Judgment J. N. Dubey, J. 1. This writ-petition is directed against the order dated 24th June, 1993 of the Respondent No.2 the Chairman, Bihar State Warehousing corporation, Patna (for short corporation), dismissing the appeal of the petitioner and confirming the order dated 28th October, 1977 of the respondent No.3, the Managing Director of the Corporation, dismissing the petitioner from service. 2. The case of the petitioner is that he was appointed as Assistant in the Respondent Corporation on 16th october, 1969. He was later on promoted and posted as Superintendent incharge of the Corporation at Jainagar (Madhubani ). On 23rd July, 1976 a First information Report was lodged against him at Police Station Jainagar under sections 408, 409, 380, 411 and 414 of the Indian Penal Code and Rule 114 of the Defence of India Rules. The petitioner filed an application for anticipatory bail in this Court, which was allowed on 10-11-1976. The cognizance in this case was taken against him on 5th December, 1980. He filed Cr. Misc. No.4193 of 1981 under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the entire criminal proceeding, which was allowed on 14-9-1983 and the entire proceeding initiated on the basis of the F. I. R. were quashed. 3. The petitioner was placed under suspension on 12-11-76 in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. He was served with a charge-sheet, to which he submitted his detailed explanation within the stipulated time. The Enquiry Officer, without conducting any enquiry, submitted his report to the Respondent No.3 with the finding that all the charges, levelled against the petitioner, were proved. The respondent No.3 without affording any opportunity to the petitioner, to explain his conduct, dismissed his from service on 28th October, 1977. Petitioner filed appeal to the respondent No.2 on 26th november, 1977. On the failure of the petitioner to get his appeal decided in spite of repeated reminders, he filed this writ petition, which was admitted for hearing Meanwhile, the respondent No.2 dismissed the pending appeal of the petitioner on 24th June; 1993. The petitioner moved an application for amendment of the writ-petition, on 5th october, 1993, which was allowed on 3rd August, 1994. 4. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 5. The petitioner moved an application for amendment of the writ-petition, on 5th october, 1993, which was allowed on 3rd August, 1994. 4. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the order of the respondent No.2 dismissing the appeal of the petitioner does not contain any reason and is, therefore, liable to be quashed on this ground alone. He further contended that after the quashing of criminal proceeding by this Court, respondent No.3 was not legally justified in initiating disciplinary proceeding against him. It was further submitted that the petitioner was served with the charge-sheet to which he submitted his show cause but thereafter the Enquiry officer did not record any evidence in the disciplinary proceeding nor did he afford any opportunity to the petitioner to lead evidence in his defence, and submitted his report to the respondent No.3. The enquiry report, having been submitted without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, could not be used against him for any purpose, but the respondent No.3 acting on it dismissed him from service by a non-speaking order. The order of the respondent No.3 shows that he has neither considered the charges levelled against the petitioner nor the show cause submitted by him and has passed the order of dismissal without recording his own finding on each point. According to the learned Counsel the charges levelled against the petitioner were vague and, as such, no action could be taken on the basis thereof. He has also assailed the correctness of the charges with the help of the show cause submitted by the petitioner to the charge-sheet. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the petitioner has been rightly dismissed from the service on the basis of the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer after holding him guilty of all the charges levelled against him. 6. Having considered the arguments of the learned Counsel for the parties, I have no hesitation in holding that the petitioner has not been treated fairly by the respondents in this case. Inspite of the fact that the criminal proceedings were quashed by this Court, the disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner substantially for the same charge. 6. Having considered the arguments of the learned Counsel for the parties, I have no hesitation in holding that the petitioner has not been treated fairly by the respondents in this case. Inspite of the fact that the criminal proceedings were quashed by this Court, the disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner substantially for the same charge. It is true that in an appropriate case even if the criminal case is decided in favour of the delinquent officer, disciplinary proceeding may be initiated against him. But it can be as an exception and not as a general rule. In this particular case, after the specific finding of this Court that no prima-facie case was made out against the petitioner, in my opinion, respondent No.3 was not justified in initiating disciplinary proceeding against him. The grievance of this petitioner that neither any enquiry was conducted in the matter nor was he afforded any opportunity of hearing, is also well-founded. From the materials on record it is clear that the Enquiry Officer did not conduct any enquiry into the matter and submitted his report to the respondent No.3 without even allowing the petitioner to have his say. The charges are also quite vague and there appears to be no legal evidence to substantiate the same. A bare reading of the enquiry report would show that the enquiry officer instead of deciding the charges levelled against the petitioner simply reproduced the charges and concluded that all of them were proved. 7. Admittedly, no copy of the enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner before the final decision of dismissal was taken by the respondent no.3. It is now well settled that the failure to supply a copy of the enquiry report to a delinquent officer before final decision is taken in the matter deprives him of his valuable right to file representation against it. 8. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent No.3 has not recorded his own findings about the various charges levelled against the petitioner and has passed the order of dismissal in a most mechanical manner, is also well-founded. 8. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent No.3 has not recorded his own findings about the various charges levelled against the petitioner and has passed the order of dismissal in a most mechanical manner, is also well-founded. From the order, I find that the respondent No.3 instead of referring the charges levelled against the petitioner and the show cause, the evidence led by the department to substantiate the said charges and the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, has merely observed that in the light of the enquiry report the services of the petitioner were terminated. It is now well settled that the punishing authority has to record its own finding on the basis of the material on record, which has admittedly not been done in this case. The order of the respondent No.3 does not contain any reason for dismissing the petitioner from service. Similar is the position about the order of the appellate authority. It is strange that the appellate authority after taking long 16 years, for deciding the appeal, dismissed it without assigning any reason, which alone is sufficient for setting aside its order. 9. Learned Counsel for the respondents contended that in case this court was of the opinion that disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner were not properly conducted, the Corporation may be given an option to proceed with the matter afresh in accordance with law. Ordinarily, after quashing the impugned orders I would have left it open for the Corporation to proceed in the matter afresh in accordance with law but considering the nature of the charges, the fact that criminal proceedings against the petitioner have already been quashed by this Court and that he has already suffered a lot, for his being out of employment for about twenty years, I am not inclined to do so. 10. In the result, the writ-petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders dated 24th June, 1993 of the respondent no.2 and the order dated 28th October 1977 of the respondent No.3 are quashed. The petitioner will be entitled for Rs.2,000 a cost. Petition Allowed.