petitioner based on the above referred to provisions of Income-tax Act, Contract Act and Specific Relief Act and the decisions cited by him. 19. No doubt, if the defendants claim is that she is justified in not entrusting the abovesaid building to the plaintiff as originally desired by her, she, in all fairness should have returned the abovesaid advance of Rs. 2 lakhs got by her from the plaintiff. But she has not at all done so, for the past nearly two years, though there is no acceptable explanation for the same. But, on this ground alone, I do not think that the abovesaid temporary injunction could be granted in favour of the plaintiff, though he may have other remedies, as stated above. 20. For all these reasons, I hold that the lower appellate court has jurisdictionally erred in coming to the conclusion that injunction could be granted in the present case. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the Civil Revision Petitions are allowed, without costs. I also direct the defendant to pay the plaintiff the abovesaid sum of Rs. 3,12,300/- within a week from today. If the defendant is inclined, he may receive the same, without prejudice to his claim, if any, for damages or any further justifiable sum on any other account. CMP. 571 of 1996 is consequently dismissed. There is no argument in C.M.P. Nos. 1356 of 1996 and 1357 of 1996. Accordingly these C.M.Ps are also dismissed.