JUDGMENT S. R. Misra, J. Defendant's appeal in a suit for ejectment and mesne profit against the order dated 30th day of July, 1994 in Title Suit No. 187 of 1990 from the Court of 4th Munsif, Alipore affirmed in Title Appeal No. 323 of 1994 dismissing the appeal affirming the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif, defendant has come in the Second Appeal before this Court. The facts in brief stated in the plaint are as follows : 2. Plaintiffs alleged to be the owners of the suit premises having purchases by means of Sale Deed in November, 1986. The present defendant/ appellant is a tenant in the suit premises. He was inducted as a tenant by the previous landlady. After the said purchase by the plaintiff through the lady, defendant admitted the plaintiff to be a landlord by making payment of rent but thereafter the defendant defaulted in making payment of the rent from January, 1988 and onwards. Plaintiffs are tenants in premises No. 120, Rup Chand Mukherjee Lane. Plaintiffs' family consisting of plaintiffs' parents, five brothers and uncle of the plaintiffs, plaintiffs reasonably require the suit premises for their own use and occupation. Suit was contested by the defendant denying the allegations of the plaintiffs that the defendant has defaulted in payment of rent from January, 1988 and onwards. He further denied that the plaintiffs reasonably required the suit premises for their own use and occupation. The Trial Court framed eight issues which are as follows : 1. Whether the suit is maintainable in law? 2. Whether the ejectment Notice has been served upon the defendant if so, is the said notice legal, valid tenable and sufficient ? 3. Whether the defendant is a defaulter in respect of paying rent? 4. Whether the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit property? 5. Whether the suit property is required for own use and occupation by the plaintiffs ? 6. Whether the plaintiffs have another reasonable and/or suitable accommodation except the suit premises ? 7. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree as prayed for? 8. To what reliefs if any, are the plaintiffs entitled to ? 3. Trial Court recorded a finding in respect of issue No. 3 that the defendant has been depositing rent regularly in the Court as such issue No.3 was decided against the plaintiffs. 7. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree as prayed for? 8. To what reliefs if any, are the plaintiffs entitled to ? 3. Trial Court recorded a finding in respect of issue No. 3 that the defendant has been depositing rent regularly in the Court as such issue No.3 was decided against the plaintiffs. As regards the issue No.4, the Trial Court held that the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit premises by virtue of the sale Deed. The main and important issue was issue No.5 i.e. whether the plaintiffs required accommodation in dispute for his own use and occupation, this issue was decided in favour of the plaintiff and the plea of the defendant that the suit property will not be adequate for all the members of his family and even if they get possession of this property their needs will not be fulfilled but from the materials on the record the Trial Court held that since the plaintiffs have filed suits against other tenant and they hope to get possession of these rooms in future. Their needs will be satisfied accordingly to the Court decreed the suit and directed the defendant to vacate the suit premises within a period of sixty days of the date of the order and in default plaintiffs were entitled to recover possession of the suit premises by executing the decree. Defendant filed a Title Appeal No. 323 of 1994, being aggrieved with the findings and the judgment of the Trial Court and the Appellant Court dismissed the appeal. On the other issues the finding of the Trial Court was affirmed by the Appellate Court. 4. Being aggrieved by the orders of the Courts below defendant has come in this appeal. At the time of hearing of the appeal, under Or. XLI R. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure plaintiff-respondents appeared and during the course of the preliminary hearing, the learned Counsel for the appellant cited a Division Bench decision of this Court, reported in AIR 1993 Cal 280 and in view of this it was thought appropriate by this Bench that this appeal may be heard and disposed of finally in accordance with the procedure prescribed after hearing both the parties so as to resolve the controversy, if any, on account of the Division Bench decision referred to above. 5. 5. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at some length. Before we deal with the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to quote the provisions of s.13 (ff) which reads as under : "(ff) subject to the provisions of sub-section (3A), where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held and the landlord or such person is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation." Section 13 sub-section (4) reads as under: "(4) Where the landlord requires the premises on any of the grounds mentioned in clause (f) or clause (ff) of sub-section (1), and the Court is of opinion that such requirement may be substantially satisfied by ejecting the tenant or a sub-tenant from a part only of the premises and allowing the tenant or the sub-tenant to continue in occupation of the rest, then...............," 6. Though a perusal of the orders of the Courts below would go to show that some of the findings recorded by the Courts below are findings of fact and are binding in a second Appeal but what has been vehemently urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that in view of the Division Bench decision referred to above since the requirement of the landlord-respondent was much more than the tenanted accommodation, as such following the reasoning and the decision of the Division Bench the suit of the plaintiffs was liable to be dismissed and the courts below have completely ignored this decision though at no point of time it has been demonstrated before this Court that this decision was cited before the Courts below and if a decision has not been cited no blame can be thrown on the subordinate courts in this regard. However, it has been urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant that this point being a pure question of law this Court may permit the appellant to take the plea and urge the legal question which goes to the root of the matter. On behalf of the learned Counsel for the respondents it has been argued that a perusal of s. 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act at nowhere talks of complete fulfilment of the requirement. But it means, the requirement may be fulfilled substantially. On behalf of the learned Counsel for the respondents it has been argued that a perusal of s. 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act at nowhere talks of complete fulfilment of the requirement. But it means, the requirement may be fulfilled substantially. It was further pointed out that on behalf of the plaintiffs that though the needs of the plaintiffs are more than the tenanted accommodation but as the plaintiffs have filed suits for ejectment against the other tenant like the defendant the case of the plaintiffs cannot be thrown out for getting a decree against the defendant when the courts below were satisfied that since suits have been filed by the plaintiff against the other tenants the defence contention was rejected, and the findings recorded are findings of facts not amenable to interference under s. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As regards the decision of the Division Bench cited on behalf of the appellant, it has been urged that the said decision is not an authority on the proposition of law and neither the authority laid down the principle on which a suit for ejectment is to be decreed and at the best the decision may be said to be per incurium or obiter. At this stage this was also urged on behalf of the appellant that there being a decision of a Division Bench if this Court does not agree with the said decision, the only course open for this Court is to refer the matter to a larger Bench and the argument of the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents that the decision referred to above is per incurium and obiter is erroneous. One of the grounds urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents trying to distinguish the Division Bench decision was that in accordance with the provision of s. 13 sub-so (6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act which reads as under : "(6) Notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in force, no suit or proceeding for the recovery of possession of any premises on any of the grounds mentioned in clauses (f) and (k) of this sub-section shall be filed by the landlord unless he has given to the tenant one month's notice expiring with a month of the tenancy." 7. The Bench having held that the notice required under S. 13 sub-so (6) was the defective one, the other findings were not required to be given. 8. There is no quarrel with the proposition of law that if a decision by a Division Bench is there, the other Division will not ignore the same and in the normal course, the decision will be binding on the other Division Bench but in this regard another question arises that whether a decision if completely ignores the provisions of the Act and an observation made by a Division Bench, in such circumstances will be binding or it is only an obiter or per incurium is another question which is to be considered by this Court. It has also been urged on behalf of the respondents that a decision which decides a point in controversy and is confirmity with the laws which were to be interpreted or decided in the said case then alone it has a binding effect. But in actual observation not required for decision in the case or in the teeth of the provision of section or the laws is neither binding and in such a matter the Bench was not required to take a decision and any observation made by the Bench which defeats the very purpose of the provisions of the Tenancy Act cannot be said to be binding if we look to the facts of the present case and the provisions of the Tenancy Act and the decision reported in AIR 1993 Cal, if literally interpreted it will amount to a legislation and in the rarest of the rare cases a decree for ejectment would be passed. The relevant paragraphs 52, 53, 54 and 55 of the case of Smt. Gita Deui Shah and Ors. vs. Smt. Chandra Moni Karnani & Ors., AIR 1993 Cal 280 read as follows : "52. It is, therefore, established that the plaintiff has no sufficient accommodation for all the family members in one place and as observed by this Hon'ble Court in case of Jiban Jamini Deui vs. Bakul Behari Guin, reported in (1961) 65 CWN 799 and in the case of Amal Chandra Mitra vs. Gobinda Basak, reported in (1982) 2 CLJ 450, plaintiff cannot be compelled to split up his family and put up at different places. 53. 53. In view of the aforesaid decision, let us look into the question whether the plaintiffs will be spared from that trouble from spliting up of the family if the possession of the tenancy, as described by them is made available. 54. As already stated above, the plaintiffs require more than 13 rooms. Therefore, the 10 rooms will certainly not suffice their purpose. We however, cannot agree with the observation of the learned Judge that the plaintiffs be advised to make construction as it is admitted in the plaint that the defendant No.2 had already obtained a sanction for construction of the second floor. 55. We further hold that the plaintiffs have failed to substantiate the ground that they reasonably require the accommodation and also apart from the fact that the question of ownership is not established." 9. On behalf of the appellant, reliance was also placed on a decision of Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 26 paragraphs 573 and 578 and also on the Summons Jurisprudence 12th Edition and the following decision: AIR 1962 SC Page 83 AIR 1956 SC Page 460 AIR 1978 SC Page 413 AIR 1970 SC Page 1475. 10. Learned Counsel for the respondents also placed reliance on a Division Bench decision in second Appeal No. 124-125 of 1993 and in that case a similar controversy was involved as is involved in the present case and the Division Bench has observed as follows :- "We do not think in Smt. Gita Deui Shah and Ors. vs. Smt. Chandra Moni Karnani and Ors. any bald proposition of law was enunciated whereby we can contend that if the landlord cannot accommodate his entire family and satisfy all his requirements from the suit premises, he will not be entitled to get any decree for eviction against the tenant or tenants. It has to be tested as to how far the landlord's requirement could be satisfied by eviction of the different tenants, one by one or of all of them together, if the exact requirement of the plaintiff justifies the same." 11. It has to be tested as to how far the landlord's requirement could be satisfied by eviction of the different tenants, one by one or of all of them together, if the exact requirement of the plaintiff justifies the same." 11. It was urged on behalf of the appellant that the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondents that once the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the notice under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, s. 13 sub-so (6) was a bad notice, the other findings were not to be recorded and any decision on other issues will not be binding. In reply to this part of this argument, it was urged on behalf of the appellant that once a number of issues were framed and no preliminary issues were framed and when the findings are recorded on all issues, those decisions on a a separate issues are relevant and it is only in those class of cases where an issue regarding the maintainability of the suit or jurisdiction of the Court is posed as a preliminary issue and a decision given on that issue that the court has no jurisdiction, the question of recording findings on other issues may not arise. Taking assistance of the said argument it was urged that in the case of AIR 1993 Cal no preliminary issue was framed and all the issues were decided by the Courts below and the Division Bench of the Court while deciding the Second Appeal, recorded findings on all the issues it cannot be said that this Court was not required to record findings nor it could be urged that the decision on other issues was liable to be ignored. If such an interpretation is accepted, this will amount to an erroneous interpretation. If such an interpretation is accepted, this will amount to an erroneous interpretation. On a careful consideration of the arguments raised on behalf of the learned Counsel for the parties and looking into the pleadings as well as the provisions of the Tenancy Laws and the various authorities cited on behalf of the learned Counsel for the parties, one of the questions is the effect of Smt. Gita Devi Shah's case and secondly whether the said decision decides a proposition of law and the decision is only an obiter or per incurium and if the decision arrived at in the said decision, if found to be an interpretation of law and whether such interpretation within the four corners of the Tenancy Act. 12. The provision of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is essentially beneficial legislation for the tenants and to have controlled over the provision contained in the said Act which also includes by providing certain rights to the owner/landlord of the said premises in getting possession of their own premises occupied by the tenants for their use and occupation for themselves or for their family members. A condition has been placed under what circumstances a owner/landlord is entitled to get actual physical possession over the tenanted accommodation and if he satisfies the authority that his need is bona fide and he requires the accommodation if released in occupation of a tenant which will substantially fulfil his requirement he is entitled to a decree for ejectment on his personal need. Each and every case has to be judged on its own. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. The provision of s. 13 itself giving protection to the tenants against eviction but there are certain exceptions which gives right to the landlord to have an accommodation for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held and the landlord or such person is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation. Rent Control Legislation in a country where there is terrible acute accommodation, a beneficial measure of construction must be given liberal enough to fulfil the statutory purposes and not to frustrate it. In case of any doubt benefit may go to a tenant. Rent Control Legislation in a country where there is terrible acute accommodation, a beneficial measure of construction must be given liberal enough to fulfil the statutory purposes and not to frustrate it. In case of any doubt benefit may go to a tenant. But when certain privileges or conditions are contemplated for permitting the landlord to get the accommodation evicted if he satisfies the authority that he reasonably requires the accommodation and whether the tenanted accommodation will fulfil his total need or a part of the need, it is for the landlord to decide it and the application for ejectment on the ground of reasonable requirement is not to be judged in a hyper technical matter that if the requirement is ten rooms and the tenanted accommodation is nine rooms, the application is to be rejected on the ground that it is only when the needs of the landlord and the tenanted accommodation are equal in size then alone an application for the release of the accommodation on personal ground could be denied, will be too harsh interpretation and it will defeat the very purpose for which it was incorporated in the section by providing certain conditions for getting an accommodation occupied by a tenant in favour of a landlord. Another illustration, namely if accommodation occupied by a landlord consists of ten rooms and he owns an accommodation of four rooms occupied by a tenant and applies for ejectment of the tenanted portion on his reasonable requirement and if he satisfies that the four rooms will fulfil his requirement, it cannot be said that since he is already occupying ten rooms in a tenanted portion which may substantially fulfil his need by getting ejectment of four rooms, his application be rejected will be an erroneous interpretation and this will also defeat the exception provided under s. 13 (ff) and s. 13 sub-so (4) of the Act what is the relevant aspect of the matter is that the landlord must satisfy and if the court of fact is satisfied that the landlord reasonably requires the accommodation for his personal use and occupation and the landlord is satisfied that his need will be fulfilled by getting the accommodation in dispute that such a landlord is entitled for a decee for ejectment and no other condition which is not required by the Act. Placing such an interpretation that it is only when the total need or full need of the landlord is satisfied then alone he is entitled for a decree is not a correct interpretation. There is no quarrel with the proposition that an interpretation which defeats the very purpose or gives an interpretation which defeats the right for whose benefit the exception clause was carved out. The attempt should be given a liberal meaning of the said provision and there should be a harmonious interpretation so as to give a normal meaning and the purpose for which the Act was made and not to give a meaning and to interpret in such manner so as to defeat the very purpose for enacting the provisions of the Act in this regard. 13. A perusal of Gita Devi Shah's case in paragrah 49 the Bench has held as under :- "In view of the above, we hold that the notice is bad in law and not binding upon the respondent in F.A. No. 178 of 1988 and on this ground the suit is not maintainable for its clear violation of the statute, i.e. s.13 (6) of the said Act of 1956." 14. Bench has further held in paragraph which reads as under :- "We further hold that the plaintiffs have failed to substantiate the ground that they reasonably require the accommodation and also apart from the fact that the question of ownership is not established." 15. A note be taken of this aspect of the matter as well that Bench decision of Gita Devi Shah's case was in respect of a regular First Appeal where a finding of fact was also to be considered by the Bench in appeal, where in the case in hand this is a Second Appeal where a finding of fact recorded by the courts below that the plaintiffs have proved that they reasonably require the accommodation in dispute is a finding of fact. Accordingly, looking into the facts and circumstances the provisions of Act of 1956 and the pleadings of the parties, there is no manner of doubt that the observation made in Smt. Gita Shah's case is at the best an obiter and it cannot be said to be a decision which is binding and which requires a reversal by a larger Bench overruling the Division Bench decision in Gita Devi Shah's case. The Bench itself has held that in the absence of a notice under s. 13(6) the suit was not maintainable. The plaintiff has failed to prove that he was a landlord of the accommodation in dispute and thereafter the decision of the Bench is only at the best can be said to be an alternative finding that the requirement of the plaintiff is more and the finding of the Trial Court that the plaintiff after getting possession can construct some more rooms was neither required nor there was any necessity for recording such a finding and when a finding not required to be given and the decision regarding the maintainability of the suit and the fact that a person seeking ejectment was not the owner in view of the finding, the suit was held to be not maintainable on those two counts. 16. The finding about the reasonable requirement of the plaintiff after considering the respective cases of the parties, the two courses having been satisfied about the reasonable requirement of the plaintiff, this finding is essentially a finding of fact and is binding in Second Appeal and we are also of opinion that Gita Devi Shah's case do not lay down a law nor any bald proposition of law was initiated. We borrow the decision in Second Appeal Nos. 124 and 125 where the Division Bench has held that the decision of the Gita Devi Shah's case do not lay down that if the landlord cannot accommodate his entire family and satisfied with all his requirement from the suit premises, he will not be entitled to get any decree against the tenant or tenants. What is materials and just in this regard is how far the landlord's requirement could be satisfied by the ejectment of tenant or tenants one by one or all of them together if the exact requirement of the plaintiff justifies the same. We are in full agreement and follow observations of the Division Bench accordingly. We do not find any force in the Second Appeal. Accordingly, it fails and is dismissed. 17. We are in full agreement and follow observations of the Division Bench accordingly. We do not find any force in the Second Appeal. Accordingly, it fails and is dismissed. 17. However, under the facts and circumstances of the case we grant 18 months time to vacate the premises in question provided the defendant appellant files an undertaking within a period of four weeks from the date of delivery of the judgment before the Trial Court that he will vacate the premises after the expiry of the aforesaid period of 18 months and in this period he will not sublet the tenanted accommodation in dispute nor he will create any hindrance of peaceful handing over of the tenanted portion after the expiry period and goes on paying monthly amount of rent in the shape of damages by 15th of every month and deposit of the damages upto the month of August is to be paid by 15th of September and the subsequent damages by the 15th of each succeeding month. 18. For a period of four weeks the execution of the decree shall remain stayed to enable the appellant to file his undertaking and if the undertaking is filed and the damages are deposited as stated above, the ejectment of the appellant shall remain stayed for 18 months. On failure to file his undertaking or pay the consecutive rent for two months staying of the ejectment of the appellant for 18 months shall automatically come to an end. It will be open for the plaintiff-respondents to execute the decree in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. S. Narayan, J.: I agree. Later: Office is directed to send the record at the earliest at the expense of the respondent, if they are ready to pay costs of the special messenger. Since we have taken the view that the findings of facts have been recorded by the courts below and there is no substantial question of law involved in the Second Appeal, we do not think it is the fit case for granting leave under Art. 134A of the Constitution for filing an appeal before the Supreme Court as prayed for by the learned Counsel for the appellant. S. Narayan, J.: I agree. Second Appeal dismissed.