JUDGMENT T.S. Doabia, J. 1. The present appellant who also figured as a plaintiff is dis-satisfied with the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below. He has come up in this second appeal. Both the courts below have gone against the appellant, though they have recorded different reasonings for dismissing the suit of the plaintiff. The brief facts for the purposes of this appeal be noticed as under :- The appellant is seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell. This is dated 6th of January. 1973. This is with respect to a residential house. It is situated in ward No. 16. Old Shivpuri. It was initially owned by defendant No. 1, namely, Shamsher Khan. According to the plaintiff, and which fact is not in dispute, he was inducted as a tenant in the suit house on 8th of February 1972. A rent-note is also said to have been executed on 10th of May, 1972. It is pleaded that on 6th of January. 1973 the defendant No. 1 entered into an agreement to sell, the suit house in favour of the appellant. The total consideration was fixed at Rs. 4,000/-. It is stated that he sold the house to defendant No. 2 on 4th of June, 1973. This sale-deed has been placed on the record as Ex. D/2. The plaintiff having come to know about this sale-deed served notices on the defendants. He insisted on the specific performance of the agreement dated 6th of January, 1973. As there was failure to comply with the notice the suit out of which this appeal has arisen was filed. 2. The stand taken by the defendants/respondents be noticed : The defendant No. 1 completely denied that he ever executed any agreement in favour of the appellant. The defendant No. 2 pleaded that he was a bonafide purchaser for value without notice. 3. The questions which were raised before the Courts below were : (i) Whether an agreement was in fact executed, in favour of the plaintiff. (ii) Whether the agreement (Ex. P/1) was in fact executed in favour of the appellant and whether the defendant No. 1. had received earnest money amounting to Rs. 1800/- ? (iii) Whether the defendant No. 2 was bonafide puchaser for value and had no notice of agreement Ex. P/1 ? 4. (ii) Whether the agreement (Ex. P/1) was in fact executed in favour of the appellant and whether the defendant No. 1. had received earnest money amounting to Rs. 1800/- ? (iii) Whether the defendant No. 2 was bonafide puchaser for value and had no notice of agreement Ex. P/1 ? 4. With regard to the first question, the trial court came to the conclusion that agreement Ex, P/1 was executed by the defendant-respondent No. 1 Shamsher Khan. It was concluded that it was signed by the defendant/respondent Shamsher Khan. A finding to this effect stands recorded in para no. 8 of the judgment of the trial Court,, The trial Court however, recorded a finding that the defendant No. 2 was a bonafide purchaser for value. It accordingly, dismissed the suit. II however, directed that the defendant No. I would return the earnest money received by him. 5. The matter was taken-up in appeal before the first appellate Court. The first appellate Court has agreed with the conclusions arrived at by the first appellate Court with regard to the due execution of agreement Ex. P/1. It concluded that the finding so recorded by the trial Court calls for no interference. The first appellate Court however, was of the view that the finding recorded on issue No. 2 dealing with the plea taken by the defendant no, 2 that he was bonafide purchaser for value has been incorrectly recorded and as such the finding recorded by the trial Court in this regard was reversed. Thus, the first appellate Court came 10 the conclusion that the defendant No. 2 was not a bonafide purchaser for value. It, however, dismissed the suit on the ground that the appellant was not ready and willing to execute the agreement in question and the pleas taken by him did not satisfy the test of section 16 of the Specific Relief Act. This is how the present second appeal has come to be filed. 6.The defendant No. 2 has supported the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court and the finding recorded that the plaintiff/appellant had failed to plead and prove the ingredients contained in section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act. It has also been argued that the finding recorded that the defendant No, 2 was not a bonafide purchaser for value has been erroneously recorded by the Court below. It has also been argued that the finding recorded that the defendant No, 2 was not a bonafide purchaser for value has been erroneously recorded by the Court below. Even, the finding with regard to due execution of agreement Ex. P/1 is being challenged. It is stated that defendant No. 2 had preferred corss-objections before the first appellate Court and these have not been given due consideration. With regard to agreement Ex. P/1, it is stated that this agreement was recorded on a paper which was of old origin. The stamp paper is said to have been purchased longway back and it was meant for a different purpose. Ex. P/1 is said to be a document of doubtful origin. The fact that minute details have been given in the agreement Ex. P/1 and these tally with the description of the property given in Ex. P/2 has been highlighted with a view to indicate that the plaintiff was aware of the sale-deed Ex. D/2, and that he copied the same. It has also been argued that once discretion has been exercised by the courts below in not giving effect to the agreement to sell then interference in second appeal should not be made. It is also highlighted that the fact that a period of two decades has been elapsed, should be taken note of. 7. I have considered the matter. I am of the view that the finding recorded by the Courts below with regard to due execution of agreement Ex. P/1 calls for no interference. The scope of further re-appreciation in second appeal of the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court which have been affirmed by the first appellate Court holds that signatures of Shamsher Khan were there on Ex. P/1 is not there. As such, this finding of the Courts below is affirmed. 8. The argument that Ex. P/1 contains all those details which are given in Ex. D/2 and this should be rejected, cannot be accepted. The facts that agreement Ex. P/1 came into existence on nth of January, 1973 and the fact that Ex. D/2 came into existence on 4th of June. 1973, have to be given due consideration. It is possible that the details given in Ex. P/2 were the same as those were given in Ex. D/2. The facts that agreement Ex. P/1 came into existence on nth of January, 1973 and the fact that Ex. D/2 came into existence on 4th of June. 1973, have to be given due consideration. It is possible that the details given in Ex. P/2 were the same as those were given in Ex. D/2. The argument raised cannot be accepted because it can be used against the defendant No. 2 also. As such, the finding in this respect calls for no interference. 9. The question as to whether the defendant/respondent No. 2 was a bonafide purchaser or not he now dealt with. It was for the defendant No. 2 to prove that he had no notice of the agreement in question. Reliance has been rightly placed on the decision given by this Court in Antpanthi's case reported as 1963 J.L.J 363. The defendant/respondent No. 1, in his statement, had stated in categorical terms that the date on which Ex. P/1 was executed the defendant No. 2 acquired the knowledge about the same. Defendant No. 2 resides in a neighbouring house. No challenge was made by the defendant/respondent No. 2 to the assertion made by the appellant. As such the finding recorded by the first appellate Court that the defendant No. 2 had the knowledge about the agreement Ex. P/1 culls for no interference and the same is affirmed. 10. The provisions of section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act be now examined. 11. It is necessary for the plaintiff to aver and prove that he has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which were to be performed by them. Before examining the legal position, the pleadings in this regard be noticed. Paragraph No. 7 of the plaintiff as it originally stood contained a recital to the effect that the plaintiff had given a notice on 9th of June, 1973 to the defendant no. 1. It is staled that that the defendant No. 2 was asked to accept the balance amount of the sale consideration, that is, Rs. 2.200/- This notice was given on 13th of June, 1973. Thus, requisite averment that the plaintiff was ready and willing to pay the balance amount of the sale consideration was duly pleaded in the suit as originally filed. This was filed on 4th of January, 1974. This paragraph no. 2.200/- This notice was given on 13th of June, 1973. Thus, requisite averment that the plaintiff was ready and willing to pay the balance amount of the sale consideration was duly pleaded in the suit as originally filed. This was filed on 4th of January, 1974. This paragraph no. 7 was amended on 28th of August, 1974 and by way of amendment, it was duly incorporated that the plaintiff is ready and willing to get the sale-deed executed. It was also pleaded that he had the requisite funds for paying not only the sale consideration but also for paying stamp duly and registration charges. This amendment was incorporated within the stipulated period of limitation. However, the Courts below came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled only to the equitable relief of refund of earnest money. I am of the view that this aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the Courts below. 12. In : Rai Rani Bhasin Vs. S. Kartar Singh AIR 1975 Delhi 137, the observations made by a Division Bench are relevant and these be noticed : A distinction may he drawn between the readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract. This includes his financial ability to pay the purchase price. Again, the Supreme Court of India in Ouseph Varghese v. Joseph Alley, 1969 (2) SCC 539 observed that a suit for specific performance has to conform to the requirements prescribed in Forms 47 and 48 of the First Schedule in the Civil Procedure Code. In a suit for specific performance it is incumbent on the plaintiff not only to set out the agreement on the basis of which he sues in all its details he must go further and plead that he has applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agreement pleaded by him but the defendant has not done so. It has further been held that he must also plead that he has been and is still ready and willing to specifically perform his part of the agreement. It is prescribed in Form 48 that the plaintiff is to plead that he tendered the money to the defendant on a particular date and demanded transfer of the property by a sufficient instrument. 13. It is prescribed in Form 48 that the plaintiff is to plead that he tendered the money to the defendant on a particular date and demanded transfer of the property by a sufficient instrument. 13. The same view was expressed by the Karnataka High Court in Gurupadayya Shivayya Hiremath v. Shivappa Basappa Gurammanavar. AIR 1978 Kar 98 . While interpreting section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act it was held: This sub-section makes it obligatory for the plaintiff to aver in his plaint and also to prove that he has performed or has always been ready to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him. The plaint however, need not be followed by the actual deposit when a contract involves such payment, but there must be proper averments in the plaint regarding the plaintiffs willingness to perform his part of the contract followed by the evidence to prove it. In others words, his conduct should not be anything other than his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. 14. Coming to the facts of the present case, I am of the view that the requisite pleading that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract was there in the plaint. Whatever was missing was added by way of amendment. Even though the plea originally taken was sufficient for recording a finding in favour of the plaintiff, yet he elaborated his plea by resorting to Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In this regard, the statement of the plaintiff Amir Khan (P.W. 1) be taken note of. In paragraph no. 3 of the statement, he has staled that he had in his possession a sum of Rs. 2, 200/- and was always ready and willing to pay the same to defendant No. 1. He has stated that he had given a notice in this regard to the defendant No. 1 also. As such, I am of the view that the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of agreement to sell Ex. P/1 the verdict to the contrary cannot be sustained. Besides, the defendants had not corss-examined the plaintiff on this aspect of the matter. As a mutter of fact the Courts below recognised the fact that agreement Ex. P/1 was duly executed. P/1 the verdict to the contrary cannot be sustained. Besides, the defendants had not corss-examined the plaintiff on this aspect of the matter. As a mutter of fact the Courts below recognised the fact that agreement Ex. P/1 was duly executed. Readiness and willingness cannot be treated as a rigid formula. This has to be determined by taking into consideration on the entirely of the facts. In the present case, as indicated above, the plaintiff/appellant had given a notice soon after Ex. D/1 was executed. In this notice, he expressed his readiness and willingness to perform the contract. This was followed by a suit. The agreement Ex. D/2 was executed on 4th of June, 1973. The suit was filed almost within a span of seven months. This factor cannot be ignored and it shows that there was no remisness on the part of the plaintiff. Nobody doubted the financial capacity of the plaintiff to pay the balance amount of Rs. 2,200/-. 15. In the view which I have taken above. I am duly fortified by what was observed by the Supreme Court in the case reported as: Smt. Indira Kaur & Ors. v. Sheo lal Kapur AIR 1988 SC 1074 . The fact that defendants had failed to cross-examine the plaintiff with regard to his statement dealing with readiness and willingness to perform the contract cannot be ignored. 16. It is settled law that specific performance of a contract is to be granted normally. For this, reliance is being placed on a decision given by the Supreme Court in the case reported as: Parkash Chandra v. Augad Lal, AIR 1979 SC 1241 . In this case, it was observed : The ordinary rule is that specific performance should be granted. It ought to be denied only when equitable consideration point to its refusal and the circumstances show that damage would constitute an adequate relief. In the present case, the conduct oil the appellate is not such as would disentitle him to the relief of specific performance. He has acted fairly. He wanted to convert his status from tenant to owner. Immediately after sale deed was executed with defendant no. 2 a notice was issued by him and a suit was promptly filed. Nothing has come into existence which could point out that the appellant has disentitled himself to the relief of Specific performance. He has acted fairly. He wanted to convert his status from tenant to owner. Immediately after sale deed was executed with defendant no. 2 a notice was issued by him and a suit was promptly filed. Nothing has come into existence which could point out that the appellant has disentitled himself to the relief of Specific performance. Thus, I am of the view : (i) that the plaintiff/appellant was always ready and willing to perform his pan of contract. This is borne out from the following facts : (a) that he had issued a notice soon after Ex. D/2 was executed. This was executed on 4th of June 1973. The notice was sent on 13.0.1973. (b) the plea was taken and the suit was filed in the month of January. 1974. (c) the plea was also taken with regard to his readiness and willingness to perform the part of his contract. This plea was further elaborated by way of amendment in the plaint, within the prescribed period of limitation. (ii) that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance and the relief given to him for the refund of his earnest money would not meet the ends of justice. 17. Accordingly, the plaintiff/appellant's appeal is allowed. It is held that he is entitled to specific perfornance of the agreement to sell, i.e. Ex. P/1. He would also be entitled to the costs of this appeal as also the costs incurred by him in the Courts below. The defendant No. 1 would execute the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff within a period of three months, failing which, the plaintiff would he entitled to get the same executed through the Court. The defendant No. 2 would be entitled to refund of the sale consideration paid by him. A decree be drawn-up accordingly.