Judgment :- C.R.P.No.1918 of 1986 is filed by the tenant/petitioner herein against the judgment and decree in R.CA.No.866 of 1985 questioning the correctness and legality of the order passed by the appellate authority. (Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras.) .2. It appears from the facts of the case and also as argued by the respective counsel appearing for the parties that the respondent is The Swadesamitran Limited, Madras publishing a Tamil Daily under the name “Swadesamitran”. The petitioner herein is a tenant. There were several other tenants like Asian Travels, Indian Airlines, etc about which we are not concerned, against whom orders of eviction have already been passed. We are concerned in this revision only with respect to the petitioner V.G.Panneerdas & Company who is a tenant occupying a portion of the property in question measuring 7,000 sq.ft. in the ground floor of the Victory House on a monthly rent of Rs.7,000. The respondent herein filed H.R.C.No.2303 of 1980 seeking eviction of the petitioner contending that it has stopped publishing a Tamil Daily, since it has incurred debts with the Central Bank of India and Syndicate Bank and others to the tune of Rs.70 lakhs and it has no means to liquidate these liabilities. On the other hand, the interest on the liabilities had increased. In order to clear all the liabilities, no alternative is left to the respondent but to raise finance by improving the property by demolishing and reconstructing the existing superstructure under the occupation of the tenant/petitioner herein, and to build a shopping arcade and office accommodation on “Own Your Own” basis not only for the purpose of raising necessary funds but also to pay off the liabilities. It was also contended by the landlord/respondent that the property under the occupation of the petitioner, which is known as Victory House, is a century old building and is unsafe for the tenants to reside and that all the other tenants occupying several other portions in the rear side of the building have vacated, and that the respondents on their vacating the premises have demolished a major portion of the building and have put up constructions. It is only the petitioner who is adamant in not vacating the premises. It is only the petitioner who is adamant in not vacating the premises. The respondent under the circumstances sought the eviction of the petitioner under section 14(l)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960 for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction. The respondents have also stated in petition that they will demolish the building within one month from the date of the petitioner giving vacant possession and will complete it within three months from the date of recovery of possession. 3. The eviction petition was resisted by the tenant/petitioner. It was contended by the petitioner that the petitioner is in possession of the portion under his occupation from the year 1971, that the Managing Director of the respondent agreed to renew the lease for a period of ten years and that the petitioner has paid a sum of Rs.21,000 as deposit. That apart, the respondent offered to sell the land and the building measuring 10 grounds for a consideration of Rs.20 lakhs to the petitioner. But subsequently the respondent has failed to execute the sale deed and hence the eviction sought for by the respondent under section 14(l)(b) of the Act is not maintainable. It was inter alia contended that the building does not require demolition and that for invoking section 14 (l)(b) of the Act, the building should be required by the landlord bona fide for the immediate purpose of demolition and such demolition should be for the purpose of erecting a new building and that the landlord should continue to be the owner of the site and if the building and the land are to be sold as is stated on “Own Your Own” basis in the eviction petition, such petition is not maintainable. Inter alia, it was contended by the tenant that the building is a strong one and it does not require demolition and reconstruction and that there are no bona fides on the part of the respondent and that the respondent has no money either to demolish or to reconstruct the building as sought for, that they have not obtained plans or permission from the Corporation of Madras for demolition and reconstruction. It was further averred that taking into account the totality of the circumstances and the facts mentioned by the petitioner, the petition filed by the respondent is not maintainable. 4. It was further averred that taking into account the totality of the circumstances and the facts mentioned by the petitioner, the petition filed by the respondent is not maintainable. 4. An additional counter wasalso filed by the tenant contending that the respondent has no valid resolution of the Board of Directors to demolish and reconstruct the building and that a petition before the Company Court was filed to restrain the Board of Directors of the respondent Company from transferring the shares in favour of Mr.John Thomas (the Managing Director) and under the circumstances, the respondent’s Managing Director Mr.John Thomas has no authority to institute the proceedings. The tenant thus contended that the eviction petition has to be dismissed. .5. The Rent Controller dismissed the eviction petition. The respondent herein preferred R.C.A.No.866 of 1985 before the appellate authority. The appellate authority, by a detailed order and considering the evidence of the case, allowed the eviction petition and ordered eviction of the tenant/petitioner. It is against this order of eviction, the tenant/petitioner herein has preferred the above C.R.P.No. 1918 of 1986. 6. Pending R.C.A.No.866 of 1985, the landlord/respondent herein filed M.P.Nos.751 of 1985 and 847 of 1986 in R.C.A.No.866 of 1985 for reception of additional evidence, namely, the correspondence with Banks regarding the fixed deposits in the name of the respondent company and plans for demolition and reconstruction and the resolutions of the respondent company and further examination of the present Managing Director, Engineering Contractors and a Photographer. These petitions along with other petitions filed for reception of additional evidence were dismissed by the appellate authority. It is against this dismissal of M.P.Nos.751 of 1985 and 847 of 1986, C.R.P.Nos.2122 and 2121 of 1986 respectively are filed by the respondent company. .7. Mr.V.R.Venkataraman, learned Counsel appearing for the tenant/petitioner herein contends before me that the contention of the respondent that the respondent requires the building for demolition and reconstruction is not bona fide, since the respondent is heavily indebted to several Banks to the tune of Rs.80 lakhs. He further contends that the intention of the respondent is only to demolish the building under the occupation of the tenant for the purpose of constructing residential flats and that the respondent Company has no power to do real estate business and hence seeking eviction of the petitioner is not bona fide. He further contends that the intention of the respondent is only to demolish the building under the occupation of the tenant for the purpose of constructing residential flats and that the respondent Company has no power to do real estate business and hence seeking eviction of the petitioner is not bona fide. The other contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is, that there is no evidence about the age of the building nor that the building is in a bad condition and that the respondent seeking demolition and reconstruction of the portion of the building under the occupation of the tenant lacks bona fides. It is further contended that under section 293(i)(d) of the Companies Act, consent of the company to hold a general body meeting is necessary, if money is to be borrowed along with the monies already borrowed and in this case, since the liabilities of the respondent exceed Rs.80 lakhs, the Company’s consent in general body meeting is essential. Lastly, it is contended that the Managing Director cannot institute legal proceedings without the approval of the Board of Directors and in this case there is no such approval and hence, the proceedings are irregular and the eviction petition has to be dismissed. It is incidentally contended that the petitioner is a lessee under the respondent for a period of ten years and that the eviction petition was filed before the expiry of the lease period and hence the claim of the landlord is not maintainable. Excepting these points, no other point was argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. It is on the basis of the aforesaid points, learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the requirement of the landlord is not bona fide and the respondent is not entitled to seek demolition and reconstruction. 8. Let us first consider whether the building is an old one and that it requires demolition and reconstruction. The contention of the landlord/respondent herein is, that the age of the building is more than 100 years whereas the petitioner contends that it was built only about 70 years back. The petitioner herein has examined R.W.10, an Engineer to speak that the building is in a good condition. According to R.W.10’s estimate, the building would have been constructed about 70 years back. The petitioner herein has examined R.W.10, an Engineer to speak that the building is in a good condition. According to R.W.10’s estimate, the building would have been constructed about 70 years back. The landlord/respondent would contend that the building is not in a good condition and the evidence of P.W.3 examined on behalf of the respondent was relied upon which is to the effect, that the building is more than 100 years old. P.W.3 has given a report marked in this case as Ex.P-15 and has also filed the photographs of the building, which are marked as Exs.P-16 to P-21. I am of the view, the question as to the age of the building and whether it requires demolition and reconstruction is a question of fact and since the appellate authority has come to the conclusion that the building is an old one and it requires demolition and reconstruction, it is unnecessary for this Court to go again into this question. We have to hold that the building requires demolition. 9. That apart, the landlord has demolished the rear portion of the Victory House and also the upstairs portion of the demised premises, which would support the case of the landlord that the condition of the building was not good. The other tenants like Indian Airlines etc. have vacated the building excepting the petitioner. P.W.3 in his evidence has specifically stated that the condition of the building is bad. On a reading of the evidence adduced by the parties regarding the age and condition of the building, and taking into consideration the fact, that the rear portion and also the upstairs portion of the demised premises were demolished and keeping in view the evidence of P.W.3, we have to hold that the respondent (landlord) have satisfactorily established that the building requires demolition and reconstruction. 10. 10. Section 14(l)(b) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960 reads as follows: "That on an application made by the landlord the Controller, shall, if he is satisfied that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished, pass an order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building to the landlord before a specified date." This section was considered by this Court in Mahaboob Badsha v. Manga Devi, (1965)2 M.L.J.209 and it was observed as follows: "There is nothing in the language of section 14(1)(b) to warrant the interpretation that the words "bona fide required by the landlord" is referable only to the condition of the building ruling out every other consideration. It must not be forgotten that the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is in essence expropriatory in character involving serious curtailment of the rights of owners of properties and therefore Courts should not give any undue or wide interpretation to the provision beyond what the express language of the provision warrants, in consonance with the avowed object of the legislation, namely, unreasonable eviction of tenants. There is nothing in the object of the enactment or in the language of section 14(l)(b) which compels or necessarily warrants the view that once a building is let out, the landlord can never obtain possession of the property either for better investment or for improvement in the sense that the tenant acquires a permanent right, as it were, subject only to the dilapidated condition of the building. The condition of the building is obviously an objective test to be established by evidence and capable of verification by personal local inspection. If the crux of the question centres round the physical state or condition of the building, there will be very little scope for the notion of a bona fide requirement. There is no warrant for reading the words "bona fide required by the landlord" in section 14(1)(b) as equivalent to "building bona fide requiring demolition". Either the building requires demolition or not. But it is not possible to have a conception of a building bona fide requiring demolition. There is no warrant for reading the words "bona fide required by the landlord" in section 14(1)(b) as equivalent to "building bona fide requiring demolition". Either the building requires demolition or not. But it is not possible to have a conception of a building bona fide requiring demolition. A decrepit building no doubt may call for immediate demolition and without anything more the landlord could be said to have satisfied the requirement or condition of his bona fide requiring the building for immediate demolition. But the terms of the section are clearly wide enough to cover cases where the landlord bona fide requires a building for the expansion of his own business or for legitimate purposes." 11. In David v. Daniel. (1967)1 M.L.J.110 at page 111, a Bench of this Court has observed as follows: "The only requirement of section 14(1)(b) is the honest desire of the landlord to demolish the building and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished. There is nothing in the language of this clause to warrant the view that the building should be old and decrepit. The expression bona fide’ occurring in that clause cannot sustain the opinion that it is only when a building is old and in a dilapidated condition that it could be demolished for the purpose of putting up a new construction so as to attract clause (b) of section 14(1). The import of the section is that the desire or the intention to demolish and rebuild should be honestly entertained by the landlord. It should not be a device to evict the tenant." 12. In Metalware and Co. v. Bansilal Sharma, (1980)1 M.L.J. (S.C.)1 = (1979)2 S.C.J.377= (1979)3 S.C.C.398= (1979)2 R.C.J.452= A.I.R.1979 S.C.1559 the Supreme Court, while dealing with a case under section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960 as amended by Act 23 of 1973, has observed in paragraph 6 of the judgment as follows: "But we fail to appreciate how the state or condition of the building and the extent to which it could stand without immediate demolition and reconstruction in future would be a totally irrelevant factor while determining "the bona fide requirement of the landlord". If the Rent Controller has to be satisfied about the bona fide requirement of the landlord which must mean genuineness of his claim in that behalf the Rent Controller will have to take into account all the surrounding circumstances including not merely the factors of the landlord being possessed of sufficient means or funds to undertake the project and steps taken by him in that regard but also the existing condition of the building, its age and situation and possibility or otherwise of its being put to a more profitable use after reconstruction." The Supreme Court went on observing as follows: "All these factors being relevant must enter the verdict of the Rent Controller on the question of the bona fide requirement of the landlord under section 14(l)(b). In a sense if the building happens to be decrepit or dilapidated it will readily make for the bona fide requirement of the landlord, though that by itself in the absence of any means being possessed by the landlord would not be sufficient. Conversely a landlord being possessed of sufficient means to undertake the project of demolition and reconstruction by itself may not be sufficient to establish his bona fide requirement if the building happens to be a very recent construction in a perfectly sound condition and its situation may prevent its being put to a more profitable use after construction. In any case, these latter factors may cast a serious doubt on the landlord’s bona fide requirement. It is, therefore, clear to us that the age and condition of the building would certainly be a relevant factor which will have to be taken into account while pronouncing upon the bona fide requirement of the landlord under section 14(l)(b) of the Act and the same cannot be ignored." 13. In Kanakavalli Ammal v. Sundaram, (1984)1 M.L.J.310= 97 L.W.166. Ramanujam, J., while dealing with a petition under section 14(l)(b) of Act 18 of i960 seeking eviction of the tenant for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction, observed as follows: "That section does not say that old and dilapidated buildings alone will come under that section and eviction from buildings other than the old and dilapidated cannot be sought for under that section. (underlining is mine). (underlining is mine). In this view it is not possible to say that in all cases where applications are filed under section 14(l)(b) evidence of age and existing condition had to be adduced by the landlord. Such evidence has to be adduced only when the landlord files the application under section 14(l)(b) alleging that the buildings are old and dilapidated which require demolition and reconstruction." In this case, the landlord has stated that the building is old and requires demolition and reconstruction. The evidence of P.W.3 who is an Engineer, is also to the effect that the building is more than 100 years old and that it is not in a good condition. 14. In the instant case, all that the respondent states is, that the respondent has incurred debts and they have to put up new construction by demolition and reconstruction of the existing structure and that the construction so put up will be put to a more profitable use by the respondent (landlord). As observed in Maha-boob Badsha v. Manga Devi, (1965)2 M.L.J. 209 the terms of the section are clearly wide enough to cover cases of this type where the landlord bona fide requires the building for expansion of his own business or for legitimate purposes. Under the circumstances, taking into consideration the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Metalware & Co. v. Bansrilal Sharma, (1980)1 M.L.J.1 (S.C.)= (1979)2 S.C.J.377= A.I.R.1979 S.C.1559 and the decisions rendered by this court cited above, and also taking into consideration the facts of this case, where the landlord wants to demolish the building to clear off the debts and bona fide seeks eviction of the tenant from the building for the expansion of his own business or for legitimate purposes I am of the view that it cannot be said that the requirement of the landlord is not bona fide. 15. It is at this stage necessary to mention that it is a common case that the Company Law Board dismissed the application of the respondent for constructing a shopping arcade to sell the property to third parties because the respondent company was not dealing in real estate and has also not complied with certain conditions imposed by the Company Law Board. It is the case of the landlord/ respondent herein, that since their application was rejected, they have decided to construct buildings on their own and augment their income by letting out to third parties. In this case, it is clearly admitted by P.W.I in his evidence that the respondents are not going to sell to third parties, but would construct their own buildings to let out to others. As stated already, the very object of seeking eviction of the tenant by demolition and reconstruction by the landlord, is only with a view to see that the debts are cleared. There is also evidence to show that the respondents are having sufficient funds and they have approached the Banks to raise money for the purpose of construction. There is the Board resolution dated 11. 1979, Ex.P-6 accepting reconstruction of the Victory House as the shopping arcade with a view to build shops. The Board has also given clearance for the purpose of construction and it cannot be said that there is no resolution at all. The resolution of the Board is not with respect to the constructed rear portion alone, but the resolution is to put up construction with respect to the entire portion of 3 grounds. Therefore, it cannot be said by the petitioner, that there is no resolution at all to put up construction. That apart, under clauses (v) and (xv) of Ex.P-5 the Memorandum of Association of the respondent-company, the respondent-company is empowered to sell, and to purchase the property as the company thinks necessary and to construct, maintain and alter any buildings or works necessary or convenient for the purposes of the company. Such being the case, it cannot be said that the respondent has no power to construct or to sell the property so constructed. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard that the company has no power to sell the property and that there is no sanction is baseless and has no substance. Such being the case, it cannot be said that the respondent has no power to construct or to sell the property so constructed. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard that the company has no power to sell the property and that there is no sanction is baseless and has no substance. I have to hold, on the basis J of the evidence adduced in this case and the exhibits filed, that the eviction of the petitioner on the ground, that the respondent requires the building in question bona fide for demolition and reconstruction and to sell the same, is not with an oblique motive, but only to clear off the debts and to improve the status of the company. 16. It is lastly contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that under section 293 (1)(d) of the Companies Act, the Company has to hold a general body meeting if money is to be borrowed by the Company and that the Managing Director cannot initiate legal proceedings without the approval of the Board of Directors and that there are no bona fides in seeking eviction of the petitioner since there is a lease deed executed by the respondent in favour of the petitioner and that the petitioner has an option to extend the lease for another ten years. As far as the extension of the lease is concerned, Ex.R-50 was projected before the Court below. Ex.R-50 is an unregistered lease deed which was not properly stamped and registered. Under section 17 of the Registration Act, a lease deed above one year has to be compulsorily registered. Learned Counsel for the petitioner herein contends before me, relying on the decision reported in Javer Chand and others v. Pukraj Surana, (1962)2 S.C.J.652= A.I.R.1961 S.C. 1655 that once an unstamped document was marked as an exhibit, it can be taken into consideration as a document. But it must be noted that the document Ex.R-50 relied on by the petitioner is not a valid document since it is not registered as required under section 17 of the Registration Act. It is not open to the petitioner to contend that they are entitled to be in possession of the property for ten years on the basis of Ex.R-50, for, there is no reference at all in Ex.R-50 about exercising option by the tenant for the extension of lease. It is not open to the petitioner to contend that they are entitled to be in possession of the property for ten years on the basis of Ex.R-50, for, there is no reference at all in Ex.R-50 about exercising option by the tenant for the extension of lease. That apart, the lease is for more than one year and it is compulsorily registrable. Under the circumstances Ex.R-50 is not a valid document which can be looked into for the terms of the lease. The Appellate Authority has discussed all these aspects in paragraph 18 of his judgment and I do not find any materials to disagree with the findings of the Appellate Authority on this aspect. 17. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the respondent have no means to reconstruct the building and that they have not obtained sanction of the Company Law Board is also untenable. It must be noted that there is evidence that the landlord has capacity to raise funds. It is also clear from the evidence, that P.W.I is in affluent circumstance. But the tenant would contend that without the permission of the Board of Directors, P.W.I cannot advance any amounts to the Company. But this aspect has to be viewed keeping in view Ex.P-5 the Memorandum of Association of the respondent-company. From the Articles of the Association, the action of the Managing Director can always be ratified subsequently. We have to see, that in this case the landlord has started construction of the rear portion of the building. If the landlord really had no means to construct the rear portion of the building, he would not have demolished and started reconstruction. It is admitted by the petitioner (tenant) that the landlord has demolished the building, and in the rear portion buildings have been put up excepting the portion under the occupation of the tenant. As pointed out in Rukmani Ammal and others v. Izudden, (1983)1 M.L.J.186= (1983)1 R.C.J.640= 96 L.W.145= A.I.R.1983 Mad.303 the means of the landlord to carry out the work of demolition and reconstruction is the relevant factor to be taken note of for consideration while testing his bona fides. But at the same time, it is not necessary that the landlord should jingle the coins before the Rent Controller to establish this factor. But at the same time, it is not necessary that the landlord should jingle the coins before the Rent Controller to establish this factor. It must also be mentioned that the respondents have established that they have the capacity to raise funds for demolition and reconstruction. It is not disputed that P.W.1 is not a man of means. The very fact that the landlord has raised two floors in Victory House except the disputed portion, itself is the best evidence to show that the respondents have the capacity to raise funds for reconstruction. 18. There is yet another point which requires consideration about the means of the landlord to put up construction. There is the evidence of P.W.I that the Company was having lands measuring about 14½ grounds at No.47, Whites Road, Madras which aspect is not disputed. Apart from that, there is a printing machine. The Appellate Authority comes to the conclusion that the value of the machine and the land possessed by the respondent will be about Rs.2 crores and the liability is only Rs.80/- lakhs. It is under these circumstances, we have to hold that the respondents have proved that they are capable of raising funds for demolition and reconstruction. 19. It is necessary at this stage to mention that P.W.1 has clearly stated in his evidence that there is a general body resolution to sell the property. When the evidence of P.W.1 is to the effect that there is a general body resolution to sell the property, the tenant/petitioner herein ought to have called the landlord/ respondent to produce before Court, the General Body Resolution which has not been done in this case. 20. Learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that the act of the respondent is ultra vires the Memorandum of Association and it is ultra vires the Company. It is further contended that the Company has no power to do real estate business and the act of the respondent is a nullity and ultra vires the Company. It is on this ground it was argued that the landlord’s requirement is not bona fide. But it must be noted that Ex.P-11 is the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors held on 5. It is on this ground it was argued that the landlord’s requirement is not bona fide. But it must be noted that Ex.P-11 is the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors held on 5. 1980 wherein it is stated as follows: “Resolved that the scheme for developing Victory House and repaying the banks as set out in the draft scheme placed on the table, be and is hereby approved.” There is also a resolution where the Managing Director was directed to act for the development of the scheme, to demolish the front portion of the Victory House occupied by the petitioner-company. Therefore, it is futile on the part of the petitioner to contend that the filing of the eviction petition seeking eviction of the petitioner is ultra vires the company. It must further be noted that no specific ground of ultra vires has been taken in the counter filed by the petitioner herein. On the other hand, it is argued on behalf of the respondent’s counsel that there is no resolution of the general body regarding the eviction of the petitioner or putting up of the construction in the place under the occupation of the petitioner. Had the petitioner taken a plea in the counter that the act of the respondent is ultra vires for want of a general body resolution or at least had the petitioner called for such a resolution at the time of the trial for production before the court by the respondent, the respondent would have produced the general body resolution. This has not been done. There is a resolution of the Board of Directors, as pointed out above. under Ex.P-11 for developing “Victory House” and for repaying the Banks. As stated already, it is futile on the part of the petitioner now, to contend that the petition filed by the respondent is ultra vires the Company and that the respondent’s requirement is not bona fide. That apart, 1 am of the view that the provisions of the Company Law in the eviction proceedings are irrelevant because the Managing Director has been given ample powers under Ex.P-5 the Articles of Association and even if a resolution to that effect is necessary, the action of the Managing Director can be ratified by a resolution subsequently. That apart, 1 am of the view that the provisions of the Company Law in the eviction proceedings are irrelevant because the Managing Director has been given ample powers under Ex.P-5 the Articles of Association and even if a resolution to that effect is necessary, the action of the Managing Director can be ratified by a resolution subsequently. The power of the Managing Director is very wide and it cannot be said that the Managing Director has no power to institute a case of the present one. Under the circumstances, it has to be held that there is evidence about the general body resolution to sell the property. That apart, even in Ex.P-5, as mentioned already, it is clearly mentioned that the Managing Director is entitled to dispose of the property belonging to the Company wholly or any part of the purpose of utilising the sale proceeds to pay the debts due by the Company. Under these circumstances, I have to hold that enough materials, have been placed before the appellate authority by the respondent for seeking demolition and reconstruction of the building under the occupation of the tenant and the appellate authority, considering all the facts and the exhibits and the evidence adduced, has come to the conclusion that the contention of the petitioner that there are no bona fides in the eviction petition filed by the landlord, is baseless. C.R.P.No.1918 of 1986, under the circumstances, is dismissed; but there will be no order as to costs. 21. I may at the outset state that the facts and the evidence in this case clearly show that the landlord/respondent requires bona fide the building for demolition and reconstruction for their own purpose not only to discharge the debts but also to improve their income. Certain contentions were raised by the tenant before the appellate authority which had led the respondent to file additional exhibits in M.P.Nos.751 of 1985 and 847 of 1986. The appellate authority, on the facts of this case has come to the conclusion that there are clear facts to prove that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide as required under section I4(l)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960 as amended and hence dismissed those petitions. It is against the dismissal of the above M.Ps. C.R.P.Nos.2122 and 2121 of 1986 are filed by the landlord/respondent. It is against the dismissal of the above M.Ps. C.R.P.Nos.2122 and 2121 of 1986 are filed by the landlord/respondent. I am of the view that in view of the clear and specific evidence placed before the appellate authority, the additional evidence sought for by the respondent is unnecessary. Hence C.R.P.Nos.2121 of 1986 and 2122 of 1986 are also dismissed. No costs. Time to vacate one month from today.