M. S. A. SIDDIQUI ( 1 ) THESE revisions arise from a common order dated 3rd May, 1995 passed by the Additional District Judge, Delhi in MCA No. 8/95 (Jagdish Singh Sethi Vs. MCD/desu), MCA 9/95 (Sandeep Aggarwal Vs. MCD/desu), MCA 10/95 (Ashwani Kumar Vs. MCD/desu), MCA No. 11/95 (Arun Kumar Vs. MCD/desu) and MCA 12/95 (Kishan Lal Vs. MCD/desu ). These revisions shall be disposed of by this common order. ( 2 ) THE material facts of the case are as follows: ( 3 ) THE petitioners filed separate suits against the respondent for permanent injunction restraining it from disconnecting the supply of electric energy to their shops in question. Along with plaints the petitioners also filed separate applications under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 Civil Procedure Code for interim injunction during the pendency of the suit. Learned trial Court issued an ad-interim ex-parte order as prayed for by each petitioner, but at later stage he revoked that order after hearing both the parties. Aggreived by the order dated 2-12-1994 the petitioners went up in appeal. The appellate Court by the impugned order dismissed these appeals as barred by limitation. Feeling aggreived by this order, the petitioners have come up in revision before this Court. ( 4 ) ADMITTEDLY, the appeals preferred TO by these petitioner were barred by limitation. Along with these appeals, the petitioner filed applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. It was stated in the applications filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act that the petitioners came to know about passing of the order on 27-1-1995 when the officials of the respondents came to the site for carrying out the disconnection of electric energy. It was also stated that the petitioners counsel never informed them regarding passing of orders by the Trial Court and he had not taken any steps for applying certified copies of the said order. On these grounds it was submitted that the petitioners could not file these appeals within limitation. On a consideration of the material available on the record, learned Appellate Court came to the conclusion that since the petitioners were expected to persue their cases diligently but they slept over the matter, they cannot be allowed to take benefits of their own wrongs. On a consideration of the material available on the record, learned Appellate Court came to the conclusion that since the petitioners were expected to persue their cases diligently but they slept over the matter, they cannot be allowed to take benefits of their own wrongs. He, therefore, dismissed these appeals on the ground that the petitioners have failed to show any sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Learned counsel for the petitioners relying on the decisions rendered in Rafiq Vs. Munshilal AIR 1981 SC 1400 and Binodbaruah Vs. Rahul Chandra, Goswami AIR 1987 Gau 7 has submitted that a litigant should not be punished for the default or carelessness or negligence of his counsel. In my opinion the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners are factually distinguishable and as such they do not help the petitioners. In the instant case none of the petitioner is rustic or illiterate. The learned Appellate Court has observed that petitioners have not disclosed in their applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as to what action they had taken to know the fate of their applications for ad-interim injunction either through their counsel or from the Court. It was not even disclosed in the applications as to on what occasions and dates the petitioners tried to contact their counsel to know the fate of these applications. Learned Appellate Court has given very cogent reasons for refusing the condonation of delay for filing the appeal. It is also relevant to note here that the learned Trial Court has observed that the petitioners have failed to make out a prima facie case for grant of ad-interim injunction. In my opinion it is not at all a fit case where in the anxiety to render justice to a party so that a just cause is not defeated, a pragmatic view should be taken by the Court in considering the sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. I am, therefore, not inclined to hold that the delay in presenting these appeals deserve to be condoned in the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 5 ) FOR the foregoing reasons I hold that the impugned order does not suffer from jurisdictional error or legal infirmity warranting interference by this under Section 115 of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the revisions are dismissed. No order as to costs.