Honble YADAV, J. – Instant revision petition has been filed against the order dated 17.10.95 passed by learned Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 2, Jodhpur whereby he refused to take on record a certified copy of the judgment pronounced on 30.5.80 in Civil Original Suit No. 131/79 and a certified copy of the judgment rendered by him on 16.1.94 in Civil Original Suit No. 39/90. (2). Indisputably afore mentioned two suits were filed by the defendant-revisionist against tenants for eviction from two portions of the disputed house which is subject matter of the present suit between the parties. It is true that in the aforesaid two suits the non-petitioner was not impleaded as party. (3). According to the learned trial court since both the judgments were given in such suits which were instituted subsequent to the present suit, therefore, these judgments rendered by him are not receivable in evidence. It is further held by the learned trial court that the provisions of Sec. 13(b) of the Indian Evidence Act are in the past tense, hence two aforesaid judgments arising out of aforementioned subsequent suits to the present suit are not receivable in evidence. (4). In support of its aforesaid conclusion the learned trial court has placed reliance on a decision rendered by Lahore High Court in the case of Shankar Lal and others vs. Kailash Chand and others (1), holding that post litem instances are inadmissible in evidence. (5). Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the order impugned. (6). A basic question of general importance is involved in the present revision as to whether two judgments which are not inter- parties arising out of subsequent suits are not receivable in evidence simply because the provisions of Sec. 13(b) of the Indian Evidence Act are in the past tense and these two judgments fall within the ambit of post litem instances. (7). For deeper understanding of the question involved in the present revision a careful scrutiny of Sections 40,41,42 and 43 reveal that these sections deal with relevancy of the judgments, orders or decrees of the courts of law. These sections further reveal that if such judgments, orders or decrees do not fall within the ambit of any of these sections, such judg- ments, orders or decrees are not receivable in evidence. (8). These sections further reveal that if such judgments, orders or decrees do not fall within the ambit of any of these sections, such judg- ments, orders or decrees are not receivable in evidence. (8). Section 40 of the Indian Evidence Act postulates that the previous judgments, decrees or orders are receivable in evidence which bar a second suit or trial. Aforesaid section provides that existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any court from taking cogni- zance of a suit or holding a trial, is a relevant fact when the question is whether such court ought to take cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial are admissible in evidence. To my mind, all those judgments, orders or decrees passed by the civil courts between the parties about the same subject matter having effect of principle of res judicata, are receivable in evidence under Sec. 40 of the Indian Evidence Act. Similarly all the judgments and orders passed by the courts of law exercising criminal jurisdiction which bar a fresh trial having affect of principle of Stare decisis are also admissible in evidence under the aforesaid section. Under this section, judgment in rem and judgment in personal, both are receivable in evidence subject to assessment of its testimonial value at appropriate stage within the meaning of Sec. 44 of the Indian Evidence Act. (9). A court of law is required to take precaution not to be influenced with the testimonial value of such judgments, orders or decrees at the stage of its admission. In fact, at the stage of admission of such judgments, orders or decrees the courts of law are required to limit its scrutiny only upto its relevancy leaving apart its testimonial value, which is to be determined within the four corners of Sec. 44 of the Evidence Act at a subsequent stage. (10). Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with the judgments in rem alone which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character or which declares any person to be entitled to any specific thing not as against any specified person but absolutely against the whole of the world. Such judgments, orders or decrees are conclusive proof of that which they state and its testimonial value has to be examined in the light of Sec.44 of the Evidence Act at a subsequent stage. (11). Such judgments, orders or decrees are conclusive proof of that which they state and its testimonial value has to be examined in the light of Sec.44 of the Evidence Act at a subsequent stage. (11). Section 42 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in Sec. 41 about the matters of public nature even if such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state. Under this section a court of law is not called upon to look into its testimonial value at the stage of its admission provided such judgments, orders or decrees relate to the matters of public nature relevant to the enquiry for the proceedings pending before such court. (12). In my humble opinion under Sec.42 of the Indian Evidence Act the relevancy of judgments, orders or decrees have nexus with the suits which are ordinarily file either in the representative capacity under O.I r.8 CPC with the leave of the court or such suits which are required to be filed with the leave of the court and also with the previous sanction of some appropriate authority as contemplated under Sections 91,92 and 93 of the Civil Procedure Code. (13). Intrinsic testimonial value of such judgments, decrees or orders are to be examined with reference to other evidence on record subject to mandatory provisions contemplated under Sec. 44 of the Indian Evidence Act. (14). From the above discussion I am of the opinion that two judgments in question sought to be exhibited and filed by the revisionist are not receivable in evidence under Sections 40,41 and 42 of the Indian Evidence Act. (15). Now only Sec. 43 of Evidence Act remains to be tested to ascertain as to whether these two judgments are receivable in evidence under the aforesaid section. In order to appreciate the controversy on hand and to adjudicate the question effectively as formulated in preceding paragraph the provisions of Sec. 43 as well as Sec. 13 of the Indian Evidence Act are quoted below for ready reference:– ``43. Judgments etc. other than mentioned in Sections 40 and 42 when relevant- Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in Sections 40,41 and 42 are irrelevant unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree is a fact in issue or is relevant under some provision of this Act. Judgments etc. other than mentioned in Sections 40 and 42 when relevant- Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in Sections 40,41 and 42 are irrelevant unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree is a fact in issue or is relevant under some provision of this Act. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (13). Facts relevant when right or custom is in question:- Where the question is as to the existence of any right or custom, the following facts are relevant:– (a). any transaction by which the right or custom in question was created , claimed, modified , recognized , asserted or denied or which was inconsistent with its existence. (b). particular instances in which the right or custom was claimed, recognized or exercised or in which its exercise was disputed, asserted or departed from. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (16). A conjoined reading of Sec. 43 and Sec. 13(b) of the Evidence Act reveal that a judgment which is not inter parties yet it is admissible in evidence as a instance for proving the plaintiffs or defendants assertion making it either probable or improbable in the suit pending consideration before such court. Such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive about the fact stated therein but these judgments, orders or decrees are receivable in evidence and its evidentiary value has to be assessed and determined with due care and caution with other evidence adduced by the parties. A court of law is not required to be influenced with the date of filing of the suit from which such judgments, orders or decrees had originated at the stage of its admission to prove as a particular instance relevant to the inquiry for the suit pending before such court. After pronouncement of judgments, orders or decrees so pronounced assume the character of instances as contemplated under Sec. 13(b) of the Evidence Act irrespective of date of filing of suits from which such judgments, orders or decrees had originated. (16A). After pronouncement of judgments, orders or decrees so pronounced assume the character of instances as contemplated under Sec. 13(b) of the Evidence Act irrespective of date of filing of suits from which such judgments, orders or decrees had originated. (16A). Mere assertion by the parties in plaint and written statement of a suit about right and custom to be used as instances under Sec. 13(b) of the Evidence Act is not decisive. It is for the court to determine the truth of such assertions made in a suit and to give recognition to such right and custom which can be used as instances under the aforesaid section. The word `instances signifies that mere allegation in a suit by way of plaint or written statement about right and custom is not enough but there should be a judicial verdict, therefore, prior or subsequent filing of suit is irrelevant consideration to decide the receivability of a judgment under Sec. 13(b) of the said Act. (17). It is true that the provisions contained under Sec. 44 of the Evidence Act about proving of fraud or collusion in obtaining such judgments, orders or decrees or incompetency of court is not extended to Sec. 43 of the Act yet the general principles envisage under Sec. 44 can be easily pressed into service at the time of appreciating its evidentiary value to check any mischief creating superficial post litem instances by any party to a suit in which such judgments, orders or decrees are sought to be relied upon. (18). Learned counsel for the respondent Mr M.R. Thanvi supported the impugned order passed by the learned trial court. He urged before me that instances or transactions in which right or custom is claimed, recognized or exercised etc. must be instances and transactions prior to the suit in question because Sec. 13 of the Indian Evidence Act under which they are receivable in evidence is in the past tense, therefore, post litem instances or transactions are inadmissible in evidence. Learned counsel for the res- pondent reiterated the ratio of Shankar Lals case (supra) relied upon by the learned trial court. (19). Learned counsel for the res- pondent reiterated the ratio of Shankar Lals case (supra) relied upon by the learned trial court. (19). I am not able to persuade myself to subscribe the view expressed in the case of Shankar Lal (supra) inasmuch as relevancy of the judgment, order or decree under Sec. 43 read with Sec. 13(b) of the Indian Evidence Act as a particular instance are independent with its intrinsic testimonial value. If a judgment, order or decree passed by the court is made receivable under Sec. 13(b) as a particular instance, it cannot be declared to be inadmissible because it arises out of a subsequent suit. Date of filing of the suit has no nexus with the relevancy of such judgment, order or decree, otherwise receivable in evidence as a particular instance. In fact for making judgment admissible under Sec. 43 read with Sec. 13(b) of the Indian Evidence Act as a particular instance the date of pronouncement of judgment is a relevant consideration and not the date of filing of the suit. (20). Prior pronouncement of judgments, decrees or orders sought to be filed in a suit pending consideration as a particular instance is sufficient explanation about the past tense used under Sec. 13 of the Indian Evidence Act and an argument contrary to it is not acceptable. (21). There is yet another reason to hold that two judgments in question are receivable in evidence within the meaning of Sec. 43 read with Sec. 11(2) of the Indian Evidence Act. Sec. 11(2) of the Indian Evidence Act can be described as residuary section dealing with the facts not otherwise relevant become relevant, if they are inconsistent with any fact in issue or if such facts by them selves or in connection with the other facts, they make the existence or non-existence of any fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable or improbable. Since both the judgments in question relate to the house in dispute in the present suit, therefore, these judgments are relevant to prove probability or improbability of the assertions made by the parties and as such are receivable in evidence. (22). The learned trial court has committed jurisdictional error in refusing to take on record two judgments in question as inadmissible in evidence treating it to be post litem instances. (22). The learned trial court has committed jurisdictional error in refusing to take on record two judgments in question as inadmissible in evidence treating it to be post litem instances. In fact the intrinsic evidentiary values of these two judgments are required to be assessed in the light of the other evidence adduced by the parties while deciding the suit on merit. In the present case the learned trial court has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally with material irregularity by treating receivability of evidence of two judgments in question co- terminous with its testimonial value which is not sustainable in eye of law for the reasons stated above. (23). The learned counsel for the parties have not argued any other point except the points discussed above. (24). As a result of the aforementioned discussion the order impugned dated 17.11.1995 is hereby set aside and the instant revision petition is allowed. The learned trial court is directed to take on record two judgments in question and appreciate its testimonial value in the light of the observations made above. Costs easy.