M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS civil revision petition assails an appellate Order of the learned civil judge, gokak in miscellaneous appeal No. 8 of 1982. The facts of the case make extremely distasteful reading insofar as the litigation concerns payment of maintenance amount to an aged wife. The litigation started in the year 1974 and it is unnecessary to recount the background of what happened except to record that the husband kept on litigating in different courts instead of paying the amount to the wife and the culmination of all these efforts was that the second respondent-wife was required to finally file an execution proceeding No. 8 of 1980 against her husband in the court of the principal munsiff, gokak. She was required to follow this up with an application for attachment of the properties because even though the maintenance awarded to her was a paltry sum, it had aggregated to around Rs. 10,000/ -. Despite the attachment of the three properties, on 1-2-1980 the amount was still not forthcoming from the husband and ultimately an application for a sale warrant and proclamation was filed on 30-9-1980. This application was adjourned on three occasions and ultimately on 30-10-1989 the court passed orders for a proclamation and ultimately, the sale was fixed for 1-1-1981. This was thereafter postponed to 5-1-1981 on which date the auction purchaser who is the petitioner before me submitted his bid for Rs. 35,100/- in respect of property bearing survey No. 416/2. This being a court auction which took place in the evening of that day the matter was placed before the court for acceptance of the bids on 6-1-1981 when the court accepted the present petitioner's bid. He deposited the 25% against the amount on the same day and the balance amount within the specified time. On 4-2-1981 the husband who was the judgment-debtor filed an application under Order 21, Rule 90 of the C. P. C. for setting aside the sale. This application was finally disposed of by the trial court on 31-3-1982 when the learned munsiff dismissed the application holding that no case had been made out for setting aside the sale. On 4-2-1981 the husband who was the judgment-debtor filed an application under Order 21, Rule 90 of the C. P. C. for setting aside the sale. This application was finally disposed of by the trial court on 31-3-1982 when the learned munsiff dismissed the application holding that no case had been made out for setting aside the sale. The judgment-debtor thereafter took the matter in appeal and he filed miscellaneous appeal No. 8 of 1982 before the court of the learned civil judge, gokak and this appeal was finally disposed of on 20-9-1988 on which date the appeal was allowed. The appeal court set aside the sale and directed that the matter be remanded to the trial court for a fresh decision in execution proceeding No. 8 of 1980 and for execution of the decree in respect of whatever amount may be outstanding against the judgment-debtor. The only party to have challenged the appellate Order is the auction purchaser who is the petitioner before me who contends that he is seriously affected by the Order and that it is liable to be set aside. ( 2 ) THE first contention raised by the petitioner's learned Advocate is that the appeal court has set aside the sale on the basis of certain so called irregularities and the learned Advocate submits that none of these are of any consequence nor are they of a sufficiently grave character as to come within the definition of the term 'material irregularity'. Relying on the provisions of Order 21, Rule 90, the learned Advocate has advanced a two-fold submission in law insofar as she first submits that the irregularity must be extremely serious in nature so as to virtually vitiate the sale and that it only then can it be characterised as a material irregularity. Simultaneously she has submitted that the law envisages that a sale shall not be set aside unless the party challenging it satisfies the court that substantial prejudice has been caused. The submission is that merely because some technical mistakes may be on record or some minor procedures may not have been complied with, a court is precluded from setting aside the auction sale because third party rights are created and it is only in cases of utmost seriousness where real prejudice is demonstrated, that the sale will be interfered with by the court. In this context, the learned Advocate has placed strong reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of dhirendra nath gorai, subal Chandra Nath Saha and others v. Sudhir Chandra Ghosh and others. The apex court had occasion to consider the principles laid down in a long line of decisions starting from Vellayan Chettiar and others v. Government of the Province of Madras and another and the court held that substantial injury will have to be proved by the party claiming the revocation of the sale deed and that it will have to be demonstrated that the irregularities were of a sufficiently grave character which resulted in such injury. Petitioner's learned advocate, relying on the observations of the Supreme Court in this decision points out that the judgment-debtor as had happened in the case before the Supreme Court did not raise any objections of any type even after the proclamation and at the time when the sale took place. The Supreme Court did construe such conduct as being a complete waiver and held that the party was thereafter disentitled from raising technical pleas and applying for the setting aside of the sale. It is pointed out to me that in the present instance, though an application was filed for setting aside of the sale, no material irregularities of any type has been demonstrated and more importantly, the serious injury or prejudice that has resulted to the judgment-debtor has not been allegedly set out. Learned Advocate also relies on the observations of the trial court wherein the learned judge has recorded the fact that the judgment-debtor did not lead any evidence but in addition to that, he has not produced any material of any type in Order to satisfy these two requirements. The contention raised therefore is that the decision of the trial court in refusing to set aside the sale was perfectly justified. In this context, the petitioner's learned Advocate has drawn my attention to two more decisions which amplify the position in law. The first of them is a decision of the Supreme Court in Laxmi Devi v. Mukand Kanwar and others, wherein the Supreme Court reiterated the position that it is insufficient to allege that substantial injury has occurred but that it is the requirement of law that it must be established. The first of them is a decision of the Supreme Court in Laxmi Devi v. Mukand Kanwar and others, wherein the Supreme Court reiterated the position that it is insufficient to allege that substantial injury has occurred but that it is the requirement of law that it must be established. In a later decision of the Supreme Court in Jaswantlal Natvarlal Thakkar v. Sushilaben Manilal Dangarwala and others, the Supreme Court had occasion to further crystallise the principle by laying down that irrespective of the injury being pleaded, that it must be specifically proved. The submission before me is that even though some irregularities, none of which are of any consequence, were alleged, that nothing was proved or established before the trial court. In passing, I need to record that the entire challenge in the application consisted of so called procedural irregularities namely the fact that the sale was postponed from the 1st to the 5th and that no fresh proclamation was issued and secondly that even though the bid was made by the auction purchaser on 5-1-1981, that the same was accepted by the court on 6-1-1981 which was not on the same day or immediately. The submission is that none of these grounds were of any consequence and as has happened in the course of the earlier litigation from 1974 to 1981, that this was one more attempt to deprive the wife from receiving the maintenance amount that was due to her. ( 3 ) IN passing, I need to refer to two other aspects of the matter one of them being that the appeal court has interfered with the decision on the ground that the purchaser is not an agriculturist and that his occupation was given as student. With regard to this aspect of the matter, the law is virtually concluded by the decision of this case in H. N. Vinayaka and others v. Firm of H. Venkatasastry and sons wherein the court has very clearly held that such a question namely as to whether the purchaser is an agriculturist or not cannot be taken up in proceedings under Order 21, Rule 90. This virtually concludes that point. Another ground on which the appeal court has interfered is that the judgment-debtor had subsequently paid an amount of Rs. This virtually concludes that point. Another ground on which the appeal court has interfered is that the judgment-debtor had subsequently paid an amount of Rs. 6,240/- and the appellate judge has taken the view that part of the decree was satisfied and that this aspect of the matter was not taken into account by the trial court. I shall dispose of this point straightaway because the petitioner's learned Advocate on the basis of the record has demonstrated to me that this amount of Rs. 6,240/- was undoubtedly deposited by the judgment-debtor before the trial court which was executing the decree but that this was done long after the sale had in fact taken place and that therefore it could have no bearing whatsoever on the validity of the sale. At the very highest, it would be a matter of accounting with regard to how much of the sale proceeds should be paid over to the decree-holder and how much to be refunded to the judgment-debtor. In any event, the petitioner's learned Advocate has drawn my attention to a decision of the Privy Council in Nanhelal and another v. Umrao Singh, wherein the privy council has clearly laid down that amounts paid at a later date cannot affect the validity of a concluded sale. The rationale behind this view is that if the sale creates third party rights or interests, that these cannot be taken away merely because the judgment-debtor at a subsequent point of time comes forward with the whole or part of the decretal amount. The petitioner's learned Advocate therefore submitted that the appellate court has acted in breach of the well-settled principles of law and that this court in exercise of its revisionary powers must interfere with that decision. ( 4 ) THE judgment-debtor has since passed away and is represented by his legal heirs, they have seriously contested this proceeding and it is contended by Mr. Gunjal, learned counsel who represents them that the appellate Order does not require any interference with. The learned counsel has drawn my attention to three decisions of the Supreme Court with regard to the jurisdiction of this court to interfere in exercise of its revisionary powers which are as follows:1. Pandurang Dhondi Chougule and others v. Maruti Hari Jadhav and others; 2. Ratilal Balabhai Nazar v. Ranchhodbhai Shankarbhai Patel and another; 3. Nani Gopal Paul v. T. Prasad Singh and others. Pandurang Dhondi Chougule and others v. Maruti Hari Jadhav and others; 2. Ratilal Balabhai Nazar v. Ranchhodbhai Shankarbhai Patel and another; 3. Nani Gopal Paul v. T. Prasad Singh and others. in sum and substance, the learned counsel has submitted that the principles- which can be culled out from these decisions very clearly lay down that the powers of the High Court in revision under Section 115, C. P. C. are relatively limited. He submits that the powers of the appellate court are much wider and that once the appeal court has examined the record and come to the conclusion that the sale is liable to be set aside, unless it can be demonstrated that there was an error of jurisdiction or a patent illegality, that this court cannot entertain virtually a fresh challenge because this is not a second appeal but a revision. The Supreme Court has clarified the difference between the two situations in the aforesaid decisions and I do concede that the learned counsel is right when he points out that unless there is a serious error apparent on the face of the record which stems from a matter of jurisdiction or an apparent illegality that this court cannot reappraise facts or for that matter reappreciate the merits of the case in exercise of its revisionary powers. Mr. Gun- jal submitted, after taking me through the various parts of the record that the appeal court has come to the conclusion that in the first instance there was no fresh proclamation when the sale was postponed from 1-1-1981 to 5-1-1981. Secondly, that there was inadequate publicity and thirdly that the price realised was much lower than the actual value of the property. His submission was that it is not a requirement of law that the judgment- debtor shall step into the witness box or for that matter produce any evidence in support of his application under Order 21, Rule 90 but it was permissible for him to get the sale set aside by demonstrating material irregularities, from the record itself. His submission was that it is not a requirement of law that the judgment- debtor shall step into the witness box or for that matter produce any evidence in support of his application under Order 21, Rule 90 but it was permissible for him to get the sale set aside by demonstrating material irregularities, from the record itself. There is no dispute with regard to the correctness of this proposition and the learned counsel proceeded to submit that if these particular irregularities are held to be established, that the prejudice and injury to the judgment-debtor, does not have to be separately demonstrated because the serious injury is manifest and that therefore, the setting aside of the sale was within the ambit of the law. As far as this submission is concerned, there is no quarrel with regard to the correctness of these propositions. I need to record that having carefully heard the learned counsel and perused the material facts of the record referred to by him, that I am unable to accept any of the three heads. It is true that the sale was postponed from 1-1-1981 to 5-1-1981 which was only 4 days but the record does not indicate conclusively as to what transpired during this period. The finding that there was inadequate publicity or that the price was too low are also the conclusions for which there is absolutely no basis from the record of the case. On the other hand, the record indicates that the panchas had valued this property at Rs. 6,000/- whereas the court fixed the minimum price at Rs. 35,000/- and therefore there is no warrant to hold in the absence of any material produced by the judgment-debtor that the price realised was too low. These are the three heads on the strength of which the learned judge has interfered and to my mind these conclusions were wholly unwarranted. It is here precisely that the error which stares one in the face and which is manifest has taken place. The conclusion that the irregularities are established or that they were material is unwarranted and the consequential prejudice that is pleaded was certainly never established. I may mention in passing that the appeal court has jumped to the conclusion that an amount of Rs. 6,340/- had already been paid. The conclusion that the irregularities are established or that they were material is unwarranted and the consequential prejudice that is pleaded was certainly never established. I may mention in passing that the appeal court has jumped to the conclusion that an amount of Rs. 6,340/- had already been paid. This is factually incorrect and any observations or finding in this regard were therefore manifestly wrong and contrary to the facts and documents on record. ( 5 ) MR. Gunjal has very strongly urged that the provisions of Order 21, Rule 84 which are mandatory must be applied in this case. The Supreme Court in the decision in Manilal Mohanlal Shah and others v. Sardar Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mahmad and another, did observe that the provisions of Order 21, rules 84 and 85 are mandatory. Mr. Gunjal submitted that the major head of challenge was that the auction purchaser who is the petitioner before me had not deposited the 25% amount immediately as the Rule requires. It is true that the Supreme Court has stated in this decision that the provisions being mandatory, it is not open to a court to extend the time period and that the immediate consequence of any breach of the provisions of this Rule are that the sale becomes void and the property will be resold. It is a matter of applying the facts of the present case to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court. That judgment is basically distinguishable because in that case the judgment-debtor was the auction purchaser himself and instead of making the payment, he claimed a set-off and the Supreme Court ultimately set aside the sale by holding that this was not permissible insofar as the auction purchaser was obliged to observe the mandatory provisions of rules 84 and 85 of Order 21. In the present instance, the petitioner's learned Advocate submits that there is no breach insofar as the auction took place on the evening of 5-1-1981, the matter was placed for approval or acceptance before the court on the very next day when the court accepted the petitioner's bid on 6-1-1981 and on that very day the petitioner has paid the 25% deposit. Insofar as this consequence of events is correct, it is impossible to argue that there has been any breach of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 84. ( 6 ) MR. Insofar as this consequence of events is correct, it is impossible to argue that there has been any breach of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 84. ( 6 ) MR. Gunjal has advanced one more submission which is of some consequence. He has seriously assailed what has taken place because he submits that against outstandings of approximately Rs. 10,000/- which was claimed from the judgment-debtor as many as three valuable properties were initially attached and subsequently all the 3 properties were put up for auction. As the record indicates, two bids were received in respect of these properties and the court ultimately accepted the bid in respect of the present survey number for an amount of Rs. 35,000/ -. What the learned counsel contends is that the law on the subject is amplified by decision of the Supreme Court in Ambati Narasayya v. M. Subba Rao and another. Interpreting the provisions of Order 21, Rule 64 the court laid emphasis on the fact that it is the duty of the court to auction only such portion of the property as is necessary for securing the satisfaction of the decrees. In the present instance, Mr. Gunjal submits that the property in dispute which has now been purchased by the present petitioner measure over 6 acres of irrigated land which was sold for Rs. 35,100/- in satisfaction of a decree for hardly Rs. 10,000/ -. What he demonstrates is that in respect of a similar piece of land a bid for Rs. 11,000/- had been received in the same auction sale and it is his submission that the executing court was in error in having accepted the bid in respect of the present piece of land which was wholly and totally unnecessary. The learned Advocate submits that this is a solemn duty cast on the court and not on the parties and that the Supreme Court has laid down that if a far more valuable and larger property is disposed of against a decree for a much smaller amount, that the entire sale will have to be set aside. He has very strongly emphasised this point and submitted that the executing court while confirming the bids or accepting the sale ought to have done so in respect of the smaller property and thai the present one ought not to have been touched. He has very strongly emphasised this point and submitted that the executing court while confirming the bids or accepting the sale ought to have done so in respect of the smaller property and thai the present one ought not to have been touched. ( 7 ) THERE are two aspects to the matter the first of them being that the reason why more than one property was put up for auction was because when a valuation had been done by the panchas, the estimates that are on record indicated that no single property would have been sufficient to satisfy the decree. The more important aspect of the matter is that the judgment-debtor had not put forward any objections at that point of time nor had he brought these facts to the notice of the court at that point of time. A perusal of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 90 makes it abundantly clear that objections which come forward as an after-thought cannot be considered by a court for setting aside the auction sale, if those objections had not been raised at an earlier point of time. Apart from this aspect of the matter, a perusal of the record will indicate that it is not very clear as to why and for what reason one of the two bids was accepted and the other was not. I have already indicated that this was the stage at which the judgment-debtor ought to have brought the fact to the notice of the court which was not done. In any event, the balance amount that is realised from the sale would necessarily have to be refunded back to the judgment-debtor which has been done and therefore I fail to see any substantial prejudice in this case. The interpretation of Rule 64, Order 21 that is incorporated in the decision referred to by me supra was on the basis of an entirely different set of facts where a large property was auctioned against a debt of hardly Rs. 3,000/- and the Supreme Court disapproved of it and negatived the defence that it was one large property and could not be split up and pointed out that it was still open to the trial court to have sold only that portion as was necessary for the satisfaction of the decree. 3,000/- and the Supreme Court disapproved of it and negatived the defence that it was one large property and could not be split up and pointed out that it was still open to the trial court to have sold only that portion as was necessary for the satisfaction of the decree. In the present case I have already held that the estimates did indicate that none of the single properties were sufficient to satisfy the decree and that therefore it was essential to direct the auction sale in respect of more than one of them. To my mind, the facts of the Supreme Court case are well distinguishable from the ones of the present case. For the reasons indicated by me, the auction sale cannot be set aside on this ground. ( 8 ) FINALLY, it is essential that in all proceedings complete Justice has to be done and this is precisely what has happened in this case. The proceeding, as I have indicated, arose out of a paltry maintenance amount awarded to the wife and the late husband instead of complying with the court orders resisted them all the way for as long as seven years and I can scarcely conceive of more reprehensible conduct than this. His learned Advocate submitted that he did not desire to even refer to the pre 1981 incidents because those are not the subject-matter of this proceeding but this court cannot shut its eyes to them. It is almost unimaginable that the petitioner lady had to resort to an execution proceeding to recover the arrears of maintenance and even that proceeding was savagely contested for years together. Learned Advocate who represents the respondent submitted that the auction purchaser is a nominee of the wife and that he even resides with her. There is nothing on record to conclusively establish this though there are some stray references to this effect. Even if that is the case, this is a situation where poetic Justice has been done. ( 9 ) A careful perusal of the record and the submissions canvassed by the learned counsel on both sides having been done; to my mind, it will have to be held that the appellate Order requires interference with. The appellate Order is accordingly set aside and the Order passed by the trial court is restored. The c. r. p. accordingly succeeds. The appellate Order is accordingly set aside and the Order passed by the trial court is restored. The c. r. p. accordingly succeeds. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no Order as to costs. --- *** --- .