( 1 ) THIS is an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay in filing the appeal as an indigent person within the prescribed time. ( 2 ) THE respondent-plaintiff filed Original Suit No. 72 of 1978 for a decree for specific performance. The Trial Court by its judgment and decree dated 25-6-1984 decreed the plaintiffs suit with a direction to the defendant-applicant to refund the earnest money of Rs. 20,000/ -. The suit was decreed only to that extent. The defendant-applicant did not either prefer the appeal nor approached this Court with application under Order 44 during the period of limitation. The defendant filed an application under Order 44, Rule 1 of C. P. C. on 11-10-1995. The defendant- petitioner also moved an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal along with application under Order 44, Rule 1 and has prayed for condonation of delay in moving the appeal along with Order 44, C. P. C. application. The appeal as well as order 44 application firstly have been filed beyond limitation. It has really been filed more than 10 years from the date of decision of the Trial Court. In the application for condonation of delay it has been stated that when the recording of evidence had completed and the case was posted for arguments, it was told to him by his Counsel that it is not necessary for the defendant- applicant to come to Court on the date of hearing. The allegations in paragraph 3 of the affidavit is as under: "i, was all along under the bona fide belief that, my case is still pending before the learned Civil Judge. I submit that after closing the evidence, the case was posted for arguments and I was told that my presence was not required. Therefore, I was all along waiting for communication from my local Counsel. But I have not received any letter". In paragraph 4 it has been mentioned that when the decree-holder had applied for execution of decree in 1995 and notice of the execution case was served, then and then only the defendant-applicant contacted her Counsel and enquired about the case and then according to averment in the affidavit, the counsel told that decree has been passed against the defendant and that Counsel had written letters intimating the passing of the decree. But the deponent has stated that letters were not received by the deponent. The applicant has asserted that the applicant came to know about the passing of the decree in september 1995 when the applicant contacted her legal Counsel. It has been stated that the applicant is poor rustic women coming from village. Time was given to the applicant to file additional affidavit, but nothing new has been brought by way of additional affidavit except that the applicant has stated that delay in filing the petition was on account of the fact that the applicant was an indigent person having no source of income. ( 3 ) I have heard the learned Counsel for the applicant, Sri C. P. Patil. Sri C. P. Patil submitted that the applicant did not know about the passing of the decree. She came to know about it in september 1995 when execution proceedings were launched and the applicant contacted her Counsel. He submitted that the respondent had not taken execution proceedings for 10 years, so the applicant did not and could not file. He further submitted that the applicant is a poor rustic women coming from the village folk and she is a person without means, so liberal attitude adopted by the Court for condonation of the delay. In this connection, the learned Counsel placed before me a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, anantnag and Another v Mst. Katiji and Others. The learned counsel submitted that refusing to condone the delay might adversely affect the cause of justice. But if delay is condoned, the case will be decided on merits after hearing. So, if delay is condoned the opposite party will not suffer and a liberal and pragmatic approach should be made by the Court in the matter of condonation of delay. ( 4 ) I have applied my mind to the contentions made by the learned Counsel. No doubt, the primary object is to impart justice and discretionary relief need be granted guided by equitable considerations, but it is also one of the principles of law and doctrine of equity, that the person seeking exercise of discretionary relief on the grounds of equity must be acting diligently and not negligently. He must come with clean hands. No doubt, the primary object is to impart justice and discretionary relief need be granted guided by equitable considerations, but it is also one of the principles of law and doctrine of equity, that the person seeking exercise of discretionary relief on the grounds of equity must be acting diligently and not negligently. He must come with clean hands. No doubt liberal approach has to be adopted, but liberality of approach does not mean that if a right has accrued to a party by the lapse of time and because of negligence of the applicant himself, particularly when he is not able to explain the cause and he has not explained any cause and it is not to be expected from the Court that the Court should create or assume there was some substantial or sufficient cause for delay nor in the name of liberal approach, the Court should itself make out a cause for the party. The party has to state the facts and circumstances explaining the cause and showing that the party, i. e. , applicant has always been diligent in performance of the duties on its part and inspite of its diligence the delay occurred. But, if the party fails to place the facts or explain, the rule of liberality cannot be stretched to such an extent that Court should assume that there has been sufficient cause for applicants' failure to file the appeal or application on the last date of limitation and thereafter. ( 5 ) IN the present case, the applicant simply alleged that after the close of evidence, the applicant was told by the Counsel that on the dates of hearing or arguments there is no need of her presence and she may not come on that date. It did not mean that she or he should have gone and taken a long sleep for 10 years. When the applicant says in the applicant, because the plaintiff did not moved for execution of decree, it gives an idea that applicant did know that the suit had already been decreed. Otherwise there was no question for the applicant to have awaited the decree-holder to have moved the application for execution. When the applicant says in the applicant, because the plaintiff did not moved for execution of decree, it gives an idea that applicant did know that the suit had already been decreed. Otherwise there was no question for the applicant to have awaited the decree-holder to have moved the application for execution. As a rule of common sense, after the closing of evidence, if reasonable time has passed, it was the duty of the applicant to have contacted the applicant's Counsel in the subordinate Court to know about the position of the case. It has been further stated that the applicant's Counsel had sent intimation of the decision and decree to the party. When that is so, it cannot be said that applicant did not know about the passing of the decree in the suit. The allegations made by the applicant are further falsified by the conduct of the applicant which have been most unnatural that after the close of evidence the applicant continued to await for 11 years or so. In these circumstances, I find that no cause has been shown at all for not filing the appeal in time. Economic disability is no doubt should not hamper the course of justice and for that provisions have been made under Order 44. The applicant was expected to have contacted the Counsel and moved the application under Order 44 within the reasonable time and not to have slept for 10 years, so on such consideration, and in these circumstances of case application for the condonation of delay under Section 5 cannot be allowed. ( 6 ) THE application for condonation of delay is hereby rejected as the applicant has failed to indicate any sufficient cause or to furnish sufficient explanation for the 11 years delay. The application for condonation of delay is hereby rejected. ( 7 ) AS the application under Section 5 is rejected, the civil petition under Order 44, Rule 1 and the memo of appeal are hereby rejected as barred by limitation. --- *** --- .