JUDGMENT - R.G. DESHPANDE, J.:---This is a revision application by an unsuccessful tenants, who have all along been contending that they were not liable to be evicted from the premises in question for various reasons. To understand the matter, it is necessary to mention few facts. The present petitioners happened to be tenants, who are the legal representatives of original tenant-Madhavlal and the present respondents happened to be the landlords, who also have been substituted in place of the original landlord. The suit property is Municipal House No. 118, situated at Mission Hospital, Sadarbazar, Jalna, in which the original respondent-Madhavlal happened to be the tenant. Since the landlords were in need of accommodation, as also they had noticed that the petitioner was a defaulter and also had created sub-tenancy, a necessary notice, dated 8.11.1978 was issued to the petitioner, which was duly replied by reply dated 8.12.1979 by the petitioners-tenants. Since the notice was not complied with, the landlord filed Rent Control Case No. 79-2/79 in the Court of Rent Controller, Jalna, on 2.1. 1979. The proceedings were filed on three grounds i.e. the tenant was a defaulter, that the landlord needed the house in question for bona fide occupation and that the tenant had created sub-tenancy in favour of the respondent No. 4 - Kanhyalal. After completing the procedure, of recording the evidence in detail and hearing the arguments, the learned Rent Controller, who dealt with the matter, by his judgment and order, dated 4.9.1982, decreed the suit only on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord to occupy the premises in question. However, as regards other two grounds, the suit was dismissed. 2.Being aggrieved by the abovesaid judgment and order, the unsuccessful tenant approached the Appellate Court by way of an appeal i.e. Rent Appeal No. 9/82, in the Court of District Judge, Jalna and the learned Judge of the Appellate Court, who dealt with the matter, by his judgment and order, dated 9.1.1986 dismissed the appeal upholding the judgment and order passed by the Court below. This is how the present revision application is filed by the unsuccessful tenant. This is how the present revision application is filed by the unsuccessful tenant. Shri S.M. Kulkarni, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the revision petitioners has raised two grounds, the first being that the judgments and orders passed by the courts below are absolutely illegal, as according to Shri Kulkarni, the findings were arrived at not on the basis of the pleadings but the evidence which was not in consonance with the pleadings. During the pendancy of the present revision application, the learned Counsel filed one additional affidavit on behalf of the petitioners-tenants contending that the landlord had obtained alternate accommodation and hence his need could not be said to be genuine one if these facts are taken into consideration while deciding the present revision application. I have given a considerate thought to the grounds raised by Shri Kulkarni, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, who argued that the findings arrived at by the Authority below on the point of bona fide need of the landlord was vague and was lacking in material particulars. Shri Kulkarni, in support of this contention relied on the judgment reported in 1974 Mah. L.J. 774, in the case of (Ganpat v. Rameshwar and another)1. Shri Kulkarni has given stress on the observations made by His Lordship of the High Court in that judgment, as he then was, in para 4, which according to Shri Kulkarni was sufficient enough to hold in the present case that there was no proper pleading and no evidence to the effect of bona fide need of the petitioner. Giving due thought to the argument of Shri Kulkarni, I have tried to test the present pleadings and the evidence on the touch-tone of this judgment and to be precise in paragraph 4 thereof. I have gone through the contents of the plaint and I find in paragraph (B) of the said plaint that the landlord has specifically pleaded that, "the house is required for personal residence of the plaintiffs as they have no other house of their own in the city of Jalna. At present they reside in the house, situated at Mastgad belonging to S.A. Majid, S.A. Salim and Nafisabegum as licencees. Petitioners are pressurised and under obligation to vacate the said bungalow, hence they are in acute need of the said bungalow for their residence. At present they reside in the house, situated at Mastgad belonging to S.A. Majid, S.A. Salim and Nafisabegum as licencees. Petitioners are pressurised and under obligation to vacate the said bungalow, hence they are in acute need of the said bungalow for their residence. Even otherwise bungalow of the plaintiffs being big they require the suit premises for their residence." If these pleadings are taken into consideration and if the same are seen in the background of paragraph 4 of the judgment, referred to above, then this Court is of the firm view that the pleadings are sufficient enough to demonstrate the need of the landlord for his bona fide need to occupy the premises in question. The judgment reported in 1974 Mah.L.J. 774, cited supra, is that no details were given in the application as to whether the premises were required by the landlord for his residence or for his business or for godown or for any other purposes. In the instant case, a specific pleading is there, as seen above, that the house was needed by the landlord for his bona fide occupation and hence the question as regards carrying out of the business by the landlord and of its kind was not necessary to be given. In the case referred to above, again there is a point, which was considered by His Lordship, that, "it has also not been brought out in the evidence that the petitioner owns besides this house number of houses in the same town. No details have been given as to why his need cannot be satisfied by those other houses, whether they are all occupied or some of them are vacant and if so why they are not available." His Lordship, therefore, was of the view that unless these details were given, the tenant could not be expected to meet the case of the landlord. In the instant case, I have seen that the landlords has specifically averred that they have no other house of their own in the city of Jalna at present. They have also further averred that they were being pressurised by the persons at whose merely they were living in the present house and naturally they were, therefore, in acute need of the premises in question. They have also further averred that they were being pressurised by the persons at whose merely they were living in the present house and naturally they were, therefore, in acute need of the premises in question. Not only that, in the present case, there is a specific pleading to the effect that the landlord needed the house, as his family was according to him, a big one, which required the accommodation by occupying the present premises in question. I think, the judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, is of no help to him in any manner. 3.The learned Counsel for the petitioner further cited two other judgments i.e. (1988) 3 Supreme Court Cases 131, in the case of (Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander and others)2, and 1986(4) Supreme Court Cases 736, in the case of (Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain)3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner wanted to argue that under the present Act i.e. Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954, under section 26 (c), this Court, has to satisfy itself as to the legality and propriety of the order under revision, which is quite obviously a much wider jurisdiction. According to Shri Kulkarni, the jurisdiction enables this Court or the Court of Revision in appropriate cases to examine the correctness of the findings of fact and reappreciate the evidence, if findings of the Appellate Court are found to be infirm in law, though the Revisional Court is not a second Court of First Appeal. It is observed that there cannot be any two opinions about this view taken by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court. However, the question is as to whether really this judgment is of any help to the present petitioner. Shri Khader, the learned Counsel for the respondents has specifically taken me through the record of the case and has specifically pointed out that the evidence adduced by the parties and to be precise by the landlord was strictly in consonance with the pleading in paragraph (B), referred to above, in the plaint, and there is nothing of which it can be said that the present petitioners were taken aback. According to Shri Khader, the pleadings were sufficient enough to demonstrate the case as regards bona fide need and the evidence was still further sufficient to prove the case of bona fide need of the respondent-landlord. According to Shri Khader, the pleadings were sufficient enough to demonstrate the case as regards bona fide need and the evidence was still further sufficient to prove the case of bona fide need of the respondent-landlord. 4.Shri Kulkarni, the learned Counsel for the petitioner further relied on (1986) 4 Supreme Court Cases 736, cited supra, on the basis of which, Shri Kulkarni wanted this Court to take into consideration the additional facts, which he has tried to put up by way of affidavit, dated 2.2.1989 before this Court in Revision. The said affidavit has been duly replied by the counter-affidavit by the respondents. By this affidavit, Shri Kulkarni wanted to demonstrate that in partition some property had gone to the share of the respondent-landlord and according to Shri Kulkarni, that should be taken into consideration by this Court at the revisional stage. It is necessary to note in this respect that in fact, the points which are being tried to be put up before the Court, were very much available for being raised by the party concerned before the courts below. Shri Kulkarni has frankly admitted that in spite of availability of these papers, they were not placed before the Court and it is for the first time that they are being brought before this Court. The property, to which a reference is made, according to the learned Counsel Shri Khader, for the respondents, that the house at Mastgad had gone to the share of Shri S.A. Majid, Shri S.A. Salim and Smt. Nafisabegum in the Civil Court decree in Regular Civil Suit No. 365/76, whereas the suit house had gone to the share of the present respondents-plaintiffs, in the same decree as mentioned above, which was passed on 20.10.1976 itself. Shri Kulkarni tried to hammer on the point that if the decree was passed in the year 1976 itself, even then the record did show the name of the present plaintiffs as owners of House No. 9688. According to Shri Kulkarni, since the House No. 9688 showed the name of both the brothers i.e. including the plaintiff, it could be said that he had an alternative accommodation. According to Shri Kulkarni, since the House No. 9688 showed the name of both the brothers i.e. including the plaintiff, it could be said that he had an alternative accommodation. The abovesaid argument of Shri Kulkarni cannot be accepted for the reason that merely because the name of the respondent-plaintiff continued along with his brother, there was no evidence whatsoever to the effect that house belonged to the present respondent-plaintiff and particularly in view of the pleadings and the evidence on the record. 5.Shri Kulkarni, the learned Counsel for the petitioner further tried to suggest that taking into consideration the affidavit, he has filed before this Court, and the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents, it is necessary to remand the matter for fresh evidence on this point. I do not find any justifiable reason now at this stage to remand the matter, particularly when the respondents-landlords have proved their case beyond reasonable doubt and there is concurrent finding of facts to that effect on the record. After going through the judgments of both the courts below, I do not find any illegality committed either by the learned Judge of the Trial Court or by the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court, nor is the case made out by Shri Kulkarni, the learned Counsel for the petitioner of any failure on the part of the Authorities below in exercising the jurisdiction vested in them properly. When there is no jurisdictional error and further when the view taken by the courts below could also be a possible view, then there is no justification for this Court either to remand the matter for fresh evidence or to disturb the findings arrived at by the courts below. Shri Khader, the learned Counsel for the respondent has brought to my notice the judgment reported in A.I.R. 1973 Supreme Court 76, in the case of the (Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan-Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway)4, wherein Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have in so many words observed that: "The order of the first appellate Court may be right or wrong; may be in accordance with law or may not be in accordance with law; but one thing is clear that it had jurisdiction to make that order. It is not the case that the first appellate Court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity." That being so, Their Lordships observed that the High Court could not have invoked the jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, which is somewhat analogous to the provisions of section 26 of the present Act. In the present case also, according to Shri Khader, the learned Counsel for the respondent, the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court has neither exercised its jurisdiction illegally nor with any material irregularity. I have no even slightest hesitation in agreeing with the learned Counsel Shri Khader for the respondents and I fully endorse the view, which Shri Khader has cited. 6.In view of the observations above, an unresistible conclusion is that the present petition deserves to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged and the interim order passed therein, needless to mention, stands vacated. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 7.The learned Counsel Shri Kulkarni for the petitioner requested for certain time to vacate the premises in question. It is true that under the umbrella of interim order of this Court, the petitioner has enjoyed the possession so far, and in ordinary case he would not deserve any leniency in the matter. However, taking into consideration the present days of rainy season and the shortage of accommodation, which the petitioner would be required to find out as an alternate accommodation for himself, in the interest of justice, I grant 45 days time from today to the petitioner to vacate the premises in question. Revision dismissed.