Judgment :- The claimants are the appellants. The claimants have filed claim petition before the Tribunal with a petition to condone the delay of 470 days in filing the same. The Tribunal has dismissed the said application in I.A. No. 1565 of 1990. Hence the appeal is against the said order. 2. The appellants have stated in the affidavit filed in support of the condone delay petition that her husband died on 31-1-1989 and due to shock and grief she was not able to file the O.P. immediately. Further she, being in illiterate lady, does not know the consequences. 3. The lower Court has dismissed the application for condonation of the delay on the ground that Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act prescribed a period of six months by way of limitation for filing the claim petition and further time of six months with a petition for condonation of the delay, i.e. altogether one year from the date of accident. In this case, the accident took place on 31-1-1989 and claim petition has been filed in December, 1991 only beyond the limitation period prescribed under the Statute. Section 166(3) reads as follows :- "No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. 4. The counsel for the appellant contended that since this provision has been amended by Act 54 of 1994 by which the section has been deleted, the claimant is entitled to maintain the claim petition. There is no restriction with regard to the limitation as on today. 5. The contention of the counsel cannot be accepted because the amended provision is not made applicable with retrospective effect. It is only perspective. So far as this case is concerned, it is to be considered as to whether the application is maintainable as on that date. There is no restriction with regard to the limitation as on today. 5. The contention of the counsel cannot be accepted because the amended provision is not made applicable with retrospective effect. It is only perspective. So far as this case is concerned, it is to be considered as to whether the application is maintainable as on that date. In fact the Supreme Court had dealt with similar occasion in case reported in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co., Ltd., 1991 (3) SCR 912, 1991 AIR(SC) 2156, 1991 (4) SCC 333 , 1991 (3) JT 660 , 1991 (2) Scale 493 , 1992 (1) UJ 129, 1992 (75) CC 611, 1991 (3) CCC 249, 1991 (2) ACJ 1060, 1991 (2) ACC 449, 1992 CAR 68, 1991 (78) AIR(SC) 2156, 1991 AllCJ 1353, 1991 AIR(SCW) 2503 wherein it has been held as follows:- "The period of limitation for filing a claim petition both under the old Act and the new Act is six months from the date of the accident. The difference in the two Acts, which is relevant in the present cases, is in regard to the provisions relating to condonation of delay. In view of the proviso to sub- sec. (3) of Section 166 of the new Act, the maximum period of delay which can be condoned is six months, which expired on 22-1-1990. If the new Act is held to be applicable, the appellant's petition filed in March had to be dismissed. The case of the appellant is that the accident having taken place before the new Act came into force, the proceeding is governed by the old Act, where there was no such restriction as in the new Act. The question is as to which Act is applicable, the new Act or the old. In the case before us the period of limitation for lodging the claim under the old as well as the new Act was same six months which expired three weeks after coming in force of the new Act. It was open to the appellant to file his claim within this period or even later by 22-7-1989 with a prayer to condone the delay. His right to claim compensation was not affected at all by the substitution of one Act with another. Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no question of the appellant being taken by surprise. His right to claim compensation was not affected at all by the substitution of one Act with another. Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no question of the appellant being taken by surprise. So far the question of condonation of six months delay was concerned, there was no change in the position under the new Act. In this background the appellant's further default has to be considered. If in a given case the accident had taken place more than a year before the new Act coming in force and the claimant had actually filed his petition while the old Act was in force but after a period of one year, the position could be different. Having actually initiated the proceeding when the old Act covered the field a claimant could say that his right which had accrued on filing of the petition could not be taken away. The present case is different. The right or privilege to claim benefit of a provision for condonation of delay can be governed only by the law in force at the time of delay. Even the hope or expectation of getting the benefit of an enactment presupposes applicability of the enactment when the need arises to take its benefit. In the present case the occasion to take the benefit of the provision for condonation ofdelay in filing the claim arose only after repeal ofthe old law. Obviously the ground for condonation set up as "sufficient cause" also relates to the time after the repeal. The benefit ofthe repealed law could not, therefore, be available actually because the cause of action for the claim arose before repeal. "Sufficient cause" as a ground of condonation of delay in filing the claim is distinct from "cause of action" for the claim itself. The question of condonation ofdelay must, therefore be governed by the new law. We accordingly hold that the High Court was right in its view that the case was covered by the new Act, and delay for a longer period than six months could not be condoned." The same was confirmed in the case reported in National Insurance Co., Ltd. v. M/s. Swaranlata Das, 1993 AIR(SC) 1259, 1993 (S2) SCC 743, 1993 (2) ACJ 748, 1993 SCC(Cr) 788, 1993 AIR(SCW) 245. Hence, the petitioner's case is governed only by the provision of Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act as on date of filing of the petition. 6. Hence the order of the lower Court is confirmed and appeal is dismissed. Consequently, C.M.P. No. 15021 of 1995 is also dismissed. Appeal dismissed.