R. K. ABICHANDANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner seeks to challenge the order dated 14. 9. 1995 at annexure "c" to the petition, passed by the respondent No. 1 reverting him from the post of Superintending Engineer to the post of Executive Engineer. ( 2 ) THE charges were issued on the petitioner in 1991 in respect of the alleged misconduct committed in 1985. As per the charge sheet dated 7th October, 1991, which is at Annexure "b" to the petition, it was alleged that the payments were sanctioned by the petitioner for being made to the contractor, eventhough inferior material was used in constructing a water tank which had collapsed. At the relevant time, the petitioner was working as an Executive Engineer at Baroda. The water tank which was constructed at karjan had collapsed and therefore, Departmental enquiry was instituted against various officer including the petitioner. The enquiry against the petitioner culminated in the order dated 14. 9. 1995 by which the petitioner, who was at the time of that order serving as superintending Engineer in the Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board, was reverted to the post of Executive Engineer. The order of reversion specified that his reversion would be effective till the date of his retirement i. e. , 31. 10. 1998. ( 3 ) IT is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order of reversion was passed by the State Government without jurisdiction, in view of the provisions of sec. 20 (1) (2) of the Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") inasmuch as the petitioner having been transferred to the Board by Notification dated 10. 2. 1988 with effect from 1. 4. 1981, the Board alone was the competent authority to take action, if any, under the said provision. It was further contended that the charge-sheet was issued in October, 1991 in respect of the incident of 1985 and therefore, the gross delay in proceedings against the petitioner amounted to denial of an adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It was also contended that the petitioner was being victimised because he was a Union leader. It was further argued that the allegations made against the petitioner did not amount to misconduct. It was also contended that the petitioner was being victimised because he was a Union leader. It was further argued that the allegations made against the petitioner did not amount to misconduct. The petitioner was required to act on the basis of the certificates and reports issued by his subordinates and since the certificate in respect of the work done were issued in favour of the contractor by the Assistant Engineer, there was no reason for the petitioner to doubt them at the time when payment was sanctioned by him. It was contended that the assistant Engineer who was directly responsible for the supervision and inspection of the work personally for quality control particularly in case of foundation, concrete and masonary works and other hidden items and was duty bound to point out deficiency to the higher officers, had not pointed out any deficiency in the work and therefore, the petitioner as an Executive Engineer could not be held responsible for sanctioning the payment. It was also contended that the Assistant Engineer who was directly responsible for personal supervision and inspection of the work was imposed punishment of with-holding of one increment only. It is submitted that the reversion of the petitioner for all time to come till the date of his retirement, was not warranted and specific mention that the reversion will operate till he retires, smacks of malafides on the part of the authority issuing the impugned order. ( 4 ) RELIANCE was placed on behalf of the petitioner on the decision of the Supreme court in Delhi Development Authority vs. H. C. Khurana, reported in AIR 1993 SC 1488 and Union of India vs. Jankiraman, reported in AIR 1991 SC 2010 in support of the contention that no disciplinary proceeding was pending on the date of transfer of the petitioner under the Notification dated 10. 2. 1988, since admittedly the chargesheet was issued only thereafter, on 12. 2. 1988. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the State Government strongly contended that the State Government was empowered to make the impugned order of reversion by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 20 (9) (b) and (c) of the said Act. He submitted that even before the charge-sheet dated 7. 10. 1991 on the basis of which the impugned order of reversion was passed, the Government had issued a charge-sheet on 12. 2. He submitted that even before the charge-sheet dated 7. 10. 1991 on the basis of which the impugned order of reversion was passed, the Government had issued a charge-sheet on 12. 2. 1988 against the petitioner in respect of some other matter pertaining to the purchase submersible pumps. It was submitted that the Notification under Sec. 20 (1) of the said act transferring the services of the employees to the Board with effect from 1. 4. 1981 was issued on 10. 2. 1988 as per annexure-"a" to the affidavit-in-reply. However, that Notification was amended by a subsequent Notification dated 28. 3. 1988 by which paragraph 7 was added in the notification dated 10. 2. 1988. Accordingly, it was specified that the employee/officers of phe Wing against the whom disciplinary proceedings were intitiated and/or completed between 1. 4. 1981 to 10. 2. 1988 were transferred provisionally as per the provisions of sub-sec. (9) of Sec. 20 of the Act. It was submitted that eventhough the charge-sheet was issued against the petitioner on 12. 2. 1988 (a copy of which is placed on record) the decision to hold the enquiry was taken much prior to 10. 2. 1988. It was argued that since decision was already taken in the Government files somewhere in January, 1988, merely because the charge-sheet was issued after 10. 2. 1988, it cannot be said that the proceedings were not initiated against the petitioner. As regards the lenient punishment of with holding one increment imposed on the Assistant Engineer is concerned, it was submitted that, that order was passed by the Board and not the State Government since the enquiry was held against the Assistant Engineer by the Board in respect of charge sheet issued to him in 1991 and no enquiry was pending against him on 10. 2. 1988. It was submitted that merely because lesser punishment was imposed by the Board on the Assistant Engineer in respect of the same incident of collapse of the water tank, it cannot be said that the State government should also have imposed lesser punishment on the petitioner. 2. 1988. It was submitted that merely because lesser punishment was imposed by the Board on the Assistant Engineer in respect of the same incident of collapse of the water tank, it cannot be said that the State government should also have imposed lesser punishment on the petitioner. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the respondent Board supporting the contention of the Counsel for the State Government, contended that the transfer of the petitioner to the Board should be treated as provisional by virtue of provisions of Sec. 20 (9) (b) of the Act and therefore, the order of the State Government was passed within its jurisdiction. ( 7 ) THE respondent No. 2-Board is a statutory Board constituted by Notification dated 17. 8. 1979 under the provisions of the said Act for the rapid development and proper regulation of water supply and sewerage service in the State of Gujarat. The petitioner was appointed as a Junior Engineer on 19. 3. 1965 by the State Government. Thereafter, in 1971 he was promoted as a Deputy Executive Engineer and in 1982 as an Executive engineer by the Government. By Government Notification dated 30. 3. 1981, the petitioner was sent on deputation to the respondent No. 2 Board. Thereafter, by Notification dated 10. 2. 1988, the employees were transferred in the Board as stated therein. The Notification was amended by subsequent Notification dated 28. 3. 1988. Both these Notifications are annexed as Annexure-"a" collectively with the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent board. Letter dated 15. 3. 1988 is an internal correspondence of the Government referring to the lists of the employees against whom departmental enquiries were pending. There is no doubt that on 15. 3. 1988 departmental enquiry was pending against the petitioner because the charge-sheet was issued on him on 12. 2. 1988. Therefore, the internal correspondence dated 15. 3. 1988 cannot be relied upon for the purpose of coming to the conclusion that enquiry was pending against the petitioner prior to 10. 2. 1988 when the notification was issued under Sec. 20 (1) of the Act. ( 8 ) IT appears that the petitioner was working as an Executive Engineer since 1985 at baroda and one R. C. C. E. S. R. water tank of 12 lacs litres capacity was constructed at village Karjan, in the Baroda District. The incident took place on 11. 1. ( 8 ) IT appears that the petitioner was working as an Executive Engineer since 1985 at baroda and one R. C. C. E. S. R. water tank of 12 lacs litres capacity was constructed at village Karjan, in the Baroda District. The incident took place on 11. 1. 1985 as stated in paragraph 8 of the affidavit-in-reply of the respondent No. 2. Thereafter, the Board constituted a High Level Committee for investigation into the irregularity committed in constructing the water tank. That Committee had given its report on 12. 7. 1988 to the board and departmental enquiry was thereafter started against the concerned Officers including the petitioners on 7. 10. 1991. ( 9 ) THE contention that the petitioner cannot question the jurisdiction of the State government now in view of the fact that he had not raised the objection during the enquiry, is required to be stated only for being rejected. The question of jurisdiction of the competent authority goes to the root of the matter and can always be raised even after the order is made. ( 10 ) THE controversy on this aspect centres around the interpretation of the provisions of Secs. 20 ( 1) and 20 (9) (b) (c) and (d) of the said Act, which reads as under : "20 (1) On and after the establishment of the Board, the State Government may, from time to time, direct that the services of such of the existing officers and servants of the State Government in the Gujarat Public Health engineering Service, who in its opinion, are rendered surplus to its requirements, shall stand terminated and their posts shall stand abolished, from such date as may be specified by its (hereinafter in this section referred to as "the appointed date") and shall on that date (which may be different for different officers and servants) becomes the officers or servants of the Board. " xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx " (9) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub- sections (a) no person employed in the Gujarat Public Health Engineering Service to whom any notice or order of termination of his services or compulsory retirement has been issued before the date of commencement of this Act shall be transferred to the Board. " xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx " (9) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub- sections (a) no person employed in the Gujarat Public Health Engineering Service to whom any notice or order of termination of his services or compulsory retirement has been issued before the date of commencement of this Act shall be transferred to the Board. (b) the transfer of a person employed as aforesaid against whom any disciplinary proceedings is pending shall initially be provisional and the State government shall review such transfer after the final order as a result of such disciplinary proceedings is passed and thereafter pass such order as may appear to it to be appropriate in the circumstances of the case; (c) the disciplinary or other action in relation to any person referred to in Clause (a) or Clause (b) may be taken after the date mentioned in Clause (a) in such manner and by such authority as the State Government may by general or special order specify in this behalf; (d) if the services of the State Government stand transferred under Sub-sec. (1) of Sub-sec. (2) to the Board, the Board shall be competent after such transfer to take such disciplinary or other action as it thinks fit against or in respect of such employee having regard to any act or omision or conduct or record of such employee while he was in service of the State Government. " under Sec. 20 (1), the State Government is empowered to direct that the services of existing employees who are rendered surplus to its requirements shall stand terminated and their posts shall stand abolished from the date that it may specify and on issuance of such directive, such officers would become the officers or servants of the Board. As provided by Sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 20, service rendered by such Government servants under the State will be deemed to be service rendered under the Board. It will thus, be noticed that there is statutory transfer of the employees of the State Government to the Board when orders are issued by the State Government under Sec. 20 (1 ). Such employees would be posted against permanent or temporary posts as the case may be, which shall correspondingly stand created in the establishment of the Board with effect from the appointed date as provided by Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 20. Such employees would be posted against permanent or temporary posts as the case may be, which shall correspondingly stand created in the establishment of the Board with effect from the appointed date as provided by Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 20. The appointed day is the date specified by the State Government under Sec. 20 (1 ). These provisions are however, subject to the provisions of Sub-sec. (9) of Sec. 20. We are concerned with Sub-sec. 9 clause (b) which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the earlier sub-sections the transfer of such employee against whom any disciplinary proceeding is pending, shall initially be provisional and the State Government will review the service after the final order as a result of the disciplinary proceedings initiated. ( 11 ) THE transfer of an employee as contemplated under Secs. 20 (1) and (2) would be provisional if there are disciplinary proceedings pending against him as on the date of transfer. In such cases, disciplinary action can be taken by such authority as the State government may specify which means that the State Government itself can take the action against such employee. Under Clause (d) of Sub-sec. (9) of Sec. 20, if the services of such employee stand transferred to the Board, the Board is competent after such transfer to take disciplinary action in respect of such employee even in respect of his conduct while he was in service of the State Government. However, Clause (d) would apply to those who have been transferred under Sub-sec. (1) and (2) of Sec. 20 and not to those whose transfer is provisional under Clause (b) of Sec. 20 (9) of the Act. ( 12 ) THE question therefore arises as to whether disciplinary proceedings were pending against the petitioner when the transfer order was made 10. 2. 1988. Even though under the Notification dated 10. 2. 1988 issued under Sec. 20 (1) transfers were made with effect from 1. 4. 1981, paragraph 7 which was later added in it made it clear that the transfer of the employees against whom disciplinary proceedings were pending between 1. 4. 1988 and 10. 2. 1988 was only provisional. There is no dispute about the fact that chargesheet was issued against the petitioner on 12. 2. 1988 and prior to that there was no chargesheet issued against him. 4. 1988 and 10. 2. 1988 was only provisional. There is no dispute about the fact that chargesheet was issued against the petitioner on 12. 2. 1988 and prior to that there was no chargesheet issued against him. That chargesheet was of course in respect of a different matter, but is relevant with a view to ascertain whether there was any disciplinary proceeding pending against the petitioner when the Notification under Sec. 20 (1) was issued on 10. 2. 1988, so as to attract the provisions of Sec. 20 (9) (b) (c) of the Act. ( 13 ) IT was submitted on behalf of the respondents that disciplinary proceeding was pending against the petitioner because in the record of the Government a decision was already takne in October, 1987 to initiate departmental proceedings agaisnt the petitioner and even a draft of the chargesheet was prepared in January, 1988. ( 14 ) THE disciplinary proceedings can be said to be pending against the delinquent after it is instituted. The disciplinary proceedings can be said to have been instituted only on the date on which the statement of charge is issued to the delinquent. The charges can be said to have been issued only when they are framed and necessary action is taken to despatch them to the concerned employee to inform him of the charges framed against him requiring his explanation. The Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority (Supra) after referring to the earlier decision in Jankiramans case (Supra) in terms held that the issue of chargesheet means it is desptached to the Government servant and this act is complete the moment steps are taken for the purpose by framing the chargesheet and dispatching it to the Government servant. It is therefore clear that on 10. 2. 1988 when the petitioner was transferred under the Notification issued under Sec. 20 (1) of the Act there was no departmental proceedings pending against him and therefore the provisions of Clause (c) of Sec. 20 (9) were not attracted in his case. It is therefore clear that on 10. 2. 1988 when the petitioner was transferred under the Notification issued under Sec. 20 (1) of the Act there was no departmental proceedings pending against him and therefore the provisions of Clause (c) of Sec. 20 (9) were not attracted in his case. The consequence is that the State Government could not have taken any disciplinary action, against him under Clause (c) of Sec. 20 (9) and the Board was required to deal with the matter since his services stood transferred to the Board by virtue of Sec. 20 (1) and (2) and the transfer could not have been treated as provisional under Sec. 20 (9) (b) of the Act. The impugned order of the petitioners reversion at Annexure-C to the petition cannot therefore be sustained and is hereby set aside with a direction that the petitioner be restored to his earlier position with all consequential benefits. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. .