N. K. BHATCHARRYA, J. ( 1 ) THE present revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the Judgment and/or order dated 17th December, 1994 passed in Civil Revision No. 177 of 94 by the learned Additional District Judge, 8th court, Alipore, 24 Parganas (South) whereby the teamed Additional District Judge allowed the revision preferred by the defendants and set aside the order of the learned Additional Munsif, 1st court, Alipore dated 22nd April, 1994 passed in Title Suit No. 1 of 1993. ( 2 ) THE brief background of the case is that in a suit for eviction of the tenant Md. Khalil, by the plaintiffs on the ground of default, subletting nuisance and reasonable requirement. The death of the tenant, Md. Khalil, took place on 22nd June, 1975. Upon his death his legal heirs were substituted including defendant No. 7, Md. Habib in the trial court. The legal heirs of deceased Md. Khalil filed a written statement. Thereafter Md. Habib died on 16-3-82 and the plaintiffs filed an application for substitution of the legal heirs of Md. Habib under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC along with a petition for condonation of the delay under section 5 the Limitation Act as that petition for substitution was filed long after the period of limitation. ( 3 ) ON 28th July, 1986 defendant Abdul Wadood filed a petition before the learned Additional Munsif for passing an order of abatement of the suit. By another petition dated 18-9-86 the defendant also prayed for abating the suit against defendant No. 7 and the plaintiffs also filed a petition dated 30-9-86 praying for substitution along with the petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act. ( 4 ) THE said 3 applications were heard together and the petition of the plaintiffs dated 30-9-86 made under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC and their applications of the same date under section 5 of Limitation Act were allowed on contest. The petition of the defendant No. 7 Abdul Wadood dated 28-7-86 and 29-8-86 praying for abatement of the suit as a whole and for passing an order of abatement against defendant No. 7 were rejected. The petition of the defendant No. 7 Abdul Wadood dated 28-7-86 and 29-8-86 praying for abatement of the suit as a whole and for passing an order of abatement against defendant No. 7 were rejected. ( 5 ) THE said order was challenged in revision before this High Court in Civil Rule No. 1280 of 1987 by defendant Abdul Wadood and single Judge of this court allowed the revision after making the rule absolute. Liberty was given to the plaintiffs to make a proper application for setting aside the abatement and praying for substitution of the heirs Md. Habib. Liberty was also given to the parties to file affidavits and to produce sufficient document to prove their respective cases before the trial Court. ( 6 ) THE matter then went back to the trial court and the plaintiffs again filed an application under order 21 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil procedure supported by an affidavit praying for setting aside the order of abatement and also prayed for substitution. ( 7 ) THE learned trial Judge by his exparte order No. 208 dated 19-11-91 allowed the said two applications of the plaintiffs. ( 8 ) THEREAFTER the defendants filed 2 petitions dated 14-9-92 and 229-93 praying, later alia for vacating the order No. 208 dated 19-11-91 of the learned Munsif for setting aside the abatement and for substitution and also the defendants made a prayer by the petition dated 14-9-92 for passing an order or abatement of the suit By third petition dated 22nd September, 1993 the defendants prayed for vacating all orders passed subsequent to 23-6-93. ( 9 ) THE learned Munsif after hearing both the sides rejected those petitions of the defendants by his order No. 253 dated 22nd April, 1994, passed in Title Suit No. 1 of 1993. It will be opposite to mention here that originally the suit was registered as Title Suit No. 84 of 1986 in the court of 2nd Additional Munsif, Alipore but since re-numbered as Title Suit No. 1 of 1993 in the court of the learned Additional Munsif, 1st Court Alipore. It will be opposite to mention here that originally the suit was registered as Title Suit No. 84 of 1986 in the court of 2nd Additional Munsif, Alipore but since re-numbered as Title Suit No. 1 of 1993 in the court of the learned Additional Munsif, 1st Court Alipore. ( 10 ) BE that as it may, the said order No. 253 dated 22nd April, 1994 passed by the learned Additional Munsif, 1st court, Alipore in Title Suit No. 1 of 1993 was challenged in revision under section 115a before the court of the leaned Additional District Judge, 8th court, Alipore in Civil Revision No 177 of 1994 and the learned Additional District Judge found that the suit has abated as a whole and he, accordingly, set aside the order of the learned Additional Munsif by his order dated 17th December, 1994. ( 11 ) THE said order is the subject matter of revision before this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India at the instance of the plaintiffs. ( 12 ) IN the petition of revision a prayer has also been made for condonation of the delay of 28 days in fling the revisional application. The reason that has been given in the petition explaining the delay of 28 days is plausible, satisfactory and sufficient and I, accordingly, accept the same and condone the delay. ( 13 ) THE other moot point that arose before this court is whether the order of abating the suit as a whole passed in revision is revisible or appealable. ( 14 ) MR. Sudhis Dasgupta a Senior Advocate was appointed by this court as an Amicus Curie to assist the court on this point and Mr. Dasgupta by placing the decisions in this respect contended that it does not amount to a decree. Mr. Dasgupta placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Musst. Jolakha Khatoon v Sushil K. Mondal reported in 1979 (l) CLJ 153 wherein the Division Bench has opined that the order recording abatement, though results in a finality, yet such finality does not necessarily amount to a decree so as to bar a subsequent application for substitution after setting aside abatement under order 22 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that decision the fact was that during the pendency of a money suit, the principal respondent died and an application was made for substitution of 2 heirs and that application was made within time Thereafter, a supplementary application for substituting 7 heirs of the deceased respondent was filed beyond, the period of limitation. The learned District Judge treating both the applications as one allowed the prayer for substitution. On the application of the respondent petitioner the learned Additional District Judge recorded abatement of the appeal as a whole on the ground that the application for substitution of all the heirs of the deceased respondent was not filed within time. Thereafter the plaintiff-appellant opposite party filed an application under Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure for substitution after setting aside abatement along with an application for condonation of delay which was allowed by the learned Additional District Judge and the said order was challenged before the Division Bench of this court an the ground, inter alia, that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain any further application under Order 22 Rule 9 after having recorded earlier an order of abatement of the suit as a whole. So, this case is not an authority on the point whether an order of abatement of the suit as a whole passed in revision amounts to a decree or not. ( 15 ) MR. Dasgupta also referred to a decision of the apex court in the case of Smt. Ganga Bai v Vijay Kumar reported in AIR 1974 SC 1126 . ( 16 ) IN that decision the apex court dealt with the question of the difference regarding suit and appeal and found that unless a suit is barred by statute, one may, -at one's peril, bring a suit of one's choice. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no Statute bar, the suit. But the position in regard to appeals is quite the opposite. The right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law. That explain why the right of appeal is described as a creature of statute. ( 17 ) THIS case also is not an authority on the point as mentioned earlier. ( 18 ) MR. The right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law. That explain why the right of appeal is described as a creature of statute. ( 17 ) THIS case also is not an authority on the point as mentioned earlier. ( 18 ) MR. Dasgupta also placed reliance on another apex court decision in the case of Smt. Rajbir Kaur v M/s Chokosiri and Co. reported in AIR 1988 SC 1845 (Para 16 of the decision at page,1854 ). ( 19 ) IN paragraph 16 of that decision the Supreme Court observed that the scope of revisional jurisdiction depends on the language of the statute conferring the revisional jurisdiction. Revisional jurisdiction is only a part of the appellate jurisdiction and cannot be equated with that of a fullfledged appeal. Though the revisional power-depending upon the language of the provision-might be wider than revisional power under section 151 (or 1157) of the Code of Civil Procedure, yet a revisional court is not a second or first appeal. When the findings of fact recorded by the courts below are supportable on the evidence on record, the revisional court must, indeed, be reluctant to embark upon an independent reassesment of the evidence and to supplant a conclusion of its own, so long as the evidence on record admitted and supported the one reached by the courts below. ( 20 ) SO this also is not a decision pertaining to the question that has been raised in this case. ( 21 ) I have noted with appreciation the argument advanced by Mr. Dasgupta on this point in assisting the court to come to the aid of the court in coming to a proper decision in this matter. ( 22 ) THE senior counsel Mr. Bhaskar Bhattacharjee, on the other hand, contended that the order of abatement of the suit as a whole even passed in revision tantamounts to a decree and is appealable in support of his contention, he relied on a court decision in the case of Shankar Ramachandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya reported in AIR 1970 SC 1 . Bhaskar Bhattacharjee, on the other hand, contended that the order of abatement of the suit as a whole even passed in revision tantamounts to a decree and is appealable in support of his contention, he relied on a court decision in the case of Shankar Ramachandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya reported in AIR 1970 SC 1 . ( 23 ) THE Supreme Court in that decision observes that where, on its revisional jurisdiction being invoked against the order of the appellate court under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, the High Court dismisses the revision, after hearing both the parties, the order of the appellate court becomes merged with the order made in revision, and, thereafter, the appellate order cannot be challenged or attacked by another set of proceedings in the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. The principle of merger of orders of inferior courts would not become affected or inapplicable by making any distinction between a petition for revision and an appeal. The right of appeal is one of entering a superior court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of the court below. Two things which are required to constitute appellate jurisdiction am the existence of the relation of superior and inferior court and the power an the part of the former to review decisions of the latter. When the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side it is done because it is a superior court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the court below. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the statute, basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense. Further even on the assumption that the order of the appellate court had not merged in the order which disposed of the revisional petition, a writ petition ought not to be entertained, by the High Court when the petitioner had already choosen the remedy under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Further even on the assumption that the order of the appellate court had not merged in the order which disposed of the revisional petition, a writ petition ought not to be entertained, by the High Court when the petitioner had already choosen the remedy under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If there are two modes of invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court and one of those modes has been chosen and exhausted it would not be a proper and sound exercise of discretion to grant relief in the other set of proceedings in respect of the same order of the Subordinate Court. The refusal to grant relief in such circumstances would be in consonance with the anxiety of the court to prevent abuse of process as also to respect and accord finality to its own decisions. ( 24 ) BY the State amendment section 115a has been introduced in the Code of Civil Procedure and in sub-section (1) of section 115a it has been provided that - A District Court my exercise all or any of the powers which may he exercised by the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sub-section (2) of that section also provides that where - any proceeding by way of revision is commenced before a District Court in pursuance of the provisions of sub-section (l), the previsions of sections 115 shall, so far as may be, apply to such proceeding and references in the said section to the High Court shall be construed as references to the District Court. " ( 25 ) SO, section 1 15a of the Code of Civil Procedure for all intents and purpose invokes all the power of the High Court in a revision to a District Court. ( 26 ) THE apex court in the case of Shankar Ram Chandra (supra) and also in the case of Rajbir Kaur held that the revisional jurisdiction is only a part of the appellate Jurisdiction. So an order passed abating the suit a, a whole even in revision is in exercise of a part of the appellate jurisdiction and applying the principle as laid down in the case of Shankar Ram Chandra (supra) the order passed by the trial court merges with the revisional order and the remedy lies in-appeal not in revision to challenge that revisional order. ( 27 ) I, accordingly, is of the view that the present revision is not maintainable. Therefore, the revisional application stands rejected. ( 28 ) THERE will be no order as to costs. Application rejected