Judgment : The above revision has been filed against the order of the learned Subordinate Judge Kumbakonam, dated 30.8.1995 in LA. No.153 of 1994 in O.S. No.68 of 1984, whereunder the learned Subordinate Judge has chosen to reject the application filed underO.6, Rule 17 read with Sec.l51 of the Code of Civil Procedure to amend the plaint so as to introduce paragraph 7(a) to the plaint stating about the subsequent developments and events subsequent to the dismissal of the suit and said to have accrued during the pendency of the appeal regarding the alleged demolition of the stair case and introducing a claim for the relief of mandatory injunction, as also amending the valuation portion of the plaint so as to include the additional claim and relief sought for. This has been opposed by the respondents by filing a counter-affidavit contending among other things that the claims made involve even addition of a new party to the suit, that the amendment if allowed, the issues in the appeal cannot be adjudicated on the evidence already on record and the object of the proposed amendments was only to get over the hurdle in successfully dislodging the judgment and decree of the trial court. The learned Judge in the court below has considered the respective contentions and claims of parties and after adverting to some of the decisions relied upon by both the learned counsel appearing on either side, has chosen to reject the application on the ground that the amendments sought for, if allowed will introduce a new cause of action which would prejudice the other side and it would amount to permitting a totally inconsistent plea at the state of appeal. Aggrieved, the above revision petition has been filed. 2. Mr.Ananthakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vehimently contended that the appeal being a continuation of the suit, the court below ought to have allowed the application for amendment and the rejection of the same amounts to failure to exercise jurisdiction vested with the-court. The learned counsel in order to justify the claim that the amendments of the nature can be allowed even at the appellate stage relied upon some of the judicial pronouncements. In Nair Service Society Limited v. K.G.Alexander, A.I.R. 1968S.C. 1165:1968 K.LT. The learned counsel in order to justify the claim that the amendments of the nature can be allowed even at the appellate stage relied upon some of the judicial pronouncements. In Nair Service Society Limited v. K.G.Alexander, A.I.R. 1968S.C. 1165:1968 K.LT. 182:1968 Ker.L.J. 175:1968 S.C.D. 500, which is a decision rendered by the Apex Court, it was held as hereunder: “Now it is a fixed principle of law that a suit must be tried on the original cause of action and this principle governs not only the trial of suits but also appeals. Indeed the appeal being a continuation of the suit, new pleas are not considered. If circumstances change they can form the subject of some other proceedings but need not ordinarily be considered in the appeal. To this proposition there are a few exceptions. Sometimes it happens that the original relief claimed becomes inappropriate, or the law changes affecting the rights of the parties. In such cases courts may allow an amendment pleading changed circumstances. Sometimes also the changed circumstances shorten litigation and then to avoid circuits of action the courts allow an amendment. The practice of the courts is very adequately summarised in Ram Ratan Sahu v. MohantSahu, (1907) 6 Cal. L.J. 74, Mookerjee and Holmwood, JJ., have given the kind of changed circumstances which the courts usually take notice, with illustrations from decided cases. The judgment in that case has been consistently followed in India. In Richaran Nandal v. Biswariath Mandal A.I.R. 1915 Cal. 103, other cases are to be found in which subsequent events were noticed. The same view was taken by the Federal Court in Lachmeshwar Prasad v. Keshwar Lal, 1940 F.C.R. 84at87:A.I.R. 1941 F.C. 5at 6 following the dictum of Hughes, C.J. in Patterson v. State of Alabama, (1934) 294 U.S. 600 at 607. In Surinder Kumar v. Gian Chand, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 875:1958S.C.R. 548, this Court also took subsequent events into account and approved of the case of the Federal Court. In Surinder Kumar v. Gian Chand, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 875:1958S.C.R. 548, this Court also took subsequent events into account and approved of the case of the Federal Court. In view of these decisions it is hardly necessary to cite further authorities.” That was a case wherein the amendment sought for was to justify the claim of relief already made on the basis of fresh Kuthakapattem and the objection that was taken for the amendment being allowed was laches and delay on the part of the party concerned, seeking amendment, It is in that context, the learned Judges of the Apex Court made the observations as referred to supra and also held that as it was not one of those cases in which there was likelihood of prolonged litigation after remand or in which a new case would begin, appellant was allowed to effect amendment so as to show to the court that in addition to possession it had title and that this will enable the court to do complete justice, if the plea is found good, without the parties having to go to another trial. 3. The decision in Begusarai Municipality v. Ram Baran Singh, A.I.R. 1973 Pat. 194, is that of a learned single Judge of Patna High Court, wherein the claim for amendment of pleadings necessitated by subsequent change in circumstances even as the suit was pending before the trial court was the subject-matter in issue. In my view, this judgment of the learned Judge cannot be said to have laid down any extraordinary principles of law or not within the comprehension of courts in dealing with such a situation, apart from the fact that the same yardstick cannot be readily applied to a case of the nature for amendment at the appellate stage. The decision in P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Insurance, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1409: (1976)1 S.C.J. 393, is that of the Apex Court wherein the question involved was about the appellate forum taking into account subsequent events in deciding the grant or refusal of the relief in a mater arising under the Rent Control proceedings. There is no issue as to the scope of amendment of pleadings and the principles as to whether any amendment sought for can be allowed at the appellate stage and under what circumstances. The decision in Ayesha Khatoon v. Durga Sahaya, A.I.R. 1977 Cal. There is no issue as to the scope of amendment of pleadings and the principles as to whether any amendment sought for can be allowed at the appellate stage and under what circumstances. The decision in Ayesha Khatoon v. Durga Sahaya, A.I.R. 1977 Cal. 108, is that of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, wherein the claim for amendment was sought to be made at the stage of appeal when the matter was pending before the appellate court. The suit for ejectment was filed in that case on the ground of forfeiture of lease for non-payment of rent. The suit was dismissed and during the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff wanted to have an amendment of the plaint to enable the appellate court to take notice of the subsequent event, in that the lease which was a contractual one for a stipulated term came to an end and on account of such expiry of lease by efflux of time, the claim for recovery of possession in an ejectment suit can also be sustained. The fact situation therein was one over which there could not have been any controversy, unlike the case on hand. 4. As noticed by the court below and as objected to by the respondents, the very cause of action for the amendment was some occurrence which was alleged to have occurred subsequent to the dismissal of the suit and during the pendency of the appeal. The facts in support of the amendment also are not matters on record, but are disputed and controvertial questions of fact seeking for a totally different relief. The suit also originally filed was not for any declaratory relief and consequential injunction so that it could be said that what was sought for by amendment was only an alternative mode of relief or amended form relief on account of subsequent developments. The amendment, if allowed would in my view render the appeal incapable of being adjudicated on the evidence on record without any fresh trial on the controvertial and conflicting claims introduced at the appellate stage. The amendments sought to be introduced are not such as would merely go to help the court to do effective justice. On the other hand it would expose the proceedings to the trial of a new cause of action, which cannot be afforded to be undertaken without a fresh trial on the said issue. The amendments sought to be introduced are not such as would merely go to help the court to do effective justice. On the other hand it would expose the proceedings to the trial of a new cause of action, which cannot be afforded to be undertaken without a fresh trial on the said issue. 5.I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel in the light of the above aspects with particular reference to the nature of the amendments sought for in this case. There cannot be any hard and fast rule in the matter of allowing amendments at the appellate stage. Though that appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings, there will be no justification to allow any amendment unmindful of the fact that the claims sought to be introduced by such amendments cannot be adjudicated without a fresh trial on the issue or claim made or without letting in fresh evidence and without minding about the prejudice that may be caused to other parties. As noticed earlier, the cause of action that is sought to be introduced is a new one and cannot be adjudicated without trial on the said claim. The amendments by introducing the facts proposed to be stated in paragraph 7(a) of the plaint, an alteration in the valuation as also the fact that pertains to a totally different and altogether subsequent cause of action, in my view are facts which would reasonably weigh with any court to desist from allowing the application for amendment at the appellate stage. In a sense, the amendments in this case themselves appear to be merely a ruse to avoid the judgment and decree of the trial court by means other than a real disposal of the appeal on merits and secure an automatic remand of the appeal on that pretext. 6. For all the reasons stated above, the courts is of the view that the court below cannot be said to have committed any patent error of law or perversity of approach in rejecting the application for amendment as inappropriate or impermissible at this stage. The revision, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. Consequently, C.M.P. No.3261 of 1996 is also dismissed.