JUDGMENT - V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.:---In this Revision Application, an order rejecting an application under section 9-A of the Civil Procedure Code is assailed. 2. A suit has been filed by the plaintiff whereby the plaintiff challenged his termination vide order dated 23-9-1994. He prayed for a relief of a declaration that the termination order is illegal, null and void and also claimed a direction to reinstate the plaintiff at his former post with continuity of service and full back wages issuing the mandatory injunction. The defendants filed an application Exhibit 19 objecting to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. They prayed that the issue of jurisdiction should be decided as a preliminary issue under section 9-A of the Civil Procedure Code. They pointed out in their application that the plaintiff had filed the suit demanding the reliefs under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and in the whole plaint, he had relied on these provisions and based his claim on the same. It was further averred that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the plaintiff's suit for the relief of reinstatement and payment of back wages and, therefore, the same is not tenable before the Civil Court. The trial Court has rejected the application by its marathon order, which is under challenge before this Court. 3. Shri Modak, the learned Counsel for the applicants has averred that the trial Court has more or less proceeded on the ground that the plaintiff, who was working as a Development Officer, was not ever a workman. He points out that the trial Court has completely misunderstood the scope of the plaint and has failed to notice that this was a case where the relief claimed was on the basis of the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Industrial Disputes Act. Shri Modak has taken me through the plaint extensively and pointed out from the contents of paragraphs 10, 11, 13 and 14 that the termination order is assailed on the basis of sections 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act as also Rule 81 of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Rules. Shri Modak, therefore, contends that since the very basis of he complaint is the rights under the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy would be under that Act and not by a civil suit. Shri Modak, therefore, contends that since the very basis of he complaint is the rights under the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy would be under that Act and not by a civil suit. He submits that for this reason, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be ousted and it would have been necessary to first decide the issue regarding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 4. In spite of the notice, there is no appearance by the other side. However, Shri Modak extremely fairly assisted the Court in understanding the possible contentions of the other side. The Court appreciates his efforts. 5. After going through the order of the trial Court as it is, it must first be observed that the order contains number of unnecessary facts. In an order over the application under section 9-A of the Civil Procedure Code, there was no necessity whatsoever for the learned Judge to write about everything that happened while the civil suit was conducted. It is seen that in the first three paragraphs, the learned Judge has given the whole gist of the plaint. Thereafter from paragraph 4 onwards right upto paragraph 7, everything that was stated was unnecessary. Even thereafter while the Court was considering the issue regarding the jurisdiction, practically the whole contents of paragraph 9 are unnecessary. The Court should have been mindful of the relevant and the irrelevant material and should have been careful and instead of writing such a huge order as this, the whole controversy could have been decided in a short manner. Be that as it may, the trial Court has held in paragraph 12 that in its opinion, the Development Officer was not deemed to be a workman and if at all he is deemed to be a workman, it is a matter of evidence and cannot be looked into at this interlocutory stage while deciding the point of jurisdiction. It seems that the trial Court has relied upon some decisions and has deduced that since the civil rights were involved in the suit, the Court has jurisdiction to try the same. Shri Modak heavily relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2238 (Premier Automobiles v. K.S. Wadke)1. It seems that the trial Court has relied upon some decisions and has deduced that since the civil rights were involved in the suit, the Court has jurisdiction to try the same. Shri Modak heavily relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2238 (Premier Automobiles v. K.S. Wadke)1. Relying on this judgment and more particularly the contents of paragraphs 9 and 23, Shri Modak submits that this was a case in which the claim was solely based on the rights arising out of the Industrial Disputes Act. It will be worthwhile to reproduce paragraph 23, which is as under : "To sum up, the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to an industrial dispute may be stated thus: (1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the Civil Court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either section 33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be." It will be seen that the Apex Court has very clearly held that if the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy. According to Shri Modak, the present is not the case where the liability or rights have their root in the general or common law. According to Shri Modak, the present is not the case where the liability or rights have their root in the general or common law. He contends that in fact the whole tenor of the plaint is such, which would show that in the plaint, the plaintiff has complained that his termination is in breach of sections 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act and Rules 20 and 81 of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Rules. The Court has gone through the plaint extensively. Now it is undoubtedly true that the plaint makes a specific reference to these complaints while the plaintiff challenges his termination. However that is not the only thing that the plaint contends. If we look particularly at paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10, it is clear that the plaintiff has also challenged his termination on the ground that the termination order is an outcome of malice and bias. In paragraph 8, he specifically submits that the Divisional Manager- the respondent No. 3, who has issued the termination order, did not have any authority to do so and it was only the Zonal Manager, who was the competent officer to terminate the Development Officer like him. In paragraph 9, he has alleged specific bias against respondent Nos. 3 and 4. Further in paragraph 10, he has quoted the Life Insurance Corporation Regulations and more importantly section 3-18.1(b) thereof to suggest that the termination is contrary to the Regulations. Even prior to this, in the plaint, the plaintiff has given a complete history of his own service and has specifically averred that he was a general secretary of the union and as such, there was a specific bias against him of the management in general and the defendants in particular. Therefore, it cannot be said that in the suit, the plaintiff tends to assert his rights only under the Industrial Disputes Act. Had that been so, Shri Modak would have been undoubtedly right to some extent that a preliminary issue regarding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court should have been ordered to be framed and tried. Unfortunately for him, such is not the situation. The order also refers to some other rights, which are strictly not in terms of the Industrial Jurisprudence and, therefore, are not triable by the Industrial Tribunal and are triable by the Civil Court as such. Unfortunately for him, such is not the situation. The order also refers to some other rights, which are strictly not in terms of the Industrial Jurisprudence and, therefore, are not triable by the Industrial Tribunal and are triable by the Civil Court as such. Shri Modak tried to get out of this situation by suggesting that here was a civil suit, which was for the purposes of enforcing the contract of service and as such the same would be outside the Civil Court's jurisdiction. I am afraid the suggestion is not acceptable and instead of expressing my opinion, it would be better if that point is contested and tried. I am following this course because particularly application Exhibit 5 is still pending for decision. If the stand regarding the Court's jurisdiction taken by the present applicants is thus not correct and if there are some other issues, which would still remain, then section 9-A application would not lie by deciding that application as also the preliminary issue as suggested by the defendants. In that view of the matter, the impugned order will have to be affirmed though not for the reasons given by the trial Court alone, but also because of the additional reasons given by this Court. The Revision Application has thus no substance and will have to be dismissed. Accordingly, the Revision Application is dismissed. However, since the non-applicant has not chosen to appear, there will be no order as to costs. The suit shall now proceed. Revision dismissed.