JUDGMENT This writ application has been filed by All Bengal Legal Husking Mill Owners' Association against the alleged issuance of some illegal licences in violation of the guidelines issued by the respondents. and also prayed for a Mandamus commanding the respondents concerned to act in accordance with. law and to grant or permit licence for husking mills in favour of the new applicants strictly following the guidelines and after complying with the provisions of the law. A prayer for an interim order was also made for grant of interim order of injunction restraining the respondents from granting any permit or licence in favour of any new applicant ignoring the guidelines made out in this behalf. 2. Admittedly, the writ application has been filed by an association of husking mill owners. It appears that the said association is not even registered under the Societies Registration Act, and it is unregistered and unincorporated society. 3. In order to get relief in writ jurisdiction, the first question is whether the petitioner can approach the Court for intervention in the matter. It is not the law that it is open to any citizen to file writ application for invoking public law remedies or sue for a prohibitory or restrained order. The issue of whether an applicant has sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates close to the Writ Court's jurisdiction to entertain the application for judicial review. The requirements as to locus standi can differ depending upon the procedure adopted in initial proceedings. In India, apart from individual standing, statutory standing and representative action or standing there is another type of litigation which is known as public interest litigation. The object of the public interest litigation is to invoke the jurisdiction of the Writ Court for the benefit of large number of poor and distressed people who are under the veil of ignorance in respect of their rights, privileges, duties and obligations under the law. In such a case, any public spirited person can invoke the jurisdiction. 4. The particular problems to do with a standing may arise in cage where the applicant is the representative body. The first difficulty concerns the capacity of the body to commence legal proceedings. This is distinct from the issue of standing. In such a case, any public spirited person can invoke the jurisdiction. 4. The particular problems to do with a standing may arise in cage where the applicant is the representative body. The first difficulty concerns the capacity of the body to commence legal proceedings. This is distinct from the issue of standing. Or, in other words, it has to be examined at the threshold whether the representative body was authorised and competent to move the Court in this behalf. If the competency is established, in that event the next question would arise whether it is locus standi to move a writ application. The question of capacity or competency of such a body to move a writ application is clearly distinct from the issue of standing. 5. In (1) R. v. Darlington B.C., ex p Association of Darlington Taxi Owners, The Times, January 21, 1994. 1994 COD 424; and (2) R. v. Tower Hamlets L.B.C., ex p. Tower Hamlets Combined Traders Association, 1994 COD 325, it was held that an unincorporated association has no legal personality and so could not apply for judicial review in its own name even if each member of such association had standing to apply personally. Even assuming that it is not an unincorporated but a registered body, in that event it has to be established that such a body is competent by virtue of its Constitution to file a writ application to espouse the cause of the members. 6. In (3) R. v. Secretary of State for Environment, ex p. Rose Theatre reported in (1990) 1 QB 504, considered the competency of a group of applicants who were seeking to establish the standing. In this case, a body of individuals who because they were interested in preserving a site of historical theatrical remains from development, formed a company to challenge the failure of the minister to prevent the development. The company failed in its application on the merits, but the Court carefully considered the question of standing before coming to the conclusion the company did not have standing. In this case, two principles were considered and found applicable. Those are :– “(i) The fact that some thousands of people join together and assert that they have an interest does not create an interest if the individuals did not have an interest. In this case, two principles were considered and found applicable. Those are :– “(i) The fact that some thousands of people join together and assert that they have an interest does not create an interest if the individuals did not have an interest. (ii) The fact that those without an interest incorporate themselves and give the company in its memorandum power to pursue a particular object does not give the company an interest.” 7. It is not a case where the petitioners are espousing the cause of the people who are directly affected by administrative action, who are, for reasons of poverty, ignorance or lack of incentive incapable of bringing proceedings. There are other situations where if a public interest body or pressure group are not in a position to bring proceedings, nobody would be in a position to do so as no individual is affected to a greater extent and any other individual, in such situations an appropriate body or if necessary an appropriate individual should be regarded by the Court having the necessary standing. 8. The question of standing of unincorporated bodies was considered by me in (4) Sand Carrier's Owners' Union v. Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta reported in AIR 1990 Cal 176 , where it was Inter alia held that unincorporated associations are not legal persons and as such, writ petitions are not maintainable at their instance. As association could be formed to protect the interest of consumers, tenants or other groups with the common interest but such group cannot move writ application. No aspect of the representative law has been changing more rapidly than the law governing standing and the standing barrier has been substantially lowered in recent years, but on the basis of the law relating to standing as in England or in America as also in India, it can be held without any difficulty that the writ petition at the instance of an association is not maintainable where the association itself is not affected by any order. The member of such association may be affected by common order and may have common grievance, but for the purpose of enforcing the rights of the members, writ petition at the instance of such association is not maintainable. The member of such association may be affected by common order and may have common grievance, but for the purpose of enforcing the rights of the members, writ petition at the instance of such association is not maintainable. The door of the writ Court could be made open at the Instance of persons or authorities under the aforesaid four categories and to hold that every Tom, Dick and Harry can move the writ application would render the standing requirement meaningless and would introduce a procedure which is not judicially recognised. 9. Where certain associations claiming to be the association of truck owners and lorry owners filed the writ application against the enhancement of dock permit fee in respect of the vehicles operating inside the dock area the same was not maintainable when no right was conferred on them by any law. By the enhancement the individual truck owners or lorry owners might be affected. In law the association is a different juristic person than that of the individual owner. 10. In the instant case, there is another bar to entertain the writ application inasmuch as the petitioner is an association of legal husking mill owners and they have filed a writ application challenging the validity of the grant of licence to some other persons and want to restrain the hands of the respondents for issuing any further licence without observing the provisions of law. In this case, the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of (5) J.M. Desai v. Roshan Kumar reported in AIR 1976 SC 578 , is fully applicable. 11. In this case, it was held that in order to have locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner should be an aggrieved person. The expression ‘aggrieved person’ denotes an elastic, and, to an extent, an elusive concept. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. 12. It was further held in this case that the rival in the trade has no right to move the writ jurisdiction. 12. It was further held in this case that the rival in the trade has no right to move the writ jurisdiction. In this case, the proprietor of a cinema theatre holding a licence for exhibiting cinematograph films have no legal right under the statutory provisions or under the general law which can be said to have been subjected to or threatened with injury as a result of the grant of ‘no objection certificate’ to the rival trader. 13. The Supreme Court in this case observed that if intervention by the Court is made at the instance of the rival trader, in that event the exercise of these discretionary powers in his favour will on balance be against the public policy. It will eliminate healthy competition in this business which is so essential to raise commercial morality it will tend to perpetuate the appellant's monopoly of cinema business in the town; and above all, it will in effect, seriously injure the fundamental rights of respondents, which they have under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution, to carryon trade or business subject to “reasonable restrictions Imposed by law.” 14. In this case, the Supreme Court clearly observed that the appellant therein had not been denied or deprived of any legal right and that the appellant had not sustained any injury to any legally protected interest. Reference was also made by the Supreme Court in this case. An earlier decision of the Supreme Court in (6) Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. N.T. Gowda reported in AIR 1971 SC 246 , wherein it was held that a rice mill-owner has no locus standi to challenge under Article 226, the setting up of a new rice-mill by another-even if such setting up be in contravention of Section 8(3)(c) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958-because no right vested in such an applicant is infringed. 15. The writ application filed by the petitioner comes clearly within the scope and ambit of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nagar Rice and Flour Mill’s case (supra). 16. Accordingly, in this case, firstly, the capacity of the association did not authorise such association to commence regular proceedings and secondly, the petitioner has no locus standi to invoke the jurisdiction of this under Article 226 of the Constitution. 16. Accordingly, in this case, firstly, the capacity of the association did not authorise such association to commence regular proceedings and secondly, the petitioner has no locus standi to invoke the jurisdiction of this under Article 226 of the Constitution. Accordingly, on these preliminary grounds the writ petition is dismissed without prejudice to the rights of the Individual members, if any, to challenge the decision in accordance with law.