Judgment :- K.S. Radhakrishnan, J. An interference with the private right of an owner of land adjoining the national highway has given rise to this Petition. Petitioner is the proprietor of an engineering workshop situated on the side of the national highway. He has been conducting business for the last 30 years. He is mainly engaged in the manufacture of Iron Gate, grill, etc. Workshop has got a main road frontage of 35 feet facing the highway. Raw materials are brought in autorikshaws, hand carts, tempo, van, etc. and the finished products such as gate, grill, etc., are removed from the workshop in those vehicles. 2. Petitioner is aggrieved by the unauthorised parking of taxi cars in front of his workshop and on the side of the national highway, causing obstruction to his business. He and his customers are unable to bring vehicles in front of the workshop to load and unload materials. Petitioner submits due to obstruction he has to make a detour to reach his premises and it causes considerable inconvenience. Petitioner submits he has got a fundamental right to do business guaranteed under Art.19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India without any obstruction to his private right or access to the highway. To conduct business, he should have direct access to the main road. Any impediment to his direct access to the highway, otherwise than for a public interest, is unauthorised and illegal. Police authorities have put up 'no parking' board on the side of the national highway in front of the petitioner's shop earlier. However, the same was unauthorisedly removed and about 15 taxies are parked round the Clock in front of his workshop, which adversely affects his private right of entry to the highway. He has, therefore, approached this Court seeking a, direction to the police authorities not to allow taxi cars to be permanently parked in front of his workshop, invading his private right of entry to the highway. 3. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the second respondent. Stand of the second respondent is that parking of vehicles in front of the petitioner's workshop is no hindrance to the traffic. It is stated only 15 taxi cars are parked in the place in question. It is their case that petitioner can use a side road without any hindrance. Stand of the second respondent is that parking of vehicles in front of the petitioner's workshop is no hindrance to the traffic. It is stated only 15 taxi cars are parked in the place in question. It is their case that petitioner can use a side road without any hindrance. Second respondent submits that petitioner cannot have any legal right seeking removal of taxi cars from the highway. 4. I heard counsel for the petitioner and learned Government Pleader. Petitioner just like taxi owners are carrying on his business of running a workshop. In other words, both the petitioner and taxi drivers have a fundamental right to carry on their trade or occupation under Art.19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Petitioner is carrying on his business, trade or occupation on the side of the highway without causing any obstruction to the national highway. Taxi drivers are equally justified in carrying on their avocation plying the vehicles using highway without obstructing the petitioner's right to have access to the national highway. There is no law or regulation, which authorises the traffic police to allow taxi cars to be permanently parked on the side of the national highway in exercise of their fundamental right to carry on their business, trade or occupation. 5. It is stated in Smith's Leading Cases, Vol. II, page 172 (13th edition) that an owner of lands adjourning a highway is entitled to access to the highway at all points where his land adjoins the highway, whether or not the soil of the highway be his. The position in England is also highlighted in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 21, "Paragraph 120 (4th edition) as follows: "An owner of land adjoining a highway is entitled to access to that highway at any point at which his land actually touches it. The right of access of an adjoining owner from his premises to the highway and vice versa is a private right and is distinct from his right to use the highway as soon as he is upon it, which (at any rate if the soil of the highway is not his) he enjoins only as a member of the public". 6. 6. The position in England has also been narrated in Harrison v. Duke ofHutland, (1893) 1 Q.B. 142 as if a person's land abuts on the highway, he can maintain an action of trespass against the person who uses the highway in an unreasonable manner by obstruction. As held in Harper v. Haden (G.N.) & Sons. (1933) Ch. 298, the law relating to the user of highways is in truth the law of give and take. Those who use them must in doing so have reasonable regard to the convenience and comfort of others, and must not themselves expect a degree of convenience and comfort only obtainable by disregarding that of other people. They must expect to the obstructed occasionally. It is the price they pay for the privilege of obstructing others. As held by Delvin, J. in Farrellv. JohnMowlen & Co. Ltd., (1954) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 437, a person whose property adjoins the highway, has aright of access to and from his property, and if, in the exercise of mat right of access, he causes as he may be sometimes an obstruction to the public using the highway, the question is whether the obstruction is reasonable or not. There are two sets of rights, which have to be met and resolved on the ordinary principle that a reasonable exercise of both must be allowed. 7. As pointed out in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 39, in Paragraph 141 at page 1079, an abutting owner has two distinct kinds of rights in a highway, a public right which he enjoys in common with all other citizens, and certain private rights, which arise from his ownership of property contiguous to the highway, and which are not common to the public generally. These rights are property of which he may not be deprived without his consent, except on full compensation and by due process of law. The rights of an abutting owner apply not only to the highway proper, but also to essential parts of the highway such as bridges and overpasses. 8. The right of a person owning land adjoining a highway to have access to the highway at any point has been recognised by courts in India in various decisions reported in Shea Narayan v. Giri Dayal, AIR 1931 Nag. 189, Muhammed DiriMian v. M.V. Alirajoo Koerad, AIR 1931 Pat 418; Beli Ram v. Sib Rani, AIR 1921 Cal. 8. The right of a person owning land adjoining a highway to have access to the highway at any point has been recognised by courts in India in various decisions reported in Shea Narayan v. Giri Dayal, AIR 1931 Nag. 189, Muhammed DiriMian v. M.V. Alirajoo Koerad, AIR 1931 Pat 418; Beli Ram v. Sib Rani, AIR 1921 Cal. 271, Mandakinee Debee v. Basanl Kumaree Debee, AIR 1933 Cal. 884, Damodaranaidll v. TIrirupurasundari. Animal, AIR 1972 Mad. 386. This Court in its decision in Tanoor Panchayat v. Kitnhiamutty, 1978 KLT 813 also held that an owner of land adjoining a highway is entitled to as a matter of private right access to such highway at any point at which his land actually touches it. 9. It is evident from the above mentioned authoritative principles laid down by Indian and English Courts, a person who is having business on the side of the national highway has got a right of access at every point. Just as the taxi owners have access at all points in the highway for passage in exercise of their occupation, trade or business, petitioner has got equally the same right for using the highway at all points in exercise of his avocation, trade or business. 10. But more than that, the owner on the side of the national highway has a private right of access as well, subject to the public right of passage, which is a higher right to be enjoyed by public including the person like the petitioner. In other words, a private right of access to the highway may co-exist with a public right of way though it does not necessarily merge with the public right. Public right of passage is subject to private right of landowners' right to access to the highway. Where a foot-path intervenes between a high way and adjoining premises, the owner of the premises is entitled to access across the foot-path to the highway for any kind of traffic which is necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of his premises. The interest of the public in a highway consists solely in the right of passage. Such right would include stopping perhaps for refreshments, enjoying the view, etc. The interest of the public in a highway consists solely in the right of passage. Such right would include stopping perhaps for refreshments, enjoying the view, etc. But no highway user may use the highway for parking their vehicles permanently for their business so as to invade the private right of entry of a owner of adjoining land to the highway. For traffic regulation and for public purpose and for the safety of pedestrians it is open to the authorities to plant barriers separating the foot path and the highway, which may invade the private right of a person owning land abutting the highway. It may also possible for a statutory authority to erect obstruction in the highway such as electric posts, telephone posts, but shelter, etc., which may invade the private right of landowners abutting the highway. The same is for public interest. But allowing taxi cars to park on the side of the highway obstructing the private right of landowners abutting the highway is not for a public purpose, but for the private interest of taxi operators in exercise of their business. 11. Allowing taxi operators who are engaged in their business to park their vehicles permanently in front of petitioner's workshop on the side of the national highway is an invasion of the private right of petitioner to have access to the national highway. It is not as if taxi cars are parked for sometime to board or alight passengers, but parked there for their business. Parking of taxi cars round the clock in front of the petitioner's shop as part of their business cannot be said to be legal. I do not, therefore, find any justification in Ext. P5 order. I, therefore, quash Ext. P5 and direct respondents to reconsider the request of the petitioner in the light of the principle laid down by this Court. Original Petition is allowed as above.