JUDGMENT : 1. This petition filed under Section 482, Cr.PC has been directed against the order dated 2.3.1993 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baran, whereby he dismissed the petitioners application filed under Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, (in short, "the Act, 1986") read with Section 127(3) Cr.PC with costs amounting to Rs. 250/-. 2. Briefly, the admitted facts are that petitioner Shaikh Mohd. Ishtyaq was married to Jamila (non-petitioner) on 2.12.1977 and a son was also born out of their wedlocks. The relations between the husband and wife did not remain cordial and they stared living separately. Jamila alongwith her minor son started living with her parents. On 9.4.1983, Jamila filed application under Section 125, Cr.PC in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baran for grant of maintenance allowance for herself and her minor son on the ground that she has no source of income. The petitioner in his reply dated 2.9.1986 resisted that application and asserted that he has divorced the non-petitioner. After recording the evidence, the learned Magistrate vide his order dated 13.12.1985 allowed that application and granted maintenance to the non-petitioner @ Rs. 125/- per month and Rs. 75/- per month to the minor son. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner as well as the non-petitioner preferred their revision petitions. Smt. Jamila prayed for enhancement of the quantum of maintenance allowance while the petitioner retreated that he was not liable to maintain Smt. Jamila after his divorce beyond the Iddat period, in view of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act, 1986. The Additional Sessions Judge, Baran by his judgment dated 9.3.1987 dismissing both the revision petitions of the husband and wife, held that the quantum of maintenance allowance granted to Jamila and her minor son was just, proper and adequate. The learned Additional Sessions Judge also held that since Jamilas application under Section 125, Cr.PC was allowed on 13.12.1985 i.e. before the Act, 1986 came into force and since the said Act was not retrospective in effect the provisions of Section 7 thereof were not applicable and as such, the husband-petitioner was not entitled to any immunity. 3. Jamila moved an application under Section 127, Cr. PC for enhancement of the maintenance on the ground of change in the circumstances before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baran. 3. Jamila moved an application under Section 127, Cr. PC for enhancement of the maintenance on the ground of change in the circumstances before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baran. It appears that the petitioner despite service did not appear and as such, exparte proceedings were drawn against him Later on, the petitioner alleged that no proper and sufficient service was effected on him. His application dated 7.12.1991 for setting aside the order proceedings ex-parte against him was dismissed. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate by his order dated 28.8.1991 enhanced the maintenance allowance from Rs. 125/- to Rs. 250/- per month in favour of Jamila and from Rs. 75/- to Rs. 150/- per month in favour of minor son. On 23.4.1992, the petitioner filed another application for setting aside the said order of enhancement and a separate application dated 5.12.1992 under Section 127 Cr.PC read with Section 4 of the Act, 1986, which was rejected by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate vide his order dated 2.3.1993. Hence this misc. petition. 4. I have heard Shri S.P Tyagi for the petitioner and Shri B.L. Mandhana for the non-petitioner at length and carefully perused the record of the lower court. 5. It has been vehemently canvassed by Shri Tyagi that the provisions of Act, 1986 are retrospective in nature, that the law laid down in Ali Mohd. v. Smt. Zaida, 1987 Cr.LR Raj. 12 (SB) has been disapproved by the Division Bench of this Court in Abid Ali v. Mst. Raisa Begum (1988 RCr.C 51) , wherein it has been held that a right to a. muslim divorced woman under Section 125, Cr.PC to get maintenance from her husband until she is remarried has been impliedly repealed by the provisions of the Act, 1986, and that she is only entitled to get maintenance allowance for her Iddat period and in such circumstances, if the impugned order regarding maintenance allowance to Smt. Jamila is allowed to stand then it would cause manifest failure of justice and would amount to abuse of process of the Court. 6. On the other hand, Mr. B.L. Mandhana has vehemently contended that since the petitioner did not challenge the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge dated 9.3.1987 rejecting his revision petition the said order has become final between the parties and the principles of res judicata applies in such a case. Mr. 6. On the other hand, Mr. B.L. Mandhana has vehemently contended that since the petitioner did not challenge the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge dated 9.3.1987 rejecting his revision petition the said order has become final between the parties and the principles of res judicata applies in such a case. Mr. Mandhana has also urged that even if the order of the Additional Sessions Judge is held to be wrong still then, since it has become final it cannot be registered under the garb of this petition filed under Section 482, Cr.PC. 7. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions made before me. The provisions of the Act, 1986 came into force w.e.f. 19.5.1986. The petitioner as early as on 2.9.1983 in his reply had averred that he had divorced his wife Jamila. In Abid Alis case (supra) the Division Bench of this Court after extensively discussing the case law and the statutory law, held that the oral divorce is permissible under the Mohammedan law and even if it is not proved still then the statement given by the husband in the Court to the effect that he has divorced his wife then the Court may declare such divorce from the date of his statement. The Division Bench has further held that though Section 125, Cr.PC entitles a divorced woman to get maintenance from her husband until she is remarried, but Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, 1986 curtails her said right to get maintenance from her husband beyond the period of her Iddat. From a perusal of Section 5 of the Act, 1986 it is obvious that if on the date of the first hearing of the application under Section 3(2) a divorced woman and her former husband declare, by affidavit or any other declaration in writing in such form as may be prescribed, either jointly or separately, that they would prefer to be governed by the provisions of Section 125 to 128, Cr.PC and file such affidavit or declaration in the court hearing the application, the Magistrate shall dispose of such application accordingly. The non-obstante clause in Sections 3 & 4 of the Act, 1986 clearly provides that provisions of those sections shall apply notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. The non-obstante clause in Sections 3 & 4 of the Act, 1986 clearly provides that provisions of those sections shall apply notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. Thus, special provisions of the Act, 1986 shall over ride the provisions of Section 125 to 128, Cr.PC. Similar is the Intention obvious from Section 7 of the Act, 1986, which deals with transitional provisions, that every application by a divorced woman under Section 125 or 127, Cr.PC pending before a Magistrate on the commencement of the Act, 1986, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Cr.PC and subject to the provisions of Section 5 of the Act, 196 be disposed by such Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of the Act, 1986. 8. The Division Bench after having a complete look at the provisions contained in Chapter IX of Cr.PC and in the Act, 1986, has further held that there is no saving clause provided in the Act, 1986, by which any order passed in favour of the divorced woman under Section 125, Cr.PC could be validated or liability created on the husband in this regard could be held valid or enforceable. It has further been held that under the Act, 1986, the liability of the husband, who has divorced his wife, to pay her maintenance is only upto the period of her Iddat and that thereafter, the divorced wife has no right to get maintenance from her former husband. Therefore, having lost her right to get maintenance from her former husband after the period of Iddat, she has also lost her remedy as provided under Section 125(3) Cr.PC to enforce her said right. The Division Bench has also held that the provisions of the Act, 1986 have completely obliterated the right of such a divorced woman to get maintenance and the repeal without saving such a right means that such divorced woman had never acquired such a right and in this view of the matter, the said right now cannot be enforced under Section 125(3), Cr.PC. Therefore, if a muslim woman is divorced prior to coming into force of the Act, 1986 in whose favour, the order of maintenance has been passed and has become final or is pending, in revision or in any other Court, is being challenged by the husband and if such an order is held to be executable then it will be in complete contravention of the intention of the legislature and will amount to frustrate the very object of the Act, 1986, for which it has been enacted. 9. The Division Bench has also dissented with the view taken by the Single Bench in Ali Mohd. v. Smt. Zaida (supra). Following the law laid down by the D.B. of the Court in Abid Alis case (supra), in Abdul Hamid v. Mst. Asia, 1990 WLN (UC) 195 , it has been reiterated and observed that the inevitable conclusion of passing of the Act of 1986 is that not only the right under Section 125(1) Cr.PC, but also the remedy under Section 125(3) Cr.PC are lost, and that Section 7 of the Act of 1986 envisages a complete replacement of right and remedy under Section 125 Cr. PC. Since no exception is made in Section 7 of the Act, 1986 neither an order passed under Section 125 Cr. PC nor the liability already incurred earlier to the coming into force of the Act, 1986, has been saved. In view of this, even if it is held that the judgment dated 9.3.1987 of the Additional Sessions Judge Baran has become final because the same was not challenged still then, in view of the law laid down by the Division Bench in Abid All's case (supra) the petitioner is not liable to pay the maintenance to the non-petitioner (Jamila), because the right to get maintenance after the period of her Iddat has been curtailed and obliterated by the provisions of the Act, 1986. In view of this, the contention of Shri Mandhana that the petitioner can not reagitate his non-liability to pay the maintenance under the Act, 1986 and that the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge dated 9.3.1987 has become final between the parties appears to me misconceived and the same cannot be accepted. The principle of res judicata also does not apply in such a case. 10. The principle of res judicata also does not apply in such a case. 10. If the impugned order dated 2.3.1993 in respect of the maintenance granted in favour of Smt. Jamila is allowed to continue then it will be clearly in contravention of the mandatory provisions of Section 3 & 4 of the Act, 1986 and the same will amount to abuse of process of the Court as also failure of justice and as such, the same cannot be sustained. 11. Shri Tyagi has, however, gracefully conceded that since the petitioner has filed the application under Section 4 of the Act, 1986 read with Section 127(3) of Cr.PC as late as on 5.2.1992, he shall not claim refund of the amount of maintenance allowance already paid by him to Smt. Jamila prior to that date. 12. As regards the maintenance allowance granted in favour of the minor son, Shri Tyagi does not want to press this petition. Consequently this petition in respect of the maintenance allowance to the minor son stands dismissed as not pressed. 13. In the result, this petition is partly allowed and the impugned order dated 2.3.1993, whereby the petitioners application under Section 4 of the Act, 1986 read with Section 127(3) Cr.PC was dismissed, is hereby set aside and the said application is allowed and it is made clear that Smt. Jamila (the non-petitioner) has ceased to have any right to claim maintenance for her-self after the period of her Iddat. However, in view of the good-will gesture shown by the petitioner, the maintenance allowance received by Smt. Jamila till 4.12.1992 shall refundable to the petitioner. No order as to costs.Petition Partly allowed.