Ambalal Nathalal Patel v. STATE — 1996 DIGILAW 326 (GUJ)

A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THE order passed by and on behalf of the District Panchayat at mehsana (respondent No. 2 herein) on 30/01/1984 rejecting the application made by the petitioners for grant of what is popularly known as the N. A. Permission with respect to one parcel of land bearing plot No. 183 situated in Barsan taluka Kalol (the disputed land for convenience) is under challenge in this petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India. ( 2 ) IT is not necessary to set out in detail the facts giving rise to this petition. It would be sufficient to note that the petitioners applied to respondent No. 2 for grant of the N. A. Permission qua the disputed land. A copy of that application is at Annexure-C to this petition. It appears that, in its Executive Committee Meeting held on 25/01/1984, the application made by the petitioners was considered and by a Resolution passed therein it was decided to reject that application. A copy of the Minutes of the aforesaid Meeting of the Executive Committee of respondent No. 2 is at Annexure-B to this petition. Pursuant thereto, the order rejecting the application for the N. A. Permission made by the petitioners was passed on 30/01/1984. Its copy is at Annexure-A to this petition. The aggrieved petitioners have thereupon approached this court by means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for questioning its correctness. ( 3 ) THE ground given for rejection of the application for the N. A. Permission made by the petitioners is that the State Government directed respondent No. 2 not to grant any N. A. Permission with respect to any land situated in the Khakharia Tapa zone of talukas Kadi and Kalol. It thus becomes clear that the application for the N. A. Permission made by the petitioners was not considered on its own merits. It has been decided at the behest of or under the dictation of the State Government. It would mean that the discretion on the part of respondent No. 2 was forfeited to the State government or it was abdicated in favour of the State Government. It is a settled principle of law that an order at the behest of or under the order of any superior authority is no order in the eyes of taw. It would mean that the discretion on the part of respondent No. 2 was forfeited to the State government or it was abdicated in favour of the State Government. It is a settled principle of law that an order at the behest of or under the order of any superior authority is no order in the eyes of taw. ( 4 ) IN this connection, a reference deserves to be made to the binding ruling of the supreme Court in the case of Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja vs. State of Gujarat, reported in Judge Today 1995 (6) Supreme Court at Page 146. In that matter, the case against the appellants before the Supreme Court was originally registered on 19/03/1995 under the Arms Act. The D. S. P. did not give any prior approval on his own to record any information about the commission of an offence under what is popularly known as the TADA. On the contrary, he made a report to the Additional Chief Secretary and asked for permission to proceed under the TADA. That is how the appellants came to be prosecuted by the sanction of the State Government. In that context, the Supreme Court has held that there was no valid sanction. It has further been held that, if the discretion is exercised under the direction of or in compliance with some higher authoritys instructions, it will be a case of failure to exercise the discretion altogether. It is obvious that such exercise of discretion would be no discretion in the eyes of law. ( 5 ) A similar view is taken by this court in its unreported ruling in Special Civil application No. 2054 of 1996 decided on 18/06/1996. This court has held therein that an order passed by an authority at the behest of or under the dictation of the superior authority is no order in the eyes of law and it cannot be sustained in law. The aforesaid ruling of this court is on all fours applicable in this case. ( 6 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the impugned order at annexure-A to this petition cannot be sustained in law. It is obvious that it is based on one resolution passed in the Meeting of the Executive Committee of respondent No. 2 held on 25/01/1984. Such Resolution also cannot be sustained in law. It is obvious that it is based on one resolution passed in the Meeting of the Executive Committee of respondent No. 2 held on 25/01/1984. Such Resolution also cannot be sustained in law. Both the resolution and the Order at Annexure-A to this petition will have to be quashed and set aside. The matter will have to be remanded to respondent No. 2 for restoration of the proceeding to file and for its fresh decision according to law uninfluenced by any government order. ( 7 ) IN the result, this petition is accepted. Resolution No. 8 (1) passed in the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the District Panchayat at Mehsana (respondent No. 2 herein) held on 25/01/1984 at Annexure-B to this petition and the order passed on its basis on 30/01/1984 at Annexure-A to this petition are quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to respondent No. 2 for restoration of the proceeding to file and for its fresh decision according to law in the light of this judgment of mine. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs. .