JUDGMENT R. L. Khurana, J.—The above noted two appeals preferred against the judgments and decrees dated 20-64989 of the learned Additional District Judge (I), Shimla, arising out of the same civil suit (being suit No 149/1 of 1981) between the parties, are sought to be disposed of by this judgment, 2. The subject-matter of dispute between the parties comprises of shop in the building bearing No 81, Lower Bazar, Shimla. This shop has been specifically detailed in the plaint and for the sake of brevity is being hereinafter referred to as the shop in dispute. 3. The appellant before this court in both the appeals was the plaintiff in the suit and he is being referred to accordingly hereinafter. 4. The plaintiff filed a suit for possession of the shop in dispute claiming himself to be the owner thereof. It was averred that one Sujan Singh, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents defendants was a statutory tenant of the shop in dispute A petition for ejectment of the said tenant Sujan Singh, under section 14, H P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1971, on the ground of reconstruction, was filed by the plaintiff before the learned Rent Controller (1), Shimla, During the pendency of the said petition, the tenant Sujan Singh died His widow Smt Balwant Kaur was, therefore, impleaded as a party-respondent being the legal heir of the deceased tenant Smt. Balwant Kaur also died during the pendency of the petition before the learned Rent Controller Since there was no other legal heir, who could inherit the tenancy, the plaintiff withdrew the said petition for ejectment on 23-9-1981. The defendants possession after the death of the tenant Sujan Singh and his widow Smt Balwant Kaur had become unauthorised, since they had no right to continue in possession of the shop in dispute Since the defendants failed to handover possession of the shop in dispute on being so called upon to do by the plaintiff, a suit for possession came to be filed. 5. The suit was originally filed against four sons of the deceased Sujan Singh, namely, respondents No 1, 8 and 9 and one Amrik Singh. Subsequently, respondents No 10 and II, the two daughters of the deceased tenant Sujan Singh, also came to be impleaded as defendants in the suit. 5. The suit was originally filed against four sons of the deceased Sujan Singh, namely, respondents No 1, 8 and 9 and one Amrik Singh. Subsequently, respondents No 10 and II, the two daughters of the deceased tenant Sujan Singh, also came to be impleaded as defendants in the suit. Amrik Singh, abovenamed son of the deceased Sujan Singh, died during the pendency of the suit before the trial Court Respondents No 3 to 7 and one Smt. Mohinder Kaur (widow) were brought on record as legal representatives. Smt, Mohinder Kaur, widow of the deceased Amrik Singh died during the pendency of the appeals before this court. Since her legal representatives were already on record as respondents No. 3 to 7, her name was ordered to be deleted vide order dated 23rd December, 1992. 6. The suit was resisted and contested by the respondents-defendants. Ownership of the Plaintiff qua the shop in dispute was denied It was averred that defendant-respondent Surjit Singh was the tenant qua the shop in dispute in his own right since 1962, under one Gian Chand Alternatively, It was pleaded that in case the deceased Sujan Singh was found to be the tenant of the shop in dispute, the defendant-respondent Surjit Singh was a sub-tenant and as such he cannot be evicted in the present suit. Further, alternative case of the defendants is that they have inherited the tenancy rights of the tenant Sujan Singh. Preliminary objections, as to the valuation of the suit, non-joinder of necessary parties and jurisdiction of the civil court to try the suit were further raised. 7. The suit of the plaintiff was decreed by the learned Sub-Judge First Class (III), Shimla, vide judgment and decree dated 27th December, 1986. Ii was held that the deceased Sujan Singh was the tenant in respect of the shop in dispute under the plaintiff On\his death, the tenancy rights were inherited by his widow Smt. Balwant Kaur None of the defendants-respondents could inherit the tenancy rights after the death of Smt. Balwant Kaur under section 4 of the BL P. Urban Rent Control Act, 197L The possession of the defendants-respondents was, therefore, unauthorised Defendant-respondent Surjit Singh was further held to be not a sub-tenant under the deceased Sujan Singh. 8. 8. Feeling aggrieved by and being dis-satisfied with the judgment and decree dated 27th December, 1986, of the learned Sub-Judge, two separate appeals came to be filed. Civil Appeal No. 241-S/13 of 1988 was filed by defendant-respondent Surjit Singh, while Civil Appeal No. 242-S/13 of 1988 was filed by the other defendants respondents. Both these appeals were allowed by the learned Additional District Judge (1), Shimla, vide the impugned judgment and decree dated 20th June, 1989, whereby the judgment and decree dated 27th December, 1986 of the trial Court was set aside and the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. It was held that the tenancy rights of the deceased Sujan Singh were heritable and such rights came to be inherited by all the sons and daughters of Sujan Singh. 9. Against the judgment and decree dated 20th June, 1989, of the learned Additional District Judge, the plaintiff has come up before this court by way of the present two Regular Second Appeals. Both the present appeals were admitted for hearing on the following questions of law: 1. Whether after the death of the tenant (statutory), the tenancy of the tenant is heritable. 2. Whether in the event of the termination of the tenancy of the tenant by notice to quit, the tenancy is heritable after his death. 3. What is the scope of the amended provision of the H. P. Urban Rent Control Act. Whether the tenancy is heritable in view of the amendment in the H. P. Urban Rent Control Act. I have heard Shri K. D. Sood, Advocate, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff and Shri Ajay Kumar Soodf alongwith Ms. Devyani Kuthiala, Advocates, the learned Counsel for the defendants-respondents and have also gone through the record of the case. 10. The H P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1971, stands repealed and substituted by the H. P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987. This Act of 1987 was passed by the State Legislature on 14th September, 1987. It received the assent of the President of India on 20th October, 1987, on which date it also came to be published in the Rajpatra. As per the provisions contained in section i (3), the said Act is to be deemed to have come into force on 17th November, 1971, that is, from the date on which the earlier Act of 1971 came into force. 11. As per the provisions contained in section i (3), the said Act is to be deemed to have come into force on 17th November, 1971, that is, from the date on which the earlier Act of 1971 came into force. 11. Under Clause (j) of section 2 of the Act of 1987, tenant* has been defined in the following terms :— "(j) tenant means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after termination of the tenancy and in the event of the death of such person such of his heirs as are mentioned in Schedule I to this i\ct and who were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified, respectively in Explanation I and Explanation II to this clause but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant, except with the written consent of the landlord, or a person to whom the collection of rent or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been framed out or leased by a municipal corporation or a municipal committee or a notified area committee or a cantonment board ; Explanation I.—The order of succession in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy shall be as follows— (a) firstly, his surviving spouse; (b) secondly, his son or daughter or both, if there is no surviving spouse, or if the surviving spouse did not ordinarily live with the deceased person as a member of his family upto the date of his death ; (c) thirdly, his parent(s)f if there is no surviving spouse, son, daughter or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death ; and (d) fourthly, his daughter-in-law, being the widow of his predeceased son. if there is no surviving spouse, son, daughter or parent(s) of the deceased person or if such surviving spouse, sod, daughter or parent(s) or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death. if there is no surviving spouse, son, daughter or parent(s) of the deceased person or if such surviving spouse, sod, daughter or parent(s) or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death. Explanation II.—The right of every successor, referred to in Explanation If to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, shall be personal to him and shall not, on the death of such successor, devolve on any of his heirs............" 12. The two courts below have arrived at concurrent findings that the deceased Sujan Singh was a statutory tenant under the plaintiff in respect of the shop in dispute. Such findings have become final inasmuch as the same have not been challenged by the defendants-respondents before this court. Even otherwise, the court in Rajesh Dhawan v Darshan Singh, ILR 1985 HP 129, following the ratio laid down by the apex Court in Damadi Laly. Parshram, AIR 1976 SC 2229, while dealing with the provisions of the H, P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1971, has held that for the purposes of the said Act, there is no distinction between a statutory tenant and a contractual tenant as regards the heritability to the rights of a tenant in occupation of the tenanted premises. 13. In the present case, as stated above, the deceased Sujan Singh was found to be a statutory tenant. Therefore, his rights were heritable. The case of the plaintiff is that it was the widow, Smt. Balwant Kaur, who succeeded to such tenancy rights in view of the definition of tenant’ contained in the Act of 1971 as amended by the Amendment Act of 1974. On the other hand, the defendants-respondents have contended that all the legal heirs of the deceased Sujan Singh, namely, his widow, sons and daughters had succeeded to the tenancy right. A Full Bench of this Court in Smt. Satya Den v. Ravinder Kumar, AIR 1990 HP 43, had the occasion of examining the question of heritability of tenancy rights of a statutory tenant in view of the definition of tenant’ as contained in Clause (j) of section 2 of the Act of 1987. In the said case, the tenant therein was found to be a statutory tenant. In the said case, the tenant therein was found to be a statutory tenant. The said tenant had died on 12th January, 1970, prior to the coming into force of the Act of 1971. At the relevant time the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, was in force in the State of Himachal Pradesh. The Full Bench held that the statutory tenant had an estate, which was heritable by his heirs subject to the restrictions imposed by the Rent Control legislation, which in this case would be as provided in section 2 (j) of the Act of 1987 The tenanted premises in the case of Smt Saiya Devi (supra) like the present case consisted of a shop, that is, non-residential/commercial premises. 14. The landlords in the case of Smt Satya Devi (supra) approached the Honble apex Court by way of Special Leave Petition, being No» SLP (C) 3628 of 1992-against the judgment of the Full Bench of this court. The said Special Leave Petition came to be decided on 6th February, 3 996, by a short order in the following terms :— "Leave granted. In view of the judgment in Smt. Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and others; 1989 (Suppl) 1 SCR 1, we do not find any merit in this appeal. It is dismissed. No costs" 15. In Smt Gian Devi’s case (supra), the Honble apex Court was dealing with the definition of tenant’ as found in section 2 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, which definition is almost the same as found in section 2 (j) of the Act of 1987, except for the fact that Explanation (3) to section 2 of the Delhi Act is not found in the Act of 1987. 16 Section 2 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, in so far as it is material for the purpose of the present case, reads : (2) (1) tenant means any person............and includes : (i) ........... 16 Section 2 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, in so far as it is material for the purpose of the present case, reads : (2) (1) tenant means any person............and includes : (i) ........... (ii) any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy ; and (iii) in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified respectively, in Explanation I and Explanation II to this clause, such of the aforesaid persons : (a) spouse, (b) son or daughter, or, where there are both son and daughter, both of them, (c) parents, (d) daughter-in- law, being the Widow of his pre-deceased son, as had been ordinarily living in the premises with such person as a member or members of his family upto the—date of his death, but does not include— (A) (B)........... Explanation I.—The order of succession in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy shall be as follows : (a) firstly, his surviving spouse ; (b) secondly, his son or daughter, or both, if there is no surviving spouse, or if the surviving spouse did not ordinarily live with the deceased person as a member of his family upto the date of his death ; (c) thirdly, his parents, if there is no surviving spouse, son or daughter of the deceased person, or if such surviving spouse, son or daughter or any of them did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death ; or (d) fourthly, his daughter-in-law, being the widow of his predeceased son, if there is no surviving spouse, son, daughter or parents of the deceased person, or if such surviving spouse, son, daughter or parents, or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death. Explanation II -—If the person, who acquires, by succession the right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, was not financially dependent on the deceased person on the date of his death, such successor shall acquire such right for a limited period of one year ; and, on the expiry of that period, or on his death, whichever is earlier, the right of such successor to continue in possession after the termination of tenancy shall become extinguished Explanation III —For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that,— (a) where, by reason of Explanation II, the right of any successor to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy becomes extinguished, such extinguishment shall not affect the right of any other successor of the same category to continue in possession after the termination of tenancy ; but if there is no other successor of the same category, the right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy ; shall not on such extinguishment, pass on to any other successor, specified in any lower category or categories, as the case may be ; (b) the right of every successor, referred to in Explanation I, to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, shall be personal to him and shall not on the death of such successor, devolve on any of his heirs." The Honble apex Court in interpreting the above provisions has observed in para 32 : “............all the three Explanations thereto is not in any way inconsistent with or contrary to sub-section (ii) of section 2(1) which unequivocally states that tenant includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy. In the absence of the provision contained in section 2 (1) (iii) the heritable interest of the heirs of the statutory tenant would devolve on all the heirs of the so called statutory tenant on his death and the heirs of such tenant would in law step into his position This sub section (iii) of section 2 (1) seeks to restrict this right in so far as the residential premises are concerned The heritability of the statutory tenancy which otherwise flows from the Act is restricted in case of residential premises only to the heirs mentioned in section 2 (1) (iii) and the heirs therein are entitled to remain in possession and to enjoy the protection under the Act in the manner and to the extent indicated in section 2 (1) (iii). The Legislature which under the Rent Act affords protection against eviction to tenants whose tenancies have been terminated and who continue to remain in possession and who are generally termed as statutory tenants, is perfectly competent to lay down the manner and the extent of the protection and the rights and obligations of such tenants and their heirs. Section 2 (1) (iii) of the Act does not create any additional or special right in favour of the heirs of the so called statutory tenant* on his death, but seeks to restrict the right of the heirs of such tenant in respect of residential premises, As the status and rights of a contractual tenant even after determination of his tenancy when the tenant is at times described as the statutory tenant, are fully protected by the Act and the heirs of such tenant becomes entitled by virtue of the provisions of the Act to inherit the status and position of the statutory tenant on his death, the Legislature which has created this right has thought it fit in the case of sesidential premises to limit the rights of the heirs in the manner and to the extent provided in section 2 (1) (iii). It appears that the Legislature has not thought it fit to put any such restrictions with regards to tenants in respect of commercial premises in this Act " (Emphasis supplied) 17. It appears that the Legislature has not thought it fit to put any such restrictions with regards to tenants in respect of commercial premises in this Act " (Emphasis supplied) 17. It was further held that in the case of commercial premises governed by the Delhi Act, the legislature did not think it fit to place any kind of restriction on the ordinary law of succession, as in the case of commercial premises, the heirs of the deceased tenant not only succeed to the tenancy rights in the tenanted premises but also to the business as a whole. The legislature could not impose any restriction under a rent legislation in respect of succession regarding the business, which is a valuable heritable right and which must devolve on all the heirs in accordance with law of succession. In coming io the said conclusion, it was observed in para 35, as under : "The mere fact that in the Act no provision has been made with regard to the heirs of tenants in respect of commercial tenancies on the death of the tenant after termination of the tenancy, as has been done in the case of heirs of the tenants of residential premises does not indicate that the Legislature intended that the heirs of the tenants of commercial premises will cease to enjoy the ^protection afforded to the tenant under the Act. The Legislature could never have possibly intended that with the death of a tenant of the commercial premises, the business carried on by the tenant, however, flourishing it may be, and even if the same constituted the source of livelihood of the members of the family, must necessarily come to an end on the death of the tenant only because the tenant died after the contractual tenancy had been terminated. It could never have been the intention of the Legislature that the entire family of a tenant depending upon the business carried on by the tenant will be completely stranded and the business carried on for years in the premises which had been let out to the tenant must stop functioning at the premises which the heirs of the deceased tenant must necessarily vacate as they are afforded no protection under the Act.” 18 The abovesaid conclusion was further supported by the Honble apex Court by another consideration. It was pointed out that commercial premises are not only let out to individuals but also to companies, corporations and other statutory bodies having a juristic personality, in which case question of death of the tenant would not arise. Despite the termination of tenancy, such a juristic personality will continue enjoying the protection afforded under the Rent Act. If such a protection is not made available to individuals, it would result in unreasonable classification in favour of tenants who are juristic personalities, which could never have been intended by the legislature It was observed in para 35 in the following terms : "If it be held that commercial tenancies after the termination of the contractual tenancy of the tenant are not heritable on the death of the tenant and the heirs of the tenant are not entitled to enjoy the protection under the Act, an irreparable mischief which the Legislature could never have intended is likely to be caused. Any time after the creation of the contractual tenancy, the landlord may determine the contractual tenancy allowing the tenant to continue to remain in possession of the premises, hoping for an early death of the tenant, so that on the death of a tenant he can immediately proceed to institute the proceedings for recovery of and recover possession of the premises as a matter of course, because the heirs would not have any right to remain in occupation and would not enjoy the protection of the Act. This would never have been intended by the Legislature while framing the Rent Acts for affording protection to the tenant against eviction that the landlord would be entitled to recover possession, even on the grounds for eviction as prescribed in the Rent Acts are made out " 19. The ratio laid down in Smt. Gian Devis case (supra) has been reiterated by the Honble apex Court by its short order passed in Ravinder Kumar and another v. Smt Satya Devi and others, Special Leave Petition (C) No. 3628 of 1992, decided on 6th February, 1996. 20. A similar view was taken by a learned single Bench of this Court in Vinod Kumar v, Rajesh Kumar and others, 1995 (1) Sim LC 452. 21. 20. A similar view was taken by a learned single Bench of this Court in Vinod Kumar v, Rajesh Kumar and others, 1995 (1) Sim LC 452. 21. Therefore following the ratio laid down in Smt. Gian Devis case and Ravinder Kumars case (supra), it is held that the inheritance of the tenancy rights qua non-residential/commercial premises under the Act of 1987 is governed by the general law of succession and not by the provisions as contained in section 2 (j) of the Act of 1987, All the legal heirs of the deceased tenant Sujan Singh, thus, have a right to inherit the estate in respect of tenancy rights qua the shop in dispute and after they have succeeded to such tenancy rights, they can be proceeded against for eviction only in accordance with the provisions of the relevant Rent Act. As a result, both the appeals fail and the same are accordingly dismissed. The parties are left to bear their respective costs. Appeal dismissed.